Re: [tor-bugs] #23972 [Webpages/Website]: Add a link to torproject.org's onion service at the bottom

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23972: Add a link to torproject.org's onion service at the bottom
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21952| Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => antonela
 * parent:   => #21952


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/8

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23001 [Webpages/Website]: On the website, in the 'bridges' section, update references from 'obfs3' to 'obfs4'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23001: On the website, in the 'bridges' section, update references from 
'obfs3' to
'obfs4'
+--
 Reporter:  snoek   |  Owner:  t0mmy
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, obfsproxy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25218  | Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  (none) => t0mmy
 * keywords:   => website-content, obfsproxy
 * status:  new => assigned
 * parent:   => #25218
 * reviewer:   => hiro


Comment:

 There are chances the PR in #25218 fixes this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26781 [Webpages/Website]: onion version should link onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26781: onion version should link onion addresses
--+--
 Reporter:  modikonark|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21952| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>
 * parent:   => #21952


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22405 [Webpages/Website]: Fix onion links for downloading Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22405: Fix onion links for downloading Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21952| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #21952


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18911 [Webpages/Website]: bitcoin donations via BitPay don't work properly for tor users (BitPay uses Cloudflare)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18911: bitcoin donations via BitPay don't work properly for tor users (BitPay 
uses
Cloudflare)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  cloudflare mitm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27132| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #27132


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11289 [Webpages/Website]: FAQ entry for where Tor's data directory is

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11289: FAQ entry for where Tor's data directory is
--+---
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  mttp
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  FAQ => website-content, FAQ


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13843 [Webpages/Website]: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering and exiting from the same country."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13843: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering 
and
exiting from the same country."
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  website-content => website-content, FAQ


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13665 [Webpages/Website]: Update the obfsbridge setup instructions on the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13665: Update the obfsbridge setup instructions on the website
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  website
 |  redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, FAQ, obfsproxy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  website-content => website-content, FAQ, obfsproxy


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11289 [Webpages/Website]: FAQ entry for where Tor's data directory is

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11289: FAQ entry for where Tor's data directory is
--+---
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  mttp
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  FAQ   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  website-content => FAQ


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23371 [Webpages/Website]: adding a short paragraph on how to protect themself anonymous on internet and outside of it to " Tips On Staying Anonymous » "

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23371: adding a short paragraph on how to protect themself anonymous on 
internet
and outside of it to " Tips On Staying Anonymous » "
---+--
 Reporter:  throwable_account  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  FAQ|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => FAQ


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Loading erros while using a web-site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27023: Loading erros while using a web-site
--+---
 Reporter:  nightwolf_ch  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  Webpages/Website => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 I am not able to reproduce this, instead i saw "Please turn JavaScript on
 and reload the page."

 After enabling js the page was looking functional. Please contact the
 service provide if the problem persists.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26915 [Webpages/Website]: [Jobs page] Move Fundraising Director from currently-looking-for list to looked-for list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26915: [Jobs page] Move Fundraising Director from currently-looking-for list to
looked-for list
--+
 Reporter:  t0mmy |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => closed


Comment:

 
https://github.com/torproject/webwml/commit/769769bdf307374fbf4311b4c6ee635f0ebbd00e
 #diff-0e6d0b7252bf17eb1dd8c7894e0533bd

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26781 [Webpages/Website]: onion version should link onion addresses (was: Possible incorrect Tor onion configuration)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26781: onion version should link onion addresses
--+
 Reporter:  modikonark|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The first problem is solved. Links to blog and projects however aren't
 onions addresses. I can't think of an easy way to implement this (except
 that the webserver delivers different versions based on the UA). If you
 have another idea, please open a new feature request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13469 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows installer is missing many languages from the NSIS file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13469: Windows installer is missing many languages from the NSIS file
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => l10n


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows installer's language should default to the bundle's language

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11013: Windows installer's language should default to the bundle's language
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 See also #13469—some of Tor Browser's supported localizations (e.g.
 Chinese, Farsi) are not even present in the installer combobox, apparently
 due to a font encoding issue. A few years ago when I was looking into it,
 I found that a newer version of NSIS (v3.0+) would be needed for Unicode
 support.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26539 [Webpages/Website]: add checksums to download page; make checksum vs. sig file purpose much clearer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26539: add checksums to download page; make checksum vs. sig file purpose much
clearer
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gpg, verify gpg signatures  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3893   | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #3893


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26361 [Webpages/Website]: Please remove/deactivate job posting on website (Localization Project Manager)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26361: Please remove/deactivate job posting on website (Localization Project
Manager)
--+
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 
https://github.com/torproject/webwml/commit/7b9311ad3101e265b4172103d810798e3fb56e77
 #diff-0e6d0b7252bf17eb1dd8c7894e0533bd

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26133 [Webpages/Website]: Add OnionBrowser to TorProject.org/download redesigned page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26133: Add OnionBrowser to TorProject.org/download redesigned page
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  download  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => download
 * owner:  (none) => traumschule
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I'd link [https://prism-break.org/en/categories/ios here]. It describes
 the problem with IOS quite well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20618 [Applications/GetTor]: GetTor does not return download links when using Protonmail.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20618: GetTor does not return download links when using Protonmail.com
+--
 Reporter:  gaj |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GetTor, download links, protonmail  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi Gaj, sorry for the long delay. Do you happen to use the
 [https://protonmail.com/support/knowledge-base/encrypt-for-outside-users/
 outside encryption] feature of protonmail?

