Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 acat]:
 > There's a patch for torbutton to fix the saved logins here
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commit/30565.
 >
 > Note: using `sticky_pref()` instead of `pref()` in `000-tor-browser.js`
 should have prevented this behaviour (the pref would not have been removed
 from `user.js` when it matched the default value).

 Looks good to me. Merged to `master` with commit
 6406662331d900d7218cccb82b3e6bd7065e04f4.

 Leaving this ticket open for a bit to figure out whether we need to file a
 new bug for the update issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:13 rollback-question]:
 > i found a difference between them,
 >
 > the first TBB i upgraded that doesn't recover tabs (left screenshot) is
 now on version 8.5 but based on firefox version 60.6.1esr - it shows a
 "Restart to update Tor Browser" button, when pressed the tor browser gets
 restarted but with the same version and still showing the same button
 again

 Huh, yes. That looks broken. You should not be on Tor Browser 8.5 and
 Firefox 60.6.1esr at the same time. If you open `about:config` and set
 `app.update.log` to `true` and check your browser console (Ctrl+Shift+J)
 while doing the update are there any error messages showing up that could
 give some clues about what is going on?

 > the second TBB i upgraded that recovers the tabs without problem (right
 screenshor) is on version 8.5 but based on firefox version 60.7.0esr and
 doesn't show any button and works fine

 That's the expected behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: agnox (added)


Comment:

 Closed #30581 as a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30581 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 9.0a1 Passwords Master Debian 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30581: Tor Browser 9.0a1 Passwords Master Debian 9
+---
 Reporter:  agnox   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * severity:  Critical => Normal
 * component:  Applications => Applications/Tor Browser
 * priority:  High => Very High
 * keywords:  TorBrowser9.0a1 Passwords Master Debian9 => tbb-8.5-issues,
 tbb-regression
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Flipping `security.nocertdb` back to `false` and restarting should give
 you everything back. This is a duplicate of #30565.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28896 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure our bundled WebExtensions are running in Private Browsing Mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28896: Make sure our bundled WebExtensions are running in Private Browsing Mode
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 #29192 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29192 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure our extensions are enabled in Private Browsing Mode in Tor Browser based on ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29192: Make sure our extensions are enabled in Private Browsing Mode in Tor
Browser based on ESR 68
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Indeed. It's even my own bug, how embarrasing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities (was: Add a line to bridge descriptors specifying they're bridges?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16564: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge easy intro  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 I have a draft tor and spec patch for this change.

 But I still need to write tests:
 * bridge-distribution-request descriptors are accepted by:
   * bridge authorities
   * bridge clients
 * other roles reject bridge-distribution-request descriptors:
   * non-bridge authorities
   * non-bridge clients
   * bridge and non-bridge relays

 I think I'll find some missing cases when I make this change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30581 [Applications]: Tor Browser 9.0a1 Passwords Master Debian 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30581: Tor Browser 9.0a1 Passwords Master Debian 9
-+-
 Reporter:  agnox|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowser9.0a1 Passwords Master |  Actual Points:
  Debian9|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by agnox):

 * Attachment "screenshot_1.jpg" added.


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[tor-bugs] #30581 [Applications]: Tor Browser 9.0a1 Passwords Master Debian 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30581: Tor Browser 9.0a1 Passwords Master Debian 9
-+-
 Reporter:  agnox|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:
 |  Applications
  Version:   |   Severity:
 Keywords:  TorBrowser9.0a1 Passwords Master |  Critical
  Debian9|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Hello, after update > I see deleted all saved passwords and I cannot enter
 the master password + save my passwords again.

 Have a nice days- nights.

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[tor-bugs] #30580 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30580: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  041-must, regression
Actual Points:  0.2 |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must  |
+--
 In #30091, we replaced this code:
 {{{
 if (!strcasecmpstart(option, "purpose=")) {
   option += strlen("purpose=");
   purpose = router_purpose_from_string(option);
   if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN) {
 connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "552 Unknown purpose \"%s\"\r\n",
  option);
 goto done;
   }
 }
 }}}

 With this code:
 {{{
   line = config_line_find_case(args->kwargs, "purpose");
   if (line) {
 purpose = router_purpose_from_string(line->value);
 connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "552 Unknown purpose \"%s\"\r\n",
  line->value);
 goto done;
   }
 }}}

 There's no purpose check any more (`if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN)
 {`), so Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR requests.

 I'm assigning this bug to nickm and cc'ing catalyst, because they were the
 author and reviewer.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30051, #29880, #29881, #30033, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30051, #29880, #29881, #30033, #30050 by teor:
sponsor to Sponsor31-can

Comment:
These can be sponsor 31, if we want them to be.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29792 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker problems and CI broken on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29792: practracker problems and CI broken on master
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ggus):

 An operator emailed this relay fingerprint to add:

 AFD1E28D6BFDFF03E715AF06259167ADA0E0CB1D

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ggus):

 An operator emailed these relays fingerprints to add:

 63BF46A63F9C21FD315CD061B3EAA3EB05283A0A

 and

 509EAB4C5D10C9A9A24B4EA0CE402C047A2D64E6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30579 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add more STUN servers to the default snowflake configuration in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30579: Add more STUN servers to the default snowflake configuration in Tor 
Browser
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, stun  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: cohosh, dcf, arlolra, phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ggus):

 An operator emailed this relay fingerprint to add:

