Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Good job, thank you! > Am 02.09.2016 um 17:26 schrieb D.S. Ljungmark : > > I just multiplied my BandwidthRate with a bit for my exit. > > //Spid > > >> On 02/09/16 02:28, Tristan wrote: >> Is the Tor strike today? Because I just set up a second instance on my >> relay to get the most out of its bandwidth. >> >> Oops 😏 >> >> >> >> ___ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
I just multiplied my BandwidthRate with a bit for my exit. //Spid On 02/09/16 02:28, Tristan wrote: > Is the Tor strike today? Because I just set up a second instance on my > relay to get the most out of its bandwidth. > > Oops 😏 > > > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
> I was riffing a bit on Mao's infamous Hundred Flowers Campaign. "The policy > of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend > is designed to promote the flourishing of the arts and the progress of science." Depends on your threat model, I suppose. The full quotation, taken from a speech of Mao's in Peking in February 1957, is: "Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is the policy for promoting progress in the arts and the sciences and a flourishing socialist culture in our land." It is sometimes suggested that the initiative was a deliberate attempt to flush out dissidents by encouraging them to show themselves as critical of the regime. Whether or not it was a deliberate trap isn't clear but it is the case that many of those who put forward views that were unwelcome to Mao were executed. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Is the Tor strike today? Because I just set up a second instance on my relay to get the most out of its bandwidth. Oops 😏 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On 09/01/2016 01:47 AM, grarpamp wrote: > On 8/31/16, Kenneth Freeman wrote: >> To me it seems to be a bit late in the day for a Cambrian >> Explosion -let a thousand anonymity networks bloom and see where it gets >> you. > > I wouldn't say that. So long as any particular network is > incapable or insufficient at resisting certain adversaries... > or any of its models on the people or other sides of things > are non ideal, or it just doesn't do what its users need it to > do, there's in fact every expectation that other networks > should and will bloom up. 1000? No of course not. Yet a > handful of similar nets based on some feature chart... sure. I was riffing a bit on Mao's infamous Hundred Flowers Campaign. "The policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is designed to promote the flourishing of the arts and the progress of science." Depends on your threat model, I suppose. 0xDD79757F.asc Description: application/pgp-keys signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On 8/31/16, Kenneth Freeman wrote: > As for the burgeoning of anonymity networks other than Tor, it'll be > interesting to see what level of interest law enforcement organs take in > them, if any. We know certain elements and entities are not at all fond of encryped anonymous overlay networks as a technology. That's different from any interest they take in the *users* of such networks and their activities. And different from any level of technical protection those *networks* may provide to the users against their adversaries. Any decently strong overlay network against some threat model is going to have the above three similar to any other network. > To me it seems to be a bit late in the day for a Cambrian > Explosion -let a thousand anonymity networks bloom and see where it gets > you. I wouldn't say that. So long as any particular network is incapable or insufficient at resisting certain adversaries... or any of its models on the people or other sides of things are non ideal, or it just doesn't do what its users need it to do, there's in fact every expectation that other networks should and will bloom up. 1000? No of course not. Yet a handful of similar nets based on some feature chart... sure. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On 08/31/2016 04:39 PM, grarpamp wrote: > On 8/31/16, Green Dream wrote: >> Well said grarpamp. >> >>> there are plenty of other already existing, interesting, and >>> upcoming anonymous overlay networks for transporting IP, messaging, >>> storage and so on. >> >> Mind sharing some names here so I can research further? > > Well, regarding recent threads... > > There's the IndependentOnion / RotorBrowser / Rotor project. > See the links and audio below for more info on how the latter is > beginning to take shape and unfurl its own sails. Flash proxy may be of some utility here, although to the best of my knowledge it is not in wide use. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_proxy As for the burgeoning of anonymity networks other than Tor, it'll be interesting to see what level of interest law enforcement organs take in them, if any. To me it seems to be a bit late in the day for a Cambrian Explosion -let a thousand anonymity networks bloom and see where it gets you. 0xDD79757F.asc Description: application/pgp-keys signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On 8/31/16, Green Dream wrote: > Well said grarpamp. > >> there are plenty of other already existing, interesting, and >> upcoming anonymous overlay networks for transporting IP, messaging, >> storage and so on. > > Mind sharing some names here so I can research further? Well, regarding recent threads... There's the IndependentOnion / RotorBrowser / Rotor project. See the links and audio below for more info on how the latter is beginning to take shape and unfurl its own sails. However if people would like to check out some things different and outside anything tor like or related, then of course neither Tor or IO would be of interest. So more along the lines of what I wrote regarding other networks, I'll try to list a variety of other projects in a followup post. https://rotorbrowser.com/ https://github.com/IndependentOnion https://lists.rotorbrowser.com/pipermail/rotor-general/ https://twitter.com/Jmprcx # IndependentOnion / RotorBrowser / Rotor Interview # intro 00:06:29-00:07:51 # exclusive jmprcx from 00:12:37-00:31:27, 00:37:02-00:51:30 # ppi commentary from 00:51:30-01:02:01 https://www.spreaker.com/user/anonukire/t0pg3arliv3-rotor-torfork-new-tor-broswe https://api.spreaker.com/download/episode/9283555/t0pg3arliv3_rotor_torfork_new_tor_broswer_project.mp3 # unrelated segments 01:06:01-01:31:20, 01:34:18-01:57:00 https://twitter.com/hashtag/rotor https://twitter.com/hashtag/rotorbrowser https://twitter.com/hashtag/independentonion Other reference materiel re: thread... https://ghostbin.com/paste/kmnzz https://twitter.com/hashtag/torstrike https://ghostbin.com/paste/4am8w https://twitter.com/hashtag/torfork @miss_cybernaut, @jmprcx, @thatrez, @routenotfound @forktor, @puppydogs12345, @gguernica, @shiromarieke @shafpatel, @shallowaddict @saigonseamus, @angry_node ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Well said grarpamp. > there are plenty of other already existing, interesting, and > upcoming anonymous overlay networks for transporting IP, messaging, > storage and so on. Mind sharing some names here so I can research further? ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On 8/21/16, Marcel Krzystek wrote: > What are the thoughts of relay operators on this? > I can be persuaded otherwise, and perhaps i'm being naive As unpaid and non contractually obligated volunteers, it's really up to each operator to follow their own conscience. No one is going to "die" if comms are a little slower than usual for a day. And it's not as if a 10%-30% aggregate dip for a while is going to dig into real capacity rather than unused headroom. Or that your statistics aren't going to recover. Or that Tor Project, or the community will not be able to mobilize any needed replacements, after all, the concept of anonymous networks is within us now, we've lived them... so they're not going anywhere. (And Tor has an advertising machine and budget, huge compared to other projects). But it would send a message, not just to Tor, or its community, but to the entire space, about what some values are, or need to be, or their level of importance, and so on... or it could just silently signal the need for others to talk more to discover them. Because we've got far bigger battles with adversaries to fight than to carry some suboptimal bullshit and come weak to the game as a result. There are now at least the idea of tor forks with different ethos. And there are plenty of other already existing, interesting, and upcoming anonymous overlay networks for transporting IP, messaging, storage and so on. Morphing market utilization and resources among them all is a normal and expected process. For that matter, for diversity reasons, there needs to be more than one good anonymous overlay network... different in areas of technology, code, operational base, geo politik/jurisdiction, development, funding, leadership, activism, and participation models... that is well known to the public, supported, reviewed, and used, par for par. Competition is fun and healthy. So this might be an oppurtunity for you to explore and participate in some of them as well, even exclusively as you might be doing today with Tor (if that's the way you do things). So maybe it's not really an issue of persuading anyone one way or the other, or being initially naive, or following any particular groupthink or call to action, or fear of making or even being labeled for choices... but a real chance to independantly take a week or more, researching and thinking about the issues, really the whole scope of the space and what's out there... beyond just the particulars of Tor and #torstrike alone... and then make any actions or longer term adjustments, changes, and talk, in your own way, based on that. Operators would have my support, whichever network[s] they choose to contribute to. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
