Re: [tor-bugs] #22865 [Obfuscation/meek]: Explicitly set Content-Length to zero when there is no data to send

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22865: Explicitly set Content-Length to zero when there is no data to send
--+--
 Reporter:  twim  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by twim):

 Yes, this patch fixes 411 in GAE flex which always returns 411.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19476 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use conditional intervals in heartbeat_callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19476: Use conditional intervals in heartbeat_callback
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, heartbeat, usability, |  Actual Points:
  review-group-20|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Every 30 minutes is plenty.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19476 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use conditional intervals in heartbeat_callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19476: Use conditional intervals in heartbeat_callback
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, heartbeat, usability, |  Actual Points:
  review-group-20|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * reviewer:   => isis


Comment:

 I set myself as the reviewer for cypherpunks' patch, but someone else
 should review my changes!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19476 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use conditional intervals in heartbeat_callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19476: Use conditional intervals in heartbeat_callback
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, heartbeat, usability, |  Actual Points:
  review-group-20|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Hi! I applied cypherpunks' patch in my `bug19476` [ branch]. It mostly
 LGTM.

 I made the following small changes:
  - Instead of rescheduling for the next second—if the writing the
 heartbeat log message failed, retry `MIN_HEARTBEAT_PERIOD` seconds later.
 (The documentation for `MIN_HEARTBEAT_PERIOD` states that it is the
 "Lowest allowable value for HeartbeatPeriod; if this is too low, we might
 expose more information than we're comfortable with.")
  - Documented this behaviour in the `heartbeat_callback()` docstring.
  - Added a changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21953 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dealing with Tor hardening on Windows properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21953: Dealing with Tor hardening on Windows properly
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-backport, 029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22563 [Core Tor/Tor]: Many memory pages in tor.exe for Windows violate W^X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22563: Many memory pages in tor.exe for Windows violate W^X
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows tor-client win32 tor-relay   |  Actual Points:
  security hardening 031-backport,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201707R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:
 windows tor-client win32 tor-relay security hardening 031-backport,
 TorBrowserTeam201707
 =>
 windows tor-client win32 tor-relay security hardening 031-backport,
 TorBrowserTeam201707R
 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 The patch is now in mingw-w64 master. So here's a branch that pulls that
 in:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser-build/commit/22563

 (If we decide we want to apply it to alpha only, I think maybe we can use
 rbm vars to do that.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22755 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Use stem to create test descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22755: Use stem to create test descriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  python, stem, bridgedb-parsers,  |  Actual Points:
  bridgedb-ci|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22349 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir auth attempts to fetch a descriptor every minute for every relay with mismatched rsa/ed key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22349: dir auth attempts to fetch a descriptor every minute for every relay 
with
mismatched rsa/ed key
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 030-backport, tor- |  Actual Points:
  dirauth, review-group-20   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18856 [Core Tor/Stem]: Talk with tor's ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18856: Talk with tor's ORPort
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  descriptor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Here's what I must implement to do this:
 * implement VERSIONS, NETINFO, and CREATE_FAST in python
 * implement KDF-TOR in python
 * implement "hybrid encryption" in python
 * send a BEGINDIR cell containing a directory request
 * decode RELAY_DATA cells
 * make sure the ORPort and DirPort responses match

 Here's what I really should implement:
 * sendme cells, so we can download more than 250kB of data
 * closing the circuit properly using a DESTROY cell

 Here are optional things that would be nice:
 * parse error responses rather than ignoring them
 * use the v5 link protocol to disable link padding
 * verify relay hashes match the fingerprint
 * other certificate verification
 * do TAP or ntor (needs onion keys)
 * use cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf.HKDF for KDF-RFC5869
 * other protocol variations from tor-spec

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22572 [Core Tor/Tor]: please don't kill WarnUnsafeSocks option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22572: please don't kill WarnUnsafeSocks option
-+-
 Reporter:  starlight|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-deprecation tor-client needs-   |  Actual Points:
  design regression? |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by starlight):

 The motivation for removing the option (to prevent people from harming
 themselves inadvertently) is evident and sensible.  For me it would work
 if a prefix to the socks isolation username or password acted as a flag to
 suppress the warning.  Perhaps "UNSAFE" or similar blatant indication.
 The purpose of the script where this happens is issuing arbitrary DNS
 queries anonymously--no chance  I will accidently request my own addresses
 unintentionally.

 Or, don't worry about it.  I prefer logs clear of distracting noise (so I
 don't miss important messages) and have demoted several daemon messages to
 info or debug level in my builds.  I can hack this one as well.  But spam
 is spam and it invariable harms the signal-to-noise ratio on any channel.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22349 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir auth attempts to fetch a descriptor every minute for every relay with mismatched rsa/ed key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22349: dir auth attempts to fetch a descriptor every minute for every relay 
with
mismatched rsa/ed key
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 030-backport, tor- |  Actual Points:
  dirauth, review-group-20   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > Here's an oniongit.eu merge request.  Let's try it out!
 https://oniongit.eu/network/tor/merge_requests/1
 >
 > This branch is also in `bug22349_029` in my public repository.

