[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Joe, list, Thank you! Those quotes are both apropos and interesting in other ways. Excessively brief samples: Peirce: "The point of contact is the living mind which is affected in a similar way by real things and by their signs. And this is the only possible point of contact." The mind alone recognizes sign and interpretant as corresponding to the real. Yet that mind's recognition of the signs' corresponding to the object is not the mind's sign for the object yet is the mind's _something_ regarding the object, something involving experience of the object. Maybe it's just that, experience, and experience is something "outside" semiosis, technically non-semiotic in that sense, and supporting semiosis by external pressure? (No, I don't think that, in case anybody is wondering :-)) and Peirce: "1. Truth belongs to signs, particularly, and to thoughts as signs. Truth is the agreement of a meaning with a reality. "2. The meaning -- to lekton -- is the respect in which signs which translate each other are conceived to agree. It is something independent of how the thing signified really is and depends only on what is conveyed to whoever interprets the sign rightly. " Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The interpretant is the sign's meaning. The meaning is the respect in which signs which translate each other are conceived to agree, and is independent of how the thing signified really is. BUT -- truth is the agreement of a meaning with a reality and _belongs to signs_. So signs have truth, soundness, legitimacy -- and it's not an non-semiotic issue; and it's not their meaning, value, etc., per se. It's a further relationship of meaning, a relationship to the real. Is truth a sign's being in 'real relation' to the object? Can an index -- when defined as a sign defined in particular cases by a real relation with its object -- be defined as sign defined in particular cases by its truth, its legitimacy, its deserving of recognition as true? This does seem a consequence of Peirce's view. I've said in other posts why I don't think that this works for the index as usually conceived -- the index's representation of some other object is just as mistakable as an icon's representation of another object. Then it isn't really an index, but only a deceptive one at best, OF that object. Likewise the icon, mistaken, isn't really an icon OF the supposed object. But then the supposed index isn't an index, while the icon is still an icon, at least of itself? But _the index is just as capable as the icon, just as capable of self-reference in the absence of any other object_. So it's still an index even if not an index of some given mistakenly supposed object. And the defining of the index by 'real relation' (and not by singularity and reaction) takes us decisively beyond the notion of an _actual_ or reactive relation and, I think, leaves us with the mathematical diagram fitting the definition of an index -- the geometric figure, the array of algebraic expressions and their behavior, etc., which need not look or feel like their objects at all and indeed are constructed in order to bridge, by confirmable agreeings, large divergences of appearance & feeling.) * * * I guessed almost right about "imputation" and "attribution." -- except that "attribution" is the 'genus' whereof 'imputation' is the species. I said that a symbol is defined by its effecting an imputation by the interpretant. But, as seems clearer to me now, that's just a detailing of "defined by its effect on the interpretant' unless we can substitute "attribution" for "imputation" and still come up with a general definition of symbols: What kind of sign is defined as that sign whereof the given case is defined by the _attribution_ to which it determines the interpretant? Can a blue icon be said to be a sign which, by presentment or approximation of a quality, determines the interpretant to attribute the quality to an object? I think that you could say it; if so, then "symbol" is not singled out by the phrase "defined by the attribution to which it determines the interpretant." But if that's the case, then it would not be enough to say that the symbol is the sign defined by its effect on the interpretant. Instead, one would need to say that the symbol is the sign defined by its interpretant-effect achieved without presentment or approximation of the quality or the reaction (or the representational relation?) which it represents the object as having. Actually, Peirce (if I recall aright) does occasionally specify an effect on the interpretant achieved other than by reaction with or resemblance to the object -- achieved by the interpretive habit "itself" rather than involving an interpretive habit arising in accordance with a reaction or a resemblance. I guess the thing is, that, once reaction or resemblance are involved, it's no longer necessary to go on mentioning the effect on the inter
[peirce-l] Re: MS 403 available at Arisbe
Joe, i think we all owe you a round of thanks for your transcription of
MS 403, especially those of us who are relative newcomers to the study
of Peirce. After several readings of the "New List" paper i still find
it a tough nut to crack, and this 1893 version makes it much more
accessible. In fact i would advise beginners in Peirce studies to try MS
403 (and 404) first and the 1867 paper later. Terminologically, the "New
List" paper seems to have a very hard crust, perhaps the result of its
conceptual content having been "in the oven" for three or four years
before reaching its published form -- guaranteeing that its language
would be transparent for its author, however opaque it may be for the
average reader. I think MS 403 shows Peirce making some progress toward
making his expression as "elementary" for the public as his categories
were already "elementary" in the logical sense.
