Re: DIS: Re: OFF: [Promotor] Distribution of Proposals 7922-7929

2017-10-16 Thread Kerim Aydin


On Mon, 16 Oct 2017, Alex Smith wrote:
> On Sun, 2017-10-15 at 20:20 -0700, Aris Merchant wrote:
> > I hereby distribute each listed proposal, initiating the Agoran
> > Decision of whether to adopt it, and removing it from the proposal
> > pool.
> 
> not-technically-a-CoE: The ID numbers listed in the summary at the
> start and in the proposal descriptions later on are inconsistent with
> each other. I'm not immediately clear on what the consequences of this
> are.

Is the confusion enough that it's unclear what "the matter to be decided"
is?  If so a CoE would invalidate the initiation (R107).  (my feeling
is that the Titles line up and no number is actually duplicated in
the wrong place, so it's clear enough).







DIS: Re: OFF: [Promotor] Distribution of Proposals 7922-7929

2017-10-16 Thread Alex Smith
On Sun, 2017-10-15 at 20:20 -0700, Aris Merchant wrote:
> I hereby distribute each listed proposal, initiating the Agoran
> Decision of whether to adopt it, and removing it from the proposal
> pool.

not-technically-a-CoE: The ID numbers listed in the summary at the
start and in the proposal descriptions later on are inconsistent with
each other. I'm not immediately clear on what the consequences of this
are.

-- 
ais523


Re: DIS: Re: OFF: [Promotor] Distribution of Proposals 7922-7929

2017-10-15 Thread VJ Rada
also, nttpf

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:41 PM, VJ Rada  wrote:
> "The problem here is that deregistration without objection isn’t
> cuddlebeam-proof."
>
> I think you mean everyone-proof! Omd and Murphy can't be deregistered
> rn and that's 1/10 of the whole Supply level right there.
>
> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Gaelan Steele  wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Oct 15, 2017, at 8:20 PM, Aris Merchant 
>>>  wrote:
>>>
>>> I hereby distribute each listed proposal, initiating the Agoran
>>> Decision of whether to adopt it, and removing it from the proposal
>>> pool. For this decision, the vote collector is the Assessor, the
>>> quorum is 8.0 and the valid options are FOR and AGAINST (PRESENT is
>>> also a valid vote).
>>>
>>>
>>> ID Author(s) AI   Title Pender  Pend fee
>>> ---
>>> 7922*  Alexis 3.0  Clarity Act  Alexis  1 AP
>> FOR
>>> 7923*  Gaelan 1.0  Another Economy Fix Attempt  Gaelan  1 AP
>> AGAINST; this needs some fixes
>>> 7924*  Aris, [1]  3.0  Contracts v8 Aris1 sh.
>> FOR
>>> 7925*  Aris, Alexis   3.0  Safety Regulations v2Aris1 AP
>> FOR
>>> 7926*  Alexis 3.0  Deregulation Alexis  1 AP
>> CONDITIONAL: if safety regulations passed (or is about to pass), then 
>> AGAINST. else, FOR. If, save for this sentence, a conditional vote on 7925 
>> would cause the result of my vote on 7926 to be circular, act as if the 
>> result of that conditional resolves to PRESENT.
>>> 7927*  V.J. Rada, G.  2.0  Estate Auction Fix   V.J. Rada   1 sh.
>> FOR
