Re: some people are optimizers
Quoting Fred Foldvary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > --- Marko Paunovic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I can't really see a situation where decision not to have children is > > good for your genes. > > What matters for evolution is the propagation of the species, not > individuals. So if most individuals have children, but some choose to > enhance the welfare of others by avoiding having children, that overall can > help the species flourish and reproduce. > Yes, it could help the species. However, my genes don't care about the well- being of the species. They care about themselves. What is good for the species is not necesarily good for my genes. I guess one could even argue that by helping the other members of the species you are hurting yourself because you are increasing competition for limited resources. The only exemption, as I already mentioned, is caring for relatives. The situation is analogous to the public good problem. If I did something good, it would help everyone, but probably harm me. That is why I will not do it at all. Again, the only exemption are the people I care about, which are usually memebers of my family and for whom I am willing to sacrifice.
Re: some people are optimizers
--- Marko Paunovic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I can't really see a situation where decision not to have children is > good for your genes. What matters for evolution is the propagation of the species, not individuals. So if most individuals have children, but some choose to enhance the welfare of others by avoiding having children, that overall can help the species flourish and reproduce. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: some people are optimizers
On 2003-07-01, Marko Paunovic uttered to [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
>However, I don't think that there is any evidence, except in social
>insects, for this kind of specialization that you are suggesting.
The existence of two sexes appears an obvious counter-example. There are
also some reasons to expect that the principle might work at a
finer-grained level. I don't have a reference at hand, but I've once read
a highly interesting sociobiology account of why homosexuality might be
one such specialisation (that's where the childcare idea came from). I've
also heard some speculation about the possibility of "warrior genes" (i.e.
genes which cause aggression bordering on self-sacrifice). The same goes
for novelty seeking ("troubled youth"), which I understand has been
extensively studied. From the economic standpoint the ratio between
novelty seekers and steady people determines the community's collective
risk profile.
So I wouldn't dismiss the possibility of genetic occupations (a wonderful
term, BTW) just yet. Otherwise we're in vigorous agreement.
--
Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111
student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front
openpgp: 050985C2/025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2
Re: some people are optimizers
"Sampo Syreeni" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 2003-07-01, Marko Paunovic uttered to [EMAIL PROTECTED]: > > >Because gene for "not wanting children" will not be around for too long, > >but only for one generation. > > Not true. For instance, such a gene could have positive effects on the > other people in your tribe (say, added time for common childcare, which is > quite common in orang-outang communities), so the gene might well be > self-propagating in the social evolutionary sense. I mean, you only need > trivial economic analysis to show that specialisation is useful, and so > having a percentage of individuals who do not breed but do some other > useful work for the community could prove very advantageous. True. Could prove advantageous... > > Why on earth should we presume evolution couldn't take advantage of basic > economics, when it has lead to far more nontrivial consequences? Genes do > not care about individuals. They only care about their own survival. Why > should we presume individuals have some special place in the theory of > evolution? I agree completely. However, I don't think that there is any evidence, except in social insects, for this kind of specialization that you are suggesting. It is theoretically possible, but I've never heard of "genetically transfered occupation" (if I can call it that way) in any other animal species but social insects. I think that evidence would support my view that male and female of almost all species want to procreate because their genes want that. Why we are not witnessing more specialization, I don't know. What we do see, is that many males don't breed (I think that many male sea-lions don't breed), but I don't think they do any useful work for the community. > >It might be good for your genes to "invest" all your time and money in > >one child or two children. > > But historically they haven't, just as they don't in less developed > countries today. Thanks to our knowledge of biology we also see that the > genes in those surroundings are pretty much the same as ours. So where's > the difference? > > The real difference is that there are other forces at work here besides > Darwinian evolution. Cultural evolution is the prime one -- it has long > since overtaken its biological counterpart, just about everywhere. To put > it bluntly, if you can at least farm, you're no longer guided solely by > biological dictates. Instead it's information which guides your life. > Economics still applies, but it isn't as trivial as in the simple case of > evolutionary biology. This is of course true. Culture has added some costs (you have higher opportunity cost of your time) and some benefits (if you have many children, you don't have to save for retirement because children will look after you) so the optimal number of children is different. Also, for example, because of legal "issues", hit-and-run strategy is much less profitable for men. My point was that there IS some optimal number of children and that simple maximization of that number is not in the self-interest of genes. > >> Human genes endow