Re: [tor-bugs] #30992 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding machines have shutdown sync issues (with intro circ NACKs and other cases)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30992: circpadding machines have shutdown sync issues (with intro circ NACKs 
and
other cases)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad circpad-researchers-maybe-   |  Actual Points:
  want 043-should|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 I believe that https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/tor/tree/bug30992_draft
 should fix the issues I found in comment:7 and comment:10, but they are
 rare. I have not reproduced them yet.

 That branch may also solve several other "wrong hop" circpad warns and
 related issues.

 Going to wait a bit on review to see if asn's research work can exercise
 it and confirm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29370 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Measure mode with arbitrary tgen traffic models

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29370: Measure mode with arbitrary tgen traffic models
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  acute
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59
-+-

Comment (by acute):

 Attached a patch that describes how to use other TGen models. You can also
 see how the formatting looks here:

 https://github.com/ana-cc/onionperf/tree/docs

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29370 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Measure mode with arbitrary tgen traffic models

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29370: Measure mode with arbitrary tgen traffic models
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  acute
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59
-+-
Changes (by acute):

 * Attachment "0001-Adds-arbitrary-traffic-model-documentation.patch"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33516 [Webpages]: [Community Portal] Add an article under Onion Services with different options for redirecting to Onion Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33516: [Community Portal] Add an article under Onion Services with different
options for redirecting to Onion Services
-+---
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33512   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+---
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32040 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS intro padding machine reactivates after receiving INTRODUCE_ACK

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32040: HS intro padding machine reactivates after receiving INTRODUCE_ACK
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, padding, circpad-   |  Actual Points:
  researchers-want, 043-deferred |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 FWIW, I like the tolerated_purpose_list idea from comment:2 slightly
 better as it may come in handy elsewhere.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #5304, #29128, #29215, #31009, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #5304, #29128, #29215, #31009, #32208, #32622, #29111 by 
nickm:


Action: new

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #5304, #29128, #29215, #31009, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #5304, #29128, #29215, #31009, #32208, #32622, #29111 by 
nickm:


Action: reassign

Comment:
Un-assign tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22265 [Webpages/Website]: write high-level overview of bootstrap process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22265: write high-level overview of bootstrap process
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  FAQ   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 doc/Boostrap it is.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #29136, #32868, #33119, #16016, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #29136, #32868, #33119, #16016, #30971, #31036, #31482, 
#31699, #31913, #32306, #32622, #32661, #32729, #32815, #32816, #32830, #32863, 
#33346, #33352, #33354, #33411, #33503, #33589, #33629, #33639, #33640, #33669, 
#33747, #33757, #33768, #33781, #33796, #33873, #34084, #34086, #34087, #34220, 
#34248, #34251, #34375 by nickm:


Comment:
Mark tickets which are important or safe enough to look at post-freeze for 
0.4.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33503 [Core Tor/Tor]: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-6472d9cfdf1198cf)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33503: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
6472d9cfdf1198cf)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regresssion memleak tor-hs 044-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  regresssion memleak tor-hs 044-should => regresssion memleak
 tor-hs 044-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33399 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Measure static guard nodes with OnionPerf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33399: Measure static guard nodes with OnionPerf
-+-
 Reporter:  acute|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33325   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 I just noticed that DROPGUARDS has a call to or_state_mark_dirty() buried
 deep in its callpath. I did not do this for DROPTIMEOUTS, but it is easy
 enough to throw a call in there.

 This should only matter if there is a risk of restarting or SIGHUPing the
 tor process right after DROPTIMEOUTS. The CBT code will mark the state
 file dirty again as soon as it saves 10 timeouts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29645 [Core Tor/Tor]: test.exe hangs on Appveyor CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29645: test.exe hangs on Appveyor CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge, tor-ci, tor-windows,  |  worksforme
  tor-test, hang, 044-should |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 We haven't run into this in a long time, and it appears this has stalled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22331 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor needs to stop trying to read directories before it changes users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22331: Tor needs to stop trying to read directories before it changes users
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-unreached, apparmor usability|  Actual Points:
  042-proposed 044-can 043-backport??|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33974 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Update OnionPerf to TGen 1.0.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33974: Update OnionPerf to TGen 1.0.0
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:  0.3
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  2.0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-
Changes (by jnewsome):

 * owner:  jnewsome => metrics-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33974 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Update OnionPerf to TGen 1.0.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33974: Update OnionPerf to TGen 1.0.0
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 |  jnewsome
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:  0.3
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  2.0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-

Comment (by jnewsome):

 Given this tickets higher prioritization, probably doesn't make sense to
 block it on me ramping up on onionperf. Handing back to metrics team.