 I was very excite to review there, but then nothing was wrong with your
 patch, so there was nothing to comment on except an overall "LGTM"! Next
 time you should make your patch have bugs or be controversial in some way!
 ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22891 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add GitLab CI configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22891: Add GitLab CI configs
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci continuous-integration testing|  Actual Points:
  best-practice unit-testing new-developers  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * cc: isis (added)


Comment:

 We'll need some VMs to
 [https://docs.gitlab.com/ce/ci/quick_start/README.html#configuring-a-runner
 setup runners] on, and the [https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/ GitLab
 official runner implementation] is written in Go (so it might be a good
 idea to have an ansible script for deploying the VMs, since Go is a huge
 pain to set up on Debian).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12541: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, tcp, kist, scheduling,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-relay, term-project-ideas  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * owner:   => pastly
 * status:  new => assigned
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22636: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  patrickod
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  continuous-integration ci testing|  Actual Points:  .5
  best-practice unit-testing new-developers  |
  travis |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:8 isis]:
 > Oh actually, this needs a changes file.  Let me do that.

 Okay done.

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[tor-bugs] #22891 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add GitLab CI configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22891: Add GitLab CI configs
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:
  catalyst   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  ci continuous-integration testing
 Severity:  Normal   |  best-practice unit-testing new-developers
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We'll soon have Travis configs (#22636), so we should also add a `.gitlab-
 ci.yml` or something so GitLab's continuous integration will do automated
 builds for oniongit and gitlab.com forks (and merge requests).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22636: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  patrickod
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  continuous-integration ci testing|  Actual Points:  .5
  best-practice unit-testing new-developers  |
  travis |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Oh actually, this needs a changes file.  Let me do that.

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[tor-bugs] #22890 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recent tor relays do use canonical connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22890: Recent tor relays do use canonical connections
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
 5.3.1. Canonical connections

It is possible for an attacker to launch a man-in-the-middle attack
against a connection by telling OR Alice to extend to OR Bob at some
address X controlled by the attacker.  The attacker cannot read the
encrypted traffic, but the attacker is now in a position to count all
bytes sent between Alice and Bob (assuming Alice was not already
connected to Bob.)

To prevent this, when an OR gets an extend request, it SHOULD use an
existing OR connection if the ID matches, and ANY of the following
conditions hold:
- The IP matches the requested IP.
- The OR knows that the IP of the connection it's using is
 canonical
  because it was listed in the NETINFO cell.
- The OR knows that the IP of the connection it's using is
 canonical
  because it was listed in the server descriptor.

[This is not implemented in Tor 0.2.0.23-rc.]
 }}}

 But it was implemented in some version since then.

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[tor-bugs] #22889 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add "no peer authentication" to the list of client identification methods in tor-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22889: Add "no peer authentication" to the list of client identification 
methods
in tor-spec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 CREATE_FAST is no longer a reliable client discriminator:
 {{{
If an OR sees a circuit created with CREATE_FAST, the OR is sure to be
 the
first hop of a circuit.  ORs SHOULD reject attempts to create streams
 with
RELAY_BEGIN exiting the circuit at the first hop: letting Tor be used
 as a
single hop proxy makes exit nodes a more attractive target for
 compromise.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22349 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir auth attempts to fetch a descriptor every minute for every relay with mismatched rsa/ed key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22349: dir auth attempts to fetch a descriptor every minute for every relay 
with
mismatched rsa/ed key
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 030-backport, tor- |  Actual Points:
  dirauth, review-group-20   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * reviewer:   => isis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22830 [Core Tor/Tor]: Problems with building with --enable-rust with RUST_DEPENDENCIES

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22830: Problems with building with --enable-rust with RUST_DEPENDENCIES
-+--
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
-+--
Changes (by isis):

 * reviewer:   => isis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22636: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  patrickod
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  continuous-integration ci testing|  Actual Points:  .5
  best-practice unit-testing new-developers  |
  travis |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * points:   => .5
 * actualpoints:   => .5
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 Hi! Patrick (patrickod) did a bunch of work on this, and I did a bit of
 work on top of that. Our changes are in my `bug22636`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug22636 branch],
 and as you can see, [https://travis-
 ci.org/isislovecruft/tor/builds/252621270 CI is passing]. :)

 Note that it passing depends on the minor fix for #22830 (changing `$HOME`
 to `$CARGO_HOME` in `src/rust/tor_util/include.am`, which I've included in
 this branch in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/commit/?h=bug22636=4c580a609e06b93a1ba3bb73ff4df959084a86dd
 commit] `4c580a609e`.

 If you have any questions about the whats or the whys of any of the
 directives in `.travis.yml`, please feel free to ask.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12890 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design and implement optimizations for socket write limits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12890: Design and implement optimizations for socket write limits
---+---
 Reporter:  robgjansen |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-relay kist networking tcp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12541 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 A lot has changed in the last year that I've been implementing KIST.

 It looks like most/all of this ticket deals with the KIST prototype that
 would run stuff off of the main thread and collect stats on all sockets.
 That's no longer a thing.

 Huge optimization: when it comes time to do some scheduling, only collect
 TCP info for the sockets that have channels ready to send. To quote our
 new KIST paper that hasn't been accepted anywhere yet.