 What you pasted above are multipart messages. This is not very helpful in
 here. Try to find an option to disable HTML mails and all kinds of
 automatic encrypted and try again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25730 [Webpages/Website]: The Tor website's bridges page has old Tor Browser screenshots

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25730: The Tor website's bridges page has old Tor Browser screenshots
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  (none) => ggus
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 duplicates #25218

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25475 [Webpages/Website]: Credits page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25475: Credits page
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  (none) => traumschule
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I think this is important. One approach is to list contributors one page
 based on the existing projects lists. I remember a neat guide on github to
 represent all people active in a project not only coders. With respect to
 the [https://gitweb.torproject.org/ long list of repositories]. This could
 become quite comprehensive.

 Assigning ti myself to not forget about it after the TBB 8 release. If I
 do, please grab it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25385 [Webpages/Website]: update chroot howtos (was: updated chroot document to reference)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25385: update chroot howtos
-+--
 Reporter:  gman999  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  chroot openbsd tor, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  chroot openbsd tor => chroot openbsd tor, FAQ


Comment:

 As this is still open I take the chance to mention that
 [[doc/TorInChroot]] is outdated as well. I linked to the current debian
 guide but this is not solution. "It will result in a Tor-Installation
 which will be run in a chroot-environment by the special user tor" is
 basically what a packaged installation achieves, so it would be better to
 replace the instructions with a link to the package. However on some
 installations (like shared hosting) apt and dpkg are not accessible and
 the instructions to install from source are helpful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24880 [Webpages/Website]: Update onion service instructions to use next-gen onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24880: Update onion service instructions to use next-gen onion services
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  FAQ   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => FAQ


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I think I know what the bug for `hs-v23-ipv6-md` is: some addresses are
 being marked as they don't make it through
 `fascist_firewall_allows_address_ap()` (I believe the main Tor codebase
 does not make addresses go though this now, nor does my old "simplified"
 address choosing code that got abandoned).

 A solution can be to add a flag like `verify_addr` to
 `fascist_firewall_choose_address_impl()`,
 `fascist_firewall_choose_address()`, and
 `fascist_firewall_choose_address_base()` that determines whether we should
 verify the addresses or not, and set this flag to `0` in
 `fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls()`'s call to
 `fascist_firewall_choose_address_base()` and `1` in other calls.

 In my solution, we end up choosing addresses by replacing code in
 `fascist_firewall_choose_address_impl()` from something like this:

 {{{
if (fascist_firewall_allows_address_ap(a, fw_connection, pref_only,
   pref_ipv6)) {
 }}}

 to this:

 {{{
if (fascist_firewall_allows_address_ap(a, fw_connection, pref_only,
   pref_ipv6) || !verify_addr) {
 }}}


 Would this be okay? I know this may not be a good solution, but it may
 help fix this bug we are talking about (and is similar to my previous
 address choosing code which worked, but with the
 `fascist_firewall_allows_address_*` family of functions).

 I also attempted to do a three-hop fallback, and merged it with this
 codebase (not committed at all), but it still crashed with the same error
 described. It is possible that my three-hop fallback is broken.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23809 [Webpages/Website]: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23809: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  FAQ   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => FAQ


Comment:

 Alec Muffett develops
 [https://github.com/alecmuffett/eotk/blob/master/opt.d/build-tor-on-
 raspbian-stretch.sh EOTK] to make it easier to set up mirrors and
 integration with Onion Balance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26779 [Core Tor/Tor]: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26779: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression, 032-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport, 035-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Ok this seems plausible to me that it detects a working stdatomic, and if
 not, falls back to our previous mutex-based functions.

 I'm setting this to merge ready, but with the caveat that I'm not the best
 person to review this to ensure that all the stdatomic stuff is sane. But
 the ifdef changes check out. The 033 branch does appear to replace all
 usage of HAVE_STDATOMIC_H with HAVE_WORKING_STDATOMIC.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5463 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB must GPG-sign outgoing mails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5463: BridgeDB must GPG-sign outgoing mails
-+
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bridgegb-email, bridgedb-ui  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3893| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * severity:   => Blocker
 * parent:   => #3893


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23446 [Webpages/Website]: Write a guidelines documentation for requirements with Tor integration by third parties

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23446: Write a guidelines documentation for requirements with Tor integration 
by
third parties
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  FAQ   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => FAQ


Comment:

 The UA differs depending on the used OS and its is not the only way to
 fingerprint users (#26146).

 I wonder if a link to the [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git tor
 spec] in the FAQ answering a question like "How to implement an
 application based on/like Tor" is what the reporter meant.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24465 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Snowflake broken if no libatomic on host

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24465: Snowflake broken if no libatomic on host
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, tbb-rbm,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 For review:

 https://github.com/azadi/tor-browser-build-1/tree/bug-24465

 Note that this simply copies the library from `gcc/libs`. Perhaps we can
 do something similar for #25485, where we first try to run `snowflake-
 client` and if it fails, then only we add it `libatomic.so` to
 `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`. Is that preferred?

