Re: [qubes-users] USB hardware firewall
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 2016-12-10 14:36, Robert Fisk wrote: > On 12/10/2016 08:25 AM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: >> This project have great potential! The USB proxy hardware can be >> used for somehow more secure USB keyboard usage on Qubes OS, when >> only a single USB controller is available. Take a look at this >> idea[1]: > >> Have a piece of hardware plugged between USB keyboard and PC (based >> on https://github.com/robertfisk/USG?), to encrypt and >> integrity-protect the events. And then decrypt them in dom0 and >> check integrity protection, and only then pass them down to input >> devices stack. This should at least partially guard against >> malicious USB VM. It still will be able to perform timing based >> attacks to guess what you're typing - not sure how accurate such >> attacks are currently. Such device could introduce artificial delay >> (like - inject queued events every 50ms) to at least partially >> mitigate such attacks. > >> What do you think about it? I think the hardware you've designed >> is perfect for this! > >> [1] >> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2507#issuecomment-265894809 > > This sounds like a great idea, and I am keen to be involved. There is > plenty of flash space available on the embedded CPUs to implement some > form of encryption, although the best method of doing so on bare-metal > ARM is certainly open for discussion. > > A recent batch of hardware samples sold out in November. Due to Real > Life(TM) the next batch of hardware is likely to be ready late January > or early February. Pricing is currently NZ$80 each (approx US$57). > > Regards, > Robert > Tracking this as a community-developed feature: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2518 https://www.qubes-os.org/qubes-issues/#usg-keyboard-hardware-proxy Please keep us posted as to your progress, and let us know how we can help. :) - -- Andrew David Wong (Axon) Community Manager, Qubes OS https://www.qubes-os.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYT6Z0AAoJENtN07w5UDAwXNsP/j0KrGEyjCHq0h3v7/nmlTwx YGn05f+Bh7L7r9HSGOeH9PMgKkFr85btXdXPhG5+swCSdFgmhbkcad0lgy8hX2mz uZND7Z/wnEI99kK7D2EN3Kl9vM4fHM4/I8jV6ulwXPrMfr8xNvdDiQn9JLfcUTwU SvL4VzP92JKZTss2ILfjK8TsH7cIoFek72+Bn9dQKyppDmrlxi9xu0Y67m0B8NkW L94YLLIQGO4Qq2vuuVlTIJmw6DGN8AXbwMwOixBtirM1AzeAZGt9GB3ZtTU438EE xFXc9Ould67L2sqluuj7rkLoAE6QnkhzeyCbsgfS6OcE2rCXCNdQkmjx8zXzLrgL DZg+D/PPCwSSyV2tzeGfsxTX4bY1w7dc8ecPHcgeuAV7L7UjL7hSrNJj3Y49jEtR XBmleAq9XCaStYl29MkpYNLddCI3grLMwRFnW9adg85PU2Zay7q64Ay8OSjZDa72 wuO57t6UchbHRURth5P8Sa2SmjzenohPPWeWOqETa6O1ZMj+4+P+X2F+cS1pawio EAggf4y/brbQkAAyC5eYpO7RxmzvbWN2Ciu0csYD8GEHBvvcJC2N/bENRBUujI8i J9AjU2E1hoYwRbghwk7iNRFzCcPr1WJW3sbhibKjaTrIwKVsib/3XkgeXM5e6bU1 yGJ9eVDpcb/ekzvzM5qm =kZIF -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/0a10c703-9bef-1878-363c-41d0705c4734%40qubes-os.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] USB hardware firewall
On 12/10/2016 05:36 PM, Robert Fisk wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 12/10/2016 08:25 AM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: On Sun, Sep 04, 2016 at 06:35:42PM +1200, Robert Fisk wrote: On 09/01/2016 06:55 PM, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote: I was thinking earlier that some form of a "USB Firewall" hardware device might be cool to create; one that goes into each USB port in between each device and the PC, and only passes a specific device, or only a HID device (and doesn't permit a drive to add another HID identity). Yet another side project for winter. :) There may be existing products. Ahem. Allow me to introduce you to a project I have been working on for a while now: https://github.com/robertfisk/usg/wiki https://github.com/robertfisk/USG/wiki/FAQ The USG (which is Good, not Bad) is a hardware firewall for your USB ports. It connects between your computer and your untrusted USB device, isolating the badness with two dedicated processors. Features: - Isolates low-level USB exploits by using a simple internal protocol with minimal attack surface - No hub support blocks 'hidden' malicious devices - Prevents devices changing their enumerated class after connection, stopping