Or maybe i'm reading my own progress as a reader into it ... i'd like to
hear a real beginner's testimony as to which version makes more
immediate sense. (I wonder if it would work better to put the sections
from 1867 after the 1893 versions of each section?)
The new footnotes also reveal some unexpected implications and
connections (unexpected by me, anyway). -- As for MS 339D.663f, i'm
still struggling with that one.
gary
}Drawing nearer to take our slant at it (since after all it has met with
misfortune while all underground), let us see all there may remain to be
seen. [Finnegans Wake 113]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
---
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[peirce-l] Re: Fw: Programa II Jornadas "Peirce en Argentina"
More information about the "II Jornadas Peirce en Argentina" in http://www.unav.es/gep/Argentina.html Claudio Guerri - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 3:44 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Fw: Programa II Jornadas "Peirce en Argentina" This was forwarded to me by Alfredo Horoch, one of the participants in the conference in Argentina which is described below. It is gratifying to see how many scholars are involved and how widely they are dispersed throughout Central and South America now, though I can only guess at the location of a good many of them. Perhaps a later version of the program will indicate the institutional affiliations more explicitly. (The acronyms used are not informative to me.) Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 1:08 PM Subject: Programa II Jornadas "Peirce en Argentina" II Jornadas Peirce en Argentina 7 y 8 de septiembre de 2006 ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE CIENCIAS DE BUENOS AIRES Av. Alvear 1771 3er. Piso (PROGRAMA PROVISIONAL) 7 de Septiembre de 2006 14:00 Recepci¨n-Acreditaci¨n 14:20 Apertura: Palabras de la Lic. Catalina Hynes, Coordinadora GEP Argentina. 14:25 Conferencia Inaugural: Dr. Roberto Walton (Centro de Estudios Filos¨ficos "Eugenio Pucciarelli"): "Peirce y la fenomenolog¨a". Presentaci¨n a cargo del Dr. Jaime Nubiola (Universidad de Navarra). Trabajo en comisiones: Sal¨n de Actos: Mesa panel sobre verdad y error Coordinadora: Evelyn Vargas 15:30 ANDR¨S HEBRARD (UNLP), FEDERICO L¨PEZ (UNLP-CIC): "Razones para la convergencia: realidad, comunidad y m¨todo experimental" 16:00 EVELYN VARGAS (UNLP- CONICET) "La inferencia como s¨mbolo" 16:30 CRISTINA DI GREGORI (UNLP- CONICET), CECILIA DURAN (UNLP) "John Dewey: acerca del pragmatismo de Peirce" 17:00 MARIA AURELIA DI BERNARDINO (UNLP) "Máxima Pragmática y abducci¨n" Sala CEF: Coordinador: Roberto Marafiotti 15:30 ROBERTO FAJARDO (Univ. de Panamá) "Hacia una l¨gica de lo indeterminado; creaci¨n art¨stica y semiosis" 16:00 CLAUDIO CORT¨S L¨PEZ (Univ. Finis Terrae - Chile) "Semi¨tica y est¨tica de la pintura: una aproximaci¨n desde la teor¨a Peirce-Bense" 16:30 IVONNE ALVAREZ TAMAYO ( Univ. Pop. Aut. del Estado de Puebla) "Abducci¨n y fenomenolog¨a de Peirce aplicada en procesos de diseño visual y audiovisual" 17:00 LORENA STEINBERG (UBA) "La semi¨tica aplicada al análisis de las organizaciones" 17:30 Pausa caf¨ Trabajo en comisiones: Coordinador: Javier Legris Sal¨n de Actos: 17:45 EDGAR SANDOVAL (Univ. de Panamá) "Peirce y la semi¨tica de las afecciones" 18:15 DANIEL KAPOLKAS (UBA - CONICET) "Verdad, realidad y comunidad: una lectura realista de la teor¨a de la cognici¨n de Charles Sanders Peirce" 18:45 CARLOS GARZ¨N (Univ. Nac. de Colombia), CATALINA HERN¨NDEZ (Univ. Nac. de Colombia) "C. S. Peirce: realidad, verdad y el debate realismo-antirrealismo" 19:15 CATALINA HYNES (UNSTA- UNT) "El problema de la unidad de la noci¨n peirceana de verdad" 19:45 Mesa Panel (Sal¨n de Actos): "El origen de la cuantificaci¨n en Peirce": Javier Legris (UBA), Gustavo Demartin (UNLP), Gabriela Fulugorio (UBA), Sandra Lazzer (UBA) Coordinador: Ignacio Angelelli Sala CEF: Coordinadora: Natalia Rom¨ 17:45 ALEJANDRO RAM¨REZ FIGUEROA (Univ. de Chile) "Peirce desde la inteligencia artificial: la abducci¨n y la condici¨n de consistencia" 18:15 GUIDO VALLEJOS (Univ. de Chile) "Autonom¨a de la abducci¨n e inferencia hacia la mejor explicaci¨n" 18:45 SANDRA VISOKOLSKIS (UNVM -UNC) "Metáfora, ¨cono y abducci¨n en