Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 So, this just happens on 64bit devices?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about using mingw-w64 with dwarf exception support for rustc cross-compilation for 32bit Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28240: Think about using mingw-w64 with dwarf exception support for rustc 
cross-
compilation for 32bit Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 tom]:
 > Hm. I know that mingw-clang-x86 needs sjlj-exceptions because the
 default SEH exceptions are not supported there.  But I'm confused why Tor
 needs a special case and the Mozilla builds don't.

 What do you mean with special case? I doubt you are cross-compiling Rust
 for 32bit Windows. But we do mainly to be able to react "quickly" to
 potential reproducibility issues (see the infamous #26475 where this
 stance has helped).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: App menu items stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31607: App menu items stop working
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: acat (added)
 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha => ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,
 TorBrowserTeam201909
 * points:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Do we get any errors in the error console? I wonder whether we made a
 mistake when integrating the About dialog from Torbutton directly into
 tor-browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31594 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close all the log fds before aborting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31594: Close all the log fds before aborting
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31571   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 There were a lot of really tricky related bugs here. And I'm not sure if I
 got them right. So I made a separate child ticket for each one.

 Here is a draft PR that I think fixes all those bugs:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1289

 Here's what I still need to do:
 * changes files

 Here's what I don't know:
 * when we clear the list of error fds, should we use -1 or 0 as the
 placeholder value?
 * are any of these bugs serious? Do they need a backport?
 * should I split this PR up into multiple PRs?
   * the subsys changes are independent
   * the backtrace changes are independent
   * the torerr changes need to be merged before the log changes

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23591 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build Tor and Tor Browser with -mmitigate-rop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23591: Build Tor and Tor Browser with -mmitigate-rop
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21448| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Actually we only transitioned to mingw-w64-clang for Firefox right now.
 Tor e.g. is still built with mingw-w64-gcc. So, we could leave this open
 for that case but the right fix I think is just moving all our Windows
 cross-builds to mingw-w64-clang instead. Thus, WONTFIX.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31597 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Go over all closed bugs/bugs where patches landed between Firefox 61 and 68 (inclusive)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31597: Go over all closed bugs/bugs where patches landed between Firefox 61 
and 68
(inclusive)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0|  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must, GeorgKoppen201909 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-alpha-must =>
 TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-alpha-must, GeorgKoppen201909


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31597 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Go over all closed bugs/bugs where patches landed between Firefox 61 and 68 (inclusive)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31597: Go over all closed bugs/bugs where patches landed between Firefox 61 
and 68
(inclusive)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, ff68-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-alpha-must, GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-alpha-must, GeorgKoppen201909 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201909, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-alpha-must, GeorgKoppen201909


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31594 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close all the log fds before aborting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31594: Close all the log fds before aborting
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31571   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Hmm, it looks like I forgot a header that Windows needs. I'll fix that
 when I fix everything else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31597 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Go over all closed bugs/bugs where patches landed between Firefox 61 and 68 (inclusive)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31597: Go over all closed bugs/bugs where patches landed between Firefox 61 
and 68
(inclusive)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, ff68-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-alpha-must, GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Back from #22074:
 {{{
 ) Firefox bugs

 
​https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?list_id=12910125&product=Firefox&query_format=advanced&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=Firefox%2053&target_milestone=Firefox%2054target_milestone=Firefox%2055&target_milestone=Firefox%2056&target_milestone=Firefox%2057&target_milestone=Firefox%2058&target_milestone=Firefox%2059&order=priority%2Cbug_severity&limit=0

 2) Core bugs per target milestone

 
​https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?product=Core&query_format=advanced&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=mozilla53&order=priority%2Cbug_severity&limit=0

 
​https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?resolution=---&query_format=advanced&product=Core&target_milestone=mozilla53
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 e.g. sec level flips https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1458662,
 and hundreds of other crashes, starting from
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1446898

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31617 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide import/export bookmarks functionality on mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31617: Provide import/export bookmarks functionality on mobile
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, ux-team
 * cc: antonela (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31610 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Some cdn.torproject.org URLs are giving 404 errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31610: Some cdn.torproject.org URLs are giving 404 errors
-+
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 weasel fixed the issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properly enable letterboxing (again)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31598: Properly enable letterboxing (again)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 acat]:
 > Patches in https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/31598 and
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commit/31598.

 I think we want to bind the behavior to the letterboxing pref maybe? That
 is: if letterboxing is enabled don't show any notification if resizing is
 happening (but make sure that our window is still properly rounded when
 created) and if letterboxing is disabled (because folks don't like the new
 behavior) fall back to the current status quo)

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[tor-bugs] #31618 [Applications/Tor Browser]: linux32 builds of Tor Browser 9.0a6 are not matching

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31618: linux32 builds of Tor Browser 9.0a6 are not matching
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,
 |  TorBrowserTeam201909
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #30321
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When building Tor Browser 9.0a6 we got two non-matching builds.