 Btw a volunteer sent an applicable PR; might be worth reaching out to
 them: https://github.com/torproject/onionperf/pull/26

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34397 [Metrics/Website]: Onion for metrics.torproject.org makes clearnet XMLHttpRequests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34397: Onion for metrics.torproject.org makes clearnet XMLHttpRequests
-+--
 Reporter:  c|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * cc: ggus (removed)
 * owner:  (none) => metrics-team
 * component:  Webpages => Metrics/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32895 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve marsigning_check.sh script to deal better with non-reproducible, signed macOS mar files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32895: Improve marsigning_check.sh script to deal better with non-reproducible,
signed macOS mar files
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sign, tbb-maint, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202006, TorBrowserTeam202006R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-sign, tbb-maint, GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202006
 => tbb-sign, tbb-maint, GeorgKoppen202006, TorBrowserTeam202006R


Comment:

 `bug_32895_v4` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32895_v4=a3c272d2e53ea60c1a596bc25189e6f63a535471)
 rebased onto `master` has the changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32824 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Upgrade tpo onions to v3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32824: Upgrade tpo onions to v3.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by c):

 * cc: c (added)


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[tor-bugs] #34397 [Webpages]: Onion for metrics.torproject.org makes clearnet XMLHttpRequests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34397: Onion for metrics.torproject.org makes clearnet XMLHttpRequests
--+
 Reporter:  c |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 A query such as http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/rs.html#toprelays will send
 an XHR through onionoo.torproject.org rather than through
 tgel7v4rpcllsrk2.onion

 For a hidden service, it seems preferred not to have any third-party
 clearnet requests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34396 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Remove atlas from onion.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34396: Remove atlas from onion.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  c|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ggus):

 * cc: ggus (removed)
 * owner:  (none) => tpa
 * component:  Webpages => Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34366 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The onion-location mechanism does not redirect to full URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34366: The onion-location mechanism does not redirect to full URL
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:1 acat]:
 > One way to avoid having to scroll again would be to keep the scroll
 position when there is the redirect. That might solve the issue when there
 is no hash in the url, so this solution might be implemented
 independently.
 >
 > However, the hash part of the URL (fragment identifier?) is not only
 used for anchors, but also for other stuff like navigation in single-page
 applications, etc., so it would be good to preserve it. One idea would be
 to allow a "relative mode" for Onion-Location, where the value is
 interpreted as the scheme + host, and the redirect is performed by
 appending the current path + query params + hash to it. This would also
 allow to have shorter and simpler Onion-Location headers for websites, and
 in most cases, to serve the same static Onion-Location header for the
 whole website.

 I understand why this is a useful feature, but I worry about successfully
 achieving this goal. I think the underlying question is "should reloading
 a page based on onion-location provide same-origin behavior?". If it
 should not provide that behavior, then we should simply reload the page
 using the provided URL without modification. If the behavior should be
 "same-origin"-like, then I like the idea of providing a "relative" mode.
 However, if that is the case, then we need to discuss how cookies and
 storage are shared. I expect some pages contain content depending on a
 cookie or localstorage, and reloading the page with a different domain may
 cause weird problems if the anchor isn't valid on the new page or in the
 SPA. Alt-svc entirely avoids this problem.

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[tor-bugs] #34396 [Webpages]: Remove atlas from onion.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34396: Remove atlas from onion.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  c |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Since atlas.tpo is no longer running, it should be removed from the
 listing on onion.tpo

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26092 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Split broker into components

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26092: Split broker into components
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: phw, cohosh (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32888 [Core Tor/Tor]: Log address config info when tor starts up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32888: Log address config info when tor starts up
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  c
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 043-deferred  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5940   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by c):

 * owner:  (none) => c
 * status:  reopened => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33469 [Core Tor/Tor]: INTERNAL ERROR: Raw assertion failed at src/lib/malloc/map_anon.c:239: lock_result == 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33469: INTERNAL ERROR: Raw assertion failed at src/lib/malloc/map_anon.c:239:
lock_result == 0
-+-
 Reporter:  m95d |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  0.4.2.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, malloc, map_anon, windows,|  Actual Points:
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  crash, malloc, map_anon, windows, 042-backport, 044-must =>
 crash, malloc, map_anon, windows, 042-backport
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 does this affect any supported version of windows?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33921 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: gitlab monitoring

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33921: gitlab monitoring
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-may  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by hiro):

 I should have had specified that my first comment wasn't a request for a
 review, but rather me logging how I was going about solving this. As a
 matter of fact I did not see your comments till today when I came to
 update this ticket with the grafana dashboard.