Charles S. Peirce" 19:15 V¨CTOR BRAVARI (Pontificia Univ. Cat¨lica de Chile) "Abducci¨n colectiva" 19:45 Presentaci¨n del libro (Sala CEF): E. Sandoval (Comp.): Semi¨tica, l¨gica y epistemolog¨a. Homenaje a Ch. S. Peirce (UACM, M¨xico, 2006): Jaime Nubiola (Universidad de Navarra) y Edgar Sandoval (UACM) 8 de Septiembre Sal¨n de Actos: Coordinador: Jorge Roetti 14:00 ROSA MAR¨A MAYORGA (Virginia Tech) "Pragmaticismo y Pluralismo" 14:30 SARA BARRENA Y JAIME NUBIOLA (Universidad de Navarra) "El ser humano como signo en crecimiento" 15:00 ALFREDO HOROCH (ARISBE) "Arisbe 1888-1914: un hogar para Julliette, Charles, y un refugio para la ciencia estadounidense" 15:30 HEDY BOERO (UNSTA) "Juicio de consejo y abducci¨n: Tomás de Aquino y C. S. Peirce" Sala CEF: Coordinador: Mariano Sanginetto 14:00 CATALINA HERN¨NDEZ Y ANDERSON PINZON (Univ. Nac. de Colombia) "Peirce, mente y percepci¨n: una posible cr¨tica" 14:30 ALEJANDRA NI¨O AMIEVA (UBA) "La abducci¨n en el análisis semi¨tico de imágenes" 15:00 OSCAR ZELIS, GABRIEL PULICE (Grupo de Investigaci¨n en Psicoanálisis) "Las tres categor¨as Peirceanas y los tres registros lacanianos. La estructura triádica del acto de semiosis como nudo de convergencia entre ambas teorizaciones" 15:30 MAR¨A GRISELDA GAIADA (UNLP), CHRISTIAN ROY BIRCH "La tercerdidad en la experiencia psicoanal¨tica" 1
[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Ben, list: Thanks for the response, Ben, and for the news from Gary about the conference. I hope Stjernfelt's paper is made generally available soon. He has an important paper in Transactions of the Peirce Society 36 (Summer 2000) called "Diagrams as Centerpiece of a Peircean Epistemology".. I'm caught by a luncheon engagement and can't do more at the moment than to add some more quotes to provide some background for sorting out the imputation factors along the lines you are suggesting: These are all from the early years (1865-1873): ==QUOTE PEIRCE=== Writings 1,172f (1865) MS 94 Harvard Lecture I "Concerning words also it is farther to be considered," [Locke] says, "that there comes by constant use to be such a connection between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses." Now this readiness of excitation obviously consists in this, namely, that we do not have to reflect upon the word as a sign but . . . it comes to affect the intellect as though it had that quality which it connotes. I call this the acquired nature of the word, because it is a power that the word comes to have, and because the word itself without any reflection of ours upon it brings the idea into our minds. . . . Now, I ask, how is it that anything can be done with a symbol, without reflecting upon the conception, much less imagining the object that belongs to it? It is simply because the symbol has acquired a nature, which may be described thus, that when it is brought before the mind certain principles of its use -- whether reflected on or not -- by association immediately regulate the action of the mind; and these may be regarded as laws of the symbol itself which it cannot _as a symbol_ transgress. Writings 1, 280 (1865) MS 106 Harvard Lecture X Inference in general obviously supposes symbolization; and all symbolization is inference. For every symbol as we have seen contains information. And in the last lecture we saw that all kinds of information involve inference. Inference, then, is symbolization. They are the same notions. Now we have already analyzed the notion of a symbol, and we have found that it depends upon the possibility of representations acquiring a nature, that is to say an immediate representative power. This principle is therefore the ground of inference in general. Writings 1,477, Lowell Lecture IX 1866 Representation is of three kinds -- Likeness, Indication or Correspondence in fact, and Symbolization. . . . A representation is either a Likeness, an Index, or a Symbol. A likeness represents its object by agreeing with it in some particular. An index represents is object by a real correspondence with it -- as a tally does quarts of milk, and a vane the wind. A symbol is a general representation like a word or conception. Scientifically speaking, a likeness is a representation grounded on an internal character -- that is, whose