 > We observed that the median number of write-pending sockets that
 accumulated during a 10 millisecond period was 23 (with min=1, q1=18,
 q3=27, and max=127), while the median amount of time to collect TCP
 information on all write-pending sockets was 23 microseconds (with min=1,
 q1=17, q3=33, and max=674). We observed a linear relationship between the
 amount of time required to collect TCP information on all write-pending
 sockets and the number of such sockets (1.08 microseconds per pending
 socket), independent of the total number of open sockets. Therefore, we
 believe that the KIST overhead, with our optimization of only collecting
 TCP information on pending sockets, should be tolerable to run in the main
 thread for even the fastest Tor relay.

 But what does the algorithm look like? See
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/pastly/tor.git/tree/src/or/scheduler_kist.c?h
 =kist-fortor-01=7cdff19bc14136e792c6d1ebcc8dfb8631a32db8#n205 here].

 {{{
   struct tcp_info tcp;
   socklen_t tcp_info_len = sizeof(tcp);
   getsockopt(sock, SOL_TCP, TCP_INFO, (void *)&(tcp), _info_len);
   ioctl(sock, SIOCOUTQNSD, &(ent->notsent));
   ent->cwnd = tcp.tcpi_snd_cwnd;
   ent->unacked = tcp.tcpi_unacked;
   ent->mss = tcp.tcpi_snd_mss;

   int64_t tcp_space, extra_space;
   tcp_space = (ent->cwnd - ent->unacked) * ent->mss;
   if (tcp_space < 0) tcp_space = 0;
   extra_space = (ent->cwnd * ent->mss) * sock_buf_size_factor -
 ent->notsent;
   if (extra_space < 0) extra_space = 0;
   ent->limit = tcp_space + extra_space;
   if (++counter >= 1000) {
 counter -= 1000;
 log_info(LD_SCHED, "socket info: cwnd=%d unacked=%d notsent=%d
 limit=%"
 PRIi64,
 ent->cwnd,
 ent->unacked,
 ent->notsent,
 ent->limit);
 }}}

 First calculate the amount of "TCP space" there is. This is the amount of
 data that the kernel should send out onto the wire immediately since TCP
 won't limit it.

 Then calculate some amount of extra space. To avoid starving the kernel,
 we want a //little// extra data to be there so if ACKs come back before
 the next scheduling run the kernel has something to send so the wire isn't
 idle. Assuming the `sock_buf_size_factor` is 1.0, we allow up to one extra
 congestion window worth of data to sit in the outbound kernel socket
 buffer.

 Add together the TCP space and extra space and that's the socket's KIST-
 imposed write limit.

 It requires two system calls. A recent version of linux (which came out in
 March 2016, see `git describe --contains cd9b2660` against the kernel) has
 a `struct tcp_info` intended for internal use that has notsentbytes in it.
 We'd only need one system call if we took advantage of that.

 What about cross platform support?

 In the name of actually getting KIST merged and to keep the code simple,
 we make no attempt to support anything other than Linux. This is a great
 balance between maximizing benefit and development cost. KIST checks for
 the `struct tcp_info`, that it has the right members, and that it can make
 the ioctl syscall too. If so, we have full KIST support. If not, we can
 still run the KIST scheduler but make the per-socket write limit INT_MAX.
 It won't hurt.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22830 [Core Tor/Tor]: Problems with building with --enable-rust with RUST_DEPENDENCIES

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22830: Problems with building with --enable-rust with RUST_DEPENDENCIES
-+--
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
-+--
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * owner:   => chelseakomlo
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201707   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:39 linda]:
 > We decided that keeping the padlock icon as is but removing the warning
 is the best course of action for now.

 Still better than the current situation, hope this lands soon.

 > What happens with loading http images on a .onion http site? etc.

 IMHO just as there's a padlock for when http resources get loaded with an
 https site
 
[[Image(https://support.cdn.mozilla.net/media/uploads/gallery/images/2015-10-21-18-54-26-fe01d6.png)]],
 there should too be a padlock for when http resources get loaded with an
 onion site.

 But again this isn't high priority for the moment, and the fix you agreed
 on will be vastly sufficient to counter this issue for most users.

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[tor-bugs] #22888 [- Select a component]: Permanent download URL for the latest release

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22888: Permanent download URL for the latest release
--+-
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/latest/README.txt says

 Please use download.mozilla.org to retrieve the latest Firefox release.

 For example, if you wish to download the US English installer for Windows
 (32bit)
 the url is
https://download.mozilla.org/?product=firefox-latest=win=en-US

 This could be pasted into the location bar of a browser, or used with curl
 or wget,  e.g.
 wget -O FirefoxSetup.exe "https://download.mozilla.org/?product=firefox-
 latest=win=en-US"


 Can you please offer this for Tor Browser too?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22524 [Applications/TorBirdy]: clear download history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22524: clear download history
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Maybe someone could file a new report and see if one of the Thunderbird
 developers is willing to bring that function back. Last time (looking at
 the bug reports) they refused because no-one presented them a 'valid' use
 case. If someone knows a good use case, they may change their mind.