We have 2016 not 1950. Update your ntp server. > assault/abuse/exploitation. The western culture we have collectively > created, where women are the lesser equals, and this underlining tone of > male arrogance that if a women was sexually abused/exploited that she > wanted it, was looking for it, or even enjoyed it (I speak from my > past-perspective on these type of scenarios, although wrong. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Hi, I'm a white-boy from a silly-old-town. I would like to express my perspective on the sexual assault/abuse/exploitation. The western culture we have collectively created, where women are the lesser equals, and this underlining tone of male arrogance that if a women was sexually abused/exploited that she wanted it, was looking for it, or even enjoyed it (I speak from my past-perspective on these type of scenarios, although wrong. Where did this ideology originate from? I can't be the only one? After I became aware of this behavior pattern, it became clear that this was a cultural belief system that was adopted). If the alleged abuser, and the several victims are within the same organization, and if the abuser is in a position of power, drastic actions needs to taken, and quick (The risk is too great, for the abuser to take action, out of fear, and use/abuse her/his power. Nothing good will ever come from actions motivated by fear). You can not expect to wait for or rely on the Law System to give you a verdict. If several victims are speaking out, and not all anonymously, that ought to be a strong indication of wrong doing. We are not progressing as a species, because of beings in a position of power exploiting those without. Do not let these situations change your behavior towards the Tor Project, by sabotaging the progress of the project. We all have a vision of the greatness Tor can bring to mankind. We the people are Tor, keep taking actions that will build us. Stay focused on the true fight. With Love, Rastaman O na kar maan rupaiye wala bar bar ke na rajje > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Dear team, Speaking as a former Tor board member and as a relay and bridge node operator, I'm more confident in Tor than ever before. I'm pleased with the new leadership team as well as the direction of the Tor Project. I'm pleased with the careful and caring manner in which issues have been handled. I'm pleased with how the community has rallied to build and inclusive and welcoming place to further the cause of freedom. We at Team Cymru remain firmly committed to the Tor Project, and will do all we can to help the Tor Project and community grow. We will not participate in any strike, or any other action that adversely impacts the dissidents and freedom-seekers of the world. Be well, Rabbi Rob. - -- Rabbi Rob Thomas Team Cymru "It is easy to believe in freedom of speech for those with whom we agree." - Leo McKern -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJXvcIHAAoJEEPoYWL6hfKNrhUQAJ7MIzsh4fQrTPx3GtTu0eLx nERvui625lc7RZCrLLIkKN19SjhJNzWfUdhOL8aGsvuvTmcXMswgFrGzru+E8K7h Ki1h91+H45+NXwHBsSpqJKf8ABE5Zq8Dkci6zz7gK3lyLLyp5TnLUFfNVWTc8IEW eljZxxEfOgY/GdmMEpZ2UEv0migk4j25f003g/Swn6JqtQJKrl9MCxacRqnVCptR /HRALjf4xojhd3Irp8dLWxK3UkFqnwlPEEUraf7Q+IqlxvP75QqfjPiXY/Ziwr6L hijoYTkCTXYP5mU8m6ZqdOCExRoEpTjFPFjW77P04+ddDvdmeH7WjoOlqFTSOJIg 27/EEo/ViFD4kl4YHspHu+00kstDr+FoJhFF5cmS04A7rVBlAc0wdHlKhPVDXHOR /O6bvlKR7HDIlESA7u02z186ElBR59Kqut1SgfI3OpLoL/X4V26eQEDdQuG+m8yC 8SgUWSqkabn9G1sbgauH49+dGX0VQjw+ayvZk22Ju5M2WJDH2oAZ3YSv+zmWzk5w VmlCAGC4UbDHDLJpvxpV1/KYfFqfZw+9KJHgofcaxfGnvHIP1gQjjsf87pS0y2w9 S0rRtMgZ4d1vpv/F5SjQcZ+YfFH7Pk0xR+5IP2fxxw62H8Yi0p566F9TOSeJA5pm eJUNKn8wjmuyd3FkvZgB =Lh+Q -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Personally, the expulsion of Appelbaum and the replacement of the board make me *more* confident in the Tor organization. The relays I run, B6C7FAFFFCEFC30541D38F33E25B1E0DB135C5D8 (non-exit) and 78C7C299DB4C4BD119A22B87B57D5AF5F3741A79 (exit), will NOT be participating in this "strike". I am making this announcement because we have to physically move the computer running the exit sometime in the next week or so, and it may be down for a couple of days, depending on how long it takes the network admins to reconfigure things. This is merely an unfortunate coincidence of timing. The non-exit will remain up. zw signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Arisbe writes: > > I agree in general with a lot of what is said here, but I have to take issue with one point: > > > > Okay, so I've been concerned about the safety of at-risk Tor users > since all this shit broke. New employees at the organizational > structure serving as the main accuser, an all new board with > interrelationships and motivation unknown, grenades rolled under > office doors and all of the rest leaves a bad taste in my mouth. I > cannot, at this time, recommend to a third world citizen, that (s)he > trust the Tor network. I hope that changes. > > The issue is whether or not someone new in the Tor organization > will, accidentally or intentionally, put third world users at risk. > I cannot trust an all-new board. Tor needs to be on their best > behavior in order for me to re-establish trust in the organization. > > > As a retired corporate manager I've seen these