Re: [agi] Chaogate chips: Yum!
Mmmm... Chaoglate-chip cookie processing! On 11/6/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A report about research to build chaotic logic: http://technology.newscientist.com/article/mg20026801.800 --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Ethics of computer-based cognitive experimentation
On Fri, Nov 14, 2008 at 2:07 AM, John G. Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: there are many computer systems now, domain specific intelligent ones where their life is more important than mine. Some would say that the battle is already lost. For now, it's not really your life (or interest) vs the system's life (or interest). It's rather your life (or interest) vs lives (or interests) of people the system protects/supports. Our machines still work for humans. At least it still seems to be the case ;-)). If we are stupid enough to develop very powerful machines without equally powerful safety controls then we (just like many other species) are due for extinction for adaptability limitations. Regards, Jiri Jelinek --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: [agi] Ethics of computer-based cognitive experimentation
From: Jiri Jelinek [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Fri, Nov 14, 2008 at 2:07 AM, John G. Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: there are many computer systems now, domain specific intelligent ones where their life is more important than mine. Some would say that the battle is already lost. For now, it's not really your life (or interest) vs the system's life (or interest). It's rather your life (or interest) vs lives (or interests) of people the system protects/supports. Our machines still work for humans. At least it still seems to be the case ;-)). If we are stupid enough to develop very powerful machines without equally powerful safety controls then we (just like many other species) are due for extinction for adaptability limitations. It is where the interests of others is more valuable than an individual's life. Ancient Rome had the entertainment interests of the masses at a higher value than those being devoured by lions in the arena. I would say that computers and machines interests today in many cases now are of similar relational circumstances in some cases. Our herd mentality makes it easy for rights to be taken away and at the same time it is accepted and defended as necessary and an improvement. Example - anonymity and privacy = gone. Sounds paranoiacal but there are many that agree on this. It is an icky subject, easy to ignore, and perhaps something that hinders technological progression. John --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Chaogate chips: Yum!
HATED IT On 11/14/08, Olie Lamb [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Mmmm... Chaoglate-chip cookie processing! On 11/6/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A report about research to build chaotic logic: http://technology.newscientist.com/article/mg20026801.800 --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Why consciousness is hard to define (was Re: [agi] Ethics of computer-based cognitive experimentation)
--- On Fri, 11/14/08, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Try running yourself with empirical results instead of metabelief (belief about belief). You'll get someplace .i.e. you'll resolve the inconsistencies. When inconsistencies are testably absent, no matter how weird the answer, it will deliver maximally informed choices. Not facts. Facts will only ever appear differently after choices are made. This too is a fact...which I have chosen to make choices about. :-) If you fail to resolve your inconsistency then you are guaranteeing that your choices are minimally informed. Fine. By your definition of consciousness, I must be conscious because I can see and because I can apply the scientific method, which you didn't precisely define, but I assume that means I can do experiments and learn from them. But by your definition, a simple modification to autobliss ( http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt ) would make it conscious. It already applies the scientific method. It outputs 3 bits (2 randomly picked inputs to an unknown logic gate and a proposed output) and learns the logic function. The missing component is vision. But suppose I replace the logic function (a 4 bit value specified by the teacher) with a black box with 3 switches and a light bulb to indicate whether the proposed output (one of the switches) is right or wrong. You also didn't precisely define what constitutes vision, so I assume a 1 pixel system qualifies. Of course I don't expect anyone to precisely define consciousness (as a property of Turing machines). There is no algorithmically simple definition that agrees with intuition, i.e. that living humans and nothing else are conscious. This goes beyond Rice's theorem, which would make any nontrivial definition not computable. Even allowing non computable definitions (the output can be yes, no, or maybe), you still have the problem that any specification with algorithmic complexity K can be expressed as a program with complexity K. Given any simple specification (meaning K is small) I can write a simple program that satisfies it (my program has complexity at most K). However, for humans, K is about 10^9 bits. That means any specification smaller than a 1 GB file or 1000 books would allow a counter intuitive example of a simple program that meets your test for consciousness. Try it if you don't believe me. Give me a simple definition of consciousness without pointing to a human (like the Turing test does). I am looking for a program is_conscious(x) shorter than 10^9 bits that inputs a Turing machine x and outputs yes, no, or maybe. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
[agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be found at: http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf The title is Consciousness in Human and Machine: A Theory and Some Falsifiable Predictions, and it does solve the problem, believe it or not. But I have no illusions: it will be misunderstood, at the very least. I expect there will be plenty of people who argue that it does not solve the problem, but I don't really care, because I think history will eventually show that this is indeed the right answer. It gives a satisfying answer to all the outstanding questions and it feels right. Oh, and it does make some testable predictions. Alas, we do not yet have the technology to perform the tests yet, but the predictions are on the table, anyhow. In a longer version I would go into a lot more detail, introducing the background material at more length, analyzing the other proposals that have been made and fleshing out the technical aspects along several dimensions. But the size limit for the conference was 6 pages, so that was all I could cram in. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Richard, As a general rule, I find discussions about consciousness, qualia, and so forth to be unhelpful, frustrating, and unnecessary. However, I enjoyed this paper a great deal. Thanks for writing it. Because of my inclinations on these matters, I am not an expert on the history of thought on the topic, or its current status among philosophers, but I find your account to be credible and reasonably clear. I'm not particularly repulsed by the idea that ... our most immediate, subjective experiance of the world is, in some sense, an artifact produced by the operation of the brain so searching for a more satisfying conclusion is not really high up on my priority list. Still, I don't see anything immediately objectionable in your analysis. I am not certain about the distinguishing power of your falsifiable predictions, but only because I would need to give that considerably more thought. I look forward to being in the audience when you present the paper at AGI-09. Derek Zahn agiblog.net --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Oh, one other thing I forgot to mention. To reach my cheerful conclusion about your paper, I have to be willing to accept your model of cognition. I'm pretty easy on that premise-granting, by which I mean that I'm normally willing to go along with architectural suggestions to see where they lead. But I will be curious to see whether others are also willing to go along with you on your generic cognitive system model. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Conciousness is akin to the phlogiston theory in chemistry. It is likely a shadow concept, similar to how the bodily reactions make us feel that the heart is the seat of emotions. Gladly, cardiologist and heart surgeons do not look for a spirit, a soul, or kindness in the heart muscle. The brain organ need not contain anything beyond the means to effect physical behavior,.. and feedback as to those behavior. A finite degree of sensory awareness serves as a suitable replacement for consciousness, in otherwords, just feedback. Would it really make a difference if we were all biological machines, and our perceptions were the same as other animals, or other designed minds; more so if we were in a simulated existence. The search for consciousness is a misleading (though not entirely fruitless) path to AGI. --- On Fri, 11/14/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Friday, November 14, 2008, 12:27 PM I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be found at: http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf The title is Consciousness in Human and Machine: A Theory and Some Falsifiable Predictions, and it does solve the problem, believe it or not. But I have no illusions: it will be misunderstood, at the very least. I expect there will be plenty of people who argue that it does not solve the problem, but I don't really care, because I think history will eventually show that this is indeed the right answer. It gives a satisfying answer to all the outstanding questions and it feels right. Oh, and it does make some testable predictions. Alas, we do not yet have the technology to perform the tests yet, but the predictions are on the table, anyhow. In a longer version I would go into a lot more detail, introducing the background material at more length, analyzing the other proposals that have been made and fleshing out the technical aspects along several dimensions. But the size limit for the conference was 6 pages, so that was all I could cram in. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Some notes/review. Whether AGI is conscious is independent from whether it'll rebel/be dangerous. Answering any kind of question about consciousness doesn't answer a question about safety. How is the situation with p-zombies atom-by-atom identical to conscious beings not resolved by saying that in this case consciousness is an epiphenomenon, meaninglessness? http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/04/zombies.html http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/04/zombies-ii.html http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/04/anti-zombie-pri.html Jumping into molecular framework as describing human cognition is unwarranted. It could be a description of AGI design, or it could be a theoretical description of more general epistemology, but as presented it's not general enough to automatically correspond to the brain. Also, semantics of atoms is tricky business, for all I know it keeps shifting with the focus of attention, often dramatically. Saying that self is a cluster of atoms doesn't cut it. Bottoming out of explanation of experience is a good answer, but you don't need to point to specific moving parts of a specific cognitive architecture to give it (I don't see how it helps with the argument). If you have a belief (generally, a state of mind), it may indicate that the world has a certain property, that world having that property caused you to have this belief, or it can indicate that you have a certain cognitive quirk that caused this belief, a loophole in cognition. There is always a cause, the trick is in correctly dereferencing the belief. http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/03/righting-a-wron.html Subjective phenomena might be unreachable for meta-introspection, but it doesn't place them on different level, making them unanalyzeable, you can in principle inspect them from outside, using tools other then one's mind itself. You yourself just presented a model of what's happening. Meaning/information is relative, it can be represented within a basis, for example within a mind, and communicated to another mind. Like speed, it has no absolute, but the laws of relativity, of conversion between frames of reference, between minds, are precise and not arbitrary. Possible-worlds semantics is one way to establish a basis, allowing to communicate concepts, but maybe not a very good one. Grounding in common cognitive architecture is probably a good move, but it doesn't have fundamental significance. Predictions are not described carefully enough to appear as following from your theory. They use some terminology, but on a level that allows literal translation to a language of perceptual wiring, with correspondence between qualia and areas implementing modalities/receiving perceptual input. You didn't argue about a general case of AGI, so how does it follow that any AGI is bound to be conscious? -- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Derek Zahn wrote: Oh, one other thing I forgot to mention. To reach my cheerful conclusion about your paper, I have to be willing to accept your model of cognition. I'm pretty easy on that premise-granting, by which I mean that I'm normally willing to go along with architectural suggestions to see where they lead. But I will be curious to see whether others are also willing to go along with you on your generic cognitive system model. That's an interesting point. In fact, the argument doesn't change too much if we go to other models of cognition, it just looks different ... and more complicated, which is partly why I wanted to stick with my own formalism. The crucial part is that there has to be a very powerful mechanism that lets the system analyze its own concepts - it has to be able to reflect on its own knowledge in a very recursive kind of way. Now, I think that Novamente, OpenCog and other systems will eventually have that sort of capability because it is such a crucial part of the general bit in artificial general intelligence. Once a system has that mechanism, I can use it to take the line I took in the paper. Also, the generic model of cognition was useful to me in the later part of the paper where I want to analyze semantics. Other AGI architectures (logical ones for example) implicitly stick with the very strict kinds of semantics (possible worlds, e.g.) that I actually think cannot be made to work for all of cognition. Anyhow, thanks for your positive comments. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Robert Swaine wrote: Conciousness is akin to the phlogiston theory in chemistry. It is likely a shadow concept, similar to how the bodily reactions make us feel that the heart is the seat of emotions. Gladly, cardiologist and heart surgeons do not look for a spirit, a soul, or kindness in the heart muscle. The brain organ need not contain anything beyond the means to effect physical behavior,.. and feedback as to those behavior. A finite degree of sensory awareness serves as a suitable replacement for consciousness, in otherwords, just feedback. Would it really make a difference if we were all biological machines, and our perceptions were the same as other animals, or other designed minds; more so if we were in a simulated existence. The search for consciousness is a misleading (though not entirely fruitless) path to AGI. Well, with respect, it does sound as though you did not read the paper itself, or any of the other books like Chalmers' Conscious Mind. I say this because there are lengthy (and standard) replies to the points that you make, both in the paper and in the literature. And, please don't misunderstand: this is not a path to AGI. Just an important side issue that the geneal public cares about enormously. Richard Loosemore --- On Fri, 11/14/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Friday, November 14, 2008, 12:27 PM I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be found at: http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf The title is Consciousness in Human and Machine: A Theory and Some Falsifiable Predictions, and it does solve the problem, believe it or not. But I have no illusions: it will be misunderstood, at the very least. I expect there will be plenty of people who argue that it does not solve the problem, but I don't really care, because I think history will eventually show that this is indeed the right answer. It gives a satisfying answer to all the outstanding questions and it feels right. Oh, and it does make some testable predictions. Alas, we do not yet have the technology to perform the tests yet, but the predictions are on the table, anyhow. In a longer version I would go into a lot more detail, introducing the background material at more length, analyzing the other proposals that have been made and fleshing out the technical aspects along several dimensions. But the size limit for the conference was 6 pages, so that was all I could cram in. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
