[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Alase, List: Yes. I shipped my reply to Claudio with an attachment too extensive for to be distributed, according to the Lyris Administrator. The attachment contained a work that Michel Balat sent me 6 years ago, entitled 'Sur le pragmatisme de Peirce ¨ l'usage des psychistes'. Since Claudio had sent me some Michel's biblography, I wanted to complete it a bit. Anyway, I sent him a copy too. Faithfully yours, J. Lurac ALASE _Asociaci¨n Latinoamericana de Semi¨tica_ [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Jorge, We haven't understood the purpose of your post to Claudio. Would you be able to clarify it?. VTY, AlaseJorge Lurac [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Claudio, List,Justa small bibliographic collaboration.Cheers,J. LuracClaudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jorge, List,I think that (even if I don't know too much about the exact way in which Lacan "met" Peirce) there is no discussion anymore that Lacan is LACAN after he included Peirce's proposal in his structuralistic approach to Freud. For the conceptual approach you can see "Des fondements s¨miotiques de la psychanalyse. Peirce apr¨s Freud et Lacan" by Michel Balat.Paris: L'Harmattan,
2000.There are 3 triads that are VERY profitable for applied semiotics, each one in it's one way is specific for different tasks:For 1nessFor 2ness For 3ness PeirceAlthusser Lacan FirstnessTheoretical Practice Imaginary SecondnessEconomical Practice Real
ThirdnessPolitical Practice Symbolic Since all signs are very complex signs always, we can not reduce everything only to the peircean-logical-aspects.In my view, there are also 3 logical sequences to begin researching on something:1. The logical approach: beginning by 1ness,possibility; then 2ness, actualization; and 3ness, law or necessity. 2. The study of a concrete case: beginning by Economical Practice(Which are theconcrete existent examples? for concrete things, or Which are thebehaviors/performances?for abstract concepts); following Political Practice and finally Theoretical Practice. 3. The psychological approach: ("symbols grow"... also for the psychoanalyst) beginning by the Symbolic aspect through
the significant... I will avoid here more details because it is not my competence... but it works wonderful... I can tell...Applied semiotics is accepting to put our feets in the muddy earth... and get dirty!!! All this is not ment as a peircean review. At the same time a thank Ransdell (specially for the List) and others for their "clean" and very necessary work.Best Claudio- Original Message - From: Jorge Lurac To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 4:00 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...Claudio, listI find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati.J. Lurac---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/ --- Message from
peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! ¡Abr¨ tu cuenta ya! - http://correo.yahoo.com.ar --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/
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[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Jorge, We haven't understood the purpose of your post to Claudio. Would you be able to clarify it?. VTY, AlaseJorge Lurac [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Claudio, List,Justa small bibliographic collaboration.Cheers,J. LuracClaudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jorge, List,I think that (even if I don't know too much about the exact way in which Lacan "met" Peirce) there
is no discussion anymore that Lacan is LACAN after he included Peirce's proposal in his structuralistic approach to Freud. For the conceptual approach you can see "Des fondements s¨miotiques de la psychanalyse. Peirce apr¨s Freud et Lacan" by Michel Balat.Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000.There are 3 triads that are VERY profitable for applied semiotics, each one in it's one way is specific for different tasks:For 1nessFor 2ness For 3ness PeirceAlthusser
Lacan FirstnessTheoretical Practice Imaginary SecondnessEconomical Practice Real ThirdnessPolitical Practice Symbolic Since all signs are very complex signs always, we can not reduce everything only to the peircean-logical-aspects.In my view, there are also 3 logical sequences to begin researching on something:1. The logical approach: beginning by 1ness,possibility; then 2ness, actualization; and 3ness, law or necessity. 2. The study of a concrete case: beginning by Economical Practice(Which are theconcrete existent examples? for concrete things, or Which are
thebehaviors/performances?for abstract concepts); following Political Practice and finally Theoretical Practice. 3. The psychological approach: ("symbols grow"... also for the psychoanalyst) beginning by the Symbolic aspect through the significant... I will avoid here more details because it is not my competence... but it works wonderful... I can tell...Applied semiotics is accepting to put our feets in the muddy earth... and get dirty!!! All this is not ment as a peircean review. At the same time a thank Ransdell (specially for the List) and others for their "clean" and very necessary work.Best Claudio- Original Message - From: Jorge Lurac To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 4:00 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...Claudio, listI find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati.J. Lurac---Message from peirce-l forum to
subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! ¡Abr¨ tu cuenta ya! - http://correo.yahoo.com.ar
