Re: [tor-talk] Hello I have a few question about tor network

2016-01-01 Thread Oskar Wendel 
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Oskar Wendel :

> How many relays with guard flag are there? What is the percentage of 
> relays with guard flag set in population of all relays?

I'll try to answer this question myself.

$ grep '^m ' /var/lib/tor/cached-microdesc-consensus | wc -l
7062

$ grep '^s ' /var/lib/tor/cached-microdesc-consensus | grep Guard | wc -l
1909

Is it correct to say that 1909 out of 7062 relays (27%) have guard flag?

Other questions remain...

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[tor-talk] Torified Mobile Experience

2016-01-01 Thread Spencer 

Hi,

About a year ago, a discussion touched on what could be TorPhone, or 
PhOnion, or whatever.


Following up with this, I find Mike Perry's original post is still 
alive:


https://blog.torproject.org/blog/mission-impossible-hardening-android-security-and-privacy

But it has been upgraded to a formal project:

https://github.com/mission-impossible-android/mission-impossible-android

TOMY seems to be back burnered, which is fine given the growth of the 
Guardian Project F-Droid repo over the past year:


https://dev.guardianproject.info/projects/libro/wiki/Tomy_Detachable_Secure_Mobile_System

I inquired about the state of this and the briefly lived GuardianROM and 
was redirected to Mike Perry's original post.


Since then, there seems to be some development that could be of interest 
to followers of this topic:


NetHunter
https://www.kali.org/kali-linux-nethunter/

AOSParadox
http://www.xda-developers.com/aosparadox-a-new-rom-for-the-oneplus-one-with-a-fresh-perspective/
https://github.com/AOSParadox

Both of these seem like easy targets; others would know better.

Thoughts on this or the status of similar things?  Is anybody doing this 
or something different?  I feel like there is an OS guarded secretly 
under development :)


Wordlife,
Spencer










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Re: [tor-talk] Why most democratic contries are most active users of TOR... except Russia of course

2016-01-01 Thread Anton Nesterov 
Well Russia now has Internet censorship which heavy increased number on
Tor users
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-relay-country=2012-01-01=2016-01-01=ru=off

Also number of Tor users in US increased after Snowden's leaks, because
Tor is not only about censorship, but also about surveillance
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-relay-country=2012-10-03=2016-01-01=us=off
Germany and other EU countries has the same picture.

So answering main question, it's because people in these countries are
more informed about Tor (Snowden recommended Tor, in Russia many people
advice to use Tor to bypass censorship) and trying to solve problems
presented in their countries. And because Tor is not blocked here (using
bridges can be sometimes harder for Chinese user than using VPN).
Another reason is because many dictatorships are small and by percentage
of Internet population dictatorships has higher ranks
http://geography.oii.ox.ac.uk/?page=tor

4torlist2:
> Do you mean that Russia is a non-democratic country with a murderous
> dictator?
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/1/2016 19:09, Артур Истомин wrote:
>> https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-table.html
>>
>> TOP-5:
>>
>> 1. USA
>> 2. Russia
>> 3. Germany
>> 4. France
>> 5. UK
>>
>> Where are all these bloody regimes with murderous dictators (except
>> Russia)?
>>


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Re: [tor-talk] Hello I have a few question about tor network

2016-01-01 Thread Seth David Schoen 
Oskar Wendel writes:

> Seth David Schoen :
> 
> > As I said in my previous message, I don't think this is the case because
> > the correlation just requires seeing the two endpoints of the connection,
> > even without knowing the complete path.
> 
> Is it possible to be sure that one of these connecting clients is in fact 
> a client and not just intermediate relay in the circuit?

As a guard node (or someone observing a guard node) trying to locate the
operator of a hidden service, you can use the IP address of the inbound
connection and the Tor directory to see if it's another Tor node or not.
I guess the hidden service operator could use a bridge to create more
ambiguity about what's happening; I don't know for sure if a guard node
has a way to distinguish an inbound connection from a bridge from an
inbound connection directly from a client.

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Re: [tor-talk] Hello I have a few question about tor network

2016-01-01 Thread Oskar Wendel 
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Seth David Schoen :

> As I said in my previous message, I don't think this is the case because
> the correlation just requires seeing the two endpoints of the connection,
> even without knowing the complete path.

Is it possible to be sure that one of these connecting clients is in fact 
a client and not just intermediate relay in the circuit?

How many relays with guard flag are there? What is the percentage of 
relays with guard flag set in population of all relays?

Recently there was a bug corrected (#17772) when all relays were treated 
like entry guards, while only relays with a guard flag should be treated 
like entry guards. Correcting this bug obviously made "entry guard pool" 
smaller. Can it make correlation attack easier, as now the attacker has 
a smaller pool (only relays with the guard flag) to consider and it's 
more probable that client will connect to a relay controlled or observed 
by the attacker?

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Re: [tor-talk] Why most democratic contries are most active users of TOR... except Russia of course

2016-01-01 Thread 4torlist2 
Do you mean that Russia is a non-democratic country with a murderous 
dictator?




On 1/1/2016 19:09, Артур Истомин wrote:

https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-table.html

TOP-5:

1. USA
2. Russia
3. Germany
4. France
5. UK

Where are all these bloody regimes with murderous dictators (except Russia)?


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