reference to a ground is prescindible. An index is a representation whose relation to its object is prescindible and is a Disquiparance, so that its peculiar Quality is not prescindible but is relative. A symbol is a representation whose essential Quality and Relation are both unprescindible -- the Quality being imputed and the Relation ideal. Thus there are three kinds of Quality Internal Quality (Quality proper) -- The Quality of an Equiparent and Likeness External Quality -- The Quality of a Disquiparant and Index Imputed Quality -- The Quality of a Symbol And two kinds of Relation Real Relation (Relation proper) -- The Relation of Likeness and Index Ideal Relation -- The relation of a Symbol . . . Having thus made a complete catalogue of the objects of formal thought, we come down to consider symbols, with which alone Logic is concerned -- and symbols in a special aspect; namely, as determined by their reference to their objects or correlates. The first division which we are to attempt to make between different kinds of symbols ought to depend upon their intention, what they are specially meant to express -- whether their peculiar function is to lie in their reference to their ground, in their reference to their object, or their reference to their interpretant. A symbol whose intended function is its reference to its ground -- although as a symbol it must refer also to an object and an interpretant, and although the nature of its reference to its object is alone the study of the logician -- is nevertheless intended to be nothing more than something which has meaning and to which a certain character has been imputed; in other words it is a symbol only because the imputation of a certain character has made it one -- the imputation of the character is the same as putting it for a thing or things -- so that it is merely con
[peirce-l] Open Questions, MS 325 (c.1907),
To the List:The following quote, the fourth and part of the fifth paragraphs, is from Ms. 325, "Pragmatism Made Easy" (We are thankful to Juan Pablo Serra for posting this Ms.)"The particular point that had been made by Bain and that had most struck Green, and through him, the rest of us, was the insistence that what a man really believes is what he would be ready to act upon, and to risk much upon. The writer endeavoured to weave that truth in with others wich he had made out for himself, so as to make a consistent doctrine of cognition. It appeared to him to be requisite to connect Bain’s doctrine, on the one hand, with physiological phenomena, and on another hand, with logical distinctions. It had long been said that the phenomena of consciousness were of three kinds, Feeling, Volition and Cognition. The writer proposed to amend that enumeration in one particular, so as to make it correspond with a logical division. Logical predicates are of three kinds; these of wich each is connected with a single subject, these of wich each is connected with two subjects, one grammatically called the subject nominative and the other the object, and these whose connections with subjects exceed two and wich are analyzable into predicated at once of subjects nominative, of direct objects, and of indirect objects.Now feelings always arise as predicates of single objects; and it is only by subsequent reflexion, wich is not Feeling, that they may become connected with two or more subjects." I note the following:In the earlier (1869?) essay, the example of the logic of three objects was a spatial example of three paths. More directly, if two paths, then the paths could only be added, if three paths, then branching was possible. The distinction was based on the possible arrangements of two ro three "objects" in the plane or in space. This reasoning was very consistent with the chemical symbolism of Dalton in terms of relational logic among chemical radicals.In MS 325, the logic is explicitly expressed in terms of grammar. More precisely, in terms of predicate logic. The phrase:Logical predicates are of three kinds; is a particular belief about English grammar. I am skeptical that it is true for all grammars.Does anyone know of languages that have more than three kinds of predicates?Or, less than three kinds of predicates?Given the extraordinary richness of