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[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Claudio, List,Justa small bibliographic collaboration.Cheers,J. LuracClaudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jorge, List,I think that (even if I don't know too much about the exact way in which Lacan "met" Peirce) there is no discussion anymore that Lacan is LACAN after he included Peirce's proposal in his structuralistic approach to Freud. For the conceptual approach you can see "Des fondements s¨miotiques de la psychanalyse. Peirce apr¨s Freud et Lacan" by Michel Balat.Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000.There are 3 triads that are VERY profitable for applied semiotics, each one in it's one way is specific for different tasks:For 1nessFor 2ness For 3ness PeirceAlthusser Lacan FirstnessTheoretical Practice Imaginary SecondnessEconomical Practice Real ThirdnessPolitical
Practice Symbolic Since all signs are very complex signs always, we can not reduce everything only to the peircean-logical-aspects.In my view, there are also 3 logical sequences to begin researching on something:1. The logical approach: beginning by 1ness,possibility; then 2ness, actualization; and 3ness, law or necessity. 2. The study of a concrete case: beginning by Economical Practice(Which are theconcrete existent examples? for concrete things, or Which are thebehaviors/performances?for abstract concepts); following Political Practice and finally Theoretical Practice. 3. The psychological approach: ("symbols grow"... also for the psychoanalyst) beginning by the Symbolic aspect through the significant... I will avoid here more details because it is not my competence...
but it works wonderful... I can tell...Applied semiotics is accepting to put our feets in the muddy earth... and get dirty!!! All this is not ment as a peircean review. At the same time a thank Ransdell (specially for the List) and others for their "clean" and very necessary work.Best Claudio- Original Message - From: Jorge Lurac To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 4:00 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...Claudio, listI find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati.J. Lurac---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/
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[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Claudio, listI find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati.J. LuracClaudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] escribi¨: Jim, List,I would like to try a comment on the relation between this two quotes: 1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuinetriadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant..." (CP 2.274) and 2. "A sign is a thirdmediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". (Trichotomic, p. 281 Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third] as an apparent contradiction.I have to give up trying to understand the subtle differences in Englishbetween capital "First" and little "third"... but even so, something sounds also meaningfull there (even for an Italian leaving head upside-down in Argentina)...Since EVERYTHING is a sign, or everything can only be considered as a sing by humans, and since all discussions can proceed only through signs, etc. etc...(see CP 1.540, 5.283, 5.308, 5.309 and others...), signs can not be a 'definitive-something', or all Peirce's effort could get lost in his most ineresting aspect: the emphasys on relations instead of on taxonomies.On the other side, every sign can be considered in it's3 aspects (or better 9, or 27, or 81, since, only3 is mostly a very rough cut into 'reality'... that resists symbolization -Lacan-).In quote 2 we have the sign in context. The sign is considered a little third, 'only' it's thirdness, which is it's most outstanding aspect to fulfill the task of mediation. Only the symbolic aspect is considered here, byusing the verbal language (which is lineal and sequential -de Sassure-). Auke's diagrams (or other diagramms too...) could show the same statement without 'erasing' the other two aspects of the different signs involved, just by enphasysing with color the outstanding parts involved in this statement. Here we have a graphic example (forgive me Ben, the outcome could not be uglyer):In quote1 the sign is considered in it's most complex-difficult aspect, the capital First, which envolves the pure POSSIBILITY, the quali-quantitative-elemental-abstract-knowledge that "opens" the logical 'power' of that sign. The most valuable value of any sign is to know and to be aware (by the 'interpretant') of it's 'firstness'. In that 'possible FIRST' we have the clue of what comes logically'after'. Signs "grow" (historically) from thirdness to firstness, in opposition of the logical order.Jim Piat says: "...all signs (which are thirds) are also firsts because they havequalities.Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have effects.But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds". (bold is mine)Each coherent statement, in verbal language, should be constructed logically like quote 2 by relating 1ness, 2ness and 3ness (not necessarily in this order) of three different signs. This parts havenot to be explicit in the verbaltext. The signs are not mere Firsts nor mere Seconds nor mere Thirds, but the verbal language can give or construct this (terrible) impression. (like in the traditional bad example: the weathervaneIS an index...)Jim Piat says: "...I do think Peirce meant for his threetrichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to meare clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be thefoundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his firsttrichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as eitherhypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses theways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitativesimilarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the thirdtrichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a merequality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a three by threematrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories." (bold is mine)There is already some research done in this direction, for applied semiotics. The outcome is whatI called the "Semiotic Nonagon". It is a diagrammatic-icon, an operative model that can be used with great advantage in qualitative research, but it is NOT an explanation of Peirce's logic-phylosophical proposal. Peirce would probably die again if he sees it as a diagram of his ideas. In fact he drew the 'triangle' of the10 classes but never the 9adic matrix. Peirce's proposal could be probably schetched in hiperspace with the help of computer sciences... but probably, it would not be easy to'use' for applied semiotics... As fare as I know Max Bense (he probably was the first) already draw this 3x3 matrix in the 60's, some other scholars used it too, just to show all 9 aspects in some order. But they never gived the diagram a