 As you mentioned there are many things that should be improved. Not hard
 coding prometheus IP in gitlab config is one of them.

 Anyways, this is the first iteration. Dashboards available at:

 Gitlab dashboard: https://grafana.torproject.org/d/QrDJktiMz/gitlab-
 omnibus?orgId=1=5m

 Gitaly dashboard: https://grafana.torproject.org/d/x6Z50y-iz/gitlab-
 gitaly?orgId=1=1m

 Gitlab Node dashboard: https://grafana.torproject.org/d/Z7T7Cfemz/node-
 exporter-full?orgId=1=gitlab=gitlab-02.torproject.org
 =9101

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion pol->magic failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32564: Assertion pol->magic failed
-+---
 Reporter:  Logforme |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  assert, crash, backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  High => Medium
 * keywords:  assert, crash, backport, 044-should, 044-must => assert,
 crash, backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 This doesn't seem to be happening a lot and it is still needs_info; we
 can't do it in 044 without knowing that it is still happening and getting
 the above info solved.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32895 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve marsigning_check.sh script to deal better with non-reproducible, signed macOS mar files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32895: Improve marsigning_check.sh script to deal better with non-reproducible,
signed macOS mar files
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sign, tbb-maint, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202006|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-sign, tbb-maint, GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202006R
 => tbb-sign, tbb-maint, GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202006


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32895 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve marsigning_check.sh script to deal better with non-reproducible, signed macOS mar files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32895: Improve marsigning_check.sh script to deal better with non-reproducible,
signed macOS mar files
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sign, tbb-maint, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202006R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Can we print the error message for only non-osx64? Printing 35+ non-match
 messages seems like unnecessary noise.

 {{{
 +if ! [ "$sha256_txt" = "$(sha256sum "$f")" ]
  then
echo "$f does not have the SHA-256 sum of the unsigned MAR file!"
 -  BADSIGNED_MARS=`expr $BADSIGNED_MARS + 1`
 +  not_reproduced_mars=$((not_reproduced_mars + 1))
 +  case "$f" in
 +*osx64*)
 +  not_reproduced_mars_expected=$((not_reproduced_mars_expected +
 1))
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34370 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve identity doorhanger message during failed onion authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34370: Improve identity doorhanger message during failed onion authentication
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 mcs]:
 > As someone pointed out on the blog, this behavior is the same as for all
 error pages that Firefox displays. There is a really old bug report for
 this issue:
 > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=420095
 > Unfortunately, it was closed due to lack of activity.

 I don't understand how this ticket got closed in the first place. I mean
 folks were seeing the bug. What about reopening linking to this issue, so
 it's harder to close it this time and no one notices/cares?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34394 [Core Tor/sbws]: Test net keys expired

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34394: Test net keys expired
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve Onion Service Authentication prompt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34362: Improve Onion Service Authentication prompt
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pastly):

 Replying to [comment:2 mcs]:
 > The text "Please enter the private key for your identity with this onion
 service" is too long to use as the placeholder text (the graytext inside
 the key textbox).  After we fix #34369 the `Learn more` link within the
 prompt will point to https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/client-
 auth/ which does mention that the private key is not transmitted to the
 onion service. Is it then enough to only change the introductory text as
 shown in the following screenshot?
 >


 To the extent you are asking for my opinion, I agree that fully
 implementing this comment (fixing #34369 and changing the text as in the
 screenshot) would solve this issue.

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[tor-bugs] #34395 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion-Location fails silently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34395: Onion-Location fails silently
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We received a blog comment saying the onion-location button appears, but
 it only disappears when it is clicked (the page is not reloaded).

 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/288193#comment-288193

 The two explanations I see are `OnionLocation:Refresh` does not reach the
 child process (this seems unlikely), or `if (onionLocationURI &&
 refreshURI) {` fails.