>>> 7928*  G. 3.0  no we can't  G.  1 AP
>> FOR
>>> 7929*  V.J. Rada  1.0  Consumerism  V.J. Rada   1 sh.
>>
>> AGAINST. The problem here is that deregistration without objection isn’t 
>> cuddlebeam-proof. We should just fix that instead.
>>
>> Gaelan
>>
>>>
>>> The proposal pool currently contains the following proposals:
>>>
>>> IDAuthor(s) AI   Title
>>> ---
>>> pp1   o 2.0  Faster Auctions
>>>
>>> Legend: * : Proposal is pending.
>>>
>>> [1] o, G., ais523, Gaelan, 天火狐, CuddleBeam, V.J Rada, Trigon, Alexis, P.S.S.
>>>
>>> A proposal may be pended for 1 AP, or for 1/20th the Floating Value
>>> in shines (see the Secretary's report).
>>>
>>> The full text of the aforementioned proposals is included below. Please note
>>> that, due to its length, Proposal 7924 is listed last.
>>>
>>> //
>>> ID: 7922
>>> Title: Clarity Act
>>> Adoption index: 3.0
>>> Author: Alexis
>>> Co-authors:
>>>
>>>
>>> Text in square brackets is not a part of this proposal's substance and
>>> is ignored when it takes effect.
>>>
>>> Enact a new power 3 rule entitled Voting Methods, reading as follows:
>>>
>>>  Each Agoran decision has a voting method, which must be
>>>  AI-majority, instant runoff, or first-past-the-post. The voting
>>>  method is that specified by the authorizing authority, or
>>>  first-past-the-post by default.
>>>
>>>  Each Agoran decision has a set of valid options (the choices that
>>>  the voters are being asked to select from) and valid votes (the
>>>  ways in which the voters can express their opinion or lack thereof.
>>>  For AI-majority decisions, the valid options are FOR and AGAINST;
>>>  for other decisions, the valid options are defined by other rules.
>>>
>>>  The valid votes on an Agoran decision are:
>>>  1. PRESENT;
>>>  2. The valid conditional votes, as defined by rules of power at
>>> least that of this rule; and
>>>  3. For an instant runoff decision, the ordered lists of entities.
>>>  4. For any other decision, the valid options.
>>>
>>> [This splits off the portion of 955 that isn't actually related to
>>> resolution. The definition of instant runoff is changed to evaluate
>>> validity of options at the end of the voting period, and avoid
>>> retroactively invalidating votes if an option drops out.]
>>>
>>> Amend Rule 955 by replacing the second paragraph and numbered list with
>>> the following and by deleting the second bullet in the unnumbered list.
>>>
>>>  1. For an AI-majority decision, let F be the total strength of all
>>> valid ballots cast FOR a decision, A be the same for AGAINST,
>>> and AI be the adoption index of the decision. The outcome is
>>> ADOPTED if F/A >= AI and F/A > 1 (or F>0 and A=0), otherwise
>>> REJECTED.
>>>
>>>  2. For an instant runoff decision, the outcome is whichever option
>>> wins according to the standard definition of instant runoff.
>>> For this purpose, a ballot of strength N is treated as if it
>>> were N distinct ballots expressing the same preferences. In
>>> case 