 79509683AB4C8DDAF90A120C69A4179C6CD5A387

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[tor-bugs] #30579 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add more STUN servers to the default snowflake configuration in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30579: Add more STUN servers to the default snowflake configuration in Tor 
Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  snowflake, stun
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19|
-+-
 Right now snowflake blocking in China is happening in the client's
 connection to the default STUN server (which is set to Google's STUN
 servers). We should add more STUN servers, including ones that are popular
 in regions that are trying to block snowflake so that blocking this stage
 causes more collateral damage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ggus):

 A user submitted the following relay fingerprint for inclusion:

 0338F9F55111FE8E3570E7DE117EF3AF999CC1D7

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-May/017326.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ggus):

 A user submitted the following relay fingerprint for inclusion:

 2206C72ECC0D55593BC7B698F982533F1E141DD2

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-May/017325.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ggus):

 A user submitted the following relay fingerprints (Quintex family) for
 inclusion:

 {{{

 0077BCBA7244DB3E6A5ED2746E86170066684887
 041646640AB306EA74B001966E86169B04CC88D2
 155D6F57425F16C0624D7641E4EB1B47C6F0
 1DB25DF59DAA01B5BE3D3CEB8AFED115940EBE8B
 1E5136DDC52FAE1219208F0A6BADB0BA62587EE6
 2ED4D25766973713EB8C56A290BF07E06B85BF12
 3687FEC7E73F61AC66F7AE251E7DEE6BBD8C0252
 36D68478366CB8627866757EBCE7FB3C17FC1CB8
 3CA0D15567024D2E0B557DC0CF3E962B37999A79
 40E7D6CE5085E4CDDA31D51A29D1457EB53F12AD
 43209F6D50C657A56FE79AF01CA69F9EF19BD338
 54A4820B46E65509BF3E2B892E66930A41759DE9
 5649CB2158DA94FB747415F26628BEC07FA57616
 5F4CD12099AF20FAF9ADFDCEC65316A376D0201C
 60D3667F56AEC5C69CF7E8F557DB21DDF6C36060
 66E19E8C4773086F669A1E06A3F8C23B6C079129
 764BF8A03868F84C8F323C1A676AA254B80DC3BF
 7A3DD280EA4CD4DD16EF8C67B93D9BDE184D1A81
 7E6E9A6FDDB8DC7C92F0CFCC3CBE76C29F061799
 7FA8E7E44F1392A4E40FFC3B69DB3B00091B7FD3
 8B80169BEF71450FC4069A190853523B7AEA45E1
 9314BD9503B9014261A65C221D77E57389DBCCC1
 9C1E7D92115D431385B8CAEA6A7C15FB89CE236B
 9D21F034C3BFF4E7737D08CF775DC1745706801F
 9E2D7C6981269404AA1970B53891701A20424EF8
 9F2856F6D2B89AD4EF6D5723FAB167DB5A53519A
 A0DB820FEC87C0405F7BF05DEE5E4ADED2BB9904
 A4A393FEF48640961AACE92D041934B55348CEF9
 B028707969D8ED84E6DEA597A884F78AAD471971
 B0CD9F9B5B60651ADC5919C0F1EAA87DBA1D9249
 B2197C23A4FF5D1C49EE45BA7688BA8BCCD89A0B
 B6320E44A230302C7BF9319E67597A9B87882241
 B7047FBDE9C53C39011CA84E5CB2A8E3543066D0
 C5A53BCC174EF8FD0DCB223E4AA929FA557DEDB2
 C78AFFEEE320EA0F860961763E613FD2FAC855F5
 CB7C0D841FE376EF43F7845FF201B0290C0A239E
 CC14C97F1D23EE97766828FC8ED8582E21E11665
 CC4A3AE960E3617F49BF9887B79186C14CBA6813
 D25210CE07C49F2A4F2BC7A506EB0F5EA7F5E2C2
 D33292FEDE24DD40F2385283E55C87F85C0943B6
 D6FF2697CEA5C0C7DA84797C2E71163814FC2466
 DF20497E487A979995D851A5BCEC313DF7E5BC51
 E480D577F58E782A5BC4FA6F49A6650E9389302F
 EABC2DD0D47B5DB11F2D37EB3C60C2A4D91C10F2
 EC15DB62D9101481F364DE52EB8313C838BDDC29
 F21DE9C7DE31601D9716781E17E24380887883D1
 F7447E99EB5CBD4D5EB913EE0E35AC642B5C1EF3
 FDD700C791CC6BB0AC1C2099A82CBC367AD4B764
 FE00A3A835680E67FBBC895A724E2657BB253E97
 1AE949967F82BBE7534A3D6BA77A7EBE1CED4369

 }}}

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-May/017324.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28804 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28804: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, tor-spec, 041-proposed, network-  |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Other things to do: I want to stop referring to what we implemented as
 "WTF-PAD" in technical documentation. WTF-PAD was the implementation of
 the system described by the research paper
 http://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.00524. The stuff in Tor now is NOT WTF-PAD. If
 people start writing research papers about how they attacked the new WTF-
 PAD as implemented in Tor, all hell will break loose and nobody will know
 what anybody is talking about anymore.

 We should update the Tor spec/proposal (aka
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2019-May/013822.html)
 accordingly.