 Based on the description, `OnionLocationParent.buttonClick()` is called,
 and that calls `OnionLocationParent.redirect()`, and that calls
 `OnionLocationParent.setDisabled()`. But, in the content process, the page
 is not reloaded.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33521 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check if RecommendedTBBVersions is still used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33521: Check if RecommendedTBBVersions is still used
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202006, tbb-update  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 It is more accurate to say that after the patches for #28745 are merged,
 `RecommendedTBBVersions` will no longer be used. Looking at the existing
 code, removing the file should not break anything. It may cause current
 and old versions of Tor Browser to log info messages that look like:
  Version check failed. Versions file is 404.
 (which is probably okay).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34370 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve identity doorhanger message during failed onion authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34370: Improve identity doorhanger message during failed onion authentication
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 As someone pointed out on the blog, this behavior is the same as for all
 error pages that Firefox displays. There is a really old bug report for
 this issue:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=420095
 Unfortunately, it was closed due to lack of activity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34369 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix learn more link in Onion Auth prompt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34369: Fix learn more link in Onion Auth prompt
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.5-issues,TorBrowserTeam202006R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues => tbb-9.5-issues,TorBrowserTeam202006R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a fixup patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug34369-01=06d418b24d801aeb704101cfc0e44ca9fb72cab6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34385 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Be consistent with onion service terms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34385: Be consistent with onion service terms
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202010  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Thanks for opening this ticket, sysrqb! I think we are not losing
 translation memory if we `s/onionsite/onion site` because the latest were
 already translated as separate words. We will be fine in l10n land.

 If we have this patch for 9.5.1, we can review our docs (support.tpo &
 community.tpo & manual.tpo) to make sure we are keeping consistency.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33871 [Core Tor/sbws]: Scale exactly as torflow does?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33871: Scale exactly as torflow does?
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33775   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Should be fine now :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve Onion Service Authentication prompt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34362: Improve Onion Service Authentication prompt
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: antonela (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve Onion Service Authentication prompt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34362: Improve Onion Service Authentication prompt
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 The text "Please enter the private key for your identity with this onion
 service" is too long to use as the placeholder text (the graytext inside
 the key textbox).  After we fix #34369 the `Learn more` link within the
 prompt will point to https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/client-
 auth/ which does mention that the private key is not transmitted to the
 onion service. Is it then enough to only change the introductory text as
 shown in the following screenshot?

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/34362/revised-prompt.png, 700px)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve Onion Service Authentication prompt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34362: Improve Onion Service Authentication prompt
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "revised-prompt.png" added.

 revised prompt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't use site's icon as window icon in Windows when in private browsing mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33855: Don't use site's icon as window icon in Windows when in private browsing
mode
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33534| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 The current implementation does not appear to account for PBM. Kathy and I
 found this bug which is related:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1604272

 We will create a patch to set `browser.ssb.enabled` to `false`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33399 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Measure static guard nodes with OnionPerf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33399: Measure static guard nodes with OnionPerf
-+-
 Reporter:  acute|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33325   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 Thanks! I'll give this a try today and possibly tomorrow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34394 [Core Tor/sbws]: Test net keys expired

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34394: Test net keys expired
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Description changed by juga:

Old description:

> One more problem that could be avoided implementing #33150

New description:

 And the integration tests fail cause test net dirauths don't generate
 consensuses. Travis error https://travis-
 ci.org/github/torproject/sbws/jobs/693690384, though that doesn't show
 dirauths tor log.
 One more problem that could be avoided implementing #33150.

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[tor-bugs] #34394 [Core Tor/sbws]: Test net keys expired

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34394: Test net keys expired
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  sbws-roadmap
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #33121
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 One more problem that could be avoided implementing #33150

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33853 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable What's New? feature

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33853: Disable What's New? feature
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33534| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33866 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Onion Service info to new cert viewer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33866: Add Onion Service info to new cert viewer
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33534| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33421 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Track which Guard is used for experimental measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33421: Track which Guard is used for experimental measurements
-+-
 Reporter:  acute|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: asn (added)


Comment:

 Is it possible that the `GUARD` event is not implemented (anymore) as
 specified in control-spec.txt?