 But to me that looks like something that should be solved in thunderbird.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22830 [Core Tor/Tor]: Problems with building with --enable-rust with RUST_DEPENDENCIES

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22830: Problems with building with --enable-rust with RUST_DEPENDENCIES
-+--
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
-+--

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:6 chelseakomlo]:
 > It seems there are two changes needed to close this ticket, but let me
 know if these are not what you were thinking:
 >
 > 1. We should update documentation for how to build in offline mode, via
 instructions above.
 > 2. We should use `CARGO_HOME` rather than `HOME` when building with Rust
 (see src/rust/tor_util/include.am, for example)
 >

 Yep! While working on #22830 I also verified that switching to
 `CARGO_HOME` [https://travis-ci.org/isislovecruft/tor/jobs/252571040 fixes
 the build].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22830 [Core Tor/Tor]: Problems with building with --enable-rust with RUST_DEPENDENCIES

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22830: Problems with building with --enable-rust with RUST_DEPENDENCIES
-+--
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
-+--

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 It seems there are two changes needed to close this ticket, but let me
 know if these are not what you were thinking:

 1. We should update documentation for how to build in offline mode, via
 instructions above.
 2. We should use `CARGO_HOME` rather than `HOME` when building with Rust
 (see src/rust/tor_util/include.am, for example)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22524 [Applications/TorBirdy]: clear download history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22524: clear download history
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > Seems like `browser.download.manager.retention 1` has had no function
 for years.
 >
 > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=838663
 > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=838681

 Interesting so there seems to be no way to do it from the preferences.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22865 [Obfuscation/meek]: Explicitly set Content-Length to zero when there is no data to send

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22865: Explicitly set Content-Length to zero when there is no data to send
--+--
 Reporter:  twim  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Thanks for the information. I'll try to reproduce with the flexible
 environment.

 Does attachment:0001-Explicitly-set-Content-Length-to-zero-when-there-
 is-.patch fix the error in the flexible environment? Or does it still
 return status 411 in some cases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20900 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Unable to open and install TorBirdy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20900: Unable to open and install TorBirdy
---+--
 Reporter:  IceFrog|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 (Since there has been no activity for a while.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22636: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  patrickod
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  continuous-integration ci testing|  Actual Points:
  best-practice unit-testing new-developers  |
  travis |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:   => patrickod


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21881 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Torbirdy for Mac Has Stopped Working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21881: Torbirdy for Mac Has Stopped Working
---+-
 Reporter:  mm |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  torbirdy 0.2.2 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21881 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Torbirdy for Mac Has Stopped Working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21881: Torbirdy for Mac Has Stopped Working
---+-
 Reporter:  mm |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  torbirdy 0.2.2 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Marking this as fixed. (Feel free to reopen if the issue persists.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16650 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Set up domain fronting for BridgeDB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16650: Set up domain fronting for BridgeDB
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bridgedb-dist, bridgedb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-wants, usability, bridge-distribution, |
  TorCoreTeam201608  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 David and I spent some time in April hacking on this, and we've got it set
 up such that, if you request https://tor-bridges-hyphae-
 channel.appspot.com/meek it'll go to the Apache reverse proxy on
 polyanthum, which strips out the authenticated layer of TLS (i.e. using
 the cert for bridges.torproject.org) and then passes the underlying
 payload (still TLS encrypted, but with a random cert) to meek which is
 listening on localhost, which then passes it to the BridgeDB server.
 (Right now the BridgeDB server doesn't understand the request yet for
 `bridges.torproject.org/meek` yet, so it responds with a 404. But the
 point is that the meek tunnel is set up and works.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21979 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Load and configure service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21979: prop224: Load and configure service
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-19,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-20|
Parent ID:  #20657   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Reviewed! Please let me know if you've any questions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21979 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Load and configure service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21979: prop224: Load and configure service
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-19,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-20|
Parent ID:  #20657   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22865 [Obfuscation/meek]: Explicitly set Content-Length to zero when there is no data to send

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22865: Explicitly set Content-Length to zero when there is no data to send
--+--
 Reporter:  twim  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by twim):

 Seems to be not a bug. This is now persistent behavior at Google AppEngine
 Flexible Environment. Most likely it was being upgraded at that moment.
 Standard Environment works as before (without inspection middleware).

 I'm curious how it works. This middleware returns an error //only// if
 domain is being fronted. If one goes with a correct `appspot.com` SNI it
 takes all requests directly to the backend. Probably there is routing in
 place that routes requests by SNI to some non-AppEngine frontend which
 performs these pre-checks. Though this doesn't explain why there are no
 such checks on Standard  Environment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22828 [Applications/TorBirdy]: UX: RSS Feed "Edit as new Message" has still Html bar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22828: UX: RSS Feed "Edit as new Message" has still Html bar
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial| Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Interesting. I haven't looked in too much detail yet, but it seems like
 editing a message from the feed brings up a HTML enabled compose window by
 default. Pressing "Shift" also doesn't seem to help.

 If you have any ideas meanwhile on how to force plain text here, please
 share.

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[tor-bugs] #22887 [HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome]: myfitnesspal errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22887: myfitnesspal errors
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere: Chrome |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When adding a food, the "recent" page is blank. When adding from the
 "frequent" page a "website down for maintenance" is returned from server.

 This only occurs with https everwhere on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18856 [Core Tor/Stem]: Talk with tor's ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18856: Talk with tor's ORPort
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  descriptor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:8 atagar]:
 > Interesting! The module which downloads descriptors from DirPorts
 doesn't require a tor binary and things like DocTor don't presently have
 one. However, if you think this is the best way to go it certainly would
 be a neat capability to have even if it does have that dependency.