 Additionally, I updated the comments in
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.c#L60
 to make it easier to understand, but these did not get updated in the
 spec. So we should do that too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29437 [Core Tor/Stem]: test-stem times out intermittently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29437: test-stem times out intermittently
---+
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks catalyst, that's interesting. The operative bit that jumps out to
 me is

 {{{
   File
 "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/test/integ/control/controller.py",
 line 527, in test_without_ephemeral_hidden_services
 with test.runner.get_runner().get_tor_controller() as controller:
 ...
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/connection.py", line
 1007, in get_protocolinfo
 protocolinfo_response = _msg(controller, 'PROTOCOLINFO 1')
 }}}

 This indicates that test_without_ephemeral_hidden_services likely hung
 when calling PROTOCOLINFO in an attempt to authenticate. Most likely this
 is *not* an issue during test_without_ephemeral_hidden_services, but
 rather a prior test got tor into a borked state where it no longer
 responds in a healthy fashion to PROTOCOLINFO.

 Previously I suggested collecting trace runlevel logs from Stem. If we
 don't have repro steps I can use to generate this locally then that's the
 next step.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #27104   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  bootstrap => bootstrap network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29220 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update review guidelines to list best practices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29220: Update review guidelines to list best practices
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  doc => doc network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29437 [Core Tor/Stem]: test-stem times out intermittently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29437: test-stem times out intermittently
---+
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by catalyst):

 This Travis failure seems to not be related to #30235?
 {{{
   control.controller...
 timelimit: sending warning signal 10

 

 Signal SIGUSR1 received by thread MainThread in process 19670
 

 Event notifier thread stacktrace

   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/threading.py", line 888, in _bootstrap
 self._bootstrap_inner()
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/threading.py", line 920, in _bootstrap_inner
 self.run()
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/threading.py", line 868, in run
 self._target(*self._args, **self._kwargs)
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/control.py", line 991,
 in _event_loop
 self._event_notice.wait(0.05)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/threading.py", line 553, in wait
 signaled = self._cond.wait(timeout)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/threading.py", line 294, in wait
 gotit = waiter.acquire(True, timeout)

 

 Tor listener thread stacktrace

   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/threading.py", line 888, in _bootstrap
 self._bootstrap_inner()
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/threading.py", line 920, in _bootstrap_inner
 self.run()
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/threading.py", line 868, in run
 self._target(*self._args, **self._kwargs)
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/control.py", line 946,
 in _reader_loop
 control_message = self._socket.recv()
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/socket.py", line 474,
 in recv
 return self._recv(lambda s, sf: recv_message(sf))
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/socket.py", line 274,
 in _recv
 return handler(my_socket, my_socket_file)
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/socket.py", line 474,
 in 
 return self._recv(lambda s, sf: recv_message(sf))
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/socket.py", line 676,
 in recv_message
 line = control_file.readline()
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/socket.py", line 374, in readinto
 return self._sock.recv_into(b)

 

 MainThread thread stacktrace

   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/run_tests.py", line 451, in
 
 main()
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/run_tests.py", line 292, in
 main
 run_result = _run_test(args, test_class, output_filters)
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/run_tests.py", line 432, in
 _run_test
 run_result = stem.util.test_tools.TimedTestRunner(test_results,
 verbosity = 2).run(suite)
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py",
 line 308, in run
 return super(TimedTestRunner, self).run(test)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/unittest/runner.py", line 168, in run
 test(result)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/unittest/suite.py", line 84, in __call__
 return self.run(*args, **kwds)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/unittest/suite.py", line 122, in run
 test(result)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/unittest/case.py", line 625, in __call__
 return self.run(*args, **kwds)
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py",
 line 258, in run
 result = super(type(self), self).run(result)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.4/unittest/case.py", line 577, in run
 testMethod()
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/test/require.py", line 57,
 in wrapped
 return func(self, *args, **kwargs)
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/test/require.py", line 57,
 in wrapped
 return func(self, *args, **kwargs)
   File
 "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/test/integ/control/controller.py",
 line 527, in test_without_ephemeral_hidden_services
 with test.runner.get_runner().get_tor_controller() as controller:
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/test/runner.py", line 482,
 in get_tor_controller
 controller.authenticate(password = CONTROL_PASSWORD, chroot_path =
 self.get_chroot())
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/tor/stem/stem/control.py", line
 1110, in authenticate
 stem.connection.authenticate(self, *args, **kwargs)
   File "/ho

Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27104| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27104| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+--

Comment (by catalyst):

 Pull request in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1040

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30578 [Core Tor/Tor]: The circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine test: Re-enable, remove, re-document, or ___?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30578: The circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine test: Re-enable, remove, re-
document, or ___?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  circuitpadding, 041-should,  |  Actual Points:
  hopefully-easy, wtf-pad|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  circuitpadding, 041-should, hopefully-easy => circuitpadding,
 041-should, hopefully-easy, wtf-pad


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[tor-bugs] #30578 [Core Tor/Tor]: The circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine test: Re-enable, remove, re-document, or ___?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30578: The circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine test: Re-enable, remove, re-
document, or ___?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  circuitpadding, 041-should,
 Severity:  Normal   |  hopefully-easy
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Our code in `test_circuitpadding.c` says:
 {{{
   /** Disabled unstable test until #29298 is implemented (see #29122) */
   //  TEST_CIRCUITPADDING(circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine, TT_FORK),
 }}}

 But both #29298 and #29122 are closed now.