 The diffoscope output is:
 {{{
 --- tor-browser-linux32-9.0a6_fr.tar.xz
 +++ ../../alpha/unsigned/9.0a6-build4/tor-browser-linux32-9.0a6_fr.tar.xz
 ├── tor-browser-linux32-9.0a6_fr.tar
 ├── tor-browser_fr/Browser/libxul.so
 ├── readelf --wide --notes {}
 │ │ │ @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 │ │ │
 │ │ │  Displaying notes found at file offset 0x0174 with length
 0x0024:
 │ │ │Owner Data sizeDescription
 │ │ │GNU  0x0014NT_GNU_BUILD_ID (unique
 build ID bitstring)
 │ │ │ -Build ID: 57c2a4b3de9417e15b6d435bb7981ea61713a295
 │ │ │ +Build ID: 3af1172285050179a85a5d4d6f193b4016e8c9ad
 ├── readelf --wide --hex-dump=.gnu_debuglink {}
 │ │ │ @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 │ │ │
 │ │ │  Hex dump of section '.gnu_debuglink':
 │ │ │ -  0x 6c696278 756c2e73 6f00 0bad6af1 libxul.so.j.
 │ │ │ +  0x 6c696278 756c2e73 6f00 8c120a73 libxul.so..s
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 The sec level point is a good one. We should make sure that
 `javascript.options.native_regexp` is never set to `true`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 >#31140
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1523015

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 e.g. "This is the top crash for ARM64 Fennec ":
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521158

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Android 10: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1537701#c5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31561 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31561: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs hv-v3  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30200| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 A few more corrections are needed I believe.

 Also, would it be possible to write a small unittest for
 `hs_service_circuit_timed_out()` just to make sure that the codeflow works
 properly?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31545 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1452819: nul-terminated string handling, possibly spurious

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31545: CID 1452819: nul-terminated string handling, possibly spurious
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-must, memory-safety?, easy,  |  Actual Points:
  intro, ipv6, logging, fast-fix, coverity   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks well made to me

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[tor-bugs] #31619 [Core Tor/Tor]: Describe prop220 certs in tor-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31619: Describe prop220 certs in tor-spec.txt
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 IIUC the ed25519 certs described in prop220 are not anywhere in tor-
 spec.txt even tho they are used as part of the protocol (and also as part
 of onion services). Shouldn't they be somewhere in torspec?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31619 [Core Tor/Tor]: Describe prop220 certs in tor-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31619: Describe prop220 certs in tor-spec.txt
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tor-spec easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Ugh there is a cert-spec.txt that I missed. Closing this. Sorry for the
 noiz!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properly enable letterboxing (again)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31598: Properly enable letterboxing (again)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Yes, I think that's a good idea. Revised patch:
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commit/31598+1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 teor]:
 > Does the #31495 fix also fix this issue?

 Yes, that's fixed with a tor compiled from 7fa624537cded385 as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27493: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha|
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-alpha =>
 TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-9.0-must-alpha
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > `bug_27493` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_27493&id=e361790e2540af786386b6a13ac9477d82267db7)
 has the changes. I still need to test them.

 This works for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27493: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha|
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > `+ac_add_options --enable-rust-simd`?

 That could be done in a different bug if Mozilla set it in ESR 68.
 However, I don't see that to be the case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24653 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24653: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  security-slider, tbb-parity,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201909, TorBrowserTeam201909 |
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:
 tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider, tbb-parity,
 TorBrowserTeam201909, TorBrowserTeam201909R
 =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider, tbb-parity,
 TorBrowserTeam201909, TorBrowserTeam201909


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 acat]:
 > Patches in https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commits/24653 (last
 two commits) and https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/24653.

 Could you leave the security settings strings in one block right now there
 circuit display ones in the middle with your changes which is a bit
 confusing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27493: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha|
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 They forgot. Only that:
 
https://hg.mozilla.org/mozreview/gecko/rev/de0f0fa6f19d116db5e6d05ade564b3e990814da#l1.12

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Many users are reporting crashes on Android:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/283654#comment-283654
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/283655#comment-283655
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/283657#comment-283657
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/283658#comment-283658
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/283664#comment-283664
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/283666#comment-283666

 I'm wondering if we should temporarily disable the update on Android until
 we have a fix.

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[tor-bugs] #31620 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser app crashing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31620: Tor browser app crashing
--+--
 Reporter:  Sendpuzzles   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Blocker
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I've downloaded latest version of tor browser on my android 9 smartphone,
 Samsung Galaxy M20, whenever I'm opening app it is crashing I.e. not
 responding, the problem is occurring when I updated to latest version
 60.9.0 available on today's date 4/4/19.