problems before. I > have several suggestions that I feel are must-do tasks for the Tor > Project: > 1) Secure an independent investigator to look into the allegations > against Jacob. Either demonstrate that he is not an honorable > employee or reinstate him. No one should trust anonymous claims > that can ruin his career. If Jacob is guilty, he should be > prosecuted; ... and this is it. I've seen this now over and over in these discussions: if Applebaum is guilty then some legal action must follow. Involving your local legal system in rape and sexual misconduct cases is problematic for many reasons. I highly encourage anyone who thinks that the obvious answer to the kinds of wrongdoing that Jacob Applebaum is accused of is "the courts" to read *something* about rape culture. Here are three links that aren't bad starting points: http://time.com/40110/rape-culture-is-real/ http://jezebel.com/5822649/why-a-rape-doesnt-get-prosecuted http://everydayfeminism.com/2014/03/examples-of-rape-culture/ I would also encourage anyone who thinks the police or court system of any country on the planet are always good ways to resolve these issues should also read this article and follow the links in it: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/18/idaho-sheriff-said-most-rape-victims-hes-worked-with-are-lying-the-numbers-disagree/ There are obviously a lot more articles online about this issue, and I want to stress that this goes well beyond these accusations against a specfic person. The cries of "due process" (whatever that means wherever you happen to be) and "if it's true charge him with a crime" sound thin and naive to me. They are based on assumptions that aren't true. If you accept this then the actions of the accusers in this case don't look so strange or off-base and the constant scolding to let the courts decide guilt or innocence look hollow. It also means that the real path forward is not so clean or easy. > 2) Board member should be open, accessible and available to > employees and node operators. Their background and motivation for > being a director of the Tor Project should be disseminated. There > interrelationship with other board members should be known; > 3) As one of the founders of Tor, Roger should openly discuss these > and all issues in a public manner (on the web page, webinar, > magazine article, etc.); > 4) An organizational plan should be placed in the employment manual > that puts significant distance between coding employees and > directors; > 5) Employees and directors should not operate nor have access to > authority servers. > > I've operated a number of exits and guards for several years now > (including, as far as I know, the only Tor node in Albania). [1] I > will leave these operational for now but I expect changes in this > unprofessionally operated 501c3. > > [1] >cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="410"> > style="mso-width-source:userset;mso-width-alt:12316;width:260pt" > width="346"> > >width="346">A827646DD0F8B92A9963789529CEE3141FF74761 > > > >height="19">4061C553CA88021B8302F0814365070AAE617270 > > > >height="19">C80DF89B21FF932DEC0D7821F679B6C79E1449C3 > > > >height="19">9B31F1F1C1554F9FFB3455911F82E818EF7C7883 > > > >height="19">D3E5EDDBE5159388704D6785BE51930AAFACEC6F > > > > > -- http://haqistan.net/~attila | att...@haqistan.net | 0x62A729CF ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Or six-years-old-sand...@lists.torproject.org This whole manifesto sounds like it was written by spoiled teenager or counter intelligence agent who is trying to incite unrest. Its designed to provoke emotions and doesn't deal with anything real. And I think its really awesome. This means that tor is a pain on someone's ass and doing its job for people who really need it. This someone is likely from said intelligence because spinning sexual scandals and building new stuff on those "scandals" is their way of doing their job where people get socially crucified without any evidence or legal conduct. Even when and _if_ such conduct happens it _always_ ends fast and without conclusions, but the harm was already made. Noise around tor is good for tor - it means its alive. Its just sad to see that people can get destroyed in this information war. Actually this stuff made me to slap another relay somewhere On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 9:08 AM, Iwrote: This thread should be moved to [ tor-knitting-cir...@lists.torproject.org ] or write to The Tor Corporation you think exists. Robert ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