 I reproduced and tested this on Lubuntu 17.10.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22958 [Webpages/Website]: Update website FAQ about padding defenses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22958: Update website FAQ about padding defenses
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  website
   |  redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website, website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  website, website-content => website, website-content, FAQ


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22265 [Webpages/Website]: write high-level overview of bootstrap process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22265: write high-level overview of bootstrap process
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  FAQ   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => FAQ


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22842 [Webpages/Website]: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22842: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs
--+---
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  ux-team => ux-team, FAQ


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Re: [tor-bugs] #3893 [Webpages/Website]: Verifying-signatures needs some work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3893: Verifying-signatures needs some work
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #23266


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18925 [Webpages/Website]: Add instructions for removing the code signing parts of OS X bundles and MAR files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18925: Add instructions for removing the code signing parts of OS X bundles and
MAR files
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, GeorgKoppen201806,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:  #3893| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #3893


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25487 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Add an example for cards that are also links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25487: Add an example for cards that are also links
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25404   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 .. meant the metrics page. Also with ff 61 the icons are shown. Did not
 try TBB 8. The cause could however also be an unclean TBB dir, will make a
 fresh one later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25487 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Add an example for cards that are also links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25487: Add an example for cards that are also links
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25404   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * Attachment "metrics_screenshot.png" added.

 This is how it looks here with TBB "7.5.6 (based on Mozilla Firefox
 52.9.0) (32-bit)". With ff nightly it looked fine. From the source it is
 impossible to know what is supposed to be shown in the squares. Inspector
 claimed some of the css values are invalid, for example {{{-webkit-text-
 size-adjust}}}.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24056 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI locale is detectable by button width

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24056: UI locale is detectable by button width
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, TorBrowserTeam201808 => tbb-
 fingerprinting, TorBrowserTeam201808R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24056 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI locale is detectable by button width

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24056: UI locale is detectable by button width
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 arthuredelstein]:
 > > Here's the revised patch:
 > > https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/24056+1
 >
 > It seems we don't need to potentially adjust `aFile` in
 > {{{
 > nsresult nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(
 >   PropertiesFile aFile,
 >   const char* aKey,
 >   const nsTArray&
 aParamArray,
 >   nsAString& aResult)
 > }}}
 > as it does not get touched in it but rather gets passed on.

 You're right. I removed the inserted lines there.

 > I guess we are safe regarding `GetLocalizedEllipsis()`? At least I hope
 so, assuming the localization folks adhered to Mozilla's advice to use
 `\u2026` for it...

 Good point. I think it's safer to patch this. I have done so in this
 latest version:

 ​https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/24056+2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27091 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure jenkins with CARGO_HOME in a writeable directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27091: Configure jenkins with CARGO_HOME in a writeable directory
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport, 033-backport,  |  implemented
  034-backport   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24629   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 Hello71]:
 > I believe Cargo presently stores only configuration, registry
 information, and package source in CARGO_HOME. The first one is manually
 created by the user (another solid reason to not override CARGO_HOME now
 that I think about it), and the other two are vendored.
 Some quick experimentation seems to confirm this: in a build tree
 configured to build with Rust but in offline mode, cargo doesn't seem to
 try writing registry or cache stuff.  Let's open a new ticket if we find
 evidence to the contrary, because the desired Jenkins config change seems
 to be deployed already.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26403 [Webpages/Website]: Add press clips to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26403: Add press clips to website
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged: https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27145 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: help.tpo accounts is not clear enough

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27145: help.tpo accounts is not clear enough
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * owner:  (none) => tpa
 * component:  - Select a component => Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team


Comment:

 I am not a sysadmin team person, so some of this may be incorrect, but
 here's my understanding:

 Replying to [ticket:27145 juga]:
 > Quoting https://help.torproject.org/tsa/doc/accounts/:
 >
 > > Most of the time when people want access to a specific host, what they
 really want is getting added to a particular group
 >
 > does "people" need to know how ldap works or how the different
 services/machines are configured to know which "group" they want to be
 added to?
 > i suspect no

 If you already have an ldap account you can probably log in to the machine
 and run `ls -la /srv/thing` and it will tell you what group owns a
 service.

 Many things are documented on the
 
[[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/operations/Infrastructure|Infrastructure]]
 wiki page.

 For most services you would probably have been working with existing
 people in the group and they would know what group access to ask for.

 > > If you want to get added to some unix group, you will have to find an
 existing member of that group.
 >
 > awesome explanation, what if a new group is needed?

 This should probably still be a ticket for the sysadmin component, but the
 group creation would normally be a side effect of the deployment of a new
 service, which again would be a ticket for the sysadmin component.

 > > They should then request on trac –
 >
 > ok, the person in the group, not the person that "want" the "access".

 Yes. The request must be from an existing member of the group.

 > > ideally in a PGP signed message (as above in the new account creation
 section) – that you be added to their group.
 >
 > it seems this means that the *OpenPGP*-signed messaged should be in the
 trac ticket, but gives confusion to whether it should be a email, and
 whether it should be PGP-signed.

 `gpg --clearsign` will produce a signed message that can be pasted into a
 trac ticket, and allow for the person processing the ticket to validate
 the signature.

 > And i could not find the component where to include this ticket.