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Claudio, Jim and others I have a little game to suggest to everybody on the list who has some time to devote to it. Fortunately, it is related to a question of wines. In French language we have a phrase Appellation d'Origine Controlee (A.O.C.) to characterize at the same time the name, the origin and the level of certification of a bottle of wine. It seems that in English the phrasing would have to be Protected Designation of Origin (P.D.O.). I am sure that Claudio knows how to say that in his mother tongue. I will suppose that anyone of the acronyms is a sign. The question is : among the three elements of this sign (either A,O,C or P,D,O) which of them is the First, the Second and which is the Third? Hoping that you will find that the question is worth answering. Bernard Claudio Guerri a ¨crit : Jim, List, I would like to try a comment on the relation between this two quotes: 1. A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant... (CP 2.274) and 2. A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented. (Trichotomic, p. 281 Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third ] as an apparent contradiction. I have to give up trying to understand the subtle differences in English between capital First and little third... but even so, something sounds also meaningfull there (even for an Italian leaving head upside-down in Argentina)... Since EVERYTHING is a sign, or everything can only be considered as a sing by humans, and since all discussions can proceed only through signs, etc. etc... (see CP 1.540, 5.283, 5.308, 5.309 and others...), signs can not be a 'definitive-something', or all Peirce's effort could get lost in his most ineresting aspect: the emphasys on relations instead of on taxonomies. On the other side, every sign can be considered in it's 3 aspects (or better 9, or 27, or 81, since, only 3 is mostly a very rough cut into 'reality'... that resists symbolization -Lacan-). In quote 2 we have the sign in context. The sign is considered a little third, 'only' it's thirdness, which is it's most outstanding aspect to fulfill the task of mediation. Only the symbolic aspect is considered here, by using the verbal language (which is lineal and sequential -de Sassure-). Auke's diagrams (or other diagramms too...) could show the same statement without 'erasing' the other two aspects of the different signs involved, just by enphasysing with color the outstanding parts involved in this statement. Here we have a graphic example (forgive me Ben, the outcome could not be uglyer): In quote 1 the sign is considered in it's most complex-difficult aspect, the capital First, which envolves the pure POSSIBILITY, the quali-quantitative-elemental-abstract-knowledge that opens the logical 'power' of that sign. The most valuable value of any sign is to know and to be aware (by the 'interpretant') of it's 'firstness'. In that 'possible FIRST' we have the clue of what comes logically 'after'. Signs grow (historically) from thirdness to firstness, in opposition of the logical order. Jim Piat says: ...all signs (which are thirds) are also firsts because they have qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have effects. But *signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds*. (bold is mine) Each coherent statement, in verbal language, should be constructed logically like quote 2 by relating 1ness, 2ness and 3ness (not necessarily in this order) of three different signs. This parts have not to be explicit in the verbal text. The signs are not mere Firsts nor mere Seconds nor mere Thirds, but the verbal language can give or construct this (terrible) impression. (like in the traditional bad example: the weathervane IS an index...) Jim Piat says: ...I do think Peirce meant for his three trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his first trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses the ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the third trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a mere quality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a* three by three matrix of sign aspects* based on Peirce's categories. (bold is mine) There is already some research done in this direction, for applied semiotics. The outcome is what I called the Semiotic Nonagon. It is a diagrammatic-icon, an operative model that can be used with great advantage in qualitative research, but it is NOT an explanation of
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Claudio, Jim and others I have a little game to suggest to everybody on the list who has some time to devote to it. Fortunately, it is related to a question of wines. In French language we have a phrase Appellation d'Origine Controlee (A.O.C.) to characterize at the same time the name, the origin and the level of certification of a bottle of wine. It seems that in English the phrasing would have to be Protected Designation of Origin (P.D.O.). I am sure that Claudio knows how to say that in his mother tongue. I will suppose that anyone of the acronyms is a sign. The question is : among the three elements of this sign (either A,O,C or P,D,O) which of them is the First, the Second and which is the Third? Hoping that you will find that the question is worth answering. Bernard Dear Bernard, You mean who's on First? Well, per my most recent take on this issue I'd say that, first of all, it all depends on what you mean by First. The sign it seems is the universal conceptual tool -- if it can be thought, the sign can accommodate it. Ah, yes ---and that too! Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