I concur with all you say below. Exceptionally well spoken. Evidently you have some solid experience in your corporate managerial role. Thanks for speaking up. On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 11:50:37PM -0700, Arisbe wrote: >Okay, so I've been concerned about the safety of at-risk Tor users since > all this shit broke. New employees at the >organizational structure serving as the main accuser, an all new board > with interrelationships and motivation >unknown, grenades rolled under office doors and all of the rest leaves a > bad taste in my mouth. I cannot, at this >time, recommend to a third world citizen, that (s)he trust the Tor > network. I hope that changes. >The issue is whether or not someone new in the Tor organization will, > accidentally or intentionally, put third world >users at risk. I cannot trust an all-new board. Tor needs to be on their > best behavior in order for me to >re-establish trust in the organization. >As a retired corporate manager I've seen these problems before. I have > several suggestions that I feel are must-do >tasks for the Tor Project: >1) Secure an independent investigator to look into the allegations > against Jacob. Either demonstrate that he is not >an honorable employee or reinstate him. No one should trust anonymous > claims that can ruin his career. If Jacob is >guilty, he should be prosecuted; >2) Board member should be open, accessible and available to employees and > node operators. Their background and >motivation for being a director of the Tor Project should be disseminated. > There interrelationship with other board >members should be known; >3) As one of the founders of Tor, Roger should openly discuss these and > all issues in a public manner (on the web >page, webinar, magazine article, etc.); >4) An organizational plan should be placed in the employment manual that > puts significant distance between coding >employees and directors; >5) Employees and directors should not operate nor have access to > authority servers. >I've operated a number of exits and guards for several years now > (including, as far as I know, the only Tor node in >Albania). [1] I will leave these operational for now but I expect changes > in this unprofessionally operated 501c3. >[1] > >A827646DD0F8B92A9963789529CEE3141FF74761 >4061C553CA88021B8302F0814365070AAE617270 >C80DF89B21FF932DEC0D7821F679B6C79E1449C3 >9B31F1F1C1554F9FFB3455911F82E818EF7C7883 >D3E5EDDBE5159388704D6785BE51930AAFACEC6F ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
This thread should be moved to [ tor-knitting-cir...@lists.torproject.org ] or write to The Tor Corporation you think exists. Robert > -Original Message- > From: tor-am...@foofus.com > Sent: Sun, 21 Aug 2016 20:35:50 -0700 > To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike > > I'm not switching off my relay, primarily because I'm lazy and can't be > arsed to figure out what all the politics bullshit is about. > > Some project member did some shit and other project members are mad at > them. Other people may or may not be righteously mad at the first people > for reasons I haven't bothered to learn. > > I started my relay so oppressed people in third world countries could > communicate with the outside world and each other in relative safety. If > that objective is still being achieved by the software, I could give a > shit > what beefs the coders have with each other. > > > > On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 8:14 PM, krishna e bera > wrote: > >> On 21/08/16 10:02 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote: >>> Fact: Jacob Applebaum's directory authority was a target of NSA's >>> XKEYSCORE: >>> https://contraspin.co.nz/the-weaponising-of-social-part-3- >> the-resurrection-of-ioerror/ >> >> Of course, perhaps they all are. >> >>> Fact: Jacob Applebaum got kicked from Tor Inc, prior to a proper >>> investigation. >> >> Any organization would do the same with similar allegations. If he was >> exonerated, he could rejoin afterwards. >> >> >>> Fact: The investigation done by Tor Inc, was run by the primary >>> accusers >>> of Jacob Applebaum. >> >> Evidence? >> >> >>> In the USA's war against Bradley Manning, Julian Assange, Wikileaks and >>> Edward Snowden, Jacob Applebaum was a very high target, and caused the >>> three letter agencies a lot of problems. >>> >>> So yes, operation of the network you use for -genuine- privacy needs, >>> is >>> very much dependent on those running the organisation. >>> >>> >>> Fact: The ENTIRE board of Tor Inc got replaced after Jacob was given >>> the >>> boot! >>> >>> My conclusion: This was a coup, blunt and bloody, take no prisoners, >>> respect no righteousness. >> >> Overdramatic. Where's the blood? Who was behind the coup, and what >> hard evidence do you have? Are you looking for #torstrike to prompt >> leaks of such info? >> >> Makes more sense for the Board to be distinct from the day to day >> operations people anyway. >> >> >>> My conclusion: The operation of the Tor directory authorities can no >>> longer be trusted. >> >> Perhaps it never could be. Are you ready to run one? >> >> >>> My conclusion: The deployment of TBB by Tor Inc can no longer be >>> trusted. >> >> Fork it. >> >> >> ___ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] #torstrike