 Thank you

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31620 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser app crashing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31620: Tor browser app crashing
--+---
 Reporter:  Sendpuzzles   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #31616.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Yes, we should but I think only sysrqb can do that right now. :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: Sendpuzzles (added)


Comment:

 #31620 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properly enable letterboxing (again)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31598: Properly enable letterboxing (again)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Hm, so this leaves is in a weird situation, kind of: disabling/enabling
 letterboxing happens instantly. However, showing/not showing the
 notification box depends on the window creation state, which gives
 surprising results. You'd e.g. get the notification bar if you just
 enabled letterboxing but you started without it being on and vice versa. I
 think we should find a better way binding letterboxing to the notification
 bar.

 If that's to tricky I am fine just disabling that part entirely. However,
 in that case we could just rip the resizelistener etc. out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31608 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_state_publish() never triggers when a new origin circuit is created

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31608: circuit_state_publish() never triggers when a new origin circuit is 
created
+
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit tor-pubsub  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31609  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-circuit => tor-circuit tor-pubsub


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31608 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_state_publish() never triggers when a new origin circuit is created

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31608: circuit_state_publish() never triggers when a new origin circuit is 
created
+
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit tor-pubsub  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31609  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


Comment:

 This issue, if #31609 is fixed, breaks many tests because they allocate an
 origin circuit but do not initialize pubsub for it.

 Either we setup that pubsub for all tests all the time or we make it that
 tests can publish messages for an unconfigured pubsub? Or ?

 For now, I'm leaning towards "pubsubs setup at all time for all tests"
 since initializing a new origin circuit is very basic use case in tests
 and shouldn't require us to do extra work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 So, all those happy users spamming everywhere have just upgraded from
 32-bit arm to 64-bit, is that supported at least?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august, asn-|  Actual Points:  3
  merge dgoulet-merge|
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august, asn-merge => network-team-
 roadmap-august, asn-merge dgoulet-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31612 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update the function comment in format_number_sigsafe()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31612: Update the function comment in format_number_sigsafe()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  comment-only, doc, fast-fix, asn-|  Actual Points:  0
  merge, dgoulet-merge, nickm-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (lgtm)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31476 [Core Tor/Tor]: Practracker: document new features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31476: Practracker: document new features
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  practracker, tech-debt,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  refactoring, easy, 041-deferred-20190530,  |
  network-team-roadmap-july, dgoulet-merge   |
Parent ID:  #29746   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31554 [Core Tor/Tor]: Restrict "make test-stem" to tests that actually use tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31554: Restrict "make test-stem" to tests that actually use tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix, 041-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  040-backport, 035-backport, dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 041 and master. Moving to 040 milestone for backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31612 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update the function comment in format_number_sigsafe()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31612: Update the function comment in format_number_sigsafe()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  comment-only, doc, fast-fix, asn-|  Actual Points:  0
  merge, dgoulet-merge, nickm-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august, asn-|  Actual Points:  3
  merge dgoulet-merge|
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 PR 1268 is not building for me (gcc-9):

 {{{
 src/test/test_confparse.c: In function ‘test_confparse_reset’:
 src/test/test_confparse.c:613:21: error: passing argument 1 of
 ‘config_reset_line’ from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-
 pointer-types]
   613 |   config_reset_line(&test_fmt, tst, "routerset", 0);
   | ^
   | |
   | const config_format_t * {aka const struct
 config_format_t *}
 In file included from src/test/test_confparse.c:17:
 ./src/app/config/confparse.h:152:51: note: expected ‘const config_mgr_t *’
 {aka ‘const struct config_mgr_t *’} but argument is of type ‘const
 config_format_t *’ {aka ‘const struct config_format_t *’}
   152 | STATIC void config_reset_line(const config_mgr_t *mgr, void
 *options,
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august, asn-|  Actual Points:  3
  merge dgoulet-merge|
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 It looks like the new test I added to test_confparse_reset() postdated the
 API changes here.

 New branch: ticket31240v2_merged_2_merged.  New PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1290 .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31431 [Webpages/Support]: Update or deprecate verifying-signatures.html.en

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31431: Update or deprecate verifying-signatures.html.en
--+---
 Reporter:  shrike|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Issue to redirect to new page to support portal created:
 https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/33

 Closing here in favour of ticket in gitlab

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30716 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30716: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor28, anti-censorship-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  august |
Parent ID:   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Nice! Thanks for sharing the update on this!

 I have a few questions and comments about the website fingerprinting
 approach. The observation that these two problems have some overlap is a
 good one, but it's also worth noting that it's not necessarily the case
 that implementing website fingerprinting defences will be strictly better
 for a pluggable transport from an obfuscation point of view.

 The main goal for a website fingerprinting defence is to prevent an
 attacker from learning which site you're visiting, not from learning that
 you are using Tor or even that you are using a website fingerprinting
 defence. And while the website fingerprinting portion is good to have, I
 think the current understanding of website fingerprinting of Tor traffic
 is that it makes more sense to apply to Onion Services at the moment and
 isn't urgent for the rest of Tor traffic yet? This is also being actively
 worked on I believe. Of course PTs don't have to only be used with Tor and
 this would make them better if used for other anti-censorship tools.