 If this test will work now, let's enable it. If it is no longer useful,
 let's remove it. If it is disabled for some reason other than the one
 that's described in the comment, let's adjust the comment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25791 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_util_fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD 0.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25791: test_util_fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD 0.2.9
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression, ci-fail, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  ci-fail|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:  jenkins, regression, ci-fail => jenkins, regression, ci-fail,
 tor-ci-fail


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25791 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_util_fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD 0.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25791: test_util_fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD 0.2.9
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression, ci-fail  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:  jenkins, regression => jenkins, regression, ci-fail


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29192 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure our extensions are enabled in Private Browsing Mode in Tor Browser based on ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29192: Make sure our extensions are enabled in Private Browsing Mode in Tor
Browser based on ESR 68
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by acat):

 Is this a duplicate of #28896?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Investigate/Setup Fastlane

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26844: TBA: Investigate/Setup Fastlane
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:  #26782   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201905 => tbb-mobile,
 tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201905R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Investigate/Setup Fastlane

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26844: TBA: Investigate/Setup Fastlane
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #26782   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:16 eighthave]:
 > I recommend adding `exiftool -all= *.png` somewhere to strip all
 metadata from images.  I don't know a metadata stripper for SVG.

 Thanks for the suggestion! It looks like they were clean.

 {{{
 $ exiftool -all= image_repository/*.png
 0 image files updated
29 image files unchanged
 }}}

 For svg files, the [https://superuser.com/questions/739525/removing-
 personal-data-from-svg-file best suggestion] I found was opening them in
 inkscape and then saving it as an optimized  SVG.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Investigate/Setup Fastlane

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26844: TBA: Investigate/Setup Fastlane
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #26782   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:14 gk]:
 > Okay, that almost fell through the cracks (I am filtering all the
 reviews by the TorBrowserTeamMMR keyword), but here we are:
 >
 > 1) `README`
 >
 > s/fastlast/fastlane/
 >
 > 2) `2015539345.txt`
 >
 > s/Tor Browser for Android/Tor Browser/g
 >

 These are old changelogs (the changelogs we originally published with the
 releases). I don't think we should (basically) change history at this
 point.

 > 3) Why do we have the Changelog for 8.5a9 and 8.5a10 twice (and we
 should add the Changelog for 8.5a11)
 > basically

 There is one changelog per apk per release - so one for armv7 and another
 for x86. I only created one for the entire release, but it seems Google
 used that changelog and automatically created one for each apk.



 > 4) `full_description.txt`
 >
 > There are some trailing whitespaces that are superfluous
 >
 > s/Tor Browser for Android/Tor Browser/
 >
 > I think the "Known issue:" is fixed as well as the note that we need
 Orbot.
 >

 Done.

 > 5) `icon.png`
 >
 > That's the old icon. We have new ones, thanks to #28622.

 Done.

 >
 > 6) `title.txt`
 >
 > s/Tor Browser for Android/Tor Browser

 Done.

 >
 > 7) `TBA Welcome p...@3x.png`
 >
 > Should we update that and the @1 and @2 versions to contain the
 newsletter signup line as well which we have since #29035?

 I created #29834 for this. I think we can update them later.

 >
 > 8) `File:Lead Image - Full Color.svg`
 >
 > That image still has the Sketch metadata in it (``). Let's remove
 that.
 >

 Thanks for noticing this. Removed.

 > 9) General
 >
 > That's for the alpha releases right now. We should probably integrate
 the respective icon and text for the stable one as well given that we want
 to have different series. Not sure how that works, though.

 Yes, I see two options here. The first option is we follow tor-browser-
 build and create one branch per series (`master`, `maint-8.5`, `nightly`
 (?)). The second option is only using the master branch and creating a
 different `fastlane/` directory for each series, e.g. `fastlane_stable/`,
 `fastlane_alpha/`, `fastlane_nightly/`. Actually, if we use the second
 option, then we can create a common directory as `fastlane/` or
 `fastlane_shared/` where all of the shared files are stored (like the
 descriptions) and then we can create symlinks from both
 `image_repository/` and `fastlane/` in each series, as needed, for all
 shared resources.

 I can begin this in the next patch.

 I pushed a fixup commit on `bug26844_0`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by rollback-question):

 i found a difference between them,

 the first TBB i upgraded that doesn't recover tabs (left screenshot) is
 now on version 8.5 but based on firefox version 60.6.1esr - it shows a
 "Restart to update Tor Browser" button, when pressed the tor browser gets
 restarted but with the same version and still showing the same button
 again

 the second TBB i upgraded that recovers the tabs without problem (right
 screenshor) is on version 8.5 but based on firefox version 60.7.0esr and
 doesn't show any button and works fine

 i don't know how i ended up with this difference. i don't think i have
 messed with the first TBB during the upgrade in any way and they have the
 same settings.. one works fine the other doesn't

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rollback-question):

 * Attachment "tbb-diff.png" added.

 tbb based on different firefox versions

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30382: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an
onion
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:11 dgoulet]:
 > In my torspec repo: https://git.torproject.org/user/dgoulet/torspec.git
 >
 > Branch: `ticket30382_01`
 >
 > I think there are too many codes there for what we need here but I
 wanted to at least get the basic errors implemented as well. The last two
 are the one TB needs for this.

 Kathy and I think the proposal looks good. Just a couple of comments:
 - I had trouble understanding the note near the beginning. Maybe reword
 to: "When Tor Browser supports HTTPCONNECT, we plan to stop using these
 SOCKS5 extensions."
 - Regarding compatibility, it seems like it would be safer for tor to not
 emit these new error codes unless enabled via a config option (maybe a
 SocksPort flag). Otherwise, non Tor Browser clients that use the SocksPort
 may be unhappy. Or maybe enable by default but provide an "escape hatch"
 that allows them to be disabled somehow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by rollback-question):

 flipping security.nocertdb to false fixed the issue on both instances,
 logins and passwords appear again and functionality is again normal

 thank you very much to all for your help and specially to acat for the
 detailed explanation and the patch

