Re: [tor-bugs] #25598 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Let the broker inform proxies how often to poll

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25598: Let the broker inform proxies how often to poll
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by serna):

 Here's how it would work with a hardcoded 20sec poll rate:
 https://github.com/BubuAnabelas/snowflake/pull/1

 The broker sends the {{{ Snowflake-Next-Poll }}} header and the proxy
 reads it set it as it's next poll interval.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30935 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30935: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 That's fine, but let's try to avoid this process issue in future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31463 [Core Tor/Tor]: Redundant build exclusion not working corrently on travis

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31463: Redundant build exclusion not working corrently on travis
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge-backport, nickm-merge- |  Actual Points:  0.1
  backport, consider-backport-immediately, tor-  |
  ci-speed, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: asn, nickm (added)
 * keywords:
 consider-backport-immediately, tor-ci-speed, 035-backport,
 040-backport, 041-backport
 =>
 asn-merge-backport, nickm-merge-backport, consider-backport-
 immediately, tor-ci-speed, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport


Comment:

 Hi asn, nickm, can you please test the new push-all.sh script in #29879 by
 merging this backport to 0.3.5 and pushing using:
 {{{
 TOR_PUSH_DELAY=5 git-push-all.sh
 }}}

 This CI change is safe to backport immediately.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29879 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make git-push-all.sh push branches in a specific order

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29879: Make git-push-all.sh push branches in a specific order
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, git-scripts, fast-fix,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:  #31178   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The extra features are contained behind extra flags or env vars, so I
 don't think there is any need to do anything.

 Feel free to test it next time you merge and push a backport.

 #31463 is a CI backport that we can backport immediately.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31369 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31369: HSv3 descriptor support in stem
-+---
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-hs onionbalance scaling  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Hi asn, [https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=6790035 hidden
 service v3 descriptor support pushed]. It only includes the outer later,
 and does not validate signatures. If this doesn't do the trick for your
 use case please let me know. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31413 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check for internal IPv6 connects and extends (was: Check for null IPv6 addresses/extends in circuit_extend())

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31413: Check for internal IPv6 connects and extends
-+--
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> In teor's comment in #31088:
>
> > You've added some code that isn't needed yet. Please reject all IPv6
> extends in this patch, and open a separate child ticket of #24403 for
> allowing IPv6 extends.

New description:

 In teor's comment in #31088:

 > You've added some code that isn't needed yet. Please reject all IPv6
 extends in this patch, and open a separate child ticket of #24403 for
 allowing IPv6 extends.

 Edited to add:

 When we add support for IPv6 extends, we should check for internal IPv6
 addresses in extends. And we should check for internal IPv6 connects on
 non-bridge clients, relays, and authorities.

 ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses should disable these new checks.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31385 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake client fails after bootstrap

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31385: Snowflake client fails after bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:20 arlolra]:
 > > Can someone review this ASAP and I'll push an update?
 >
 > Yeah, looks like this was the intention in `2521f4f`.
 >
 > Couple of notes, L89 in proxy/snowflake.js is redundant,
 >
 > {{{
 > if (pair.active) {
 >   ...
 > } else {
 >   return pair.active = false;
 > }
 > }}}
 >
 > Also, since the timeout sets up a race, maybe add a `this.active` check
 in `channel.onopen`.
 >
 Thanks! I added a fix for both of these comments to the same branch.
 > I guess this is another reason to tackle #31310
 Yeah. I think there's still some problems here caused by reusing proxy
 pairs (if the pair is reused the active check in onopen might pass even
 though it's meant for a different client), but this is probably okay in
 the short term especially since we have so few clients.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30466 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Do not allow more than one control cell on a circuit

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30466: hs: Do not allow more than one control cell on a circuit
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-hs, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1259

 Setting as needs review.

 Tests were written where possible/feasible. If more tests are needed feel
 free to put as needs revision and I can add the extra tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30466 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Do not allow more than one control cell on a circuit

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30466: hs: Do not allow more than one control cell on a circuit
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-hs, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
+--

Comment (by neel):

 I have a branch here: https://github.com/neelchauhan/tor/commits/bug30466

 It's incomplete (meaning not ready for review), I need to write tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30935 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30935: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've made the easier changes, and I agree with the harder ones but propose
 to queue them until more of this branch is merged, since I am worried
 about nontrivial conflicts later on.  What do you think?

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[tor-bugs] #31502 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revise authority and fallback code so that they use the same "defaults" logic as other code

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31502: Revise authority and fallback code so that they use the same "defaults"
logic as other code
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 For ages we've let "NULL" be the default set of authorities, and then
 added code to substitute "NULL" with the actual authorities.

 Same with fallback directories.

 We should fix that so that the real defaults are the "actual" defaults
 from the POV of what counts as default in the code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found (required by ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/snowflake-client)

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31380: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not 
found
(required by ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/snowflake-client)
--+---
 Reporter:  xhdix |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, tbb-rbm|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dcf):

 I'm not able to reproduce this with a newly installed Debian 10.

 I installed in a brand new VM using [https://cdimage.debian.org/debian-
 cd/current/amd64/iso-cd/debian-10.0.0-amd64-netinst.iso
 debian-10.0.0-amd64-netinst.iso]. I downloaded
 [https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/9.0a4/tor-browser-linux64-9
 .0a4_en-US.tar.xz tor-browser-linux64-9.0a4_en-US.tar.xz]. It took a few
 tries to find a working proxy, but I was able to bootstrap using
 snowflake. I'm also able to run snowflake-client in the terminal.