 > - We need to build an evaluation framework to understand what works and
 what doesn't.

 So my concern here is that even though the packet breaking is
 probabilistic (and eventually variable, etc.), can we do it without adding
 a fingerprintable feature to the obfuscation traffic? I suppose this is
 related to the "long tail" argument that we have, where hopefully by
 making the sharknado traffic look less and less like any regular thing,
 we're increasing the uncertainty a censor would have in blocking it.

 And it brings us to your bullet point above. It would be an interesting
 research question perhaps to take a look at existing website
 fingerprinting work and see how identifiable the defences are as they are
 implemented in those works given that the adversary knows the client is
 using Tor.

 > - We should find a way to make obfs4's packet sequences server-specific
 by incorporating the server's shared secret into the sequence generation
 process, just like it's done for packet lengths and inter-arrival times.

 Was the purpose of this to maintain some consistency for censors who are
 observing all traffic to a specific bridge IP address (which might make it
 less suspicious)? Or to try to introduce some variability for different
 obfs bridges in order to add to the confusion?

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[tor-bugs] #31621 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix node bug that makes large writes to stdout fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31621: Fix node bug that makes large writes to stdout fail
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,
 |  TorBrowserTeam201909,
 |  GeorgKoppen201909
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31538
   Points:  0.25 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We wallpapered around a `node` bug that breaks compilation in case large
 writes are made to stdout (see: comment:7:ticket:30321 for context). This
 is biting us in cases where we actually *do* need those large write to
 debug problems like in #31538.

 We should provide a better fix/workaround.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31594 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close all the log fds before aborting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31594: Close all the log fds before aborting
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31571   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > Hmm, it looks like I forgot a header that Windows needs. I'll fix that
 when I fix everything else.

 fsync() doesn't do what we want here: I should delete most of the last
 commit, and just keep one of the comment changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properly enable letterboxing (again)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31598: Properly enable letterboxing (again)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Mmm, actually I thought about that, but not sure how I tested that I
 thought letterboxing was not being enabled instantly, just on a new
 window.

 In any case, here is a revised patch:
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commit/31598+2. Now the resize
 listener is always enabled and checking the pref when it's called. Being
 strict, this still has the issue that a user with the window already
 maximized changing letterboxing pref will not get any notification, since
 these are only shown on window resize right now. Do you think we should
 also handle those cases?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properly enable letterboxing (again)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31598: Properly enable letterboxing (again)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30126 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30126: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Apple just announced that they have relaxed the requirements for
 notarization (until January 2020):
 https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=09032019a

 At this point, I think the only item on their list that might help us is
 that a secure timestamp is not required during code signing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31561 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31561: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs hv-v3  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30200| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 All fixed. Pushed unit test in commit e55235f72f. Sorry about that, I had
 one but it was stuck in the stash :(.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about using mingw-w64 with dwarf exception support for rustc cross-compilation for 32bit Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28240: Think about using mingw-w64 with dwarf exception support for rustc 
cross-
compilation for 32bit Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 tom]:
 > > Hm. I know that mingw-clang-x86 needs sjlj-exceptions because the
 default SEH exceptions are not supported there.  But I'm confused why Tor
 needs a special case and the Mozilla builds don't.
 >
 > What do you mean with special case? I doubt you are cross-compiling Rust
 for 32bit Windows. But we do mainly to be able to react "quickly" to
 potential reproducibility issues (see the infamous #26475 where this
 stance has helped).

 Right; we're not, we download pre-compiled stuff (and repack it).

 So I guess the answer is you need a patch to your version because you're
 compiling with a different compiler than us. (Presumably, the windows rust
 components are compiled using clang-cl or msvc on Windows?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31621 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix node bug that makes large writes to stdout fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31621: Fix node bug that makes large writes to stdout fail
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #31538   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1500436

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31457 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disable per-installation profiles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31457: disable per-installation profiles
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909 =>
 ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 mcs]:
 > We may also be able to disable this by adding the following to our
 .mozconfig files (but I have not tried yet):
 >  ac_add_options "MOZ_DEDICATED_PROFILES="

 The above does not work. It seems that options that are defined using
 `project_flag` cannot be overridden easily... or at least Kathy and I
 could not figure out how to do so via .mozconfig. Here is a patch that
 changes the default value:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug31457-01&id=646a7e897d3b313fadc37b52b147cc85dbd53fad

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about using mingw-w64 with dwarf exception support for rustc cross-compilation for 32bit Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28240: Think about using mingw-w64 with dwarf exception support for rustc 
cross-
compilation for 32bit Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:4 tom]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > > Replying to [comment:2 tom]:
 > > > Hm. I know that mingw-clang-x86 needs sjlj-exceptions because the
 default SEH exceptions are not supported there.  But I'm confused why Tor
 needs a special case and the Mozilla builds don't.
 > >
 > > What do you mean with special case? I doubt you are cross-compiling
 Rust for 32bit Windows. But we do mainly to be able to react "quickly" to
 potential reproducibility issues (see the infamous #26475 where this
 stance has helped).
 >
 > Right; we're not, we download pre-compiled stuff (and repack it).
 >
 > So I guess the answer is you need a patch to your version because you're
 compiling with a different compiler than us. (Presumably, the windows rust
 components are compiled using clang-cl or msvc on Windows?)

