Re: Good News From Across the Big Pond
At 02:58 PM 3/3/05 -0500, you wrote: Don't we do this all the time over here? An orthodox Jew can sport a beard and other dress despite an employer's general policy against this, while a reform Jew cannot. Muslim women can wear scarves in school even though not all do, because for some it is felt to be required and others not. Or has this law changed? But I read that a Sikh train passenger had been rousted for wearing his kirpan. (The other cases that I can recall were in Canada or Europe). On Thursday, March 3, 2005, at 02:49 PM, Rick Duncan wrote: Unequal accommodations with respect to religious attire--to accommodate moderate Muslims and their dress, but not extremist Muslims and their dress--would be a serious doctrinal problem both under FEC and EC (and EPC) here on this side of the Pond? No? Especially if there were evidence that the distinction was made because some students don't like the faiths perceived to beextremist. Imagine a public school in America that adopted a uniform policy that allowed one kind of religious uniform, but not another. Denominational discrimination under Larson and non-neutral under Smith. No? Again, I don't know European religious liberty law, but if I were litigating a case like this, I would want to know if this kind of denominational discrimination is permissible. Rick Duncan Steven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Isn't an accommodation denominational discrimination? And don't we encourage and even require that? It is troublesome only in the sense that sometimes applying the requirement is difficult or troublesome. Is that what you meant or did you mean doctrinally troublesome? Steve Jamar On Thursday, March 3, 2005, at 02:16 PM, Rick Duncan wrote: One problem with the uniform policy is that it does accommodate some religious students, but not others. Here is the New York Times report: In contrast to French state schools, where students are prohibited from wearing head scarves, Denbigh allows girls a choice: wearing standard pants or skirts, or dressing in a shalwar kameez, a traditional Muslim outfit consisting of pants covered by a tunic. Head scarves are allowed if they meet certain criteria.! But they don't allow the jilwab, apparently because it is regarded as being associated with Muslim extremism. This looks like denominational discrimination to me. Moderate Muslims are allowed to wear the shalwar kameez, but extremist Muslims are not allowed to wear the jilwab. I know almost nothing about European law (except that which has crept into U.S. Supreme Court opinions), but it seems to me that under any kind of religious liberty/religious equality protection denominational discrimination such as this should be troublesome. No? Rick Duncan -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8428 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar Rarely do we find men who willing! ly engage in hard, solid thinking. There is an almost universal quest for easy answers and half-baked solutions. Nothing pains some people more than having to think. - Martin Luther King Jr., Strength to Love, 1963 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 Red State Lawblog: www.redstatelaw.blogspot.com When the Round Table is broken every man must foll! ow either Galahad or Mordred: middle things are gone. C.S.Lewis, Grand Miracle I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed, or numbered. --The Prisoner image.tiff Celebrate Yahoo!'s 10th Birthday! Yahoo! Netrospective: 100 Moments of the Web ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/ The aim of education must be the training of independently acting and thinking
Good News From Across the Big Pond
Here's the problem. Suppose a public school in the USA has a "no headgear" dress code, and we have two religious groups that seek a religious accommodation. "Moderate" Christians (say, Methodists and Episcopalians) wear green headgear, and "extremist" Christians (say, Evangelicals and Catholics) wear red headgear. The School decides to permit green headgear for the "moderate" denominations, but not the red headgear for the "extremist" denominations. Isn't this what happened over in the UK? The school accommodated some Muslims and allowed them to wear the "shalwar kameez," but refused to accommodate "extremist" Muslims and their "jilwab." Moreover, this distinction may have been based, at least in part, on religious bigotry (as the Times put it, because "other students, including [some] Muslims, said they felt threatened by the jilbab because they associated it with extremism.") In the USA, this arguably constitutes a non-neutral burden under Smith and Lukumi and denominational discrimination under Larson v. Valente. Am I wrong? Isthis kind of denominational non-neutrality a factor under European law? By the way, I am re-sending this post because it appears some of you may not have received it yesterday. My apologies if you are getting this for the second time. Rick Duncan Steven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Don't we do this all the time over here? An orthodox Jew can sport a beard and other dress despite an employer's general policy against this, while a reform Jew cannot. Muslim women can wear scarves in school even though not all do, because for some it is felt to be required and others not.Or has this law changed?On Thursday, March 3, 2005, at 02:49 PM, Rick Duncan wrote: Unequal accommodations with respect to religious attire--to accommodate "moderate" Muslims and their dress,but not "extremist" Muslims and their dress--would be a serious doctrinal problem both under FEC and EC (and EPC) here on this side of the Pond? No? Especially if there were evidence that the distinction was made because some students don't like the faiths perceived to be"extremist." ! ; Imagine a public school in America that adopted a uniform policy that allowed one kind of religious uniform, but not another. Denominational discrimination under Larson and non-neutral under Smith. No? Again, I don't know European religious liberty law, but if I were litigating a case like this, I would want to know if this kind of denominational discrimination is permissible. Rick Duncan Steven Jamar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: Isn't an accommodation denominational discrimination? And don't we encourage and even require that? It is troublesome only in the sense that sometimes applying the requirement is difficult or "troublesome." Is that what you meant or did you mean doctrinally troublesome? Steve Jamar On Thursday, March 3, 2005, at 02:16 PM, Rick Duncan wrote: One problem with the uniform ! policy is that it does accommodate some religious students, but not others. Here is the New York Times report: "In contrast to French state schools, where students are prohibited from wearing head scarves, Denbigh allows girls a choice: wearing standard pants or skirts, or dressing in a shalwar kameez, a traditional Muslim outfit consisting of pants covered by a tunic. Head scarves are allowed if they meet certain criteria."