 the issue with the tabs still persists on the first TBB i upgraded, not
 only after upgrading but also if i restart or kill the tor browser now (i
 tried many times). the browser history is here, but tabs are never
 recovered and only a plain tor tab is shown. it makes no difference if i
 exit cleanly (quit the program) or if i kill it. what is strange is that
 the second TBB i upgraded on a different PC doesn't have the issue and
 tabs are recovered from before the upgrade (and also new tabs opened after
 the upgrade)

 i have tried copying Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default to a
 fresh install of a version 8.0.9 and i get an error related to the TBB
 upgrade but i can open new tabs that get recovered on restart - just not
 the older ones, these seem to have been lost

 i wish there was an easy way to roll back to a previous version for such
 situations, or at least know what directories should be copied to make a
 manual backup and if it's safe to overwrite a new install with them to
 restore the backup (of course it would be also nice to have an option to
 "export" or backup all local settings, history, passwords, etc from the
 tor browser GUI itself). i only have a 1 year old "full directory" backup
 which is too old :( but that is my fault

 again thanks everyone for the help!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30382: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an
onion
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 =>
 tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-
 spec
 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 In my torspec repo: https://git.torproject.org/user/dgoulet/torspec.git

 Branch: `ticket30382_01`

 I think there are too many codes there for what we need here but I wanted
 to at least get the basic errors implemented as well. The last two are the
 one TB needs for this. Going in `needs_review`, once we are happy with the
 spec, lets put it back in `Assigned` so we can do the code and post the
 proposal on tor-dev@.

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[tor-bugs] #30577 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Fundraising Banner with next TBB security update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30577: Add Fundraising Banner with next TBB security update
--+--
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Let's plan to add a fundraising banner with the next TBB security update
 (TBB 8.5.2?) which should happen on 2019-07-09

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Thanks both! I attached a new image without the hamburger menu to
 incorporate users who have more icons at the toolbar.

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/30560
 /figure_tor-toolbar-layout.png, 300)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "figure_tor-toolbar-lay...@2x.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "figure_tor-toolbar-layout.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28091 [Applications/GetTor]: Port GetTor to python3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28091: Port GetTor to python3
-+-
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28152   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 New code is deployed and running.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28091 [Applications/GetTor]: Port GetTor to python3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28091: Port GetTor to python3
-+
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28152   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+

Comment (by gaba):

 Can we close this ticket now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30541 [Applications/Tor Browser]: webgl readPixels FP entropy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30541: webgl readPixels FP entropy
-+-
 Reporter:  Thorin   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 ^^ just to be clear, the booleans of each are mismatched
 - `webgl.disabled` (false = enabled, true=disabled)
 - `webgl.enable-webgl2`(^^ the reverse)

 I made sure to use the right combinations. Are you sure you're not
 flipping something in the wrong place, or using the wrong boolean?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29969: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ma1):

 Now released as stable 10.6.2, too.
 https://github.com/hackademix/noscript/releases/tag/10.6.2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29969: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ma1):

 Removed the work-around in
 https://github.com/hackademix/noscript/releases/tag/10.6.2rc2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30541 [Applications/Tor Browser]: webgl readPixels FP entropy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30541: webgl readPixels FP entropy
-+-
 Reporter:  Thorin   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 > We explicitly set `webgl.enable-webgl2` to false

 Thanks. I'll get it fixed in
 https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/TorZillaPrint/issues/37

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29738 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecate RecommendedPackages torrc option, and remove the code for voting for packages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29738: Deprecate RecommendedPackages torrc option, and remove the code for 
voting
for packages
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28465  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-spec => tor-spec dgoulet-merge


Comment:

 Marked as dgoulet-merge, but please don't merge this until master is
 0.4.2.x.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29969: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:8 ma1]:

 > Which buildID should I look for the fix? >= "20190416010130" (per
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532530#c19 ) or something
 else (the 8.5 I've just been updated to has buildID="20190307010101")?

 OK, I'll assume anybody on with an up-to-date browser don't need the work
 around anymore, and to hell the others. Removing it unconditionally...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28634 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design a first useful padding machine (hiding client-side intro/rend circuits)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28634: Design a first useful padding machine (hiding client-side intro/rend
circuits)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 041-should  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-proposed, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 0411-alpha, 041-should
 =>
 wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-proposed, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 041-should


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30428 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30428: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, sendme, 041-must,   |  Actual Points:
  0411-alpha, postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30454 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30454: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-must, nickm-merge, network-  |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 0411-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Merged into 0.4.1; marking for possible backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30428 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30428: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, sendme, 041-must,   |  Actual Points:
  0411-alpha, postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 LGTM.  Squashed and merging!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30454 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30454: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-must, nickm-merge, network-  |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 0411-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket30454_035_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1039

 (I've basically merged `nickm/ticket30454_034_01_squashed` in an 035
 branch and fixed the conflict.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30428 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30428: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, sendme, 041-must,   |  Actual Points:
  0411-alpha, postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Ok! I've confirmed that we do always have a multiple of 509
 (`CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE`) and it is aligned on the window.

 There is a edge case there where we record a cell digest of a non `DATA`
 cell if the window is on the SENDME limit. It is not a big problem because
 in that case, the window is not updated so the next DATA cell will
 properly get recorded. However, it makes us sometimes record a digest that
 we shouldn't. To fix that, we would need to pass down to the relay crypto
 layer the cell relay command so we ONLY record for data cells.

 Two commits were added here. First one is fixing a bug that I discovered
 while stress testing with the chutney bidi where an Exit was not sending
 v1 as expected so the other end kept accumulating cell digest on the
 circuit. The commit takes care of removing the digest each time we get a
 SENDME.