 Yes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31615 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reorder the early subsystems based on their dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31615: Reorder the early subsystems based on their dependencies
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31594   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Possibly helpful: you can run `./scripts/maint/practracker/includes.py
 --toposort` to get the modules covered by `.may_include`, topologically
 sorted by which other modules they depend on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:11 cypherpunks]:
 > So, all those happy users spamming everywhere have just upgraded from
 32-bit arm to 64-bit, is that supported at least?

 Yes, there shouldn't be any impact from switching from a 32-bit library to
 a 64-bit library. This is what Mozilla did, as well - and this is what
 Google's policy effectively enforces.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31545 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1452819: nul-terminated string handling, possibly spurious

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31545: CID 1452819: nul-terminated string handling, possibly spurious
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-must, memory-safety?, easy,  |  implemented
  intro, ipv6, logging, fast-fix, coverity   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31545 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1452819: nul-terminated string handling, possibly spurious

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31545: CID 1452819: nul-terminated string handling, possibly spurious
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-must, memory-safety?, easy,  |  Actual Points:
  intro, ipv6, logging, fast-fix, coverity   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Merging to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31594 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close all the log fds before aborting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31594: Close all the log fds before aborting
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31571   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I'll review everything but the fsync commit, and try to answer your
 questions.

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[tor-bugs] #31622 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: puppet: webmirror should not include static_mirror_source

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31622: puppet: webmirror should not include static_mirror_source
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 02:54:39  anarcat: conceptually, it makes no sense why a webmirror
 would include static_mirror_source.  mirrors are not sources.
 02:55:15  it does that via static_mirror.
 03:08:24  tpo-admin: [tor-puppet/master] 2019-09-04 07:03:59 Peter
 Palfrader : Do not trust facter, the source of lies
 03:25:19  anarcat: why does puppet create an
 /etc/ssh/userkeys/mirroradm on colchicifolium
 [...]
 03:31:07  I found your bug.  I still don't understand half the
 things.  for instance why collector defines /etc/ssh/userkeys/mirroradm
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31615 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reorder the early subsystems based on their dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31615: Reorder the early subsystems based on their dependencies
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31594   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > Possibly helpful: you can run `./scripts/maint/practracker/includes.py
 --toposort` to get the modules covered by `.may_include`, topologically
 sorted by which other modules they depend on.

 Hmm, so there's another check that practracker could do: make sure the
 subsystem init order corresponds to the topological sort order,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31615 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reorder the early subsystems based on their dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31615: Reorder the early subsystems based on their dependencies
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31594   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Yeah -- I think in this case what we want to do might be to make a
 debugging command for tor to dump the subsystem init order, so we don't
 need to parse it out of the source.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31616: Tor Browser on Android based on 60.9.0 is crashing on every launch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Google Play shows this is primarily affecting Android 9 on aarch64.
 `signal 11 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr 0x2aae` is
 interesting. This is the same fault address (and same code) as #31140.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31594 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close all the log fds before aborting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31594: Close all the log fds before aborting
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31571   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've left a couple of comments on the review. I've not reviewed the fsync
 commit, and I haven't checked that the new list of levels on the
 subsystems matches their dependency order or their order in
 subsystem_list.c.

 Here are my current thoughts on your questions, but for all of these
 cases, I'll defer to your judgment.

 > when we clear the list of error fds, should we use -1 or 0 as the
 placeholder value?

 If the n_sigsafe_log_fds value is zero, it should not matter what the
 empty entries contain.

 That said, -1 is more commonly used in our code for "not a valid FD."
 (''That'' said, we already use 0 here, and it might be better to leave
 that unchanged in this branch.)

 > are any of these bugs serious? Do they need a backport?

 IMO they don't currently warrant a backport, but they might warrant a
 backport some day.  They strike me as the kind of issue that we might
 change our mind about and really wish we had backported at some point in
 the future.  On the other hand, they also strike me as subtle enough to
 warrant extensive testing before we think of a backport.

 > should I split this PR up into multiple PRs?

 I don't think so, unless you want to. Maybe. (At first I thought that if
 we are considering a backport, we might want to backport only part of this
 branch.  But on the other hand, if we backport only part of this branch,
 we risk backporting something unstable that has not had testing.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31571 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add the tor version and a newline to raw_assert()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31571: Add the tor version and a newline to raw_assert()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31570   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 The return-value checking looks okay to me.