 The only `GUARD` event that I was able to trigger was `GUARD DROPPED` in
 response to calling Stem's `drop_guards()`:

 {{{
 2020-06-08 13:37:15 1591623435.81 650 GUARD ENTRY
 $98350B16551452ABC7F3457D06032CD30F7280CE~carbons DROPPED
 2020-06-08 13:37:15 1591623435.81 650 GUARD ENTRY
 $ADB98B27D7A3FB5732068FD23602A1BCB3BE9F38~Assange008fr DROPPED
 2020-06-08 13:37:15 1591623435.81 650 GUARD ENTRY
 $4E98AA295B7171996D18DD1F6A19F64AB4036B4A~summalummadooma DROPPED
 2020-06-08 13:37:15 1591623435.81 650 GUARD ENTRY
 $0C6D3655763B1A3A60FC42135CD60765AFE953BA~aSmallRelay DROPPED
 ... 16 more...
 }}}

 But I didn't spot any other `GUARD` events. Which matches my understanding
 of the Tor sources where `control_event_guard()` is only called in a
 single place.

 Is it maybe possible that the `GUARD` event has been broken during the One
 Guard Revolution? Calling in comrade asn.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33854 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof Network ID

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33854: Spoof Network ID
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33534| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34381 [Core Tor/Tor]: Shellcheck warnings for no-longer-existent contrib scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34381: Shellcheck warnings for no-longer-existent contrib scripts
--+
 Reporter:  c |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  044-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged that; thanks!

 (You weren't the first to hit this warning, but with any luck you'll be
 the last.)

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[tor-bugs] #34393 [Core Tor/sbws]: Maybe vote on the relays that have few or close measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34393: Maybe vote on the relays that have few or close measurements
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  sbws-roadmap
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #33121
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 To vote on aprox. the same number of relays as Torflow.
 Toflow does not do it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34309 [Core Tor/sbws]: Check that relay_recent_measurement_attempt_count and relay_recent_priority_list_count are correc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34309: Check that relay_recent_measurement_attempt_count and
relay_recent_priority_list_count are correc
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => juga


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33947 [Core Tor/sbws]: Compare sbws and Torflow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33947: Compare sbws and Torflow
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap, GeorgKoppen202006  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => gk


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33421 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Track which Guard is used for experimental measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33421: Track which Guard is used for experimental measurements
-+-
 Reporter:  acute|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten
 * status:  needs_information => accepted


Comment:

 I'll try to find out how to register for the `GUARD` event and then see
 what we can learn from that. Grabbing the ticket for the moment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29369 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Fix message logging and filtering

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29369: Fix message logging and filtering
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  Actual Points:  1.0
  team-roadmap-2020-june |
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  1.0
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:  1 => 1.0


Comment:

 Thanks for those suggestions, I included both of them. Rebased, squashed,
 pushed to master, and now closing as fixed. Thanks again!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29365 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add digests and sizes to index.xml

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29365: Add digests and sizes to index.xml
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  implemented
  team-roadmap-2020-june |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  acute|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * actualpoints:  0.3 => 0.4


Comment:

 Okay, you're right that the overhead to compute these digests is really
 small. I had the CollecTor use case in mind where we include SHA-256
 digests of large descriptor tarballs. But it's true, the files produced by
 OnionPerf are tiny in comparison.

 I tweaked your patch a bit by making the field more similar to the one
 produced by CollecTor, that is, by calling it `sha256` and encoding the
 digest using base64. Example of the produced file:

 {{{
 
 
   
   
 ...
 }}}

 Rebased and pushed to master, and closing as implemented. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33871 [Core Tor/sbws]: Scale exactly as torflow does?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33871: Scale exactly as torflow does?
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33775   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:22 juga]:
 > thanks, I think i addressed your comments

 Almost. One is left. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29368 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add single onion service mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29368: Add single onion service mode
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020, metrics-  |  implemented
  team-roadmap-2020-june |  Actual Points:  0.7
Parent ID:  #33321   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor59-must
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * actualpoints:  0.6 => 0.7


Comment:

 Merged together with a minor fix. Closing. Thanks, all!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33626 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add TBB project for GeckoView

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33626: Add TBB project for GeckoView
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202006, TorBrowserTeam202006R   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen202006, TorBrowserTeam202006
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen202006, TorBrowserTeam202006R


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:24 gk]:
 > This needs a small fixup at least.

 `bug_33626_v11` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_33626_v11=de88f1991023744cc22067c5e46e8ad78486f29c)
 has the fixup. `bug_33626_v13` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser-build.git/log/?h=bug_33626_v13) has everything rebased on latest
 `master`/`fenix_toolchain5`.

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