 {{{
 $ cat /etc/debian_version
 10.0
 $ uname -a
 Linux debian 4.19.0-5-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.37-5+deb10u2 (2019-08-08)
 x86_64 GNU/Linux
 $ dpkg -s libstdc++6 | grep ^Version
 Version: 8.3.0-6
 $ Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/snowflake-client -h
 Usage of ./Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/snowflake-client:
   -front string
 front domain
 ...
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31495 [Core Tor/Tor]: cannot configure bridges

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31495: cannot configure bridges
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * keywords:   => regression
 * status:  new => accepted
 * parent:   => #29211
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31478 [Core Tor/Tor]: CodeStructure.md is not markdown compliant

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31478: CodeStructure.md is not markdown compliant
+--
 Reporter:  aveuiller   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Trivial | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  doc easy nickm-merge asn-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29879 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make git-push-all.sh push branches in a specific order

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29879: Make git-push-all.sh push branches in a specific order
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, git-scripts, fast-fix,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:  #31178   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Oh crud!  I merged it before I read the note on the last sentence.  Please
 let me know what steps to take.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31463 [Core Tor/Tor]: Redundant build exclusion not working corrently on travis

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31463: Redundant build exclusion not working corrently on travis
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-immediately, tor-  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  ci-speed, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.1 and forward; marking for backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12537 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Perhaps BridgeDB should supply decoys

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#12537: Perhaps BridgeDB should supply decoys
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, sql-injection,   |  duplicate
  XKEYSCORE, forthelulz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Yes, this feature was implemented in #31252. I'm closing this ticket as a
 duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12537 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Perhaps BridgeDB should supply decoys

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#12537: Perhaps BridgeDB should supply decoys
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, sql-injection,   |  Actual Points:
  XKEYSCORE, forthelulz  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * cc: phw (added)


Comment:

 It sounds like phw has been doing this recently.

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/2019-August/002439.html
 > * Set up decoy bridge that's handed out to BridgeDB crawlers

 http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2019/tor-
 meeting.2019-08-22-17.00.log.html
 > 17:48:32  i recently set up a decoy bridge that is handed out to
 requests that are coming from bots. the only purpose of this decoy bridge
 is to try and find out what our adversaries are doing with it

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[tor-bugs] #31501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript doesnt remember site settings

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31501: NoScript doesnt remember site settings
+--
 Reporter:  protoruser  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 NoScript doesnt keep track of trusted sites. I selected very low priority
 because this might be a feature.

 My Settings:

 - Remember history.
 - Delete cookies on exit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity, ux-team,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201908, GeorgKoppen201908|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Ok, I just realized I made a big/stupid mistake here, I'm sorry :(. At
 some point I looked at what I thought was the latest branch (`10760`) and
 saw that it was missing the `Remove nsISupports from
 ChromeUtils.generateQI` changes, so pushed a new `10760+1` which overwrote
 the actual latest branch (which I had missed), so all the changes
 addressing the review comments got lost.

 Anyway, I recovered the original `10760+1` branch, which is now at
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commits/10760+2. I tried merging
 with torbutton 2.2.1, and there were some conflicts but just due to some
 removed files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31385 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake client fails after bootstrap

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31385: Snowflake client fails after bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 > Can someone review this ASAP and I'll push an update?

 Yeah, looks like this was the intention in `2521f4f`.

 Couple of notes, L89 in proxy/snowflake.js is redundant,

 {{{
 if (pair.active) {
   ...
 } else {
   return pair.active = false;
 }
 }}}

 Also, since the timeout sets up a race, maybe add a `this.active` check in
 `channel.onopen`.

 I guess this is another reason to tackle #31310

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29207 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29207: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, design, ex-sponsor-19,|  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap|
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:15 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 serna]:
 > > Replying to [comment:5 cohosh]:
 > > > As referenced in #29426, the broker currently gives proxies a 504
 message if no client is available which is a questionable design
 > >
 > > I suggest changing the status to 204 No Content, it would represent
 that there's no error but it also no one to connect to.
 >
 > I disagree here. It's better not to hide ''any'' necessary information
 in the HTTP layer, because not every way of interacting with the broker
 will have those HTTP features. See for example comment:11:ticket:25985.
 Even assuming HTTP, codes like 204 are probably less likely to pass
 untouched by proxies. I propose to just always use status code 200, unless
 there is a genuine internal server error, and encode ''all'' necessary
 information in the HTTP body. We're not designing a REST interface here.

 Okay, this makes sense to me. So the idea would be to change all codes to
 200 and then do a redesign as suggested in #30704.

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[tor-bugs] #31500 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Malicious website not handled well

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31500: Malicious website not handled well
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 wwnc.xyz/ww/

 It replaces / displaces the mouse cursor and can somehow screw up
 unrelated tabs (i.e. close them).

 (encountered with current TBB stable and alpha)

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[tor-bugs] #31499 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31499: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 https://github.com/libevent/libevent/releases

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31449 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31449: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201908,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201908, tbb-9.0-alpha-must => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201908, tbb-9.0-must-alpha


Comment:

 TO be more precise here: only `mar` and `msbdiff` are 64-bit now while the
 other binary files we bundle are 32-bit as expected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31447 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't install python just for mach

2019-08-24 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31447: Don't install python just for mach
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, makes sense, thanks! Merged to `master` (commit
 00354e514c96c25dea3107a8240249063526a29a).

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