 Second commit adds two non fatal assert for cases that should never happen
 but in case they do, tor will scream loudly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
--+---
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by kT3Ycp9jwm):

 * Attachment "tor_network_settings.PNG" added.

 Tor network settings

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
--+---
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by kT3Ycp9jwm):

 in our proxy.pac the function FindProxyForURL(url, host) terminates with
 {{{
 return "PROXY proxy.***.local:8080";
 }}}

 so I set Tor Browser as in the tor_network_settings.PNG attached

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29969: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > Yes, that's perfectly fine, thanks.
 Sorry, I'm confused: did you already release yesterday after all?
 Which buildID should I look for the fix? >= "20190416010130" (per
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532530#c19 ) or something
 else?
 And I've just noticed https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla
 /Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/runtime/getBrowserInfo now exposes an
 isTorBrowser info property, apparently because of us (look at the
 "reference" link). Since when? Can I conditionally drop the alternate
 check on setup calls?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
--+---
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 So, Tor Browser has some built-in capabilities to deal with proxy
 requirements in e.g. enterprise networks. I wonder what happens if you try
 that out. Could you figure out the actual ip address:port being used (and
 the proxy type)? Then there is "Tor Network Settings..." -> "I use a proxy
 to connect to the Internet" behind the onion button on the toolbar where
 you could enter those settings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30024 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 3: Notify users if a current website they are visiting on Tor Browser has an onion service version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30024: Objective 2, Activity 3: Notify users if a current website they are
visiting on Tor Browser has an onion service version
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:4 antonela]:
 > Hi. Making .onions discoverable is a must for Tor Browser.
 >
 > We have three different ways (for now) for routing Onion addresses. Each
 of them affects differently on two major UI components: The URL bar and
 the circuit display at the Identity doorhanger. I've started mapping each
 UX and describing how those UI components get affected:
 >
 > 1. alt-svc
 > 2. alt-onion
 > 3. https-e
 >
 > **1. alt-svc**
 >
 > 1. User type the known URL with a regular domain.
 > 2. On server-side, the user gets redirected.
 > 3. The Onion icon gets added at the URL bar. The URL could remain. The
 circuit display shows the Onion address [#27590]

 What is the functionality of the onion icon here? The circuit display is
 bound to the load of the website. Thus, either it got already loaded over
 alt-svc or not. In either case the circuit display should match what
 actually happened. I don't think we should bind it to whether the user
 clicked on the onion icon or not. And, yes, it is crucial that the URL
 remains as it is in this scenario as it is, as there is not really a
 redirect happening.

 > **2. alt-onion**
 >
 > When users are visiting a site which also has an Onion service
 available, the ideal user flow allows users to opt-in to visiting an
 onion. It is what alt-onion can offer to us, as follow:
 >
 > 1. User type the known URL with a regular domain.
 > 2. If the Onion exists, the URL bar suggest an .onion.
 > 3. User click the suggestion
 > 1. Tor Browser should save this opt-in and only prompt first-time
 users
 > 4. The Onion Icon gets added at the URL bar. The URL could remain. The
 circuit display shows the Onion address.

 Again, what is the functionality of the .onion icon? Does the .onion
 version get loaded once I click on it? If so, then the URL bar domain
 should change and the circuit display. If not then both should stay as the
 display is bound to the actual requests happen(ed).
 We need to think about the opt-in saving here as well and how we expose
 that, as in #30237.

 > **3. https-e**
 >
 > With this option, we are introducing the opportunity to have a readable
 and memorable onion domain name. That option will make sense when we
 expose the .onion domain at the URL bar.
 >
 > 1. User type the known URL with a regular domain.
 > 2. If the rule exists, the URL bar suggest a .onion

 When does that and 2.1, 3. and 3.1 happen? After the user hits Enter?

 > 1. If the rule doesn't exist, we could encourage users to add it.
 That will be discussed at [#30029].
 > 3. User click the suggestion
 > 1. Tor Browser should save this opt-in to only prompt first-time
 users
 > 4. The Onion Icon gets added at the URL bar. The URL changes to show the
 .onion domain. The circuit display shows the Onion address.

 I assume this happens together with actually loading the .onion URL which
 would be fine from my PoV.

 > **The case of the long Onion addresses**
 >
 > We will continue to have long Onion addresses for a while. What if we
 improve the way we are showing them at the circuit display? We reported
 some UI bugs, like #26322. I propose to try a truncated version of the URL
 that is also easy to verify and copy.

 How would you verify a truncated version of the onion address? And what
 would you use the copy for?

 > `p53lf57qovyuvwsc6xnrppyply3vtqm7l6pcobkmyqsiofyeznfu5uqd.onion →
 p53lf5fu5uqd.onion`
 >
 > Could we apply any heuristic that help us to define how many characters
 are smart to have at the start and and the end? Can we allow users to copy
 the full address from the circuit display?

 Sure copying the full address sounds fine. However, I am wary of any
 truncated version. This sounds like a security risk and we should not
 encourage dealing with truncated .onions either I think.

 >
 > **Some general thoughts and questions:**
 >
 > - We should prioritize the exposure of Onion domains at the URL bar if
 they are readable and memorable for various reasons. On the product side,
 we should reinforce the communication about the benefits of using Onion
 services.
 >
 > - Onion addresses should get exposed at the circuit display *always*.