malicious class changes. Device support: mass storage (flash drives), keyboards, mice. Project status: You can build your own USG v0.9 hardware out of development boards if you are handy with a soldering iron. End user hardware is approaching production-ready status, samples will be available in the coming months. Feedback / pull requests / sales leads are welcome! This project have great potential! The USB proxy hardware can be used for somehow more secure USB keyboard usage on Qubes OS, when only a single USB controller is available. Take a look at this idea[1]: Have a piece of hardware plugged between USB keyboard and PC (based on https://github.com/robertfisk/USG?), to encrypt and integrity-protect the events. And then decrypt them in dom0 and check integrity protection, and only then pass them down to input devices stack. This should at least partially guard against malicious USB VM. It still will be able to perform timing based attacks to guess what you're typing - not sure how accurate such attacks are currently. Such device could introduce artificial delay (like - inject queued events every 50ms) to at least partially mitigate such attacks. What do you think about it? I think the hardware you've designed is perfect for this! [1] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2507#issuecomment-265894809 This sounds like a great idea, and I am keen to be involved. There is plenty of flash space available on the embedded CPUs to implement some form of encryption, although the best method of doing so on bare-metal ARM is certainly open for discussion. A recent batch of hardware samples sold out in November. Due to Real Life(TM) the next batch of hardware is likely to be ready late January or early February. Pricing is currently NZ$80 each (approx US$57). Regards, Robert -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYTINVAAoJEN65WsAVra66UqgP/js8V9oHjYtsVs8wHhBs0Iq+ NL4pWUUtceGlCPBJZnKhmPM2Q7gNve3CS4K1i3JikSGIMw4BTqH59JqRmHIv1UDW jH3DHfbGRLNXAJQTAUFQVV+M43rMQXcM0BT5xrTUdlwG8dQhe44cS+cW1BzmSBtn FsszZVEp7UU6IJ/YZMYfEIbd/dhq92YBU5fU16F6PVdAFq8ObQoLCMPxWN8GLSKy JgYkcRHiC2mjzYWN5hv+iZYFVWfxR33jkUoo7n2Iyaz27bYjHyKCy83sBsnhUaLg Xr2+HJxGoxtScG9Q42ay1/40W5LQyhLRyvnYg1Yih1p18JrY54oe4k2F5jGnj953 giQri7lg6xWk9Md9rDRKvq7Xc2Kd6VdRAp1ooPfehGSIidGRdyYEAVttaqMxmZB3 7U1j35ELDTN3q79++LxnQr01yERsQHM6cKYQsog5/mOHtSG2+iOK2RoNK5M2fhQB wrULmBTmwNruRGO+W2RBCcOZCvmP8WTthEb85BSVwHlrra6Vv02oFyAvDTj4Q8RI NLV9HqwXILW1eICCoQUOzcW41SAYrn3ykX/eWgksg221Lks9RWzfxDItBXtrjXSR pqKtbqRVZIT0k35GJug8RjTuG2JRaMbSEepblmWCvm9cN4bl/RRkOy9uRgfBLKsx +k6vRfW54/ly/WT/XVJh =1NhG -END PGP SIGNATURE- For the record there is also http://syncstop.com/ It isn't "smart" like this but it is more secure if you just want charging - in case you need to charge an unsafe (friends, colleagues) device on your laptop, or charge your device with someone elses charger or a public charger. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/3bbdce9f-5819-cbbc-322a-39d5b6a4ec58%40gmx.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] USB hardware firewall
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 12/10/2016 08:25 AM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > On Sun, Sep 04, 2016 at 06:35:42PM +1200, Robert Fisk wrote: >> On 09/01/2016 06:55 PM, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote: >>> I was thinking earlier that some form of a "USB Firewall" >>> hardware device might be cool to create; one that goes into >>> each USB port in between each device and the PC, and only >>> passes a specific device, or only a HID device (and doesn't >>> permit a drive to add another HID identity). Yet another side >>> project for winter. :) There may be existing products. > > >> Ahem. Allow me to introduce you to a project I have been working >> on for a while now: > >> https://github.com/robertfisk/usg/wiki >> https://github.com/robertfisk/USG/wiki/FAQ > >> The USG (which is Good, not Bad) is a hardware firewall for your >> USB ports. It connects between your computer and your untrusted >> USB device, isolating the badness with two dedicated processors. > >> Features: - Isolates low-level USB exploits by using a simple >> internal protocol with minimal attack surface > >> - No hub support blocks 'hidden' malicious devices > >> - Prevents