-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 > Shouldn't some exit relays (funded or not) be deployed to use an > exit IP that is different from it's advertised exit IP in order to > prevent a simplistic form of blocking based on scraping the > descriptor set? I think this can happen if the default route is out > another interface or secondary address. Something of that nature.
Actually I think this is a great idea and allows Tor to be used when it wasn't possible or painful before. How does the Torproject and the major Tor network operators think about it? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iF4EAREKAAYFAlCws6QACgkQyM26BSNOM7YoUwEAtsrq4+zcKVDMM1mrAz1Up/rC YH6UhTVI3i2bWUQsRxYA/iMVMYJscqKlQgVVVdJcUkkg5T29yIQCD8CWoLHRlaAG =89ZU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