Okay, so I've been concerned about the safety of at-risk Tor users since all this shit broke. New employees at the organizational structure serving as the main accuser, an all new board with interrelationships and motivation unknown, grenades rolled under office doors and all of the rest leaves a bad taste in my mouth. I cannot, at this time, recommend to a third world citizen, that (s)he trust the Tor network. I hope that changes. The issue is whether or not someone new in the Tor organization will, accidentally or intentionally, put third world users at risk. I cannot trust an all-new board. Tor needs to be on their best behavior in order for me to re-establish trust in the organization. As a retired corporate manager I've seen these problems before. I have several suggestions that I feel are must-do tasks for the Tor Project: 1) Secure an independent investigator to look into the allegations against Jacob. Either demonstrate that he is not an honorable employee or reinstate him. No one should trust anonymous claims that can ruin his career. If Jacob is guilty, he should be prosecuted; 2) Board member should be open, accessible and available to employees and node operators. Their background and motivation for being a director of the Tor Project should be disseminated. There interrelationship with other board members should be known; 3) As one of the founders of Tor, Roger should openly discuss these and all issues in a public manner (on the web page, webinar, magazine article, etc.); 4) An organizational plan should be placed in the employment manual that puts significant distance between coding employees and directors; 5) Employees and directors should not operate nor have access to authority servers. I've operated a number of exits and guards for several years now (including, as far as I know, the only Tor node in Albania). [1] I will leave these operational for now but I expect changes in this unprofessionally operated 501c3. [1] A827646DD0F8B92A9963789529CEE3141FF74761 4061C553CA88021B8302F0814365070AAE617270 C80DF89B21FF932DEC0D7821F679B6C79E1449C3 9B31F1F1C1554F9FFB3455911F82E818EF7C7883 D3E5EDDBE5159388704D6785BE51930AAFACEC6F ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
I'm not switching off my relays. I'd prefer to leave the politics to other people. > Fact: The investigation done by Tor Inc, was run by the primary accusers > of Jacob Applebaum. Citation needed. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 11:14:59PM -0400, krishna e bera wrote: > On 21/08/16 10:02 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > Fact: Jacob Applebaum's directory authority was a target of NSA's > > XKEYSCORE: > > https://contraspin.co.nz/the-weaponising-of-social-part-3-the-resurrection-of-ioerror/ > > Of course, perhaps they all are. > > > Fact: Jacob Applebaum got kicked from Tor Inc, prior to a proper > > investigation. > > Any organization would do the same with similar allegations. If he was > exonerated, he could rejoin afterwards. Put it to relevant/ external/ unbiased authorities, not internally compromised "investigation group with chips on their shoulders". > > Fact: The investigation done by Tor Inc, was run by the primary accusers > > of Jacob Applebaum. > > Evidence? > > > > In the USA's war against Bradley Manning, Julian Assange, Wikileaks and > > Edward Snowden, Jacob Applebaum was a very high target, and caused the > > three letter agencies a lot of problems. > > > > So yes, operation of the network you use for -genuine- privacy needs, is > > very much dependent on those running the organisation. > > > > > > Fact: The ENTIRE board of Tor Inc got replaced after Jacob was given the > > boot! > > > > My conclusion: This was a coup, blunt and bloody, take no prisoners, > > respect no righteousness. > > Overdramatic. Where's the blood? Jacob Applebaum's scalp. > Who was behind the coup, and what hard evidence do you have? Are you > looking for #torstrike to prompt leaks of such info? I don't know that torstrike could be useful ultimately. Forking possibly. > Makes more sense for the Board to be distinct from the day to day > operations people anyway. The only thing that makes sense is that the core people are trustworthy - there are now major problems with core Tor Inc people. > > My conclusion: The operation of the Tor directory authorities can no > > longer be trusted. > > Perhaps it never could be. Are you ready to run one? Is that a genuine offer and a genuine possibility? > > My conclusion: The deployment of TBB by Tor Inc can no longer be > > trusted. > > Fork it. That is happening. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
I'm not switching off my relay, primarily because I'm lazy and can't be arsed to figure out what all the politics bullshit is about. Some project member did some shit and other project members are mad at them. Other people may or may not be righteously mad at the first people for reasons I haven't bothered to learn. I started my relay so oppressed people in third world countries could communicate with the outside world and each other in relative safety. If that objective is still being achieved by the software, I could give a shit what beefs the coders have with each other. On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 8:14 PM, krishna e bera wrote: > On 21/08/16 10:02 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > Fact: Jacob Applebaum's directory authority was a