Re: DIS: Re: OFF: [Promotor] Distribution of Proposals 7922-7929

2017-10-15 Thread VJ Rada
"The problem here is that deregistration without objection isn’t
cuddlebeam-proof."

I think you mean everyone-proof! Omd and Murphy can't be deregistered
rn and that's 1/10 of the whole Supply level right there.

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Gaelan Steele  wrote:
>
>
>> On Oct 15, 2017, at 8:20 PM, Aris Merchant 
>>  wrote:
>>
>> I hereby distribute each listed proposal, initiating the Agoran
>> Decision of whether to adopt it, and removing it from the proposal
>> pool. For this decision, the vote collector is the Assessor, the
>> quorum is 8.0 and the valid options are FOR and AGAINST (PRESENT is
>> also a valid vote).
>>
>>
>> ID Author(s) AI   Title Pender  Pend fee
>> ---
>> 7922*  Alexis 3.0  Clarity Act  Alexis  1 AP
> FOR
>> 7923*  Gaelan 1.0  Another Economy Fix Attempt  Gaelan  1 AP
> AGAINST; this needs some fixes
>> 7924*  Aris, [1]  3.0  Contracts v8 Aris1 sh.
> FOR
>> 7925*  Aris, Alexis   3.0  Safety Regulations v2Aris1 AP
> FOR
>> 7926*  Alexis 3.0  Deregulation Alexis  1 AP
> CONDITIONAL: if safety regulations passed (or is about to pass), then 
> AGAINST. else, FOR. If, save for this sentence, a conditional vote on 7925 
> would cause the result of my vote on 7926 to be circular, act as if the 
> result of that conditional resolves to PRESENT.
>> 7927*  V.J. Rada, G.  2.0  Estate Auction Fix   V.J. Rada   1 sh.
> FOR
>> 7928*  G. 3.0  no we can't  G.  1 AP
> FOR
>> 7929*  V.J. Rada  1.0  Consumerism  V.J. Rada   1 sh.
>
> AGAINST. The problem here is that deregistration without objection isn’t 
> cuddlebeam-proof. We should just fix that instead.
>
> Gaelan
>
>>
>> The proposal pool currently contains the following proposals:
>>
>> IDAuthor(s) AI   Title
>> ---
>> pp1   o 2.0  Faster Auctions
>>
>> Legend: * : Proposal is pending.
>>
>> [1] o, G., ais523, Gaelan, 天火狐, CuddleBeam, V.J Rada, Trigon, Alexis, P.S.S.
>>
>> A proposal may be pended for 1 AP, or for 1/20th the Floating Value
>> in shines (see the Secretary's report).
>>
>> The full text of the aforementioned proposals is included below. Please note
>> that, due to its length, Proposal 7924 is listed last.
>>
>> //
>> ID: 7922
>> Title: Clarity Act
>> Adoption index: 3.0
>> Author: Alexis
>> Co-authors:
>>
>>
>> Text in square brackets is not a part of this proposal's substance and
>> is ignored when it takes effect.
>>
>> Enact a new power 3 rule entitled Voting Methods, reading as follows:
>>
>>  Each Agoran decision has a voting method, which must be
>>  AI-majority, instant runoff, or first-past-the-post. The voting
>>  method is that specified by the authorizing authority, or
>>  first-past-the-post by default.
>>
>>  Each Agoran decision has a set of valid options (the choices that
>>  the voters are being asked to select from) and valid votes (the
>>  ways in which the voters can express their opinion or lack thereof.
>>  For AI-majority decisions, the valid options are FOR and AGAINST;
>>  for other decisions, the valid options are defined by other rules.
>>
>>  The valid votes on an Agoran decision are:
>>  1. PRESENT;
>>  2. The valid conditional votes, as defined by rules of power at
>> least that of this rule; and
>>  3. For an instant runoff decision, the ordered lists of entities.
>>  4. For any other decision, the valid options.
>>
>> [This splits off the portion of 955 that isn't actually related to
>> resolution. The definition of instant runoff is changed to evaluate
>> validity of options at the end of the voting period, and avoid
>> retroactively invalidating votes if an option drops out.]
>>
>> Amend Rule 955 by replacing the second paragraph and numbered list with
>> the following and by deleting the second bullet in the unnumbered list.
>>
>>  1. For an AI-majority decision, let F be the total strength of all
>> valid ballots cast FOR a decision, A be the same for AGAINST,
>> and AI be the adoption index of the decision. The outcome is
>> ADOPTED if F/A >= AI and F/A > 1 (or F>0 and A=0), otherwise
>> REJECTED.
>>
>>  2. For an instant runoff decision, the outcome is whichever option
>> wins according to the standard definition of instant runoff.
>> For this purpose, a ballot of strength N is treated as if it
>> were N distinct ballots expressing the same preferences. In
>> case multiple valid options tie for the lowest number of votes
>> at any stage, the vote collector CAN and must, in the
>> announcement of the decision's resolution, select one such
>> option to 