For the record, here some more definitions where the use of English grammar is not entirely consistent. Is it a question of prestige or can't anyone who was so 100% positive that these cannot be ordinal labels comment on this? 1) we have the terms 'second', 'third' (without capital letter) without referent. 1903 - C.P. 1-541 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, vol. 21, 3d Draught . My definition of a representamen is as follow: A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called is INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant. - 2) here Peirce uses 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' as adjectives: 1903 - C.P. 2_242 - Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as far as they are determined . A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, - 3) here Peirce uses 'first', 'second', 'third' as adjectives with a noun: 'something', a 'second something', a 'third something', 1906 - MS 292. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism . A sign may be defined as something (not necessarily existent) which is so determined by a second something called its Object that it will tend in its turn to determine a third something called its Interpretant source: http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/MARTY/76defeng.htm /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Bernard, Jim, List, First what is really easy: DOC is Denominazione di Origine Controllata, recently also used in Argentina as Denominaci¨n de Origen Controlada (I am not sure what happens in Spain... probably the same). Second... I don't know if I get your question... or perhaps I have no idea at all... I think that if 'all is a sign' and that 'all sign can be analyzed as triadic'... then there is nothing that can be ORIGINALLY First, or Sec... or etc. There is no other 'origin' as CP 2.228... Any sign or aspect of a sign (which is at the same time a sign) can be considered (for a moment) as a capital First or little third... depending on the context... since verbal language (differently from the graphic language) can put only one word after an other in a line... I think... wdyt? Best Claudio - Original Message - From: Bernard Morand [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 6:41 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third... Claudio, Jim and others I have a little game to suggest to everybody on the list who has some time to devote to it. Fortunately, it is related to a question of wines. In French language we have a phrase Appellation d'Origine Controlee (A.O.C.) to characterize at the same time the name, the origin and the level of certification of a bottle of wine. It seems that in English the phrasing would have to be Protected Designation of Origin (P.D.O.). I am sure that Claudio knows how to say that in his mother tongue. I will suppose that anyone of the acronyms is a sign. The question is : among the three elements of this sign (either A,O,C or P,D,O) which of them is the First, the Second and which is the Third? Hoping that you will find that the question is worth answering. Bernard --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Jim, Claudio, Ben, List,
Jim I too have benefited from Cluadio's musings, and while I don't
necessarily agree with all his conclusions, I think he makes many
important points in consideration of his juxtaposing two quotations
which seem at first blush contradictory.
1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in
such genuinetriadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to
be capable of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant..." (CP
2.274)
and
2. "A sign is a thirdmediating between the mind addressed and
the object represented". (Trichotomic, p. 281
Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third] as an apparent
contradiction.
In commenting on the second quote Claudio writes:
In quote 2 we have the sign in context. The
sign is considered a little third, 'only' it's thirdness, which is it's
most outstanding aspect to fulfill the task of mediation. Only the
symbolic aspect is considered here, byusing the verbal language
Now Claudio also writes:
Since EVERYTHING is a sign, or everything can only be considered as a
sign by humans, and since all discussions can proceed only through
signs, etc. etc...(see CP 1.540, 5.283, 5.308, 5.309 and others...),
signs can not be a 'definitive-something'
I would like to suggest below that the categorial elements in semiosis
are quite peculiar compared to all other genuine trichotomic
relationships that I've studied. Why? For one thing as Claudio noted in
accordance with two passages in Peirce, the human world is ALL signs:
Peirce: CP 5.448 Fn P1 Para 5/6 p 302
. . . all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed
exclusively of signs. . . . [Cf. 4.539.]
And, further, it is in the nature of semiosis that, as Peirce also
says, "signs grow".
CP 8.101 The whole purpose of a sign is that it
shall be interpreted in another sign; and its whole purport lies in the
special character which it imparts to that interpretation.
(I'll remark on "the special character" in a moment.) In another
passage Peirce makes all of this explicit, and this passage forms the
basis for the remainder of my comments on the categories in relation to
s-o-i.
Peirce: CP 2.228 C. A sign, or representamen,
is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that
person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign
which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign [here, btw,
Peirce uses 'first' in its ordinary ordinal way which yet refers to
Sign1's ground GR] The sign stands for something, its object. It stands
for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of
idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen.