 I have filed it in the sysadmin component, which is where ldap related
 things go.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27139 [Core Tor/Tor]: macOS i386 fails time unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27139: macOS i386 fails time unit tests
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, macos, i386  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26987   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #26987


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > Are these intermittent or consistent?

 Consistent, with exactly those numbers in the tests every time.

 I don't see the same failures on macOS x86_64, but I do occasionally see
 odd time jumps after sleep on x86_64, see #26987. Maybe they are the same
 bug.

 > I'd be okay with or without OSX i386 CI.

 Same here. Tor Browser doesn't distribute i386 builds on macOS, and
 Homebrew only supports 64-bit. (MacPorts still builds 320bit tor, though.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27146 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mismatched digest in 0.3.3.9 and master mixed chutney network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27146: Mismatched digest in 0.3.3.9 and master mixed chutney network
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tor-dirauth, macOS,  |  Actual Points:
  035-must, 035-roadmap-proposed, 034-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  regression, tor-dirauth, macOS, 035-must =>
 regression, tor-dirauth, macOS, 035-must, 035-roadmap-proposed,
 034-must


Comment:

 We must check if this issue affects Linux and BSD on 0.3.4 before
 releasing 0.3.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27139 [Core Tor/Tor]: macOS i386 fails time unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27139: macOS i386 fails time unit tests
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, macos, i386  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  regression, macos, 035-must, 034-must, 035-roadmap-proposed =>
 regression, macos, i386


Comment:

 Oops, wrong ticket for that comment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27139 [Core Tor/Tor]: macOS i386 fails time unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27139: macOS i386 fails time unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, macos, 035-must, |  Actual Points:
  034-must, 035-roadmap-proposed |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  regression, macos, i386 => regression, macos, 035-must,
 034-must, 035-roadmap-proposed


Comment:

 We must check if this issue affects Linux and BSD on 0.3.4 before
 releasing 0.3.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27146 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mismatched digest in 0.3.3.9 and master mixed chutney network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27146: Mismatched digest in 0.3.3.9 and master mixed chutney network
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tor-dirauth, macOS,  |  Actual Points:
  035-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * Attachment "nodes.1534285790.zip" added.

 macOS x86_64 chutney nodes directory

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27146 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mismatched digest in 0.3.3.9 and master mixed chutney network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27146: Mismatched digest in 0.3.3.9 and master mixed chutney network
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tor-dirauth, macOS,  |  Actual Points:
  035-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * Attachment "nodes.1534263100.zip" added.

 macOS i386 chutney nodes directory

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[tor-bugs] #27146 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mismatched digest in 0.3.3.9 and master mixed chutney network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27146: Mismatched digest in 0.3.3.9 and master mixed chutney network
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  regression, tor-dirauth, macOS,
 Severity:  Normal   |  035-must
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When I run master i386 and Tor 0.3.3.9 x68_64 in a mixed chutney network,
 I see the following error:
 {{{
 Detail: chutney/tools/warnings.sh
 /Users/USER/tor/chutney/tools/../net/nodes.1534263100
 Warning: Unable to add signatures to consensus: Mismatched digest. Number:
 102
 Exit 255
 }}}

 master x86_64 and Tor 0.3.3.9 x68_64 in a mixed chutney network also get
 the same error:
 {{{
 Detail: chutney/tools/warnings.sh
 /Users/USER/tor/chutney/tools/../net/nodes.1534285790
 Warning: Unable to add signatures to consensus: Mismatched digest. Number:
 102
 Exit 255
 }}}

 We should fix this issue if it affects Linux and BSD. If it doesn't, maybe
 we should downgrade our support for authorities on macOS.

 If we want to diagnose this issue, implementing #20625 and #4593 would
 help.

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[tor-bugs] #27145 [- Select a component]: help.tpo accounts is not clear enough

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27145: help.tpo accounts is not clear enough
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Quoting https://help.torproject.org/tsa/doc/accounts/:

 > Most of the time when people want access to a specific host, what they
 really want is getting added to a particular group

 does "people" need to know how ldap works or how the different
 services/machines are configured to know which "group" they want to be
 added to?
 i suspect no

 > If you want to get added to some unix group, you will have to find an
 existing member of that group.

 awesome explanation, what if a new group is needed?

 > They should then request on trac –

 ok, the person in the group, not the person that "want" the "access".

 > ideally in a PGP signed message (as above in the new account creation
 section) – that you be added to their group.

 it seems this means that the *OpenPGP*-signed messaged should be in the
 trac ticket, but gives confusion to whether it should be a email, and
 whether it should be PGP-signed.

 And i could not find the component where to include this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27129 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add ca, ga, id, is, nb locales for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27129: Add ca, ga, id, is, nb locales for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-localization,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R, ff60-esr|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-localization, TorBrowserTeam2018R => tbb-localization,
 TorBrowserTeam201808R, ff60-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27129 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add ca, ga, id, is, nb locales for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27129: Add ca, ga, id, is, nb locales for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-localization,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam2018R|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I built all 5 locales for linux-x86_64 and confirmed the browsers all work
 and the text is rendered in their respective languages.

 (After merging these patches for torbutton and tor-launcher we'll need to
 run ./import-translations.sh again and commit the results to make sure the
 translation strings for those locales are properly imported.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27144 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27144: When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network
settings
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Photo showing the bug.
 