 I don't see any additional refactoring or comment changes on the master
 branch, however.  Did they get eaten by a force-push?  If you still want
 to do them, please put this back in needs_review when you're done.
 Otherwise this branch can go into merge_ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31457 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disable per-installation profiles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31457: disable per-installation profiles
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `+export MOZ_DEDICATED_PROFILES=0`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august, asn-|  Actual Points:  3
  merge dgoulet-merge|
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31532: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 We should also use ptrdiff_t for our `smartlist_pqueue_*` functions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31532: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Also we should audit our use of off_t: some of them should be ptrdiff_t.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31561 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31561: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs hv-v3  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30200| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Seems like the circ timeout unittest failed in clang. I also added a minor
 issue as a comment.
 After this we are all good for merge.

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[tor-bugs] #31623 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: add ahf to speaking@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31623: add ahf to speaking@
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Alex has been giving more talks this year and is connected with several
 spaces/conferences/talks. We all would benefit of having him in the
 speaking@ alias, which is our internal alias to coordinate speaking
 requests (see #23162).

 Please add him :)

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31623 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: add ahf to speaking@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31623: add ahf to speaking@
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31532: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I have made a branch to clean up all the places I could find in our code
 that should be using `ptrdiff_t`.  I made it by first changing the three
 points listed in the description of this ticket, and then by grepping for
 `off_t`, `offsetof`, and `STRUCT_VAR_P`.

 Please let me know if you think this should be split into separate PRs or
 tickets.

 The branch is `ticket31532`; the PR is
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1291 .  I'll put this in
 needs_review once CI passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30662 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure about:newtab is blank

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30662: Make sure about:newtab is blank
+--
 Reporter:  acat|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor44-can
+--

Comment (by acat):

 I think it's a good idea, but maybe there is some reason why it's
 about:blank currently?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31623 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: add ahf to speaking@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31623: add ahf to speaking@
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 done

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29888 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire nova

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29888: retire nova
-+
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29888 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire nova

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29888: retire nova
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 final destruction of the host was completed. upstream was notified that
 the machine can be physically taken out of service and has been taken out
 of reverse DNS.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28942 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Evaluate pion WebRTC

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28942: Evaluate pion WebRTC
+--
 Reporter:  backkem |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:52 cohosh]:
 > Well I can narrow down that at least one problem I'm having using just
 master versions of pion dependencies from the snowflake
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/3cc240625cad22db02eca7af41b139606c13147d
 pion branch] is due to ICE not gathering any candidates.
 >
 > For me the client isn't even contacting the broker, but stalling in
 `exchangeSDP`
 [https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/pion/client/lib/webrtc.go#L298
 L298] waiting for an offer to be sent from when the ICE gathering is
 completed
 [https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/pion/client/lib/webrtc.go#L174
 L174]. I don't see any log messages from `OnICECandidate`.

 Found the introduction of at least one breaking change
 [https://github.com/pion/webrtc/commit/7c18bbcceed776b547a44a0b921284db7d4bc69a
 #diff-d2ee665bb8c62c914fee5e9c743be25cR1034 here]

 This is the cause for ICE not working at the client side. The reason is
 that we use the new Trickle method of gathering ICE candidates (this was
 necessary to get pion working at the client, as outlined in comment:28).
 I'm not sure why this specific change at R1034 was merged, since it
 doesn't seem to have anything to do with the commit message and I can't
 figure out it's purpose.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31529 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: fix redundant reset logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31529: config refactoring: fix redundant reset logic
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Branch is `ticket31529`; PR in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1292
 .

 I'll make this needs_review once CI has passed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31457 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disable per-installation profiles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31457: disable per-installation profiles
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > `+export MOZ_DEDICATED_PROFILES=0`?

 Thanks, but we tried various things like that. The error is:
 {{{
  0:01.89 mozbuild.configure.options.InvalidOptionError:
 MOZ_DEDICATED_PROFILES=0 can not be set by mozconfig. Values are accepted
 from: implied
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31425 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31425: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  broker   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FWIW it's happening again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30662 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure about:newtab is blank

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30662: Make sure about:newtab is blank
+--
 Reporter:  acat|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor44-can
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 mcs]:
 > I am in favor of leaving the new tab page as about:blank. It loads very
 fast and most of the time when I open a new tab I know where I want to go
 (so I just start typing it in the URL bar). For me, a page that contains
 any content at all is just a distraction. But maybe I am in the minority.
 +1, FWIW you aren't in the minority.

