Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 03:11:29PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote: > Decibel! <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > Even if we don't care about folks running on suspect hardware, having a > > CRC would make it far more reasonable to recommend full_page_writes=3Doff. > > This argument seems ridiculous. Finding out that you have corrupt data > is no substitute for not having corrupt data. Of course. But how will you discover you have corrupt data if there's no mechanism to detect it? -- Decibel!, aka Jim Nasby[EMAIL PROTECTED] EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com 512.569.9461 (cell) pgp6QMvWN2YFB.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
Decibel! <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Even if we don't care about folks running on suspect hardware, having a > CRC would make it far more reasonable to recommend full_page_writes=3Doff. This argument seems ridiculous. Finding out that you have corrupt data is no substitute for not having corrupt data. > BTW, a method that would buy additional protection would be to compute > the CRC for a page every time you modify it in such a way that generates > a WAL record, and record that CRC with the WAL record. That would > protect from corruption that happened anytime after the page was > modified, instead of just when smgr went to write it out. How useful > that is I don't know... Two words: hint bits. regards, tom lane ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 1: if posting/reading through Usenet, please send an appropriate subscribe-nomail command to [EMAIL PROTECTED] so that your message can get through to the mailing list cleanly
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 02:34:09PM +0200, Albe Laurenz wrote: > I have thought some more about it, and tend to agree now: > Checksums will only detect disk failure, and that's only > one of the many integrity problems that can happen. > And one that can be reduced to a reasonable degree with good > storage systems. > > So the benefit of checksums is not enough to bother. Uhm... how often do we get people asking about corruption on -admin alone? 2-3x a month? ISTM it would be very valuable to those folks to be able to tell them if the corruption occurred between writing a page out and reading it back in. Even if we don't care about folks running on suspect hardware, having a CRC would make it far more reasonable to recommend full_page_writes=off. I never turn that off and recommend to folks that they don't turn it off because there's no way to know if it will or has corrupted data. BTW, a method that would buy additional protection would be to compute the CRC for a page every time you modify it in such a way that generates a WAL record, and record that CRC with the WAL record. That would protect from corruption that happened anytime after the page was modified, instead of just when smgr went to write it out. How useful that is I don't know... -- Decibel!, aka Jim Nasby[EMAIL PROTECTED] EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com 512.569.9461 (cell) pgpxszAG03fC9.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
Jan Wieck wrote: > Computing a checksum just before writing the block will NOT detect any > faulty memory or Postgres bug that corrupted the block. You will have a > perfectly fine checksum over the corrupted data. > > A checksum only detects corruptions that happen between write and read. > Most data corruptions that happen during that time however lead to some > sort of read error reported by the disk. I have thought some more about it, and tend to agree now: Checksums will only detect disk failure, and that's only one of the many integrity problems that can happen. And one that can be reduced to a reasonable degree with good storage systems. So the benefit of checksums is not enough to bother. Yours, Laurenz Albe ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 7: You can help support the PostgreSQL project by donating at http://www.postgresql.org/about/donate
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
On 8/28/2007 4:14 AM, Albe Laurenz wrote: Not all databases are on enterprise scale storage systems, and there's also the small possibility of PostgreSQL bugs that could be detected that way. Computing a checksum just before writing the block will NOT detect any faulty memory or Postgres bug that corrupted the block. You will have a perfectly fine checksum over the corrupted data. A checksum only detects corruptions that happen between write and read. Most data corruptions that happen during that time however lead to some sort of read error reported by the disk. Jan -- #==# # It's easier to get forgiveness for being wrong than for being right. # # Let's break this rule - forgive me. # #== [EMAIL PROTECTED] # ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 6: explain analyze is your friend
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
* Alban Hertroys: > If you have a "proper" production database server, your memory has > error checking, and your RAID controller has something of the kind > as well. To my knowledge, no readily available controller performs validation on reads (not even for RAID-1 or RAID-10, where it would be pretty straightforward). Something like an Adler32 checksum (not a full CRC) on each page might be helpful. However, what I'd really like to see is something that catches missed writes, but this is very difficult to implement AFAICT. -- Florian Weimer<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> BFK edv-consulting GmbH http://www.bfk.de/ Kriegsstraße 100 tel: +49-721-96201-1 D-76133 Karlsruhe fax: +49-721-96201-99 ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 2: Don't 'kill -9' the postmaster