[[Image(https://s33.postimg.cc/twp8h7r4v/Screen_Shot_2018-08-14_at_1.35.33_PM.png)]]

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[tor-bugs] #27144 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27144: When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network
settings
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network
 settings, the browser will open behind Tor networks settings and it will
 not load anything.
 1. Delete {{{TorBrowser-Data}}}
 2. Open TorBrowser and try to request a bridge from torproject.org using
 Tor network settings and the bug should occur.

 TorBrowser 8a9

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27053 [Core Tor/Stem]: Check controller's event error handling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27053: Check controller's event error handling
---+--
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  controller |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi Dave. Good news, bad news time. The good news is that I figured out the
 python3 mock issue you found. Turns out there's a difference between PyPI
 and Python3's mock modules. Fixed...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=e75cf25

 Bad news is that this doesn't fix the transient test failures. I was able
 to repro those a few times, but once I started digging in the tests once
 again began passing reliably. Frustrating...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27135 [Core Tor/sbws]: Write descriptor bandwidths average in raw results

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27135: Write descriptor bandwidths average in raw results
---+-
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27108 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by starlight):

 descriptor updates arrive via control channel NS events

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pytorctl.git/tree/TorCtl.py#n1243

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pytorctl.git/tree/TorCtl.py#n121

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27124 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Reading node statuses pointlessly initialises first seen millis as last seen millis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27124: Reading node statuses pointlessly initialises first seen millis as last
seen millis
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good, merged. Closing. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27050 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Reverse DNS lookups are still slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27050: Reverse DNS lookups are still slow
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * reviewer:   => karsten


Comment:

 Will take a look tomorrow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23549 [Metrics/Website]: Move ExoneraTorServlet to metrics-web

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23549: Move ExoneraTorServlet to metrics-web
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  metrics-2018 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Cool! 3.0.0 is released, amended metrics-web patch is merged and deployed,
 3.0.0 is deployed, change is announced. I guess this concludes this
 ticket/effort. Yay! Closing. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27121 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Release ExoneraTor 3.0.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27121: Release ExoneraTor 3.0.0
+-
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Deployed and [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2018-August/015885.html announced]. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22842 [Webpages/Website]: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22842: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs
--+---
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by traumschule):

 I'd choose the wiki approach, similar to
 [http://mywiki.wooledge.org/BashFAQ BashFAQ] and protect FAQ/* pages to be
 editable only by selected curators (maybe per topic). This way we could
 easily reuse existing wikis and clean harmfully outdated stuff. Count me
 in if that becomes an official project.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27109 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev: [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: stream (marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks replies?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27109: Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev: [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: 
stream
(marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks
replies?
+
 Reporter:  traumschule |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-httptunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => tor-httptunnel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26514 [Applications/Tor Browser]: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26514: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great! Looks good to me. Applied to `tor-browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1` (commit
 c2720b2274e51eb76b91e5f6a5f2a82bdfaf8013).

 I think it is okay to be conservative and apply the fix to 32bit Windows
 as well, not knowing where exactly the bug lies. We should test the 32bit
 case however, making sure we did not regress here.

 Jacek: big thanks for your help!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27121 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Release ExoneraTor 3.0.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27121: Release ExoneraTor 3.0.0
+-
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Great, thanks for checking! Released:
 https://dist.torproject.org/exonerator/3.0.0/ . Let's wait with the
 announcement until Tor Metrics has its own ExoneraTor page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Also, when this code crashes, does it mean the connection wants to fall
 back to a 3-hop circuit but can't (and therefore crashes)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26647 [Core Tor/Tor]: defect: Spec for net/listeners/* doesn't covers HTTPTunnelPort directive or ExtORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26647: defect: Spec for net/listeners/* doesn't covers HTTPTunnelPort 
directive or
ExtORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  pyhedgehog   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, controller, easy, intro,   |  implemented
  fast-fix, 032-backport, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  034-backport, 035-triaged-in-20180711, tor-|
  httptunnel |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:
 tor-spec, controller, easy, intro, fast-fix, 032-backport,
 033-backport, 034-backport, 035-triaged-in-20180711
 =>
 tor-spec, controller, easy, intro, fast-fix, 032-backport,
 033-backport, 034-backport, 035-triaged-in-20180711, tor-httptunnel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24897 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor seems to malfunction on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24897: Tor seems to malfunction on FreeBSD
-+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-httptunnel,  |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320 => tor-httptunnel,
 033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25786 [Core Tor/Tor]: Policies for HTTPTunnelPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25786: Policies for HTTPTunnelPort
+--
 Reporter:  pyhedgehog  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-httptunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => tor-httptunnel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26062 [Core Tor/Tor]: client: ControlPort set doesn't mean you're a client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26062: client: ControlPort set doesn't mean you're a client
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
  tor-httptunnel |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, tor-client => 034-roadmap-subtask, tor-
 client tor-httptunnel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I tried using `BUG()` here:

 {{{
 neel@kat:~/tor/tor % git diff
 diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_common.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_common.c
 index df43d5cde..35e5d9ac1 100644
 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_common.c
 +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_common.c
 @@ -1724,7 +1724,7 @@ hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(const smartlist_t
 *lspecs,
fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls(lspecs, 0, , direct_conn);