target of NSA's > > XKEYSCORE: > > https://contraspin.co.nz/the-weaponising-of-social-part-3- > the-resurrection-of-ioerror/ > > Of course, perhaps they all are. > > > Fact: Jacob Applebaum got kicked from Tor Inc, prior to a proper > > investigation. > > Any organization would do the same with similar allegations. If he was > exonerated, he could rejoin afterwards. > > > > Fact: The investigation done by Tor Inc, was run by the primary accusers > > of Jacob Applebaum. > > Evidence? > > > > In the USA's war against Bradley Manning, Julian Assange, Wikileaks and > > Edward Snowden, Jacob Applebaum was a very high target, and caused the > > three letter agencies a lot of problems. > > > > So yes, operation of the network you use for -genuine- privacy needs, is > > very much dependent on those running the organisation. > > > > > > Fact: The ENTIRE board of Tor Inc got replaced after Jacob was given the > > boot! > > > > My conclusion: This was a coup, blunt and bloody, take no prisoners, > > respect no righteousness. > > Overdramatic. Where's the blood? Who was behind the coup, and what > hard evidence do you have? Are you looking for #torstrike to prompt > leaks of such info? > > Makes more sense for the Board to be distinct from the day to day > operations people anyway. > > > > My conclusion: The operation of the Tor directory authorities can no > > longer be trusted. > > Perhaps it never could be. Are you ready to run one? > > > > My conclusion: The deployment of TBB by Tor Inc can no longer be > > trusted. > > Fork it. > > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On 21/08/16 10:02 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > Fact: Jacob Applebaum's directory authority was a target of NSA's > XKEYSCORE: > https://contraspin.co.nz/the-weaponising-of-social-part-3-the-resurrection-of-ioerror/ Of course, perhaps they all are. > Fact: Jacob Applebaum got kicked from Tor Inc, prior to a proper > investigation. Any organization would do the same with similar allegations. If he was exonerated, he could rejoin afterwards. > Fact: The investigation done by Tor Inc, was run by the primary accusers > of Jacob Applebaum. Evidence? > In the USA's war against Bradley Manning, Julian Assange, Wikileaks and > Edward Snowden, Jacob Applebaum was a very high target, and caused the > three letter agencies a lot of problems. > > So yes, operation of the network you use for -genuine- privacy needs, is > very much dependent on those running the organisation. > > > Fact: The ENTIRE board of Tor Inc got replaced after Jacob was given the > boot! > > My conclusion: This was a coup, blunt and bloody, take no prisoners, > respect no righteousness. Overdramatic. Where's the blood? Who was behind the coup, and what hard evidence do you have? Are you looking for #torstrike to prompt leaks of such info? Makes more sense for the Board to be distinct from the day to day operations people anyway. > My conclusion: The operation of the Tor directory authorities can no > longer be trusted. Perhaps it never could be. Are you ready to run one? > My conclusion: The deployment of TBB by Tor Inc can no longer be > trusted. Fork it. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On 21/08/16 09:53 PM, Marcel Krzystek wrote: > What are the thoughts of relay operators on this? > https://ghostbin.com/paste/kmnzz Arguments can be made against the specifics in it but my main problem with the manifesto is it doesnt say how they propose to deal with sexual harassment or "misconduct" among staff and volunteers. The new Tor Social Contract[1] seems the right way for the future. Cleaning up after the scandal was bound to be messy and it was almost inevitable that some people would be exiled. According to the latest official statement[0], Tor Project is not alleging criminal conduct (aka rape), so there is room for Jake and others to undergo training or claim misunderstanding, whichever way they are inclined, and move on. Regarding opsec, how do they propose to prevent anyone with evil credentials being involved in the project, when spies can simply hide the info? More importantly, why exclude people who want to do good? The internet was invented by researchers for the US military and continues to be operated by corporations generally sympathetic to their aims, while being a battleground for all kinds of actors. The code itself and how vulnerabilities are handled will determine Tor's trustworthiness. However, if partipation in #torstrike is significant, it would be nice to see support for developers to operate outside US/UK influence. > I can be persuaded otherwise, and perhaps i'm being naive, but i believe > that operation of the network should remain independent from the > politics within the organization. Agree, net neutrality etc. But each of us has to choose where to place our limited time and resources, so it helps to feel positive toward the people in the organization. [0] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/statement-0 [1] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-social-contract ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On