DIS: Re: OFF: [Promotor] Distribution of Proposals 7922-7929

2017-10-15 Thread Gaelan Steele


> On Oct 15, 2017, at 8:20 PM, Aris Merchant 
>  wrote:
> 
> I hereby distribute each listed proposal, initiating the Agoran
> Decision of whether to adopt it, and removing it from the proposal
> pool. For this decision, the vote collector is the Assessor, the
> quorum is 8.0 and the valid options are FOR and AGAINST (PRESENT is
> also a valid vote).
> 
> 
> ID Author(s) AI   Title Pender  Pend fee
> ---
> 7922*  Alexis 3.0  Clarity Act  Alexis  1 AP
FOR
> 7923*  Gaelan 1.0  Another Economy Fix Attempt  Gaelan  1 AP
AGAINST; this needs some fixes
> 7924*  Aris, [1]  3.0  Contracts v8 Aris1 sh.
FOR
> 7925*  Aris, Alexis   3.0  Safety Regulations v2Aris1 AP
FOR
> 7926*  Alexis 3.0  Deregulation Alexis  1 AP
CONDITIONAL: if safety regulations passed (or is about to pass), then AGAINST. 
else, FOR. If, save for this sentence, a conditional vote on 7925 would cause 
the result of my vote on 7926 to be circular, act as if the result of that 
conditional resolves to PRESENT.
> 7927*  V.J. Rada, G.  2.0  Estate Auction Fix   V.J. Rada   1 sh.
FOR
> 7928*  G. 3.0  no we can't  G.  1 AP
FOR
> 7929*  V.J. Rada  1.0  Consumerism  V.J. Rada   1 sh.

AGAINST. The problem here is that deregistration without objection isn’t 
cuddlebeam-proof. We should just fix that instead.

Gaelan

> 
> The proposal pool currently contains the following proposals:
> 
> IDAuthor(s) AI   Title
> ---
> pp1   o 2.0  Faster Auctions
> 
> Legend: * : Proposal is pending.
> 
> [1] o, G., ais523, Gaelan, 天火狐, CuddleBeam, V.J Rada, Trigon, Alexis, P.S.S.
> 
> A proposal may be pended for 1 AP, or for 1/20th the Floating Value
> in shines (see the Secretary's report).
> 
> The full text of the aforementioned proposals is included below. Please note
> that, due to its length, Proposal 7924 is listed last.
> 
> //
> ID: 7922
> Title: Clarity Act
> Adoption index: 3.0
> Author: Alexis
> Co-authors:
> 
> 
> Text in square brackets is not a part of this proposal's substance and
> is ignored when it takes effect.
> 
> Enact a new power 3 rule entitled Voting Methods, reading as follows:
> 
>  Each Agoran decision has a voting method, which must be
>  AI-majority, instant runoff, or first-past-the-post. The voting
>  method is that specified by the authorizing authority, or
>  first-past-the-post by default.
> 
>  Each Agoran decision has a set of valid options (the choices that
>  the voters are being asked to select from) and valid votes (the
>  ways in which the voters can express their opinion or lack thereof.
>  For AI-majority decisions, the valid options are FOR and AGAINST;
>  for other decisions, the valid options are defined by other rules.
> 
>  The valid votes on an Agoran decision are:
>  1. PRESENT;
>  2. The valid conditional votes, as defined by rules of power at
> least that of this rule; and
>  3. For an instant runoff decision, the ordered lists of entities.
>  4. For any other decision, the valid options.
> 
> [This splits off the portion of 955 that isn't actually related to
> resolution. The definition of instant runoff is changed to evaluate
> validity of options at the end of the voting period, and avoid
> retroactively invalidating votes if an option drops out.]
> 
> Amend Rule 955 by replacing the second paragraph and numbered list with
> the following and by deleting the second bullet in the unnumbered list.
> 
>  1. For an AI-majority decision, let F be the total strength of all
> valid ballots cast FOR a decision, A be the same for AGAINST,
> and AI be the adoption index of the decision. The outcome is
> ADOPTED if F/A >= AI and F/A > 1 (or F>0 and A=0), otherwise
> REJECTED.
> 
>  2. For an instant runoff decision, the outcome is whichever option
> wins according to the standard definition of instant runoff.
> For this purpose, a ballot of strength N is treated as if it
> were N distinct ballots expressing the same preferences. In
> case multiple valid options tie for the lowest number of votes
> at any stage, the vote collector CAN and must, in the
> announcement of the decision's resolution, select one such
> option to eliminate; if, for M > 1, all eir possible choices in
> the next M stages would result in the same set of options being
> eliminated, e need not specify the order of elimination. If an
> entity that is part of a valid vote is not a valid option at
> the end of the voting period, or disqualified by the rule
> providing for the decision, then that entity is eliminated