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
At 11:48 PM 8/27/2007, Trevor Talbot wrote: On 8/27/07, Jonah H. Harris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 8/27/07, Tom Lane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > that and the lack of evidence that they'd actually gain anything > > I find it somewhat ironic that PostgreSQL strives to be fairly > non-corruptable, yet has no way to detect a corrupted page. The only > reason for not having CRCs is because it will slow down performance... > which is exactly opposite of conventional PostgreSQL wisdom (no > performance trade-off for durability). But how does detecting a corrupted data page gain you any durability? All it means is that the platform underneath screwed up, and you've already *lost* durability. What do you do then? The benefit I see is you get to change the platform underneath earlier than later. Whether that's worth it or not I don't know - real world stats/info would be good. Even my home PATA drives tend to grumble about stuff first before they fail, so it might not be worthwhile doing the extra work. Regards, Link. ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 9: In versions below 8.0, the planner will ignore your desire to choose an index scan if your joining column's datatypes do not match
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
Tom Lane wrote: Would it be an option to have a checksum somewhere in each data block that is verified upon read? > >>> That's been proposed before and rejected before. See the >>> archives ... > > I think > the prior discussions were around the same time WAL was initially put > in, and/or when we dropped the WAL CRC width from 64 to 32 bits. > The very measurable overhead of WAL CRCs are the main thing that's > discouraged us from having page CRCs. (Well, that and the lack of > evidence that they'd actually gain anything.) Hmmm - silence me if I'm misunderstanding this, but the most conclusive hit I had was a mail by you: http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-general/2001-10/msg01142.php which only got affirmative feedback. Also, there's a TODO entry: - Add optional CRC checksum to heap and index pages This seems to me to be exactly what I wish for... To the best of my knowledge, the most expensive thing in databases today is disk I/O, because CPU speed is increasing faster. Although calculating a checksum upon writing a block to disk will certainly incur CPU overhead, what may have seemed too expensive a couple of years ago could be acceptable today. I understand the argument that it's the task of hardware and OS to see that data don't get corrupted, but it would improve PostgreSQL's reliabitity if it can detect such errors and at least issue a warning. This wouldn't fix the underlying problem, but it would tell you to not overwrite last week's backup tape... Not all databases are on enterprise scale storage systems, and there's also the small possibility of PostgreSQL bugs that could be detected that way. Yours, Laurenz Albe ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 1: if posting/reading through Usenet, please send an appropriate subscribe-nomail command to [EMAIL PROTECTED] so that your message can get through to the mailing list cleanly
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
On Mon, Aug 27, 2007 at 12:08:17PM -0400, Jonah H. Harris wrote: > On 8/27/07, Tom Lane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Indeed. In fact, the most likely implementation of this (refuse to do > > anything with a page with a bad CRC) would be a net loss from that > > standpoint, because you couldn't get *any* data out of a page, even if > > only part of it had been zapped. I think it'd be perfectly reasonable to have a mode where you could bypass the check so that you could see what was in the corrupted page (as well as deleting everything on the page so that you could "fix" the corruption). Obviously, this should be restricted to superusers. > At least you would know it was corrupted, instead of getting funky > errors and/or crashes. Or worse, getting what appears to be perfectly valid data, but isn't. -- Decibel!, aka Jim Nasby[EMAIL PROTECTED] EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com 512.569.9461 (cell) pgpyZg8gMulyv.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
On 8/27/07, Tom Lane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Indeed. In fact, the most likely implementation of this (refuse to do > anything with a page with a bad CRC) would be a net loss from that > standpoint, because you couldn't get *any* data out of a page, even if > only part of it had been zapped. At least you would know it was corrupted, instead of getting funky errors and/or crashes. -- Jonah H. Harris, Software Architect | phone: 732.331.1324 EnterpriseDB Corporation| fax: 732.331.1301 33 Wood Ave S, 3rd Floor| [EMAIL PROTECTED] Iselin, New Jersey 08830| http://www.enterprisedb.com/ ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 5: don't forget to increase your free space map settings
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