 I was demonstrating how you could send Tor cells using a small amount of
 shell script, that could easily be translated into python.

 The tor binary is only used to test the code: in my example, I launched a
 tor relay so that I could get decent logging when my attempts to set up a
 circuit didn't work. (And because it's impolite to test against other
 people's relays.)

 > Ideal would be a pure python example of downloading a descriptor from a
 relay's ORPort but if that's extra tricky

 It's really not that tricky, unless you're trying to do it in bash. It
 just needs a decent crypto library, and stem already has a dependency on
 "cryptography".

 > certainly, a python example of doing this via the tor binary would be
 much appreciated. Thanks!

 A running tor binary automatically downloads descriptors, you can get them
 via 'GETINFO {desc,md}/id/'. You can also download individual
 networkstatus entries via 'GETINFO ns/id/'.

 So it would be easy to use the control port to download descriptors. But
 we should open a separate ticket for that: this ticket is about using the
 ORPort to download descriptors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SSL Auth broken in Tor Browser 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22855: SSL Auth broken in Tor Browser 7
+--
 Reporter:  bugster |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Note https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=325376#c20

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22842 [Webpages/Website]: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22842: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs
--+-
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > These pages would form sort of a knowledge base or resource section.

 Wiki pages would be the best for such a thing so why did you exclude them?
 I happened to find a similar trac ticket with the suggestion of having a
 https://wiki.torproject.org/ just like Mozilla's https://wiki.mozilla.org/
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22241

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22241 [Webpages/Website]: Implement a proper wiki (just as Mozilla does)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22241: Implement a proper wiki (just as Mozilla does)
--+--
 Reporter:  blockflare|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201707   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:39 linda]:
 > The UX team triaged the ticket today with Geko and catalyst a part of
 the conversaion.
 bla-bla-bla, bla-bla-bla...
 > We decided that keeping the padlock icon as is but removing the warning
 is the best course of action for now.
 warning padlock icon without a warning message...
 > The core issue here is that the lock icon indicates if it is http/https.
 Wrong, see MCB...
 > But what users really want to know is if the website is secure or not.
 Is knife secure or not? Life? HTTPS? Who will tell them?
 > While turning the lock icon to look secure would be telling them what
 they want to know ("yes, it is secure"), it is lying to them (since the
 indicator technically means that it is or is not https).
 Correct.
 > We have been discussing what we should do going forward--there were a
 lot of ideas, including: showing both an .onion icon and http/s icon and
 having a message for each combination of states, overriding the https and
 just showing the onion icon when on a .onion website (not messing with the
 https icon to lie, but to omit it), or focusing on just getting the user
 to use .onion AND https.
 The latter.
 > The issue is complicated though: .onion sites are secure
 Lie. See about the knife.
 > , but is it more/less/as secure as https? the answer is unclear. .onion
 sites can be easily be phishing sites due to their address, and has
 different security guarantees than https. What happens with loading http
 images on a .onion http site? etc.
 It is more about the connection, than HTTPS. About onion routing only.
 > Any feedback welcome.
 Feedback is given when something is done. There are only cries of some
 sort of users that can't understand the difference between "site" and
 "connection" for now.

 Mozilla says:
 > Clicking on the “i” icon, will show the text, “Connection is Not Secure”
 and “Logins entered on this page could be compromised”.
 To make it clear and TRUE, add "HTTP" - “Connection is Not Secure HTTP”
 and upstream.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21880 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Protected E-mail Headers (Enigmail)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21880: Protected E-mail Headers (Enigmail)
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for working on this ticket. This is merged in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbirdy.git/commit/?id=4fd21e7c854d25c4ebf158bf287ddd3e05ae6b9c
 4fd21e7c854] and will be a part of the next release. There is an option to
 disable this setting in case a user doesn't want it or it breaks their
 encrypted email communication.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22886 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Can't edit font mail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22886: Can't edit font mail
---+-
 Reporter:  peylight   |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Please see wiki:torbirdy#HowdoIsendandreceiveHTMLemails ... HTML emails
 (receiving or composing) is disabled by TorBirdy. Currently there is no
 way to override this setting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22886 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Can't edit font mail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22886: Can't edit font mail
---+-
 Reporter:  peylight   |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20657 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement service support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20657: prop224: Implement service support.
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 Many things have been addressed from asn's ongoing review. But if we want
 a chance to get this upstream not in 3 months, we have to start the
 upstream review process. We can easily deal with multiple reviewers at
 once. This branch is probably not perfect nor the 100% viable product but
 it's a start on which we can start fixing and improving on.

 Branch in: `ticket20657_032_02`

 Based on master commit 7b236403 and #21979. Review should start at this
 commit because everything before is #21979.