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[tor-bugs] #31625 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: fix hierarchy of configuration variable flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31625: config refactoring: fix hierarchy of configuration variable flags
--+-
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  .5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 From #31494, previously from comments on #30935:

 > * Convert the "contained" flag to something more like "NOCOPY NOCHECK
 NODUMP".
 > * at the higher level, split "contained" into "derived" and "obsolete".
 At the lower level, give both "derived" and "obsolete" the flags "NOCOPY
 NOCHECK NODUMP".
 > * even though these concepts may have the same flags right now, we
 don't want to lock them in to having the same flags in future. Because
 they are separate concepts that are quite different. For example,
 "derived" has a (derived) value, but "obsolete" has no value.
 > * Make the "invisible" flag more like "NODUMP NOREAD".
 > * Make sure that all low-level flags are orthogonal.
 > * Make sure that "invisible" vs "hidden" is more clear.

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[tor-bugs] #31624 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explain config_type_extended usage and purpose

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31624: Explain config_type_extended usage and purpose
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  doc internal
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  .1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 From #31494, previously from #30914:

 > Make sure that we have a good explanation of CONFIG_TYPE_EXTENDED, how
 it is used, and how it relates to the type_def pointer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30662 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure about:newtab is blank

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30662: Make sure about:newtab is blank
+--
 Reporter:  acat|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor44-can
+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I am in favor of leaving the new tab page as about:blank. It loads very
 fast and most of the time when I open a new tab I know where I want to go
 (so I just start typing it in the URL bar). For me, a page that contains
 any content at all is just a distraction. But maybe I am in the minority.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I have made new tickets for two of the groups of fixes above: #31624 for
 CONFIG_TYPE_EXTENDED, and #31625 for the flag refactoring.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30935#comment:7
 >
 > Do we have tests that read in whole torrc, state, and SR files, then
 write them out again, and make sure they are unchanged?

 That isn't actually guaranteed to work: read+write only preserves the file
 in some cases.  Trivially, it does not preserve comments or spacing.  Less
 trivially, it does not preserve non-semantic option ordering.  I'll try to
 think of another way to test this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31624 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explain config_type_extended usage and purpose

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31624: Explain config_type_extended usage and purpose
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc internal  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Branch is `ticket31624`; PR at
 https://github.com/nmathewson/tor/pull/new/ticket31624 .

 I did not add a changes file, since this is a comment-only change.

 I will put this needs_review once CI passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31457 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disable per-installation profiles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31457: disable per-installation profiles
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hah, good protection, added in: https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/d4dc16a12cb1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31625 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: fix hierarchy of configuration variable flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31625: config refactoring: fix hierarchy of configuration variable flags
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Here's a proposed design -- what do you think?

 == The current situation ==

 Currently we have two kinds of flags:
* flags for types
* flags for variables.

 If a flag is set on a type, it applies to every variable of that type.
 If a flag is set on a variable, it applies only to that variable.


 The type flags are:

unsettable -- cannot be set directly by name. (LINELIST_V, OBSOLETE)

contained -- addresses part of another type. (LINELIST_S, OBSOLETE)

cumulative -- setting a variable of this type does not override older
   values set to this type. (all LINELIST, LINELIST_V, LINELIST_S)

 The variable flags are:

invisible -- does not show up on lists of variables, does not get
 written to disk, and is not visible to the controller.

obsolete -- produce a warning on any attempt to set or fetch the
 option. Do not list it as a valid option.

nodump -- do not write to disk.  These are mostly testing options.

 == The refactoring ==

 The new orthogonal low-level options are:

   * NOSET -- cannot be set by name.

   * NOLIST -- does not appear in lists of options.

   * NODUMP -- do not dump this option to disk from config_dump() -- either
 because it is a testing option, or because it is contained in another
 option.

   * NOCOPY -- do not try to copy this option in config_dup, because it is
 contained in another option, or has no storage.

   * NOGET -- cannot be fetched by the controller.

   * CUMULATIVE -- remains unchanged.  We might call it NOREPLACE or
 NOOVERWRITE if that's clearer?

 With this set of options:

   "cumulative" remains CUMULATIVE.

   "nodump" remains "NODUMP".

   "unsettable" becomes NOSET.

   "contained" becomes NODUMP + NOCOPY

   "invisible" becomes NOGET + NOSET + NODUMP + NOLIST

   "obsolete" becomes NOGET + NOSET + NODUMP + NOCOPY + NOLIST.

 == How flags are set ==

 Flags can be set either on a type or on a variable.  Variable flags are
 or'd with the flags of their type before checking them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31625 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: fix hierarchy of configuration variable flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31625: config refactoring: fix hierarchy of configuration variable flags
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31625 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: fix hierarchy of configuration variable flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31625: config refactoring: fix hierarchy of configuration variable flags
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (I've set this to needs_review : there is no code yet, but I'd like your
 opinion on the set of options I listed above before I go ahead.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31529 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: fix redundant reset logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31529: config refactoring: fix redundant reset logic
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28822 [Applications/Tor Browser]: re-implement desktop onboarding for ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28822: re-implement desktop onboarding for ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30429   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909 => ff68-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201909R


Comment:

 Addressed comments in https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commit/28822
 and https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commits/28822+1 (last 5
 commits).