people with the intelligence to choose not to have > >> children when the cost and risk are high. > > Precisely. > > >I can't really see a situation where decision not to have children is > >good for your genes. > > Okay. Say you have faulty genes which do not affect your basic > reproductive ability? Like when you're stupid but oh-so-horny? That isn't > a trait that would directly interconnect with your ability to breed (your > groin ain't your brain), so a naive analysis would suggest stupidity is > irrelevant. But we all know painfully well it ain't. I don't agree. I think that my stupidity is irrelevant from the standpoint of my genes. If I am stupid it is still better for my genes if I have children. It is not good for the genes of my girlfriend, so hopefully women will (or already have) develop a way to test my intelligence or overall ability. I guess what I'm trying to say is that there is both natural selection where genes are important (like height or pretty face) and cultural selection where genes are irrelevent (like wealth). However, they are strongly connected. Although there is probably no gene for wanting a rich wife, there is a gene for loving your child. So, if you have well-being of your future child in mind, you will consider not only genetic features of his/her mother but also her cultural features. But, this also works if I AM stupid. It is still better for my genes if I marry a pretty, rich girl. Hopefully, she will also be smart and reject my proposal. > The example goes to show that the link between your genotype and your > ability to breed isn't a direct one. Nowadays I wouldn't actually expect > any precise, scientific model to be able to capture the precise dynamics > of mating and procreation. In the stone age, maybe, but not today -- since > then we did invent nylon, lubrication, lipstick, fermented beverages and > industrial stren
Re: some people are optimizers
On 2003-07-01, Marko Paunovic uttered to [EMAIL PROTECTED]: >Because gene for "not wanting children" will not be around for too long, >but only for one generation. Not true. For instance, such a gene could have positive effects on the other people in your tribe (say, added time for common childcare, which is quite common in orang-outang communities), so the gene might well be self-propagating in the social evolutionary sense. I mean, you only need trivial economic analysis to show that specialisation is useful, and so having a percentage of individuals who do not breed but do some other useful work for the community could prove very advantageous. Why on earth should we presume evolution couldn't take advantage of basic economics, when it has lead to far more nontrivial consequences? Genes do not care about individuals. They only care about their own survival. Why should we presume individuals have some special place in the theory of evolution? >It might be good for your genes to "invest" all your time and money in >one child or two children. But historically they haven't, just as they don't in less developed countries today. Thanks to our knowledge of biology we also see that the genes in those surroundings are pretty much the same as ours. So where's the difference? The real difference is that there are other forces at work here besides Darwinian evolution. Cultural evolution is the prime one -- it has long since overtaken its biological counterpart, just about everywhere. To put it bluntly, if you can at least farm, you're no longer guided solely by biological dictates. Instead it's information which guides your life. Economics still applies, but it isn't as trivial as in the simple case of evolutionary biology. >> Human genes endow people with the intelligence to choose not to have >> children when the cost and risk are high. Precisely. >I can't really see a situation where decision not to have children is >good for your genes. Okay. Say you have faulty genes which do not affect your basic reproductive ability? Like when you're stupid but oh-so-horny? That isn't a trait that would directly interconnect with your ability to breed (your groin ain't your brain), so a naive analysis would suggest stupidity is irrelevant. But we all know painfully well it ain't. The example goes to show that the link between your genotype and your ability to breed isn't a direct one. Nowadays I wouldn't actually expect any precise, scientific model to be able to capture the precise dynamics of mating and procreation. In the stone age, maybe, but not today -- since then we did invent nylon, lubrication, lipstick, fermented beverages and industrial strength black clothing. It's the same with not having kids. Biological principles alone fail to explain that. I'm also pretty sure this disconnect is what makes us talk about evolution on lists having to do with economics. -- Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front openpgp: 050985C2/025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2
Re: some people are optimizers
"Fred Foldvary" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Why is deciding not to have children against the interest of the genes? Because gene for "not wanting children" will not be around for too long, but only for one generation. > Note also that modern parents stop at one or two > children, rather than many, and is that too against the interest of the > genes? This is different situation. It might be good for your genes to "invest" all your time and money in one child or two children. Why? Well, instead of having 10 uneducated and poor children, you might want to have two highly educated and skilled children. In human society, where education and money matter in "sexual success" it makes sense. >Human genes endow people with the intelligence to choose not to > have children when the cost and risk are high. I can't really see a situation where decision not to have children is good for your genes. Maybe when you have a lot of brothers and sisters and no parents, so you invest your time and effort in them Or if it seriously threatens your own life if you decide to have children, like during wars and such. But even then, it is only "good" for your genes to postpone your decision until such "bad times" pass.