 {{{
 af027ddc prop224: API for the creation of blinded keys [David Goulet]
 }}}

 Oniongit: https://oniongit.eu/dgoulet/tor/merge_requests/5

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[tor-bugs] #22886 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Can't edit font mail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22886: Can't edit font mail
---+
 Reporter:  peylight   |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 why i can't edit font mail or i haven't any wysiwyg email editor after
 install !TorBirdy?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20929 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump GCC version in our alpha builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20929: Bump GCC version in our alpha builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201707R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201707  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > Not sure if I did everything right but here comes my first review
 request via `oniongit`. https://oniongit.eu/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle/merge_requests/1
 "You need to sign in or sign up before continuing."
 :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20929 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump GCC version in our alpha builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20929: Bump GCC version in our alpha builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201707R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201707  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1305396 is a non-issue
 anymore after we switched to esr52. Not sure which change fixed it,
 though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20929 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump GCC version in our alpha builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20929: Bump GCC version in our alpha builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201707R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201707  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201707, GeorgKoppen201707 => tbb-
 gitian, TorBrowserTeam201707R, GeorgKoppen201707


Comment:

 Not sure if I did everything right but here comes my first review request
 via `oniongit`. https://oniongit.eu/gk/tor-browser-bundle/merge_requests/1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22082 [Community]: Refine membership guidelines draft and submit proposal to tor-internal@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22082: Refine membership guidelines draft and submit proposal to tor-internal@
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22079 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by alison):

 Update: the guidelines are currently in the proposal phase on tor-internal

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21952 [Webpages]: Increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and aliasing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21952: Increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and
aliasing
-+---
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)
 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: padlock or colored url bar for connections to hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8686: padlock or colored url bar for connections to hidden services
-+-
 Reporter:  proper   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-usability, ux-|  Actual Points:
  team   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-usability => tbb-torbutton, tbb-usability,
 ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201707   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by linda):

 The UX team triaged the ticket today with Geko and catalyst a part of the
 conversaion.

 We decided that keeping the padlock icon as is but removing the warning is
 the best course of action for now.

 The core issue here is that the lock icon indicates if it is http/https.
 But what users really want to know is if the website is secure or not.
 While turning the lock icon to look secure would be telling them what they
 want to know ("yes, it is secure"), it is lying to them (since the
 indicator technically means that it is or is not https).

 We have been discussing what we should do going forward--there were a lot
 of ideas, including: showing both an .onion icon and http/s icon and
 having a message for each combination of states, overriding the https and
 just showing the onion icon when on a .onion website (not messing with the
 https icon to lie, but to omit it), or focusing on just getting the user
 to use .onion AND https.

 The issue is complicated though: .onion sites are secure, but is it
 more/less/as secure as https? the answer is unclear. .onion sites can be
 easily be phishing sites due to their address, and has different security
 guarantees than https. What happens with loading http images on a .onion
 http site? etc. Any feedback welcome.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18856 [Core Tor/Stem]: Talk with tor's ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18856: Talk with tor's ORPort
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  descriptor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Interesting! The module which downloads descriptors from DirPorts doesn't
 require a tor binary and things like DocTor don't presently have one.
 However, if you think this is the best way to go it certainly would be a
 neat capability to have even if it does have that dependency.

 Ideal would be a pure python example of downloading a descriptor from a
 relay's ORPort but if that's extra tricky certainly, a python example of
 doing this via the tor binary would be much appreciated. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22359 [Core Tor/Tor]: Community team and network team are constructing glossaries in parallel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22359: Community team and network team are constructing glossaries in parallel
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc wiki glossary website tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => doc wiki glossary website tor-spec
 * cc: catalyst, chelseakomlo (added)


Comment:

 I think it's not too nutty to have both a technical glossary and a user
 facing glossary -- but if that's where we are going we should probably try
 to get their in a coordinated way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22819 [Core Tor/Tor]: Choice of compressors seems to be suboptimal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22819: Choice of compressors seems to be suboptimal
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: ahf (added)
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 ahf, do you have time to re-run the analysis on lz4 before 0.3.1 ships?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21975 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor all the startup stuff in config.c, with dependencies in mind

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21975: Refactor all the startup stuff in config.c, with dependencies in mind
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor configuration torrc tor-|  Actual Points:
  client tor-relay sponsor8-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  refactor => refactor configuration torrc tor-client tor-relay
 sponsor8-maybe


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22852 [Webpages/Website]: donate.torproject.org header broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22852: donate.torproject.org header broken
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22534 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop parsing rend protocol versions greater than 7 in legacy hidden service descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22534: Stop parsing rend protocol versions greater than 7 in legacy hidden 
service
descriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.3-alpha
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  hs-legacy spec-conformance maybe-|  Actual Points:
  wontfix legacy-hs  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  hs-legacy => hs-legacy spec-conformance maybe-wontfix legacy-
   hs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22572 [Core Tor/Tor]: please don't kill WarnUnsafeSocks option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22572: please don't kill WarnUnsafeSocks option
-+-
 Reporter:  starlight|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-deprecation tor-client needs-   |  Actual Points:
  design |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => anti-deprecation tor-client needs-design


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix fd leak-on-close from tor-fw-helper pipe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22382: Fix fd leak-on-close from tor-fw-helper pipe
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-fw-helper fd-leak |  Actual Points:
  easy   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client tor-fw-helper fd-leak => tor-client tor-fw-helper
 fd-leak easy


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22843 [Community/Outreach]: Write blog post about drawbacks of transparent Tor proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22843: Write blog post about drawbacks of transparent Tor proxies
+---
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  mrphs, alison
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:  hiro => mrphs, alison
 * component:  Webpages/Blog => Community/Outreach


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13279 [Applications/Tor Browser]: In Tor Browser Sync is not working anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13279: In Tor Browser Sync is not working anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  JoeVR|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-testcase  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closing this old ticket due to a lack of response from the affected user
 (and the fact that the issue is probably fixed). Please re-open if not.

