(Sally is having some challenges migrating to a new email system - JLRC)
From: sa...@ucr.edu
Date: October 6, 2011 1:48:42 AM EDT
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Cc: sally.n...@ucr.edu
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic”
Dear Jerry,
I'm having email trouble (again) in migrating to a new system, so apologies for
the
brief response.
First, I have to express thanks and relief that you gave the social sciences
question to
Gene.
Second (and seriously), I would pass the buck on the Wittgenstein question to
Michael J. DeLaurentis, if he is lurking out there, as his response to my post
indicated
plainly to me that he would have a much more interesting response to your
question
than I could come up with. Also, Gene and Gary F. would be far better
respondents
on this if they would be willing to do so.
However, since you asked me directly, my main association between Wittgenstein
and the quotes you presented would be to Wittgenstein's comments on aspect-
seeing in relation to Peirce's idea of prescinding. The ability to shift
perspectives in
relation to an (empirical) object and to discern various characters in
isolation from
one another that could not in actuality be dissociated from one another was a
topic
of interest to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was also interested in the
phenomenon of
intention, of course, as it related to thought and as it was and wasn't clearly
evidenced in language use. When Peirce speaks of what symbols are meant to
express in the final quote from Lowell Lecture IX, he sounds vaguely like one
of
Wittgenstein's interlocutory voices, setting up a plausible perspective, before
problematizing it in further elaboration.
I have found Peirce's systematicity (as evident in the triadic relations the
quotes in
the main present) to be a basic difference between Peirce's semiotic and the
writings
of the later Wittgenstein at least (I have no competence to discuss
Wittgenstein's
Tractatus and his other early writings, which may in some ways be understood to
show a greater similarity to Peirce's formal logic). Perhaps others can find a
relation
there, however. In my reading of the later work, however, Wittgenstein does
not
seem to be motivated, at base, by questions that I would call semeiotic in
orientation. Despite all of his work on the subject of language, he really
isn't
interested, at heart, in identifying exactly how it is that the signs of
language
accomplish their representational work, and he resists generalizing in this
regard,
which is just what Peirce is set on doing. Wittgenstein does wrestle with
semeiotic
processes, of course (on a regular basis even and often with great subtlety),
but it is
nearly always a means to other ends, a way to get at other philosophical
questions.
So, in high contrast to what JR has said about Peirce and how 90% of his work
is
dealing with semeiotics (I'm so sorry--one of the maddening things about my
current email situation is that I can't consult any other emails while I'm in
the process
of writing one, so I may well have paraphrased this inexactly), 90% of
Wittgenstein's
work is not like this, at least not with regard to its most fundamental,
guiding
interests.
I fear this is digressing way to far afield from the content of this
paper--apologies if
so.
Best,
Sally
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