devices changing their enumerated class after >> connection, stopping malicious class changes. > > >> Device support: mass storage (flash drives), keyboards, mice. > >> Project status: You can build your own USG v0.9 hardware out of >> development boards if you are handy with a soldering iron. End >> user hardware is approaching production-ready status, samples >> will be available in the coming months. > >> Feedback / pull requests / sales leads are welcome! > > This project have great potential! The USB proxy hardware can be > used for somehow more secure USB keyboard usage on Qubes OS, when > only a single USB controller is available. Take a look at this > idea[1]: > > Have a piece of hardware plugged between USB keyboard and PC (based > on https://github.com/robertfisk/USG?), to encrypt and > integrity-protect the events. And then decrypt them in dom0 and > check integrity protection, and only then pass them down to input > devices stack. This should at least partially guard against > malicious USB VM. It still will be able to perform timing based > attacks to guess what you're typing - not sure how accurate such > attacks are currently. Such device could introduce artificial delay > (like - inject queued events every 50ms) to at least partially > mitigate such attacks. > > What do you think about it? I think the hardware you've designed > is perfect for this! > > [1] > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2507#issuecomment-265894809 > > > This sounds like a great idea, and I am keen to be involved. There is plenty of flash space available on the embedded CPUs to implement some form of encryption, although the best method of doing so on bare-metal ARM is certainly open for discussion. A recent batch of hardware samples sold out in November. Due to Real Life(TM) the next batch of hardware is likely to be ready late January or early February. Pricing is currently NZ$80 each (approx US$57). Regards, Robert -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYTINVAAoJEN65WsAVra66UqgP/js8V9oHjYtsVs8wHhBs0Iq+ NL4pWUUtceGlCPBJZnKhmPM2Q7gNve3CS4K1i3JikSGIMw4BTqH59JqRmHIv1UDW jH3DHfbGRLNXAJQTAUFQVV+M43rMQXcM0BT5xrTUdlwG8dQhe44cS+cW1BzmSBtn FsszZVEp7UU6IJ/YZMYfEIbd/dhq92YBU5fU16F6PVdAFq8ObQoLCMPxWN8GLSKy JgYkcRHiC2mjzYWN5hv+iZYFVWfxR33jkUoo7n2Iyaz27bYjHyKCy83sBsnhUaLg Xr2+HJxGoxtScG9Q42ay1/40W5LQyhLRyvnYg1Yih1p18JrY54oe4k2F5jGnj953 giQri7lg6xWk9Md9rDRKvq7Xc2Kd6VdRAp1ooPfehGSIidGRdyYEAVttaqMxmZB3 7U1j35ELDTN3q79++LxnQr01yERsQHM6cKYQsog5/mOHtSG2+iOK2RoNK5M2fhQB wrULmBTmwNruRGO+W2RBCcOZCvmP8WTthEb85BSVwHlrra6Vv02oFyAvDTj4Q8RI NLV9HqwXILW1eICCoQUOzcW41SAYrn3ykX/eWgksg221Lks9RWzfxDItBXtrjXSR pqKtbqRVZIT0k35GJug8RjTuG2JRaMbSEepblmWCvm9cN4bl/RRkOy9uRgfBLKsx +k6vRfW54/ly/WT/XVJh =1NhG -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/1fe8b1eb-4de2-ca63-c91f-4b5d3387bfeb%40fastmail.fm. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] USB hardware firewall (was: epoxy on ram to prevent cold boot attacks?)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Sun, Sep 04, 2016 at 06:35:42PM +1200, Robert Fisk wrote: > On 09/01/2016 06:55 PM, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote: > > I was thinking earlier that some form of a "USB Firewall" hardware > > device might be cool to create; one that goes into each USB port in > > between each device and the PC, and only passes a specific device, > > or only a HID device (and doesn't permit a drive to add another HID > > identity). Yet another side project for winter. :) There may be > > existing products. > > > Ahem. Allow me to introduce you to a project I have been working on > for a while now: > > https://github.com/robertfisk/usg/wiki > https://github.com/robertfisk/USG/wiki/FAQ > > The USG (which is Good, not Bad) is a hardware firewall for your USB > ports. It connects between your computer and your untrusted USB > device, isolating the badness with two dedicated processors. > > Features: > - Isolates low-level USB exploits by using a simple internal protocol > with minimal attack surface > > - No hub support blocks 'hidden' malicious devices > > - Prevents devices changing their enumerated class after connection, > stopping malicious class changes. > > > Device support: mass storage (flash drives), keyboards, mice. > > Project status: You can build your own USG v0.9 hardware out of > development boards if you are handy with a soldering iron. End user > hardware is approaching production-ready status, samples will be > available in the coming months. > > Feedback / pull requests / sales leads are welcome! This project have great potential! The USB proxy hardware can be used for somehow more secure USB keyboard usage on Qubes OS, when only a single USB controller is available. Take a look at this idea[1]: Have a piece of hardware plugged between USB keyboard and PC (based on https://github.com/robertfisk/USG?), to encrypt and integrity-protect the events. And then decrypt them in dom0 and check integrity protection, and only then pass them down to input devices stack. This should at least partially guard against malicious USB VM. It still will be able to perform timing based attacks to guess what you're typing - not sure how accurate such attacks are currently. Such device could introduce artificial delay (like - inject queued events every 50ms) to at least partially mitigate such attacks. What do you think about it? I think the hardware you've designed is perfect for this! [1] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2507#issuecomment-265894809 - -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJYSwUuAAoJENuP0xzK19csXIYH/1Xw4r49ofa9P6RA3TJDqgv3 vN7+Qxzu6zXCIYt/TdWoaKtqvqsiHvhEHrFrTLE9+ysGcuiUtEzJtOBohw4WHFHd 1E1hOL14MTPUXEtu7Jrf2B5XYXQhnNTJgh58xG+nWqIpzi7/RkHz6lq9W8iRXfX2 qWfefAAH6PRywECaj6VEPh8PcbBtu9B3tn8977q1fKB3ZrltnFUjro0p9qLVQr6z eXE6mBWKKmvTyVGCe1xe3yp7p9LGzoUgsecZEtERZHtxViOlk9faTAHwU4vOho0N QlinJSUUdE8XWEVSGrNb+KB4Kbwikh7GoABWlSmYiJrOTxVMnOv7DE/mL5WEvtA= =6Cbj -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20161209192533.GA23647%40mail-itl. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] USB hardware firewall (was: epoxy on ram to prevent cold boot attacks?)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 09/01/2016 06:55 PM, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote: > I was thinking earlier that some form of a "USB Firewall" hardware > device might be cool to create; one that goes into each USB port in > between each device and the PC, and only passes a specific device, > or only a HID device (and doesn't permit a drive to add another HID > identity). Yet another side project for winter. :) There may be > existing products. Ahem. Allow me to introduce you to a project I have been working on for a while now: https://github.com/robertfisk/usg/wiki https://github.com/robertfisk/USG/wiki/FAQ The USG (which is Good, not Bad) is a hardware firewall for your USB ports. It connects between your computer and your untrusted USB device, isolating the badness with two dedicated processors. Features: - Isolates low-level USB exploits by using a simple internal protocol with minimal attack surface - No hub support blocks 'hidden' malicious devices - Prevents devices changing their enumerated class after connection, stopping malicious class changes. Device support: mass storage (flash drives), keyboards, mice. Project status: You can build your own USG v0.9 hardware out of development boards if you are handy with a soldering iron. End user hardware is approaching production-ready status, samples will be available in the coming months. Feedback / pull requests / sales leads are welcome! Robert -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXy8C+AAoJEN65WsAVra66zQEP/jJMgf8FnaLW9jLCb13dZbkM IQQ50CgOFyzVF+S//FlZ794k9qfMFxumxfVMATawsTBooNhlTa9ASedMrcoWMuZI fuYNMeVoSYijyavqvimHMS8axiKwaI48q6olrTsOKwDM6joBb3rKQnsv63NJlbH3 +qUOY9IVDSoFKG9ki9TpltknlYuI3NDIkPRr07Ekx5XiCs92CihuNn1xTlCtweEt 4Y1YtPv2HfYFGcbQk2w17efp0mFweiqZldsxbwNLEPv03GvrNg54vlxC1Yr8ByGB nSPHslfgaCOqv4/XMvYAUA+22b7+d6VxRIYFojetdmmCi5u5fIFGv+6ErLIpPTVs wNZOli0npmLeuAnYME+6wKw0ozsYtKQNudIATHy6t6IwWBew+SCoWnCdlJZQFx0i YZwv8kJXzqTGU50vxad1FsDYQL1AaBEJBwqAGS9vV5OsyvAqpXuUacZWzrLgT4hM +HupcnoWErFMZzbNZeTMMFHuP6yTwV0mh3jP99vLtLYyjYmq6qoy+aDCQUTvtH+Y 4wEq4h7VRY9U0HI5hq0B/5LyJw4KKpimYzNmSyiDi9/FSyRa9tPe1idYjHEQsCuU sTybVvwCocIKF23XV4vPHNYydcdMvG8aHHQSeZ9ywLEkmxTeL0s9SL1+qaOOcqPC c2HOcC6+FigpPFwrGvgC =Hvzi -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/57CBC0BE.6070709%40fastmail.fm. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.