Re: some people are optimizers
--- Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > and also often act directly against > the interest of their genes (e.g., deciding not to have children) when > they apply more rational decision processes. Why is deciding not to have children against the interest of the genes? Genes also induce people to want happiness, and children are very costly, at least in modern society. So the net benefit of children may well be less than alternatives. Note also that modern parents stop at one or two children, rather than many, and is that too against the interest of the genes? Human genes endow people with the intelligence to choose not to have children when the cost and risk are high. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: some people are optimizers
On Mon, Jun 30, 2003 at 08:32:55PM -0400, Robin Hanson wrote: > This seems to me to confuse the decision with how the decision is > represented and implemented. There are presumably many ways to disperse > a decision process and make it robust to random errors, and some of those > ways may be compatible with pretty optimal behavior. Maybe there are ways to implement a decision process that is both robust and also produces optimal behavior, but it seems that evolution has not found them. I think at the margin that is available to evolution, there is a pretty sharp tradeoff between robustness and optimality. As evidence, I submit the fact that people often behave irrationally even in very high stakes situations (i.e., high stakes as far as their genes are concerned, for example choosing a mate or deciding how much parental investment to allocate to each child), and also often act directly against the interest of their genes (e.g., deciding not to have children) when they apply more rational decision processes.
Re: some people are optimizers
On 6/30/2003, Wei Dai wrote: A perfect optimizer who behaves according to decision theory (or some bounded-rationality version of it) is very vulnerable to small changes in its utility function definition or the module responsible for interpreting the meaning of terms in the utility function definition. Such a change, say a bit flip caused by cosmic radiation, or the introduction of a new philosophical idea, could cause the agent to behave completely counter to the designer's intentions. In the rule-based agent, on the other hand, the utility function definition and its interpretation are effectively dispersed throughout the set of rules. If the rules are designed with appropriate redundancy, it should be much less likely for a catastrophic change in behavior to occur. This seems to me to confuse the decision with how the decision is represented and implemented. There are presumably many ways to disperse a decision process and make it robust to random errors, and some of those ways may be compatible with pretty optimal behavior. Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
some people are optimizers
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/852lodkv.asp This fascinating article shows pretty conclusively that at least some people are optimizers, although maybe they're the exception. BTW, if you ever need to have an A+ grade removed from your academic record, read the article because it shows you how. On a different note, I have some comments on why many people seem to be rule followers rather than optimizers. Consider evolution as an AI designer. Any AI designer faces two major problems: 1. Design a decision algorithm that improves utility, taking into account the costs of computation. 2. Prevent misinterpretation and random drift of the utility function. Problem 1 obviously implies using simpler subroutines when stakes are low, and more complex resource-intensive subroutines when stakes are high. The traditional justification for modeling people as perfect optimizers is that the model will match reality when stakes are high enough, and who cares about the low stakes situations? But if you think about problem 2, you'll realize that there may be a net advantage to following rules blindly even when the stakes are high. A perfect optimizer who behaves according to decision theory (or some bounded-rationality version of it) is very vulnerable to small changes in its utility function definition or the module responsible for interpreting the meaning of terms in the utility function definition. Such a change, say a bit flip caused by cosmic radiation, or the introduction of a new philosophical idea, could cause the agent to behave completely counter to the designer's intentions. In the rule-based agent, on the other hand, the utility function definition and its interpretation are effectively dispersed throughout the set of rules. If the rules are designed with appropriate redundancy, it should be much less likely for a catastrophic change in behavior to occur.