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[tor-bugs] #22884 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor page is not showing up in non-e10s mode after fix for #18913 landed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22884: about:tor page is not showing up in non-e10s mode after fix for #18913
landed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-torbutton
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I investigated #22788 and while doing so realized that the `about:tor`
 page is not showing up when starting in non-e10s mode. Bisecting leads to
 the fix for #18913. This happens on a Linux box at least.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13317 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor 3.6.6 Mac freezing regularly OS 10.6.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13317: Tor 3.6.6 Mac freezing regularly OS 10.6.8
--+--
 Reporter:  obiwandb  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  Freezing 10.6.8   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 No response from the original reporter. Please re-open this ticket if this
 is still an issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22351 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should bridge lines in the state file use unlisted_since?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22351: Should bridge lines in the state file use unlisted_since?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop271 needs-analysis guards tor-   |  Actual Points:
  client bridges |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * keywords:   => prop271 needs-analysis guards tor-client bridges
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22450 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor works in compatibility mode on Windows 7 and later

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22450: Tor works in compatibility mode on Windows 7 and later
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, windows, win32 needs-|  Actual Points:
  windows|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, windows => tor-client, windows, win32 needs-
   windows


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve documentation for building Tor with Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22818: Improve documentation for building Tor with Rust
-+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust tor-build docs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  rust => rust tor-build docs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22094 [Core Tor/Tor]: Creating private_key/hostname fails with "RO filesystem" message but target dir is actually RW

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22094: Creating private_key/hostname fails with "RO filesystem" message but 
target
dir is actually RW
-+-
 Reporter:  nipil|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay systemd configuration  |  Actual Points:
  debian downstream  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay systemd configuration debian downstream


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22697 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should mandatory require brackets around ipv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22697: Tor should mandatory require brackets around ipv6 address
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay parsing ipv6|  Actual Points:
  compatibility-issues   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client tor-relay parsing ipv6 compatibility-issues


Comment:

 I'm okay with making this more consistent, but if we do, we should try
 very hard to avoid breaking backward compatibility, and we should make
 sure that warning messages are logical and comprehensible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22852 [Webpages/Website]: donate.torproject.org header broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22852: donate.torproject.org header broken
--+---
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:   => ux-team,


Comment:

 I think this is intended. Tagging the #ux-team to confirm this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement protover in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22840: Implement protover in Rust
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust protover rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorZ
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  rust => rust protover rust-pilot


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22433 [Core Tor/Tor]: Options for hidden services to choose nodes.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22433: Options for hidden services to choose nodes.
+--
 Reporter:  NorbertSzczybelski  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22735 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HS desc overlap period func uses absolute times instead of slots

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22735: prop224: HS desc overlap period func uses absolute times instead of 
slots
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 prop224-extra tor-hs spec-   |  Actual Points:
  conformance|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  prop224 prop224-extra tor-hs => prop224 prop224-extra tor-hs
 spec-conformance
 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17341 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The spoof English prompt is not always seen by users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17341: The spoof English prompt is not always seen by users
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 It turns out that this was fixed as a side effect of the fix for #18019.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21935 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Deeper testing of HS ntor subsystem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21935: prop224: Deeper testing of HS ntor subsystem
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, prop224-extra, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  tests, technical-debt  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * keywords:  prop224, prop224-extra, tor-hs, tests => prop224,
 prop224-extra, tor-hs, tests, technical-debt


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22843 [Community/Outreach]: Write blog post about drawbacks of transparent Tor proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22843: Write blog post about drawbacks of transparent Tor proxies
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  mrphs, alison => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22156 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Rust linting/formatting tools

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22156: Add Rust linting/formatting tools
+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust best-practice  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  rust => rust best-practice


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21989: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dns, tor-exit, reliability self- |  Actual Points:
  test   |
Parent ID:  #21900   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  dns, tor-exit => dns, tor-exit, reliability self-test
 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22380 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make windows log_from_handle() handle partial lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22380: Make windows log_from_handle() handle partial lines
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client windows ipc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client windows => tor-client windows ipc


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22304 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support generating HS private key / onion address without publishing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22304: Support generating HS private key / onion address without publishing
-+-
 Reporter:  segfault |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails tor-hs needs-design |  Actual Points:
  intro keygen ui|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  AffectsTails => AffectsTails tor-hs needs-design intro keygen
   ui


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support HTTP CONNECT tunnels as an alternative to SOCKS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22407: Support HTTP CONNECT tunnels as an alternative to SOCKS
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client pt-v2 application-|  Actual Points:
  support http-connect needs-design prop229  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > HTTP CONNECT also supports authentication, which can be used in place of
 SOCKS' password authentication, which Tor uses for isolating circuits.
 It's implemented simply as an HTTP header, which the RFC shows with the
 example header `Proxy-Authorization: basic aGVsbG86d29ybGQ=`. To the best
 of my knowledge, HTTP CONNECT supports all features which Tor uses from
 SOCKS proxies, so no strange hacks would be required to permit full usage
 of this protocol. It is a very simple protocol (when the CONNECT method is
 the only one implemented), so it can be made very simple and secure.

 So, I think that instead of just overloading proxy-authorization here, it
 might make more sense to allocate an additional header for applications
 that are tor-aware.  One of the nice things about HTTO CONNECT is that we
 can add new headers rather than overloading ones that already existed.

 > In terms of difficulties I get when using Tor, I'd say that the lack of
 HTTP proxy support is in my top 5 grievances. It is not pleasant needing
 to use the ugly hack that is libtorsocks to hook (and often break) a
 program that fully supports HTTP proxies. As the OP stated, this shouldn't
 be a complex, caching, featureful "secure HTTP proxy", but just a simple
 alternative to `SOCKSPort`.
 >
 > Are there no objections to the spirit of this ticket, making actual
 implementation and discussion of specific behavior the only thing holding
 this back?

 I think that a design for the behavior and the actual implementation are
 the only things I'm aware of.

 One thing that a design has to take into account is to make sure that this
 won't open up any exciting new security holes from a local non-tor-aware
 web browser running hostile pages.  But I think that shouldn't be pretty
 hard -- it's just that the argument should be explicit.

 The implementation should probably be written to add a new client
 connection type, HTTPConnectPort, in the style of SOCKSPort.  It can share
 most of the implementation with socks connections, except that instead of
 entering AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT on construction, it should enter a new
 state, AP_CONN_STATE_HTTP_CONNECT_WAIT.  It can probably use the existing
 fetch_from_buf_http() implementation (possibly with small inputs) to parse
 its implementation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22203 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should a hup reload the geoip files?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22203: Should a hup reload the geoip files?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro tor-client tor-relay geoip |  Actual Points:
  hup configuration reload   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => intro tor-client tor-relay geoip  hup configuration reload
 * points:   => 2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22885 [Core Tor/Tor]: When uploading the first descriptor of a session, call it dirty because "Tor just started"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22885: When uploading the first descriptor of a session, call it dirty because
"Tor just started"
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 See branch `bug22885` in my public repository.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document which interface is used for DNS requests in the context of OutboundBindAddressOR/Exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22145: Document which interface is used for DNS requests in the context of
OutboundBindAddressOR/Exit
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-doc manpage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy doc => easy tor-doc manpage
 * points:   => .5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22363 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make our test network public

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22363: Make our test network public
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  test-network integration-testing |  Actual Points:
  needs-though   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  test-network => test-network integration-testing needs-though


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22885 [Core Tor/Tor]: When uploading the first descriptor of a session, call it dirty because "Tor just started"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22885: When uploading the first descriptor of a session, call it dirty because
"Tor just started"
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12846 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to launch with error "Failed to connect to Tor network"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12846: Tor Browser fails to launch with error "Failed to connect to Tor 
network"
--+--
 Reporter:  trlaunch01|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.21
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closing this old ticket (anti-virus or anti-malware software may have been
 the cause, but at this point there is no way to confirm that fact).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21301 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adjustable parameters for torrc-defaults file path and "Tor files" directory path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21301: Adjustable parameters for torrc-defaults file path and "Tor files"
directory path
--+
 Reporter:  proxybrain|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 proxybrain]:
 > ...
 > So, all considered, the automation process would be much simpler if it
 were possible to invoke the TBB executable such that it writes the `TBB
 default profile` to disk, at a specified path, and then exits.

 I am sorry for the delayed response (I just found this ticket again by
 chance). Since we fixed #13252, new profiles are created with the correct
 files and settings on OSX. This is not yet true on Windows or Linux
 although we hope to fix that someday (see #18367 and #18369).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22403 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reset downloads more consistently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22403: Reset downloads more consistently
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bootstrap tor-client refactor|  Actual Points:
  technal-debt directory-protocol|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bootstrap => tor-bootstrap tor-client refactor technal-
 debt directory-protocol


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run tests for single Rust module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22816: Run tests for single Rust module
--+
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust unit-tests test-harness  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  rust => rust unit-tests test-harness


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22123 [Core Tor/Tor]: baseXX API strictness

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22123: baseXX API strictness
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt refactor api  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => technical-debt refactor api


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22491 [Core Tor/Tor]: DownloadExtraInfo doesn't download bridge extra infos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22491: DownloadExtraInfo doesn't download bridge extra infos
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy doc tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy doc => easy doc tor-bridge
 * points:   => .2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22636: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  continuous-integration ci testing|  Actual Points:
  best-practice unit-testing new-developers  |
  travis |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * keywords:  ci =>
 continuous-integration ci testing best-practice unit-testing new-
 developers travis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22852 [Webpages/Website]: donate.torproject.org header broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22852: donate.torproject.org header broken
--+---
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by linda):

 This is the intended design. See the mock here:
 https://share.riseup.net/#Fb6acUlv9Yj7F2_Psxmerw

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13372 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to launch Tor browser from a memory stick

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13372: Unable to launch Tor browser from a memory stick
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 No response from the original reporter. If this is still an issue, please
 re-open this ticket and provide more information such as what was
 requested in comment:1.

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