 If the requests went over the onion, yes. Otherwis

Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 hmm. I'm guessing the requested webpage isn't opened in another tab during
 the first part, correct? The homepage is loaded and displayed, but i
 wonder if the requested webpage is available in another tab.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  tbb-mboile => tbb-mobile


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 It seemed we are on the same page here that we don't want to have line-of-
 death-issues. Thus, this already cuts down possible options. Not sure how
 much we still have available though.

 I am not sure how to deal with user story 3 either as by default saving
 things to disk is not allowed in Tor Browser. I think the risks are in
 particular evident for private keys. So, we'd have to think about how we
 would offer users this option if at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
--+---
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by kT3Ycp9jwm):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Hm. Did that work before and just Tor Browser 8.5 breaks now?

 no, it never worked since the policy was deployed (some months ago, but
 could manage to report it just today)

 I use it as a local account, who does not get the policy


 > The problem with GPOs is that it seems Tor Browser is happily following
 whatever the GPO is telling it. That means this could lead to a proxy
 bypass, see: #29916. We therefore set:
 `browser.policies.testing.disallowEnterprise` to `true`.

 just checked: it's already set to true, as default value

 > Does flipping that pref get things working for you again?

 unfortunately not

 > Where does the PAC file actually point to?

 proxy.pac is on an internal server domain.local/proxy.pac

 I am using Tor Browser 8.5 (based on Mozilla Firefox 60.7.0esr) (32-bit),
 updated today just before taking screenshots

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30574 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor does not open upon clicking on icon. I cannot uninstall it to reinstal.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30574: Tor does not open upon clicking on icon. I cannot uninstall it to 
reinstal.
--+---
 Reporter:  Clogdancer|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5 =>
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 What Windows system is that? Which Tor Browser version and where did you
 get it from? What happens if you move the whole Tor Browser folder to a
 different location under C:\User\Peter? Maybe there is an `AppData` one
 (it could be hidden) which would be a good testing location.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
--+---
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: tom (added)
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team


Comment:

 Hm. Did that work before and just Tor Browser 8.5 breaks now? The problem
 with GPOs is that it seems Tor Browser is happily following whatever the
 GPO is telling it. That means this could lead to a proxy bypass, see:
 #29916. We therefore set: `browser.policies.testing.disallowEnterprise` to
 `true`. Does flipping that pref get things working for you again? Where
 does the PAC file actually point to?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [- Select a component]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
--+
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Mozilla also doesn't know how Firefox works, see ticket:29916#comment:11.
 Tor Browser 8.5 is still not portable. Sorry for that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression => tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-
 regression, TorBrowserTeam201905R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30576 [Webpages/Blog]: If permissions.default.image is set to 2 and one comments on a blog post it keeps reloading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30576: If permissions.default.image is set to 2 and one comments on a blog 
post it
keeps reloading
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It has nothing to do with permissions.default.image, it happens when JS is
 disabled. There's already a ticket for this so please close this one as
 duplicate.

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[tor-bugs] #30576 [Webpages/Blog]: If permissions.default.image is set to 2 and one comments on a blog post it keeps reloading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30576: If permissions.default.image is set to 2 and one comments on a blog 
post it
keeps reloading
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Webpages/Blog
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
+--
 Reporter:  rollback-question   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nobell):

 BTW, if you want to get a review from the Tor Browser team, you should set
 `TorBrowserTeam201905R` keyword.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [- Select a component]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
--+
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by kT3Ycp9jwm):

 * Attachment "unable_to_connect.PNG" added.

 "Unable to connect" error page

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [- Select a component]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
--+
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by kT3Ycp9jwm):

 * Attachment "connection_settings.PNG" added.

 Tor Browser connection settings screenshot

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[tor-bugs] #30575 [- Select a component]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
+--
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I am using Tor browser on a Microsoft Active Directory joined computer.
 Domain admins set up Group Policy Objects configuring Firefox to use a
 proxy auto-configuration script.
 That setting from GPO overrides automatic Tor Browser setting to use
 localhost:9150 and when I try to navigate I get "Unable to connect" error
 page.
 Tor Browser connection settings are locked by the GPO, as it is in the
 installed version of Firefox, and I cannot change them manually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30574 [- Select a component]: Tor does not open upon clicking on icon. I cannot uninstall it to reinstal.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30574: Tor does not open upon clicking on icon. I cannot uninstall it to 
reinstal.
--+--
 Reporter:  Clogdancer|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Clogdancer):

 * Attachment "TOR.pdf" added.

 error message

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[tor-bugs] #30574 [- Select a component]: Tor does not open upon clicking on icon. I cannot uninstall it to reinstal.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30574: Tor does not open upon clicking on icon. I cannot uninstall it to 
reinstal.
--+--
 Reporter:  Clogdancer|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I get an error message when trying to open Tor. I have it on file bur
 cannot see how to upload it to you.  Nor do I understand the rest of this
 website

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mboile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 gk seems to be celebrating TBA release ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
+--
 Reporter:  rollback-question   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
+--
 Reporter:  rollback-question   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by acat):

 There's a patch for torbutton to fix the saved logins here
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commit/30565.

 Note: using `sticky_pref()` instead of `pref()` in `000-tor-browser.js`
 should have prevented this behaviour (the pref would not have been removed
 from `user.js` when it matched the default value).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
+--
 Reporter:  rollback-question   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by acat):

 TLDR: You should be able to get your logins back by opening `about:config`
 page, looking for `security.nocertdb` pref, setting it to `false`, and
 restarting the browser.

 For the saved logins issue, we think we know what happened. It's a bit
 long to explain:

 In Tor Browser there is a preference `security.nocertdb` that is set to
 true by default, in order to make the browser intermediate certificate
 store memory only (no persistence to disk). This is also used for saved
 logins, so these will not work if `security.nocertdb = true`.

