What you say sounds right, Alex; I'm just thinking of a large-N problem
where the selfishly optimal strategy is 0 contribution. For air
pollution, that sounds pretty reasonable, doesn't it?
--
Prof. Bryan Caplan
Department of Economics George M
Bryan,
You don't need altruism to get a crowding-out effect if people are
initially contributing towards the public good as part of a Nash
equilibrium. In the Nash Equilibrium people contribute to the public
good but less than the optimum amount (the case where people contribute
nothing is t
--- Original Message -
From: "Bryan Caplan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: 1. februar 2001 12:48
Subject: Voluntary Pollution Control
> Suppose 50% of all people voluntarily buy low-pollution cars to "do
> their part" for clean air.
>
Well don't you forget that cars are built by companies that try to
please consumers? If 50% of all people voluntarily bought low-pollutions
cars then there is a good probability that it would be more difficult to
find high-pollutions cars. The good product would, at least gradually,
chase the bad
You wrote:
Suppose 50% of all people voluntarily buy low-pollution cars to "do
their part" for clean air.
Can anyone think up plausible mechanisms whereby their choice would
induce other people to pollute *more*?
No, I think the opposite would be the case. We are probably more in the
domain o
Suppose 50% of all people voluntarily buy low-pollution cars to "do
their part" for clean air.
Can anyone think up plausible mechanisms whereby their choice would
induce other people to pollute *more*?
The main mechanism I can think of is just crowding out of altruism. The
more people contrib