"Idea" is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very
familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that
one man catches another man's idea, in which we say that when a man
recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the
same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for
a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with
itself during that time, that is to have a like content, it is the same
idea, and is not at each instant of the interval a new idea. [emphasis
added]
I believe that there is sufficient textual evidence to show that Peirce
holds that the 'original' sign expresses Firstness in conjunction with
"the ground of the representatmen." The 'idea' "in a sort of Platonic
sense" is explicitly associated with Firstness in the CP. This is the
more abstract (less process oriented) viewpoint whereas in theoretical
grammar the "genuine trichotomic relation" will be seen to be the Sign
as a First--again, in conjunction with its expressing the 'ground'--and
in its relating to it's Object and possible Interpretant (as Second and
Third).
1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First
which stands in such genuinetriadic relation to a Second, called its
_Object_, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its
_Interpretant..." (CP 2.274)
However, in its living, growing functioning within semiosis it is
indeed a medium, a Third, perhaps a vehicle (I don't use that term
myself) in consideration of the production of its new manifestation
as a more evolved sign, the interpretant. That interpretant is a Third
which yet in semiosis (as Peirce makes this clear enough) in turn
becomes a new First with possibly the meaning of the ground of the sign
somewhat developed ("Signs grow") and the semeiotic process continues,
First transmuting into Third=a new First (for the next 'round' of
semiosis). Now what is confusing is that both Sign1 and its 'evolved'
Sign2 (i.e., it's interpretant) must take on these and vastly many
other roles and functions (as Claudio and others have suggested).
Therefore, these categorial 'placeholders' ought not be frozen within
some single static classification schema and left there to die
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Jean-Marc, You wrote: 1) we have the terms 'second', 'third' (without capital letter) without referent. The text which originally prompted this discussion is: 1. 274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. It is quite true that Peirce doesn't always capitalize ordinals. As I've contemplated the structure of the above passage what strikes me, however, as most significant is the combination of the article 'a' connected to the capitalized _expression_, for example "a Third". In all the English speaking world if one simply wanted to say "this follows this follows this" one would say something like "A Sign stands, first, in relation to x, second in relation to, etc." never "a First". A First here means a categorial something, one of the three elements of a "genuine triadic relation" at this level of analysis. Turning now to your other example, one sees that Peirce will use capitalization in most any way he pleases, here given ALL CAPS to his terms defined as well as to the relationships (TO FOR) he wants to emphasize. Here the ordinals are again preceded by an article as he means to emphasize the categorial nature of R-O-I. CP 1.541 A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant. You are correct in writing that in the following quote "Peirce uses 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' as adjectives": A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, As I see it Peirce both respects the Hegelian dialectical order and, as the "Logic of Mathematics" paper shows, gives it a kind of primacy so that, yes, one must even as one, say, turns from dialectical to involutional analysis (i.e. starting at thirdness which involves the other two categories) say, "First one has thirdness which involves secondness which involves firstness". This is first used as 'firstly', in the ordinary non categorial sense of the ordinal 'first'. The point is that one is required even in involution to employ Hegel's order (or if one doesn't care to consider "The Logic of Mathematics" discussion, a simple ordinal progression). Now, admittedly, "First one has thirdness" may seem a peculiar locution, but it makes perfect sense within the context of Peirce's involutional analysis (which, by the way, is employed to generate the three categories once one assumes the reduction thesis is correct). [cf CP 1.490-1] Gary Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: For the record, here some more definitions where the use of English grammar is not entirely consistent. Is it a question of prestige or can't anyone who was so 100% positive that these cannot be ordinal labels comment on this? 1) we have the terms 'second', 'third' (without capital letter) without referent. 1903 - C.P. 1-541 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, vol. 21, 3d Draught . My definition of a representamen is as follow: A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called is INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant. - 2) here Peirce uses 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' as adjectives: 1903 - C.P. 2_242 - Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as far as they are determined . A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, - 3) here Peirce uses 'first', 'second', 'third' as adjectives with a noun: 'something', a 'second something', a 'third something', 1906 - MS 292. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism . A sign may be defined as something (not necessarily existent) which is so determined by a second something called its Object that it will tend in its turn to determine a third something called its Interpretant source: http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/MARTY/76defeng.htm /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Gary Richmond wrote: So, finally, is a sign a First or a Third? It seems to me at this point in my reflection that it functions as both, transmuting itself as the sign grows in the continuation of a semiotic process.GaryDear Gary, Folks-- Yes, Gary, what you say in the above post seems corrrect to me in so far as my present understanding of this complex issue goes. Now, if we allow that even an object (if taken as part of triad of objects) can serve as a first or third I think we have come full circle and in some sense also merged with the position put forth by Jean-Marc. Could it be that Peirce's classifications of signs accommodates (my word for the day) both points of view-- The key being (in my view) that to serve as a first (quality or monad), second (object or dyad) or third (mediator or triad) is to function (or be construed/interpreted as functioning) in aspecific relational way. IOWs allare signs and our discussions of objects, first and thirds (as well as categories verses ordinal positions)arise from our prescissions not from the givens. What makes thought possible (including all the nesting and reframing of ideas) is the fact that all is thought. We begin with thought. We swim in a continuum of thought and are ourselves thought. Slice it however you want it comesout an irreducible triad of form, substance and function. Maybe ... Thanks for sticking with me in this discussion.For me it has at times been a bit frustratingbut even more so it has also beenextremely helpful.For the record, I conclude thatI was wrong or at best had a very limited understanding of the issues. Stilllimited, but better than before. Thanks to all, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Jim, List, I've been enjoying the challenging discussion as well as it has certainly served to sharpen my and I assume other's thinking in the matter. I too would honor all the participants in the discussion by saying that their comments were invaluable in contributing to thinking this matter through as far as its gone But, you quoted me: GR: So, finally, is a sign a First or a Third? It seems to me at this point in my reflection that it functions as both, transmuting itself as the sign grows in the continuation of a semiotic process. And began your message: . . . what you say in the above post seems corrrect to me in so far as my present understanding of this complex issue goes. Now, if we allow that even an object (if taken as part of triad of objects) can serve as a first or third I think we have come full circle and in some sense also merged with the position put forth by Jean-Marc. Could it be that Peirce's classifications of signs accommodates (my word for the day) both points of view? No, I reject Jean-Marc's analysis for the most part for the reasons I offer below. Jean-Marc wrote: Gary Richmond wrote: ...btw, do you or anyone else know of any other place where he refers to 'sign' as a third?) I know only of this one, which I think may illuminate the passage being considered in so far as Peirce notes that "in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds." CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. this is almost a Lapalissade, what is Peirce saying here? nothing more than that in a triadic relation, there are three things, a first thing, a second thing and a third thing. (I'm using non-capitalized words for ordinals and the capitalized words 'First', 'Second', 'Third' to denote classes of relations or categories) I was glad to learn a new French word, lapalissade (used above in the sense of a truism, though it could mean something different, namely a self-evident truth--for example, after newly grasping the meaning and significance of a geometrical diagram--which is how I will take it). I'm beginning to see that the fragment from CP 1.537 may hold the key--or part of it--to resolving the present controversy. I'd like to try to explicate and analyze the quotation employing one of the 10 classes of signs, namely the 10th and last, the argument (argument symbolic legisign) diagrammed trikonically: Just a brief preliminary comment before I set down the tirkonic diagram of the sign class "argument" (sign 10) I am reading the trikonic diagram in the involutional order Peirce uses to name the 10 signs in his triangular diagram at CP 2.264 (which, by the way, is not the only order that could be considered, but which I employed in my diagram of the Classification of Signs mainly to show the involutional order of P's naming, also as a mnemonic device, but also to suggest the importance of involutional analysis in semeiotic in theoretical grammar--e.g, at a different and certainly higher level than the one of the present, I pointed to how Joe Ransdell recently commented on the involutional order of the argument which involves the proposition which involves the rheme, etc.] Argument(ative) symbolic legisign: [again start to the right at the position of thirdness] legisign 3/2/1 |argument symbol First, Peirce says that "the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds," that is they will each be part of the representation of the ground of a (usually complex) object in some mind or quasi-mind when they are functioning in semiosis (i.e., mediating the meaning of the sign). So the sign as a whole is a third in a genuinely triadic sense in which each of its parts is necessary but not sufficient for a genuine triadic relation--thus as these three relate to the sign itself (legisign), the object (symbol) and the interpretant (argument But Peirce continues: while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. 1ns, legisign (the sign as sign is categorially first) 3/2/1 | 3ns, argument (in relation to the interpretant, the sign is a complex sign employing perhaps all other sign types in its unfolding) 2ns, symbol (the object--that is, the immediate object in the mind--is itself categorially second) Now there may be nothing simple about this, and it is certainly no truism. Rather I think it points to the interpenetration of 1ns/2ns/3ns in complex structures and for semiosis. Jean-Marc continued: JO: Take any of these 3 things and they will mediate between the one (first) and the other (second). this is true of all 3 members of the relation, that is to say that all members are genuine Thirds in that they mediate between a first member and another member of the relation. There is a truth in this is so far as in any genuine triadic relationship