 When you select `Tor browser will Remember history` we flip this
 preference to false, to make it consistent with "keep history" mode and
 also to enable features like saving logins to work. Internally, this pref
 change to `security.nocertdb = false` is saved in the browser profile as
 user preference (`prefs.js` file), to override the browser defaults.

 In order to fix the Firefox addons being uninstalled issue (see
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1548973), we had to change
 the browser default and set `security.nocertdb = false`. We did not expect
 that in your case, since the browser default value now matched your user
 chosen value, the `prefs.js` pref override would be removed for being
 redundant. This eventually meant that when upgrading to 8.5, where we
 switched the default to true, this pref was also wrongly switched to true
 for your case.

 So switching `security.nocertdb = false` should fix this.

 For the tabs issue, I still cannot reproduce. Can you verify if after
 switching this it still happens? Is it persistent (tabs are never kept on
 browser start) or it just happened once (when browser upgraded?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
+--
 Reporter:  rollback-question   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by rollback-question):

 thanks for looking into it. the config changes i've done after the initial
 install are:

 in Browser Privacy:

 Forms & Passwords
 X Remember logins and passwords for websites (selected)

 History
 Tor browser will Remember history

 Accept cookies and site data from websites
 Keep until I close Tor Browser
 Accept third-party cookies and site data Never

 Security Level Safest

 in General:

 When Tor Browser starts
 Show your windows and tabs from last time

 then in about:config -> javascript.enabled set to false
 i also changed recently xpinstall.signatures.required to false due to the
 well known issue of the addons getting disabled

 i think that is all i have changed. i'll try to install the previous
 version 8.0.9 in a separate directory later today and copy the contents of
 Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default over to see if i can roll
 back and have everything working again. i hope this is safe and all
 "customized" data including passwords and history are recovered

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30562 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings.html is not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30562: https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings.html is not working
--+-
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  wayward
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 fixed with
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/web/manual.git/commit/?id=a5b0fa474f40e0f0c20a9d6b03111e0e0528510b
 but yeah is better if we get rid of the .html as proposed in #30571

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
+--
 Reporter:  rollback-question   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: acat (added)
 * status:  needs_information => new
 * keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues => tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression
 * priority:  Medium => Very High


Comment:

 I think we might have enough info to at least look at the saved
 logins/passwords issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mboile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tba => tbb-mboile


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30572 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [BUG] Tor Browser Android custom tab needs Tor connected beforehand.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30572: [BUG] Tor Browser Android custom tab needs Tor connected beforehand.
--+--
 Reporter:  clash |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tba, bug => tbb-mobile


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[tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tba
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This happens to me with Tor Browser for Android alpha downloaded from our
 website in LineageOS. My system is in Spanish and Tor Browser detects the
 locale in the settings at least.

 Steps to reproduce:

 - Make sure you have Tor Browser closed
 - Click on a link on your email or similar to trigger the 'open with Tor
 Browser always, only once'.
 - Select Tor Browser. You get the pretty purple screen with the 'Conecta'
 button.
 - Click Connect. The Tor Browser homepage appears.

   Your link is forgotten!

 - Go back to your email, and click again on the link.
 - Select Tor Browser
 - The link is opened in Tor Browser.


 What should happen instead:

 - Tor Browser should open the first time with the link, after connecting,
 instead of the homepage. It seems it forgets the link during the
 connection process.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30441 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30441: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 What is the plan here? Any updates? That's still an often reported issue
 on our blog.

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[tor-bugs] #30572 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [BUG] Tor Browser Android custom tab needs Tor connected beforehand.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30572: [BUG] Tor Browser Android custom tab needs Tor connected beforehand.
--+--
 Reporter:  clash |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tba, bug  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 If I click on a link and open it with TBA when TBA is closed like here -

 [[Image(https://i.imgur.com/T4zrqac.png)]]

 It doesn't open in the custom tab and I get this -

 [[Image(https://i.imgur.com/BovthC5.png)]]

 But if I first open TBA and click Connect then go and click on the link
 then it opens up like it should.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
--+---
 Reporter:  rollback-question |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Yoyo):

 I've got the same problem. And comments to the blog post indicates that
 there are others.

 The only change to my Tor browser that I can think of is that I configured
 it so that NoScript remembers which sites I trust

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10632 [Applications/Tor Browser]: add environment variable that causes the "Open Network Settings" menu item to be hidden or disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10632: add environment variable that causes the "Open Network Settings" menu 
item
to be hidden or disabled
--+---
 Reporter:  proper|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
  Sponsor:|
--+---

Comment (by CamillaStamm):

 Adding environment variable seems like adding calendar variable in any
 project. I have done similar project with [[https://essay-writing-
 services.reviews/essayshark-com-review/|essayshark]] help which was quite
 interesting. If you need this, I can share it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30571 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider details

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30571: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider
details
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: emmapeel (added)


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[tor-bugs] #30571 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider details

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30571: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider
details
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We are currently pointing to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-
 settings.html for more details about the security slider. However, that
 should have been https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
--+---
 Reporter:  rollback-question |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-8.5-issues
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>


Comment:

 Looking over the Changelog again nothing comes to mind and I don't
 remember touching us anything that could affect you. Admittedly, yours is
 not a use case we are particularly well-prepared for yet, so we might have
 accidentally broken things for you. Sorry for the inconvenience.

 I'd need some steps to reproduce from you, in particular how you are
 modifying your Tor Browser in the beginning before the update.

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