!But they don't allow the "jilwab," apparently because it is regarded as being associated with Muslim"extremism." This looks like denominational discrimination to me. "Moderate" Muslims are allowed to wear the "shalwar kameez," but "extremist" Muslims are not allowed to wear the jilwab.I know almost nothing about European law (except tha! t which has crept into U.S. Supreme Court opinions), but it seems to me that under any kind of religious liberty/religious equality protection denominational discrimination such as this should be troublesome. No?Rick Duncan -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8428 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar "Rarely do we find men who willing! ly engage in hard, solid thinking. There is an almost universal quest for easy answers and half-baked solutions. Nothing pains some people more than having to think." - Martin Luther King Jr., "Strength to Love", 1963 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
Van Orden Transcript
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/03/transcripts_in_1.html Transcript(s) in Ten Commandments Cases 03:45 PM | Marty Lederman | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0) The Associated Press has posted an earlier-than usual transcript of Wednesday's oral argument in the Texas Ten Commandments case. We're still checking to see whether the transcript in the Kentucky case, McCreary County, is also available. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Van Orden Transcript
And here's the McCreary County transcript: http://wid.ap.org/documents/scotus/050302mccrearycounty.pdf - Original Message - From: Marty Lederman To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Friday, March 04, 2005 4:55 PM Subject: Van Orden Transcript http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/03/transcripts_in_1.html Transcript(s) in Ten Commandments Cases 03:45 PM | Marty Lederman | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0) The Associated Press has posted an earlier-than usual transcript of Wednesday's oral argument in the Texas Ten Commandments case. We're still checking to see whether the transcript in the Kentucky case, McCreary County, is also available. ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Protestants and non-Protestants
Marci, of course, is more than capable of speaking for herself. But I would think that the reference to religious intensity of belief that thrives in an environment of religious neutrality may relate to the inspiration and energy many religious groups experience in a regime of religious voluntarism -- where the success of faith-based congregations and communities depends on the personal commitment of religious individuals and associations and the power of their beliefs, rather than their ability to use the government to communicate self affirming messages or to subsidize their activities. Alan Brownstein UC Davis At 04:33 PM 3/4/2005 -0600, you wrote: Tom: I like the term, and I don't think it's so ugly as you suggest. Marci: Do you think it is empirically true that, as you say, The more the government is constrained to be neutral with respect to religion over the years, the more diversity and intensity of belief this society expresses? I suppose I might agree with the diversity point, but intensity I would agree with only in a very limited sense. Thus, I think Tom is right about the secularizing slippery slope, if you will (to use a favored phrase of our esteemed moderator). In addition, much of the public square agitating is clearly a response to what are taken to be hostile governmental -- let's face it, mostly judicial -- rulings. Richard Dougherty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom-- Thanks very much for your thoughtful answer. I completely agree with you on the first point. As a matter of fact, I think there is very little likelihood that this society can be secularized by government or any other entity. The more the government is constrained to be neutral with respect to religion over the years, the more diversity and intensity of belief this society expresses. The public square (which is to be distinguished from government space) is filled with religious ideas, political activity, and lobbying. Thus, I view the secularization thesis (used to justify government financial and other support for religion) as a myth at best, and a cover for intense political activity at worst, which is why I asked for clarification on what you meant by artificial secularization. Marci Tom-- Thanks very much for your thoughtful answer. I completely agree with you on the first point. As a matter of fact, I think there is very little likelihood that this society can be secularized by government or any other entity. The more the government is constrained to be neutral with respect to religion over the years, the more diversity and intensity of belief this society expresses. The public square (which is to be distinguished from government space) is filled with religious ideas, political activity, and lobbying. Thus, I view the secularization thesis (used to justify government financial and other support for religion) as a myth at best, and a cover for intense political activity at worst, which is why I asked for clarification on what you meant by artificial secularization. Marci (1) The belief that government is having this secularizing effect, and that itâ s a problem, is (rightly or wrongly) held by people across varying faiths, not just by evangelical Protestants. (2) To ensure that a secular government doesnâ t secularize society, government can take steps to preserve a vigorous private sector in religion. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawhttp://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
