Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

of a deployment and operational issue? /Akbar From: Ace [mailto:ace-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Michael StJohns Sent: Wednesday, November 23, 2016 1:22 PM To: kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com; Rene Struik <rstruik@gmail.com> Cc: ace@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

org> > Cc: Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca > <mailto:mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>>; Michael StJohns <mstjo...@comcast.net > <mailto:mstjo...@comcast.net>>; Rene Struik <rstruik@gmail.com > <mailto:rstruik@gmail.com>>; Tirumal

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

r Reddy (tireddy) <tire...@cisco.com> Subject: Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion Kathleen and all, I believe all necessary drafts for a solution based on asymmetric keys are already in place. With "a solution based on asymmetric keys” I understand a solution where

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

truik <rstruik@gmail.com<mailto:rstruik....@gmail.com>> Cc: Michael StJohns <mstjo...@comcast.net<mailto:mstjo...@comcast.net>>; ace@ietf.org<mailto:ace@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion Is anyone willing to work on a dra

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

ace@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion Is anyone willing to work on a draft to be ready in advance of the Chicago meeting so we have a concrete proposal for asymmetric keys? Thanks, Kathleen Please excuse typos, sent from handheld device On Nov 17,

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

Is anyone willing to work on a draft to be ready in advance of the Chicago meeting so we have a concrete proposal for asymmetric keys? Thanks, Kathleen Please excuse typos, sent from handheld device > On Nov 17, 2016, at 11:26 PM, Rene Struik wrote: > > Dear

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

Dear colleagues: Just a reminder re perceived technical hurdles for using signatures: a) time latency of signing: One can pre-compute ephemeral signing keys, so as to reduce online key computation to a few finite field multiplies. Please see my email to the list of July 26, 2016:

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

Michael StJohns wrote: > The multiparty (group) symmetric key solution is only wanted for a > single corner of the solution space - low latency, no cost > systems. E.g. lightbulbs. Given there is a worked example of the > insecurity of multiparty symmetric

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

On 11/16/2016 9:08 AM, Kepeng Li wrote: Hello all, We had a long discussion about group communication security topic since the previous F2F meeting. Hannes and I have tried to make a summary about the discussion as follows: · The solution needs to define both, symmetric and an

[Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

Hello all,  We had a long discussion about group communication security topic since the previous F2F meeting. Hannes and I have tried to make a summary about the discussion as follows: ·   The solution needs to define both, symmetric and an asymmetric group key solution. ·   The

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

Michael StJohns wrote: >> I'm less sure that I agree with the subsequent view that we can't >> adopt this item until we have assurance; I'd say that asking for the >> issue to be addressed as part of the adoption process is reasonable, >> and objecting at

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

On 11/12/2016 5:11 PM, Michael Richardson wrote: I realize that this thread is months old: I haven't seen any newer conversation, so I'll continue anyway. I would concur with MSJ's view that having an informational draft might be a way to let this work go forward, but I suggest instead the

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

see inline as well. In the summary, it was unclear if I was against the symmetric method or not. I will admit that I'm sitting on the fence here. I would prefer not to have a standardized symmetric method. My preference would be to start running code that shows the price/performance of

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

On 9/26/2016 12:10 PM, Eliot Lear wrote: Hi Mike, Just one clarification: On 9/26/16 5:41 PM, Michael StJohns wrote: With respect to Eliot's comment, it doesn't really matter if the key management protocol is asymmetric if the multicast session keys are symmetric and used for control. This

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

This time as AD. Please excuse typos, sent from handheld device > On Sep 26, 2016, at 11:41 AM, Michael StJohns wrote: > >> On 9/26/2016 8:30 AM, kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com wrote: >> Without a hat on, you can add my support to Abhinav's proposal. Perfect is >>

Re: [Ace] Summary of ACE Group Communication Security Discussion

Hi Mike, Just one clarification: On 9/26/16 5:41 PM, Michael StJohns wrote: > > With respect to Eliot's comment, it doesn't really matter if the key > management protocol is asymmetric if the multicast session keys are > symmetric and used for control. This doesn't really capture my position