/* Legacy ID is mandatory, and we require an IP address. */
 -  if (!tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(, 0) || !have_legacy_id) {
 +  if (BUG(!tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(, 0)) || !have_legacy_id) {
  /* If we're missing the legacy ID or the IP address, return NULL. */
  goto done;
}
 neel@kat:~/tor/tor %
 }}}

 I compiled the code and ran `make test-network-all` and got this:

 {{{
 neel@kat:~/tor/tor % make test-network-all
 mkdir -p ./test_network_log
 ping6 ::1 or ping ::1 succeeded, running IPv6 flavors: bridges+ipv6-min
 ipv6-exi
 t-min hs-v23-ipv6-md  single-onion-ipv6-md.
 tor-stable not found, skipping mixed flavors: mixed+hs-v23.
 SKIP: mixed+hs-v23
 PASS: basic-min
 FAIL: bridges-min
 PASS: hs-v2-min
 PASS: hs-v3-min
 PASS: single-onion-v23
 FAIL: bridges+ipv6-min
 PASS: ipv6-exit-min
 FAIL: hs-v23-ipv6-md
 Detail: chutney/tools/warnings.sh
 /usr/home/neel/tor/chutney//net/nodes.1534250$
 96
 Warning: Bug: 0x107a055 <_start+0xa5> at
 /usr/home/neel/tor/tor/src/app/tor
 (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 29
 Warning: Bug: 0x107a249  at
 /usr/home/neel/tor/tor/src/app/tor ($
 n Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 29
 Warning: Bug: 0x107a3ac  at
 /usr/home/neel/tor/tor/src/app/t$
 r (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 29
 Warning: Bug: 0x107a6b4  at
 /usr/home/neel/tor/to
 r/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 5
 Warning: Bug: 0x107d1e1  at
 /usr/home/neel/tor/tor/src/a
 pp/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 29
 Warning: Bug: 0x107ef90  at
 /usr/home/neel/tor/tor/src/ap
 p/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 29
 Warning: Bug: 0x10a580b 
 at /u
 sr/home/neel/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev
 b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Num
 ber: 24
 Warning: Bug: 0x10a6168 
 at /u
 sr/home/neel/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev
 b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Num
 ber: 24
 Warning: Bug: 0x10a799f  at
 /usr/home/neel/tor/t
 or/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 1
 Warning: Bug: 0x10ab0ea  at
 /usr/home/nee
 l/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number:
 24
 Warning: Bug: 0x10b0c72  at
 /usr/home/nee
 l/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number:
 1
 Warning: Bug: 0x10c0059  at
 /usr/home/neel
 /tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 1
 Warning: Bug: 0x10c05c2  at
 /usr/home/neel
 /tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 1
 Warning: Bug: 0x10f4b3e  at
 /usr/home/neel/
 tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 4
 Warning: Bug: 0x10f6ce8  at
 /usr/home/nee
 l/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number:
 4
 Warning: Bug: 0x110a125  at
 /usr/home/neel/
 tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 1
 Warning: Bug: 0x110e0a1 
 at /usr
 /home/neel/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a)
 Numbe
 r: 24
 Warning: Bug: 0x110ed8e  at
 /usr/home/neel/
 tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number: 4
 Warning: Bug: 0xcfc  at
 /usr/home/
 neel/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a)
 Number: 25
 Warning: Bug: 0x1118cac  at
 /usr/home/ne
 el/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev b4b67c5fb5205e9a) Number:
 1
 Warning: Bug: 0x11222b4  at
 /usr/
 home/neel/tor/tor/src/app/tor (on Tor 

Re: [tor-bugs] #23818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23818: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel@… (added)
 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1000 light years
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 fine with [https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/requestblock/
 requestblock addon]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26863 [Metrics/Relay Search]: display onionoo and RS version on RS pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26863: display onionoo and RS version on RS pages
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27064| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 Our release process is quite manual, adding more steps at the moment would
 probably just lead to errors later on. Perhaps if someone wanted to write
 an ant patch we would merge it. In the future we want to have more
 automation in our releases and deployment, and then probably we would
 revisit this. Until then, we're not going to have meaningful version
 numbers for relay search.

 Probably it is best to close this ticket for now, and file a ticket on
 metrics-web for looking at adding the git commit reference there during
 the build and release processes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27044 [Core Tor/Tor]: be more strict in parsing HiddenServicePort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27044: be more strict in parsing HiddenServicePort
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26863 [Metrics/Relay Search]: display onionoo and RS version on RS pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26863: display onionoo and RS version on RS pages
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27064| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 Replying to [comment:8 irl]:
 > This would force us to build metrics-web from git, but we distribute
 tarballs without the git information

 that could be solved by writing the git commit id into a text file when
 you create the tarball?

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[tor-bugs] #27143 [Core Tor/Tor]: Look for parts of code that relies on non-trunnel code for binary wire format handling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27143: Look for parts of code that relies on non-trunnel code for binary wire
format handling
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  trunnel wireformat heartbleed-
 Severity:  Normal   |  safety security parsing
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Open a new ticket for each, so that it could be reworked one at a time.