"Trevor Talbot" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On 8/27/07, Jonah H. Harris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I find it somewhat ironic that PostgreSQL strives to be fairly >> non-corruptable, yet has no way to detect a corrupted page. > But how does detecting a corrupted data page gain you any durability? > All it means is that the platform underneath screwed up, and you've > already *lost* durability. What do you do then? Indeed. In fact, the most likely implementation of this (refuse to do anything with a page with a bad CRC) would be a net loss from that standpoint, because you couldn't get *any* data out of a page, even if only part of it had been zapped. regards, tom lane ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 6: explain analyze is your friend
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
Jonah H. Harris wrote: > On 8/27/07, Tom Lane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> that and the lack of evidence that they'd actually gain anything > > I find it somewhat ironic that PostgreSQL strives to be fairly > non-corruptable, yet has no way to detect a corrupted page. The only > reason for not having CRCs is because it will slow down performance... > which is exactly opposite of conventional PostgreSQL wisdom (no > performance trade-off for durability). Why? I can't say I speak for the developers, but I think the reason is that data corruption can (with the very rare exception of undetected programming errors) only be caused by hardware problems. If you have a "proper" production database server, your memory has error checking, and your RAID controller has something of the kind as well. If not you would probably be running the database on a filesystem that has reliable integrity verification mechanisms. In the worst case (all the above mechanisms fail), you have backups. IMHO the problem is covered quite adequately. The operating system and the hardware cover for the database, as they should; it's _their_ job. -- Alban Hertroys [EMAIL PROTECTED] magproductions b.v. T: ++31(0)534346874 F: ++31(0)534346876 M: I: www.magproductions.nl A: Postbus 416 7500 AK Enschede // Integrate Your World // ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 5: don't forget to increase your free space map settings
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
On 8/27/07, Jonah H. Harris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 8/27/07, Tom Lane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > that and the lack of evidence that they'd actually gain anything > > I find it somewhat ironic that PostgreSQL strives to be fairly > non-corruptable, yet has no way to detect a corrupted page. The only > reason for not having CRCs is because it will slow down performance... > which is exactly opposite of conventional PostgreSQL wisdom (no > performance trade-off for durability). But how does detecting a corrupted data page gain you any durability? All it means is that the platform underneath screwed up, and you've already *lost* durability. What do you do then? It seems like the same idea as an application trying to detect RAM errors. ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 9: In versions below 8.0, the planner will ignore your desire to choose an index scan if your joining column's datatypes do not match
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
On 8/27/07, Tom Lane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > that and the lack of evidence that they'd actually gain anything I find it somewhat ironic that PostgreSQL strives to be fairly non-corruptable, yet has no way to detect a corrupted page. The only reason for not having CRCs is because it will slow down performance... which is exactly opposite of conventional PostgreSQL wisdom (no performance trade-off for durability). -- Jonah H. Harris, Software Architect | phone: 732.331.1324 EnterpriseDB Corporation| fax: 732.331.1301 33 Wood Ave S, 3rd Floor| [EMAIL PROTECTED] Iselin, New Jersey 08830| http://www.enterprisedb.com/ ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 3: Have you checked our extensive FAQ? http://www.postgresql.org/docs/faq
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
"Albe Laurenz" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Tom Lane wrote: >>> Would it be an option to have a checksum somewhere in each >>> data block that is verified upon read? >> That's been proposed before and rejected before. See the archives ... > I searched for "checksum" and couldn't find it. Could someone > give me a pointer? I'm not talking about WAL files here. "CRC" maybe? Also, make sure your search goes all the way back; I think the prior discussions were around the same time WAL was initially put in, and/or when we dropped the WAL CRC width from 64 to 32 bits. The very measurable overhead of WAL CRCs are the main thing that's discouraged us from having page CRCs. (Well, that and the lack of evidence that they'd actually gain anything.) regards, tom lane ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 2: Don't 'kill -9' the postmaster
Re: [HACKERS] [GENERAL] Undetected corruption of table files
Tom Lane wrote: >> Would it be an option to have a checksum somewhere in each >> data block that is verified upon read? > > That's been proposed before and rejected before. See the archives ... I searched for "checksum" and couldn't find it. Could someone give me a pointer? I'm not talking about WAL files here. Thanks, Laurenz Albe ---(end of broadcast)--- TIP 3: Have you checked our extensive FAQ? http://www.postgresql.org/docs/faq