(I'm sorry that I make some unclear statements on semantics/meaning, I'll probably get to the description of this perspective later on the blog (or maybe it'll become obsolete before that), but it's a long story, and writing it up on the spot isn't an option.) On Sat, Nov 15, 2008 at 2:18 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Taking the position that consciousness is an epiphenomenon and is therefore meaningless has difficulties. Rather p-zombieness in atom-by-atom the same environment is an epiphenomenon. By saying that it is an epiphenomenon, you actually do not answer the questions about instrinsic qualities and how they relate to other things in the universe. The key point is that we do have other examples of epiphenomena (e.g. smoke from a steam train), What do you mean by smoke being epiphenomenal? but their ontological status is very clear: they are things in the world. We do not know of other things with such puzzling ontology (like consciousness), that we can use as a clear analogy, to explain what consciousness is. Also, it raises the question of *why* there should be an epiphenomenon. Calling it an E does not tell us why such a thing should happen. And it leaves us in the dark about whether or not to believe that other systems that are not atom-for-atom identical with us, should also have this epiphenomenon. I don't know how to parse the word epiphenomenon in this context. I use to to describe reference-free, meaningless concepts, so you can't say that some epiphenomenon is present here or there, that would be meaningless. Jumping into molecular framework as describing human cognition is unwarranted. It could be a description of AGI design, or it could be a theoretical description of more general epistemology, but as presented it's not general enough to automatically correspond to the brain. Also, semantics of atoms is tricky business, for all I know it keeps shifting with the focus of attention, often dramatically. Saying that self is a cluster of atoms doesn't cut it. I'm not sure of what you are saying, exactly. The framework is general in this sense: its components have *clear* counterparts in all models of cognition, both human and machine. So, for example, if you look at a system that uses logical reasoning and bare symbols, that formalism will differentiate between the symbols that are currently active, and playing a role in the system's analysis of the world, and those that are not active. That is the distinction between foreground and background. Without a working, functional theory of cognition, this high-level descriptive picture has little explanatory power. It might be a step towards developing a useful theory, but it doesn't explain anything. There is a set of states of mind that correlates with experience of apples, etc. So what? You can't build a detailed edifice on general principles and claim that far-reaching conclusions apply to actual brain. They might, but you need a semantic link from theory to described functionality. As for the self symbol, there was no time to go into detail. But there clearly is an atom that represents the self. *shug* It only stands as definition, there is no self-neuron, or something easily identifiable as self, it's a complex thing. I'm not sure I even understand what self refers to subjectively, I don't feel any clear focus of self-perception, my experience is filled with thoughts on many things, some of them involving management of thought process, some of external concepts, but no unified center to speak of... Bottoming out of explanation of experience is a good answer, but you don't need to point to specific moving parts of a specific cognitive architecture to give it (I don't see how it helps with the argument). If you have a belief (generally, a state of mind), it may indicate that the world has a certain property, that world having that property caused you to have this belief, or it can indicate that you have a certain cognitive quirk that caused this belief, a loophole in cognition. There is always a cause, the trick is in correctly dereferencing the belief. http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/03/righting-a-wron.html Not so fast. There are many different types of mistaken beliefs. Most of these are so shallow that they could not possibly explain the characteristics of consciousness that need to be explained. And, as I point out in the second part, it is not at all clear that this particular issue can be given the status of mistaken or failure. It simply does not fit with all the other known examples of failures of the cognitive system, such as hallucinations, etc. I thin it would be intellectually dishonest to try to sweep it under the rug with those other things, because those are clearly breakdowns that, with a little care, could all be avoided. But this issue is utterly different: by making the argument that I did, I think I showed that it was
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