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:


 > Okay, I took the commits from your `30429+9` and here are my comments:
 >
 > ea5f8c2c9ccc0130944f05a6e31ebb2a9322041c - I think it's mostly good. Two
 things:
 > {{{
 > +const {Services}
 > }}}
 > I think we settled for space between name and braces in Torbutton? Would
 be good
 > here as well.

 Fixed.

 > {{{
 > +@$(MAKE) -C ../extensions/onboarding/locales chrome AB_CD=$*
 > }}}
 > It's really just one level up here, right? While all the other items are
 two
 > levels up?

 We could change it to

 {{{
 +   @$(MAKE) -C ../../browser/extensions/onboarding/locales chrome
 AB_CD=$*
 }}}
 but I think it's the same as the current one, since the file is already in
 browser `browser/locales/Makefile.in`.

 > 1c9eb3993c5b505c0894b13634b09690bfb97791 - not okay (not sure about the
 changed `onboarding-overlay-button` but we'll see I guess while testing)

 I changed the css to match the old patch, since the `onboarding-overlay-
 attention-dot` was not showing properly.

 > The images are the wrong ones. We want to have those from #30560.

 Fixed.

 > 6f05a139b387c072a63bfae3a086aee2cee95875 - okay
 > e19e128476f48278911656db735739f0526f12ce - not okay
 > {{{
 > -/* The primary button gets the same color as the customize button. */
 > }}}
 > in `browser/themes/shared/UITour.inc.css` is missing

 Fixed.



 > 742fccfcbb7a19ba9daee44335e9962639773d13 - not okay
 > {{{
 > -  OnboardingTelemetry:
 "resource://onboarding/modules/OnboardingTelemetry.jsm",
 > }}}
 > in `browser/extensions/onboarding/bootstrap.js` is missing

 Fixed.

 > aeb0b6678e61fd282825610ca29a225eb0991281 - I think this is okay, but are
 we affected by https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1498378?

 We are, nice catch. Reverted that one too.

 > Additionally, upon further testing it seems to me that the details part
 of the circuit level and the security settings is not working as expected.
 While clicking on the former opens the DDG .onion, no tour through the
 display shows up trying to make the menu behind the security settings
 button visible by clicking on the option does not do anything either.

 It seems there were several recent patches which did not like the
 onboarding. The security settings not opening is a regression due to
 #31322 and then #31251. The first one prevents UITour-lib.js from loading,
 and the second one makes `window.document.getElementById("security-level-
 button").doCommand()` not open the security level anymore (not sure why).

 The circuit path problem seems to be a regression caused by the FPI
 permissions patches. I tried reverting `Bug 1330467 - part 1. Don't strip
 first party domain from permissions key; r=johannh,Ehsan` and it works. It
 also works if you disable `firstparty.isolate`.

 The problem is that the permission check in [https://searchfox.org
 /mozilla-
 
central/rev/9bb55ae4d808fc48afcf93f99da6a685265b86c6/browser/components/uitour/UITourChild.jsm#91
 UITourChild.jsm] returns `false` after that patch is applied. I think this
 is because the `uitour` permission for the DDG onion page is not being
 loaded in the content process (where this is called). These are loaded in
 [https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 
central/rev/9bb55ae4d808fc48afcf93f99da6a685265b86c6/dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp#5450
 ContentParent.cpp] (for the principal). Before the FPI permission patch
 (or when disabling `firstparty.isolate`, this is called with key
 `https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion`, which loads the permission properly.
 After the patch it's called with key
 `https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion^firstPartyDomain=3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion`,
 which apparently does not work. This issue does not occur with `about:tor`
 `uitour` permission: this is always loaded because
 `nsPermissionManager::GetKeyForOrigin` returns empty keys for origins not
 starti

Re: [tor-bugs] #31622 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: puppet: a static_mirror should not include static_mirror_source (was: puppet: webmirror should not include static_mirror_source)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31622: puppet: a static_mirror should not include static_mirror_source
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30967 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make shellcheck ignore user-created directories, and run it during pre-commit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30967: Make shellcheck ignore user-created directories, and run it during pre-
commit
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, teor-backlog-ci,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  042-should, tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > This PR failed distcheck, I pushed a fix to the PR.
 >
 > Please check that CI passed before merging.
 Thanks! Mostly looks good. There's now a `Makefile.am` merge conflict.
 Please fix up the merge conflict and ensure that CI passes before merging.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31532: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 (The original version of this branch failed to compile with clang. I
 force-pushed an updated version, which passed CI.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30865 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move option-listing, setting, validation code out of confparse.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30865: Move option-listing, setting, validation code out of confparse.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 This is accomplished by other refactorings already merged.

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