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Gary Richmond wrote: JO: Now when a first thing among the three is considered in itself (i.e as a First *within the relation*), the second thing can then be considered as other than the first (i.e. as a Second in opposition to the first thing *still within the relation*), and the third thing is considered as mediating between the first and the second, (i.e in its role as a Third). There you have both the categories and the ordinals. * order has no importance. *[emphasis added] It is not correct to conclude as Jean-Marc does that order has no importance. Let's take the order Jean-Marc employs, what I've called the Hegelian order, but which is also Peirce's order of something/other/medium. Can one start with medium? Of course not! So even dialectic demands and precisely /is /this order 1st, thesis, 2nd antithesis, 3rd synthesis.Can one start with antithesis or synthesis? Of course not! I agree but this is not comparable at all (see below) Take any member of the relation, it will mediate between the other two. This has just been disproved, again in his sense that order has no importance at this level of analysis. So again, and in my opinion, Peirce is not expressing a truism here, but rather, like so much else that can result from prepared, clear-headed and open-minded diagram observation (at least since Euclid ) it may be seen to be a self-evident truth. Gary, sorry I didn't find anything in your demonstration that is in contradiction with what I wrote earlier. You write This has just been disproved but you have only shown that in the Hegelian dialiectic the 3 moments cannot be interchanged, I never claimed they could... We are concerned with genuine triadic relations and the thesis/antithesis/synthesis (which by the way Hegel never called with these terms) is a degenerate one. to be more on the topic, are you interested in Andr¨ De Tienne's article in which he shows in a 6-page article how: - the sign mediates between the object and the interpretant - the object mediates between the sign and the interpretant - the interpretant mediates between the sign and the object and based on Peirce's writings? he writes for instance: ... On the one hand, we can take this to mean that in a genuine triad, the “first” is a first of a third, the “second” is a second of a third, and the “third” is a third of a third, so that we are in fact working with two different categorial levels, one being the level of firstness, secondness, and thirdness, and the other the level of firstness of thirdness, secondness of thirdness, and thirdness of thirdness. This is certainly correct, but I repeat, not sufficient. One should also consider that each “third” element of the triad can be a “third of a third”, that is, a mediating element between the other two. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Michael, It is just as you say and as Peirce does too in the Logic of Mathematics paper earlier referred to: you can go either way in the present example. You can move from the firstness of something, through the secondness or other, to the thirdness of medium as Peirce names the elements of this order taken most abstractly (my shorthand for this in consideration of his Hegel discussion in LoM was thesis/antithes/synthesis, but I prefer Peirce's something/other/medium). You may also go the reverse direction starting as you say at the "synthesis". And Peirce too calls this "analysis" in the paper mentioned (but also the involutional order as 3ns involves 2ns which in turn involves 1ns). So this will not work for "any arbitrarily selected triplet" which you may choose, but only for those with categorial associations within "genuine trichotomic relations.". Gary Michael J. DeLaurentis wrote: Sorry, Gary, I havent been following this string closely enough. Is your point that the process of synthesis [or mediation] cant, on a particular occasion, precede the components synthesized [mediated]? Because we do commonly start with the product of synthesis which we also refer to as the synthesis and proceed to the components synthesized (which is just analysis). Or are you saying that, for any arbitrarily selected triplet, it may or may not be the case, depending on the specific nature of the elements involved, that one or another can mediate the others? -Original Message- From: Gary Richmond [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 3:29 PM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third... Jim, List, I've been enjoying the challenging discussion as well as it has certainly served to sharpen my and I assume other's thinking in the matter. I too would honor all the participants in the discussion by saying that their comments were invaluable in contributing to thinking this matter through as far as its gone But, you quoted me: GR: So, finally, is a sign a First or a Third? It seems to me at this point in my reflection that it functions as both, transmuting itself as the sign grows in the continuation of a semiotic process. And began your message: . . . what you say in the above post seems corrrect to me in so far as my present understanding of this complex issue goes. Now, if we allow that even an object (if taken as part of triad of objects) can serve as a first or third I think we have come full circle and in some sense also merged with the position put forth by Jean-Marc. Could it be that Peirce's classifications of signs accommodates (my word for the day) both points of view? No, I reject Jean-Marc's analysis for the most part for the reasons I offer below. Jean-Marc wrote: Gary Richmond wrote: ...btw, do you or anyone else know of any other place where he refers to 'sign' as a third?) I know only of this one, which I think may illuminate the passage being considered in so far as Peirce notes that "in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds." CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. this is almost a Lapalissade, what is Peirce saying here? nothing more than that in a triadic relation, there are three things, a first thing, a second thing and a third thing. (I'm using non-capitalized words for ordinals and the capitalized words 'First', 'Second', 'Third' to denote classes of relations or categories) I was glad to learn a new French word, lapalissade (used above in the sense of a truism, though it could mean something different, namely a self-evident truth--for example, after newly grasping the meaning and significance of a geometrical diagram--which is how I will take it). I'm beginning to see that the fragment from CP 1.537 may hold the key--or part of it--to resolving the present controversy. I'd like to try to explicate and analyze the quotation employing one of the 10 classes of signs, namely the 10th and last, the argument (argument symbolic legisign) diagrammed trikonically: Just a brief preliminary comment before I set down the tirkonic diagram of the sign class "argument" (sign 10) I am reading the trikonic diagram in the involutional order Peirce uses to name the 10 signs in his triangular diagram at CP 2.264 (which, by the way, is not the only order that could be considered, but which I employed in my diagram of the Classification of Signs mainly to show the involutional order of P's naming, also as a mnemonic device, but also to suggest the importance of involutional analysis in semeiotic in theoretical grammar--e.g, at a different and certainly higher level than the one of the present, I pointed to how Joe Ransdell recently commented on the
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:
PS: this is a detail, but you probably meant
"genuine triadic
relationship" instead of "genuine trichotomic relationship"
("trichotomic" means something that divides something into 3 parts,
while "genuinely triadic" means something that connects three things
into one)
No, I meant trichotomic as Peirce uses it in such works as Trichotomic
and A Guess at the Riddle. I mean it exactly as Peirce uses it.
Jean-Marc, as did Ben earlier, I feel the game is over. But thank you
again for helping to provide the opportunity to think these matters
through.
Gary
Gary Richmond wrote:
Jean-Marc, List,
Please see my most recent post addressed to Jim for what should serve
as a response to your question. My argument there in a nutshell is that
in a genuine trichotomic relationship all elements do in one
sense mediate between the others and even necessarily so or it
would not be a genuine trichotomic relationship; but as soon as
one begins to take into consideration categorial associations in some
context, then a particular order (one of six possible ones, which I
call trikonic vectors following Parmentier) matters, both as
to categorial association and their logical and/or temporal movement.
However there are frequently several orders (vectors) of possible
importance once could consider.
this is impossible: if only the sign mediates between the object and
the interpretant then the relation is by definition not a genuine
triadic relation.
It will be degenerate, it is quite clear in the following text:
1.274
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable
of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same
Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are
bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of
dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third,
cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in
such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does.
this is true of signs "in context" with all the determinations you like.
PS: this is a detail, but you probably meant "genuine triadic
relationship" instead of "genuine trichotomic relationship"
("trichotomic" means something that divides something into 3 parts,
while "genuinely triadic" means something that connects three things
into one)
/JM
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[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Gary Richmond wrote: Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: PS: this is a detail, but you probably meant genuine triadic relationship instead of genuine trichotomic relationship (trichotomic means something that divides something into 3 parts, while genuinely triadic means something that connects three things into one) No, I meant trichotomic as Peirce uses it in such works as Trichotomic and A Guess at the Riddle. I mean it /exactly/ as Peirce uses it. Jean-Marc, as did Ben earlier, I feel the game is over. But thank you again for helping to provide the opportunity to think these matters through. Gary however Peirce never used the expression trichotomic relation, so I don't know what you mean. What is the difference with a triadic relation? /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Jim, List, I would like to try a comment on the relation between this two quotes: 1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuinetriadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant..." (CP 2.274) and 2. "A sign is a thirdmediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". (Trichotomic, p. 281 Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third] as an apparent contradiction. Dear Claudio, Folks-- I've omitted the meat and best part of your post for the sake of brevity, but I like your synthesis better than my own one sided insistence that signs are thirds (in the categorical sense). I look forward to what others make of your suggestions. But as for me --bravo and thanks. You've helped me to see the fuller picture that somehowI couldn't seem to grasp. That said I don't mean to repudiate Jean-Marc's position which I do not think depends upon my insistence that signs were thirds. But having enough difficulty with my own misunderstandings I'llleave thatdiscussion to Jean-Marc et al. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