--- On Fri, 11/14/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf Interesting that some of your predictions have already been tested, in particular, synaesthetic qualia was described by George Stratton in 1896. When people wear glasses that turn images upside down, they adapt after several days and begin to see the world normally. http://www.cns.nyu.edu/~nava/courses/psych_and_brain/pdfs/Stratton_1896.pdf http://wearcam.org/tetherless/node4.html This is equivalent to your prediction #2 where connecting the output of neurons that respond to the sound of a cello to the input of neurons that respond to red would cause a cello to sound red. We should expect the effect to be temporary. I'm not sure how this demonstrates consciousness. How do you test that the subject actually experiences redness at the sound of a cello, rather than just behaving as if experiencing redness, for example, claiming to hear red? I can do a similar experiment with autobliss (a program that learns a 2 input logic function by reinforcement). If I swapped the inputs, the program would make mistakes at first, but adapt after a few dozen training sessions. So autobliss meets one of the requirements for qualia. The other is that it be advanced enough to introspect on itself, and that which it cannot analyze (describe in terms of simpler phenomena) is qualia. What you describe as elements are neurons in a connectionist model, and the atoms are the set of active neurons. Analysis means describing a neuron in terms of its inputs. Then qualia is the first layer of a feedforward network. In this respect, autobliss is a single neuron with 4 inputs, and those inputs are therefore its qualia. You might object that autobliss is not advanced enough to ponder its own self existence. Perhaps you define advanced to mean it is capable of language (pass the Turing test), but I don't think that's what you meant. In that case, you need to define more carefully what qualifies as sufficiently powerful. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Richard, In your paper you say The argument does not say anything about the nature of conscious experience, qua subjective experience, but the argument does say why it cannot supply an explanation of subjective experience. Is explaining why we cannot explain something the same as explaining it? I think it isn't the same... The problem is that there may be many possible explanations for why we can't explain consciousness. And it seems there is no empirical way to decide among these explanations. So we need to decide among them via some sort of metatheoretical criteria -- Occam's Razor, or conceptual consistency with our scientific ideas, or some such. The question for you then is, why is yours the best explanation of why we can't explain consciousness? But I have another confusion about your argument. I understand the idea that a mind's analysis process has eventually got to bottom out somewhere, so that it will describe some entities using descriptions that are (from its perspective) arbitrary and can't be decomposed any further. These bottom-level entities could be sensations or they could be sort-of arbitrary internal tokens out of which internal patterns are constructed But what do you say about the experience of being conscious of a chair, then? Are you saying that the consciousness I have of the chair is the *set* of all the bottom-level unanalyzables into which the chair is decomposed by my mind? ben On Fri, Nov 14, 2008 at 11:44 PM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: --- On Fri, 11/14/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf Interesting that some of your predictions have already been tested, in particular, synaesthetic qualia was described by George Stratton in 1896. When people wear glasses that turn images upside down, they adapt after several days and begin to see the world normally. http://www.cns.nyu.edu/~nava/courses/psych_and_brain/pdfs/Stratton_1896.pdfhttp://www.cns.nyu.edu/%7Enava/courses/psych_and_brain/pdfs/Stratton_1896.pdf http://wearcam.org/tetherless/node4.html This is equivalent to your prediction #2 where connecting the output of neurons that respond to the sound of a cello to the input of neurons that respond to red would cause a cello to sound red. We should expect the effect to be temporary. I'm not sure how this demonstrates consciousness. How do you test that the subject actually experiences redness at the sound of a cello, rather than just behaving as if experiencing redness, for example, claiming to hear red? I can do a similar experiment with autobliss (a program that learns a 2 input logic function by reinforcement). If I swapped the inputs, the program would make mistakes at first, but adapt after a few dozen training sessions. So autobliss meets one of the requirements for qualia. The other is that it be advanced enough to introspect on itself, and that which it cannot analyze (describe in terms of simpler phenomena) is qualia. What you describe as elements are neurons in a connectionist model, and the atoms are the set of active neurons. Analysis means describing a neuron in terms of its inputs. Then qualia is the first layer of a feedforward network. In this respect, autobliss is a single neuron with 4 inputs, and those inputs are therefore its qualia. You might object that autobliss is not advanced enough to ponder its own self existence. Perhaps you define advanced to mean it is capable of language (pass the Turing test), but I don't think that's what you meant. In that case, you need to define more carefully what qualifies as sufficiently powerful. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. -- Robert Heinlein --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