human communications, it seems highly probable that such examples exist; I would like to quote a specific example.Continuing on with the sentence:...these of wich each is connected with a single subject,This phrase, in this context, could mean that Peirce was expressing the potential of a copula to connect the subject with a particular property of the subject. For example, "The apple is red."Does this example of the logic of predicates of English grammar start the notion of "Firstness"?If so, how does one categorize the notion of a simpler logical sentence, "Apples exist"? Continuing to decompose the sentence, these of wich each is connected with two subjects, one grammatically called the subject nominative and the other the object,This phrase appears to continue the metaphor between English grammar and logic. Does this example of the logic of predicates of English grammar start the notion of "Secondness"?I note that one could also construct a sentence of the form: Apples and oranges exist.The final part of the sentence reads: and these whose connections with subjects exceed two and wich are analyzable into predicated at once of subjects nominative, of direct objects, and of indirect objects.At this point, Peirce appears to abandon examples of Aristotelian species and goes directly to the genus, namely, with the word pair, "exceed two".Does this example of the logic of predicates of English grammar start the notion of "Thirdness"?Does this example have any explicatory value with respect to the nature of thirdness?I note that one could also construct a sentence of the form: Apples and oranges and peaches and pears exist.I also note that I have chosen examples of existential sentences with the names (categories?) of fruit. I feel that these examples would be equally germane if I had chosen the names of chemical elements or or Daltonian signs. Am I mistaken in this belief?The introductory phrase of the next paragraph:Now feelings always arise as predicates of single objects; and it is only by subsequent reflexion, wich is not Feeling, that they may become connected with two or more subjects."is simply beyond my comprehension. I have not a method to relate to the proposed illation.My belief is that my feelings are internal impulses and are independent of English grammar but are manifestations of relations intrinsic to my internal existence. If I wish to think about my feelings or to communicate a feeling to another, then I may chose to invoke grammar. For example, my dog often responds to my feelings even before the feeling is manifest in my mind. So, what wa
[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Ben, You wrote: [Ben Udell] I had the impression that Peirce says somewhere that _every_ sign is a surrogate for its object, but I can't find it. It might be useful for somebody to do a search on the CD-ROM edition for the word "surrogate." In ordinary English, one could say that insofar as a sign stands for its object in some respect, it is a surrogate for its object in that respect. A symbol serves as a surrogate not only for its object but for some unpresented quality or reaction or representational relation which is imputed to that object. The term "surrogate" does not appear in the CD-ROM of the CP. I did however do a string search on "substitute and symbol or sign" and got such passages as these [emphasis added to reinforce the point that "substitute" (i.e., surrogate) involves purpose, i.e., genuine thirdness in all manner of signs]. CP 2.276 An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything that it is like. (The conception of "substitute" involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness.) CP 4.538 A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much widened. By a Seme, I shall mean anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign. CP 4.571. . . The Name, or any Seme, is merely a substitute for its Object in one or another capacity in which respect it is all one with the Object. Its Final Interpretant thus represents it as representing its Object after the manner of an Icon, by mere agreement in idea. It thus appears that the difference between the Term, the Proposition, and the Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity, and does not so much consist in structure as in the services they are severally intended to perform. CP 5.75. . . the Index. Here is a reactional sign, which is such by virtue of a real connection with its object. Then the question arises is this dual character in the Index, so that it has two elements, by virtue of the one serving as a substitute for the particular object it does, while the other is an involved icon that represents the representamen itself regarded as a quality of the object -- or is there really no such dual character in the index, so that it merely denotes whatever object it happens to be really connected with just as the icon represents whatever object it happens really to resemble? These taken together may at least partially address Joe's question: [Joseph Ransdell] But why, as in the passage newly transcribed here, is this being ascribed to the sign in general rather than to the symbol in particular? Peirce's own question in the last passage quoted no doubt deserves consideration. I'm still recovering from jet lag and, of course, playing catch-up with email, etc., so I haven't had time yet to reflect much on the passages Joe posted. I hope the above snippets are helpful. Gary Benjamin Udell wrote: Joe, list, The transcription of Peirce's "re-write" of the "On a New List of Categories" is exciting and valuable. For one thing, at last now we know what happened to the categories of Being and Substance. They're still there; he just no longer calls them "categories." I've been kind of distracted lately (my neighborhood was one of those blacked out in Queens), but have electricity again and am following your posts with interest. Gary emailed me today and says that the conference in Denmark went quite well. "Lots of positive support for trikonic" with a number of particulars regarding that. And I don't think Gary will mind my quoting the following: 66~ High points included Nicola Guarino's invited talk..., Sowa's on "Peirce's Contributions to the 21st Century," and perhaps especially perhaps the preeminent Danish Peirce scholar there, Frederik Stjernfelt's talk on "Two Iconicity Notions in Peirce's Diagrammatology." Amongst the other papers the most note-worthy was Rudolf Wille's on the notion of replacing the notion of "ontology" in AI with "semantology". Wille and I had some great conversations--he really is a fine scholar and an authentic Peircean. Correia's and Reinhard Poschel's strict mathematical proof of the reduction thesis was also a high point. John Old wants to use trikonic in relation to work he's doing with the on-line Roget's Thesaurus, and of course Simon is keeping me busy already, sending papers, etc. while the fire is still hot. ~99 Anyway, onward. Joe wrote, But why, as in the passage newly transcribed here, is this being ascribed to the sign in general rather than to the symbol in particular? I will return to that and other relevant considerations in another message. I had the impression that Peirce says somewhere that _every
[peirce-l] Triads and algebraic geometry
For those interested in CSP's triadic relations, I came across the following abstract from the mathematics Archive or a recent contribution. Although I have yet to examine the article itself, the abstract is suggestive, and may prove of interest to applications of triadic relations to algebraic geometry. The posting, with abstract, is as follows, for anyone who might be interested in checkig it out. Paper: math.GM/0607624 Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2006 10:10:35 GMT (26kb) Title: Introducing bisemistructures Authors: Christian Pierre Comments: 37 pages Subj-class: General Mathematics; Algebraic Geometry MSC-class: 13C05,14A20,14L17 \\ New fundamental mathematical structures are introduced by the triples (left semistructure,right semistructure,bisemistructure) associated with the classical mathematical structures and such that the bisemistructures,resulting from the reciprocal actions of left semistructures on right semistructures,are composed of bielements which are either diagonal bielements or cross bielements. \\ ( http://arXiv.org/abs/math/0607624 , 26kb) Irving H. Anellis [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.peircepublishing.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