Sun, 21 Aug 2016 19:53:26 -0600 Marcel Krzystek wrote: > What are the thoughts of relay operators on this? > https://ghostbin.com/paste/kmnzz > > I can be persuaded otherwise, and perhaps i'm being naive, but i > believe that operation of the network should remain independent from > the politics within the organization. > > mk > Mostly it just makes me question who's behind it. It definitely expresses very real concerns, but I don't see how this would possibly accomplish what they've set out to do, while at the same time making everybody that depends on tor vulnerable. It's not why I run a relay and it's not why Jake worked on tor. The only thing I see this accomplishing is further weakening the network. My relay will stay up. Others I know have considered spinning up a vps or ten for the day. Ass Pirate ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On 08/21/2016 07:53 PM, Marcel Krzystek wrote: > What are the thoughts of relay operators on this? > https://ghostbin.com/paste/kmnzz > > I can be persuaded otherwise, and perhaps i'm being naive, but i believe > that operation of the network should remain independent from the politics > within the organization. > > mk That's an excellent point. But then, Tor Project kicked Appelbaum's relay based on politics, no? ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
If Tor software is open source and therefore free to be examined for tricks what does any person matter to we who contribute hardware resources to the Tor network which in turn is used by unknown people who need privacy sometimes for very serious reasons?Robert supersluet...@gmail.com wroteI don't understand any of the demands on the page, or why they matter. Tor does its job, whether an ex-CIA agent helps develop it or not.If someone could explain this like I'm five, it'd be a great help, but I'm still going to run my Tor relay and use the Tor Browser. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
I read some tweets and found some articles. Jake Applegate stepped down from the project, and Sheri replaced the board of directors. But this strike wants to replace all Tor project members because of Applegate. I'm not connecting the dots, and the response on Twitter seems to be mostly against the strike. Regardless of who's involved with the project, lives are at stake here. People who don't rely on Tor don't realize how important it is. One tweet put it perfectly: You don't switch off the patients just because you disagree with the equipment vendor. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 07:53:26PM -0600, Marcel Krzystek wrote: > What are the thoughts of relay operators on this? > https://ghostbin.com/paste/kmnzz > > I can be persuaded otherwise, and perhaps i'm being naive, but i believe > that operation of the network should remain independent from the politics > within the organization. Hi Marcel, Fact: Jacob Applebaum's directory authority was a target of NSA's XKEYSCORE: https://contraspin.co.nz/the-weaponising-of-social-part-3-the-resurrection-of-ioerror/ Fact: Jacob Applebaum got kicked from Tor Inc, prior to a proper investigation. Fact: The investigation done by Tor Inc, was run by the primary accusers of Jacob Applebaum. In the USA's war against Bradley Manning, Julian Assange, Wikileaks and Edward Snowden, Jacob Applebaum was a very high target, and caused the three letter agencies a lot of problems. So yes, operation of the network you use for -genuine- privacy needs, is very much dependent on those running the organisation. Fact: The ENTIRE board of Tor Inc got replaced after Jacob was given the boot! My conclusion: This was a coup, blunt and bloody, take no prisoners, respect no righteousness. My conclusion: The operation of the Tor directory authorities can no longer be trusted. My conclusion: The deployment of TBB by Tor Inc can no longer be trusted. Draw your own conclusions. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
I've never believed in strikes. They never seem to really do anything, other than make something unaccessible for a day or 2 (just like the Wikipedia blackout a few years ago). I don't understand any of the demands on the page, or why they matter. Tor does its job, whether an ex-CIA agent helps develop it or not. If someone could explain this like I'm five, it'd be a great help, but I'm still going to run my Tor relay and use the Tor Browser. On Aug 21, 2016 8:54 PM, "Marcel Krzystek" wrote: > What are the thoughts of relay operators on this? > https://ghostbin.com/paste/kmnzz > > I can be persuaded otherwise, and perhaps i'm being naive, but i believe > that operation of the network should remain independent from the politics > within the organization. > > mk > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] #torstrike
What are the thoughts of relay operators on this? https://ghostbin.com/paste/kmnzz I can be persuaded otherwise, and perhaps i'm being naive, but i believe that operation of the network should remain independent from the politics within the organization. mk ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays