Re: DETAIL for wrong scram password
On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 09:49:00AM +0900, Michael Paquier wrote: > Yes, you are right here. I missed the parts before > mock_scram_secret() gets called and there are comments in the whole > area. Hmm, at the end of the day, I think that would just have > verify_client_proof() fill in logdetail when the client proof does not > match, and use a wording different than what's proposed upthread to > outline that this is a client proof mismatch. Seeing no updates, this has been marked as RwF. -- Michael signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: DETAIL for wrong scram password
On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 03:54:10PM +, Jacob Champion wrote: > It looks like the code paths that lead to a doomed authentication > already provide their own, more specific, logdetail (role doesn't > exist, role has no password, role doesn't have a SCRAM secret, etc.). Yes, you are right here. I missed the parts before mock_scram_secret() gets called and there are comments in the whole area. Hmm, at the end of the day, I think that would just have verify_client_proof() fill in logdetail when the client proof does not match, and use a wording different than what's proposed upthread to outline that this is a client proof mismatch. -- Michael signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: DETAIL for wrong scram password
On Thu, 2021-03-25 at 16:41 +0900, Michael Paquier wrote: > On top of what's > proposed, would it make sense to have a second logdetail for the case > of a mock authentication? We don't log that yet, so I guess that it > could be useful for audit purposes? It looks like the code paths that lead to a doomed authentication already provide their own, more specific, logdetail (role doesn't exist, role has no password, role doesn't have a SCRAM secret, etc.). --Jacob
Re: DETAIL for wrong scram password
On Tue, Mar 02, 2021 at 05:48:05PM +, Jacob Champion wrote: > What would you think about adding the additional detail right after > verify_client_proof() fails? I.e. Agreed. Having that once all the code paths have been taken and the client proof has been verified looks more solid. On top of what's proposed, would it make sense to have a second logdetail for the case of a mock authentication? We don't log that yet, so I guess that it could be useful for audit purposes? -- Michael signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: DETAIL for wrong scram password
On Sat, 2021-02-27 at 17:02 -0500, Jeff Janes wrote:
> Note that in one case you do get the "does not match" line. That is
> if the user has a scram password assigned and the hba specifies
> plain-text 'password' as the method. So if the absence of the DETAIL
> is intentional, it is not internally consistent.
Agreed.
> The attached patch fixes the issue. I don't know if this is the
> correct location to be installing the message,
> maybe verify_client_proof should be doing it instead.
Hmm, I agree that the current location doesn't seem quite right. If
someone adds a new way to exit the SCRAM loop on failure, they'd
probably need to partially unwind this change to avoid printing the
wrong detail message. But in my opinion, verify_client_proof()
shouldn't be concerned with logging details...
What would you think about adding the additional detail right after
verify_client_proof() fails? I.e.
> if (!verify_client_proof(state) || state->doomed)
> {
> /* */
> result = SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE;
> break;
> }
That way the mismatched-password detail is linked directly to the
mismatched-password logic.
Other notes:
- Did you have any thoughts around adding a regression test, since this
would be an easy thing to break in the future?
- I was wondering about timing attacks against the psprintf() call to
construct the logdetail string, but it looks like the other authn code
paths aren't worried about that.
--Jacob
DETAIL for wrong scram password
When md5 password authentication fails, the server log file has a helpful detail to say why, usually one of: DETAIL: Role "none" does not exist. DETAIL: User "jjanes" has no password assigned. DETAIL: User "jjanes" has an expired password. DETAIL: Password does not match for user "jjanes". But for scram authentication, only the first three of these will be reported when applicable. If the password is simply incorrect, then you do get a DETAIL line reporting which line of pg_hba was used, but you don't get a DETAIL line reporting the reason for the failure. It is pretty unfriendly to make the admin guess what the absence of a DETAIL is supposed to mean. And as far as I can tell, this is not intentional. Note that in one case you do get the "does not match" line. That is if the user has a scram password assigned and the hba specifies plain-text 'password' as the method. So if the absence of the DETAIL is intentional, it is not internally consistent. The attached patch fixes the issue. I don't know if this is the correct location to be installing the message, maybe verify_client_proof should be doing it instead. I am also not happy to be testing 'doomed' here, but it was already checked a few lines up so I didn't want to go to lengths to avoid doing it here too. Cheers, Jeff scram_password_mismatch.patch Description: Binary data