 We really should do this for Tor cell handling.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18820 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate code signing into the release process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18820: Integrate code signing into the release process
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.0a5, TorBrowserTeam201702, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201702  |
Parent ID:  #3893| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #3893


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport TLS1.3 patches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27141: Backport TLS1.3 patches
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-performance, ff60-esr => tbb-security


Old description:

> Consider backporting TLS 1.3 patches for NSS and Firefox (after they
> land). It seems like almost all the patches are within NSS.
>
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1057463

New description:

 Consider backporting TLS 1.3 patches for NSS and Firefox (after they land)
 onto Tor Browser 8 (ESR60). It seems like almost all the patches are
 within NSS.

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1057463

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27139 [Core Tor/Tor]: macOS i386 fails time unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27139: macOS i386 fails time unit tests
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, macos, i386  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * cc: rl1987 (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27044 [Core Tor/Tor]: be more strict in parsing HiddenServicePort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27044: be more strict in parsing HiddenServicePort
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/274

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1000 light years
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 I noticed that this ticket contrary to others never stops loading. Looking
 at the network log it requests following external resources:

 https://i.imgur.com/qQH09pz.png
 https://i.imgur.com/zWhSuTg.png
 https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CcGst-OUkAA0qxc.jpg:large
 https://3j3j5hyf44hgggod.onion/bbo8ui6i.png
 https://www.crimeflare.com/gifs/daddy5.jpg
 https://bitland.net/recaptcha-001.jpg

 Trac seems to reload them for the preview. But even without typing
 anything the tab keeps loading.

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[tor-bugs] #27142 [- Select a component]: Unable to clear history / history remains after closing browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27142: Unable to clear history / history remains after closing browser
--+--
 Reporter:  AppleCrisp|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  browsing_history
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Normally Tor records no browsing history whatsoever upon close but the
 website Gelbooru.com permanently added this to my browsing history.  Only
 removing and reinstalling Tor fixed the problem.

 
https://pt.trafficjunky.net/pt_click?ad_id=-1_537849_0=-1=537849=0=681=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nutaku.net%2Fsignup%2Flanding
 %2Fnaughty-
 
kingdom%2F1%2F%3Fats%3DeyJhIjo3MSwiYyI6NTYxMDQ2NDEsIm4iOjEsInMiOjEsImUiOjg1MDMsInAiOjR9%26utm_source%3DGelbooru_adtool%26utm_medium%3D852605%26utm_campaign%3DNutaku_Gelbooru_Popunder_NK_LP1_852605=1=--

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[tor-bugs] #27141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport TLS1.3 patches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27141: Backport TLS1.3 patches
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-performance,
 Severity:  Normal   |  ff60-esr
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Consider backporting TLS 1.3 patches for NSS and Firefox (after they
 land). It seems like almost all the patches are within NSS.

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1057463

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27129 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add ca, ga, id, is, nb locales for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27129: Add ca, ga, id, is, nb locales for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-localization,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam2018R|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-localization => tbb-localization, TorBrowserTeam2018R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here are patches for review:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/27129
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-launcher/commit/27129
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser-build/commit/27129

 I'm still awaiting the results of a build, but I did a manual test with
 langpacks and all 5 locales worked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27129 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add ca, ga, id, is, nb locales for Tor Browser (was: Add ca, ga, id, nb, pt locales for Tor Browser)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27129: Add ca, ga, id, is, nb locales for Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-localization  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 We have 7 that are at 100% or 99% translated: bn-BD, ca, ga, id, is, nb,
 pt.

 bn-BD has a strange bug, and pt is lower priority because we already have
 pt-BR. So I'd propose for our next batch of new locales we add `ca, ga,
 id, is, nb`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27121 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Release ExoneraTor 3.0.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27121: Release ExoneraTor 3.0.0
+-
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26863 [Metrics/Relay Search]: display onionoo and RS version on RS pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26863: display onionoo and RS version on RS pages
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27064| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 This would force us to build metrics-web from git, but we distribute
 tarballs without the git information and expect the build to be
 reproducible using this. We would break our reproducible builds if
 different things happened building for the tarball vs from git. Knowing
 the date and time of the request should be enough for a member of the
 metrics team to identify what version of the code was running at the time.

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[tor-bugs] #27140 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Bump Target SDK Version to 26

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27140: TBA: Bump Target SDK Version to 26
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #5709
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Mozilla already landed this in bug
 [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1352015 1352015]. We should
 backport these patches.

 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/60e83456adb9
 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/2e9ace719b06

 We should merge these before the second alpha release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27109 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev: [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: stream (marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks replies?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27109: Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev: [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: 
stream
(marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks
replies?
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by traumschule):

 thanks for looking into this!

 I am able to reproduce it with firefox using following proxy settings:
 {{{
 HTTP Proxy: 127.0.0.1:9099
 SSL Proxy: 127.0.0.1:9099
 FTP Proxy: 127.0.0.1:9099
 SOCKS Host: 127.0.0.1:9050
 }}}
 /etc/tor/torrc
 {{{
 SocksPort 9050
 HTTPTunnelPort 9099
 }}}
 I noticed the helpful message by tor using the SOCKS port for TLS ("SSL
 Proxy: 127.0.0.1:9050"):
 {{{
 [warn] Socks version 67 not recognized. (This port is not an HTTP proxy;
 did you want to use
 HTTPTunnelPort?)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26398 [Core Tor/Tor]: feature gate testing C code from Rust for now

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26398: feature gate testing C code from Rust for now
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-test, fast-fix, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
  |  Sponsor8-can
--+

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 As an update from https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25386,
 it looks like only doctests and compiling with sanitizers are not working
 as expected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25152 [Core Tor/Tor]: Try to call less circuitmux_find_map_entry()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25152: Try to call less circuitmux_find_map_entry()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, tor-relay,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've left a review on the PR; Mike is planning to do so as well.

 In general, I think that the approach is a good start, but that a more
 thorough approach might be called for in order to keep the code clean.
 I'm not sure it's a good idea to proliferate these "hashent" usages
 throughout our codebase, I'd like to take a step back.

 Before we optimize too much we should ask ourselves, "Is this hashtable
 really necessary?"  After all, there are at most two of these hash entries
 for each circuit, and we are looking them up _from_ the circuit. Perhaps a
 better solution would be to give each circuit a couple of pointers to this
 information, to make lookup into an O(1) operation.  Maybe after we were
 done, we might find that the hashtable wasn't necessary at all.

 Of course, we would need to manage lifetime issues carefully here.

 I am not taking a position about whether the change I suggest above should
 be done ''instead of'' or ''after'' this change; I would like a second
 opinion from mike about that -- and ideally from dgoulet too, once he is
 back online.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27135 [Core Tor/sbws]: Write descriptor bandwidths average in raw results

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27135: Write descriptor bandwidths average in raw results
---+-
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27108 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * Attachment "toy.py" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27135 [Core Tor/sbws]: Write descriptor bandwidths average in raw results

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27135: Write descriptor bandwidths average in raw results
---+-
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27108 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by pastly):

 Replying to [comment:2 juga]:
 > As an example, this are the descriptor bws from 4 files from 2 relays:
 > relay 1: [9216000, 9216000, 9216000]
 > relay 2: [1073741824, 1073741824, 1073741824]
 >
 > Since you know better this part of the code, would you feel like to
 check why is that?

 I downloaded your sbws datadir and wrote a little script to print how
 often a relay has a list of saved `relay_average_bandwidth` containing
 more than one unique element.

 It found that 1868/7999 relays had `relay_average_bandwidth` values that
 weren't all the same (118/7326 if you only look at success results). I'm
 guessing relays don't update this value in their descriptors very often.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26514 [Applications/Tor Browser]: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26514: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808 => TorBrowserTeam201808R


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:19 jacek]:
 > As a less radical solution could be using fseek64 and ftello64. Those
 are much thinner wrappers in mingw-64 around msvcrt.dll. You could try
 that by changing defines in mar_private.h

 Thank you for your analysis and for this suggestion. It appears to solve
 the problem nicely. After reading the other code (ftelli64 and _fseeki64),
 it is difficult to say where the problem is but some aspects seem to rely
 on internal Microsoft flags, etc. and certainly there is complexity there
 (as you said). Anyway, here is a patch that works for Kathy and me:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug26514-01=c2720b2274e51eb76b91e5f6a5f2a82bdfaf8013

 We tested on an up-to-date Windows 10 system. 200 incremental updates and
 200 complete updates all completed without any signature verification
 failures.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27109 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev: [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: stream (marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks replies?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27109: Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev: [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: 
stream
(marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks
replies?
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  accepted => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27109 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev: [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: stream (marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks replies?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27109: Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev: [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: 
stream
(marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks
replies?
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by rl1987):

 How are using tor when you're getting these log messages? Are you sure
 you're not trying to use it as HTTP proxy?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27139 [Core Tor/Tor]: macOS i386 fails time unit tests (was: macOS i386 fails time unit testa)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27139: macOS i386 fails time unit tests
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, macos, i386  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9809 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Re-disable Ctypes in TBB 7.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9809: Re-disable Ctypes in TBB 7.0
+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-3.0, tbb-firefox-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ct):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > That's for WebExtensions, yes, but the blocker here is actually #10137
 and I am not aware that Firefox does work now without ctypes enabled, but
 would be happy to be proven wrong (ideally with links to Mozilla bugs that
 fixed this).
 Mozilla removed `--disable-ctypes` in https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/2938c8a38f2b and support for anything other than WebExtensions
 in Firefox 57. So, this ticket and #6152 (despite its name), created to
 prevent arbitrary code execution in add-ons, look obsolete now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount blinding and encryption: add rustfmt CI check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26973: Privcount blinding and encryption: add rustfmt CI check
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 035-roadmap-master, 035   |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, rust |
Parent ID:  #25669   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This looks okay, except for the fact that the rustfmt commit itself will
 have conflicts with my patch series currently under review.

 So my current plan here is that, once that other patch series is merged,
 we should cherry-pick everything from this branch except for the rustfmt
 commit (`bdc2db60153ef9c3044b72309cc1b35f45f85618`), and then re-run
 rustfmt separately.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25641 [Webpages/Website]: content for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25641: content for torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: stephw (removed)
 * cc: steph (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26863 [Metrics/Relay Search]: display onionoo and RS version on RS pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26863: display onionoo and RS version on RS pages
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27064| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 how about displaying the git commit id?

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