Re: [tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Shouldn't some exit relays (funded or not) be deployed to use an exit IP that is different from it's advertised exit IP in order to prevent a simplistic form of blocking based on scraping the descriptor set? I think this can happen if the default route is out another interface or secondary address. Something of that nature. Actually I think this is a great idea and allows Tor to be used when it wasn't possible or painful before. How does the Torproject and the major Tor network operators think about it? -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iF4EAREKAAYFAlCws6QACgkQyM26BSNOM7YoUwEAtsrq4+zcKVDMM1mrAz1Up/rC YH6UhTVI3i2bWUQsRxYA/iMVMYJscqKlQgVVVdJcUkkg5T29yIQCD8CWoLHRlaAG =89ZU -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Akamai running Tor exit relays
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi, I found out about it via Moritz's twitter feed [1] and I think it is great. Am quite curious about it. Does anyone have some insights on why Akamai decided to start 10 fast exit relays? (CC'ing the relays contact address here) Some compass stats [2]: bandwith: 2.75% of the Tor network exit probability: 6.97% [1] https://twitter.com/torservers/status/29861139255296 [2] https://compass.torproject.org/?family=C3D1F08204E2BF81C6A426F312AE3A2212C78929ases=country=exits=all_relaystop=-1 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iF4EAREKAAYFAlCws7EACgkQyM26BSNOM7YTnQD+L6D2fH6T5QmR0MUh4wJAnan2 Aag6ImaavJeFZS+jihwA/2roYnLDlocvfgoHe4cDk7vJvGctTGgylLi/FdH2tf9r =zf1i -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] 'critical' security update: Tor 0.2.2.39
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 In the spectrum of critical, I wouldn't put this one towards the top. There's no code execution or privacy or anonymity issues. So yes, upgrading is definitely a fine idea, but it's not a cancel your dinner plans to do it sort of situation. I probably misinterpreted erinn's posts [1][2]. Are tor versions 0.2.3.x and 0.2.4.x affected too? Yes. I haven't put an 0.2.4.3-alpha out yet (it's an alpha after all). I should probably do that soon. Thanks for releasing 0.2.4.3-alpha. [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6803#comment:9 [2] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-bundles-security-release -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iF4EAREKAAYFAlBfZQgACgkQyM26BSNOM7ZW8AEAigv1cCQDzx3mLpersWRB5Fs7 uJcGbq4/FUp7kD+I2W0A/RTKmjJucP+pphpzZvQ/oD7wASYzd98hEXXy6MqO5CLs =pblY -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Tor Weather Statistics
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi Torproject, would you mind publishing a few Tor Weather statistics? (I assume publishing this information is safe) How many relays have at least one Tor Weather subscription? How many subscriptions did tick the checkbox for: 'Email me when the router's Tor version is out of date'? How many 'Node Out of Date!' emails did you send out today? :) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iF4EAREKAAYFAlBfZgsACgkQyM26BSNOM7ZmgwD8CEj9H64NF0lePd+Cr65ECcLW 1CvFTbZau/m/3m7Ef9kA/3S+cGJfcS6xPtHcNZbnRa9FC8QXlP6P9QAgkhXhny2b =3lHr -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] 'critical' security update: Tor 0.2.2.39
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 It is quite sad that one has to find out about 'critical' security updates [0] via an unrelated thread on tor-talk [1] or the blog [2] instead of getting an announcement on tor-announce [3] - where relay operators are probably expecting such information. Are tor versions 0.2.3.x and 0.2.4.x affected too? [0] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/release-0.2.2:/ReleaseNotes https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6811 [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-September/025525.html [2] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-bundles-security-release [3] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/ -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iF4EAREKAAYFAlBUV7cACgkQyM26BSNOM7ZeyAEArFSwM5Z0fhtXV6q7pdK9CqXV coEuuHUFrm6gjzkQ+p8A/2z2e+x4sYuJzKhlvFKnwCURw93FSqWEt5MCFRpkd6rV =FkRi -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] 'critical' security update: Tor 0.2.2.39
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 It is quite sad that one has to find out about 'critical' security updates [0] via an unrelated thread on tor-talk [1] or the blog [2] instead of getting an announcement on tor-announce [3] - where relay operators are probably expecting such information. Are tor versions 0.2.3.x and 0.2.4.x affected too? Yes, 0.2.3.x is affected and #6811 is fixed in 0.2.3.22-rc https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/tor-0.2.3.22-rc:/ChangeLog 0.2.3.22-rc was announced by roger as usual on tor-talk: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-September/025501.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iF4EAREKAAYFAlBUXHAACgkQyM26BSNOM7ZQ5AD9E8CVhsUV9QBjtw90oQjF9BMd 1YPqUVsFAMdxEAffghEA/i9OtTV4A9k0YkIQtyUzsynxRKuAo3D6k4lXqirQrgRv =O6+v -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
