Economics of Orgasm
http://slate.msn.com/id/2097396/ Discussion?
Re: the cost of spam
I would object that this will likely be ineffective due to the range of hardware being used, although this does fit into the accusation made multiple times that Microsoft is in bed with Intel insofar as they keep making increasingly bloated and slower running software that drives demand for faster chips. Moore's law will make this impractical for anyone not willing to buy a new computer every three years (do you want to have your PC spend 30 seconds processing every email you receive?). However, if they could pair this with a system to reduce computing time for verified senders (e.g. Passport and their whole .Net strategy) it might be usable. Or single users could use Distributed.net or a similar service to "store up" credits towards computer time and then use it to process emails -- getting closer to a viable market for computing time which I think will come about eventually... More interestingly, is this an example of trying to use economic means to reduce spam under another guise due to anti-market sentiment or skepticism about the intentions of people trying to establish "email postage" as per previous email? At 01:46 PM 3/16/2004 +0100, you wrote: An interesting alternative solution to tax spam comes from microsoft. They want to implement a cpu-based approache: "In a nutshell, the idea is this: "If I don't know you, and you want to send me mail, then you must prove to me that you have expended a certain amount of effort, just for me and just for this message." The approach is fundamentally an economic one. Suppose we measure effort in CPU cycles. Since there are about 80,000 seconds in a day, a computational "price" of just ten seconds per message would limit a spamming computer to at most 8,000 messages daily. So spammers would have to invest heavily in hardware in order to send high volumes of spam." from: http://research.microsoft.com/research/sv/PennyBlack/ Steffen -Original Message- From: ArmChair List [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Robert A. Book Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2004 8:12 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: the cost of spam > The survey is rather leading -- what about phrasing it as you pay $.01 and > everyone else pays you $.01 when they send you email? > [...] > > A $.10 reimbursement for reading this message is available upon > request. (Requester pays S&H) > > -- John Morrow Send mine via PayPal, so I won't have to pay S&H. ;-) The real trouble with the charge-for-email idea as a means of fighting spam is that spammers generally forge the "From" address(es), so you can't tell they sent it. Charging a tax or fee for e-mail will ben an even stronger incentive to do this. Either they'll get some innocent victim to pay (by making the e-mail appear to be from the victim) or use a bogus address so no one pays. Also, on the global internet, who is going to implement this tax? Even if you could get around the bogus from-line problem, all it takes is one country not to have the tax -- all spam will be sent from that country, but to all countries. --Robert Book
Re: the cost of spam
The survey is rather leading -- what about phrasing it as you pay $.01 and everyone else pays you $.01 when they send you email? Also, the results of the other polls show that people are willing to make judgements with little to no information, so I have to join the "surveys don't mean much" bandwagon. I have a hard time believing that the cost of processing spam is around $.01 as even compared with an hour of low wage labor (say $8.00/hr), everyone should be able to process around 800 pieces of spam an hour on average. I could believe that, except that the processing is spread out over a long time period (3-12 months?) with messages intentionally designed to make you think that "gee, it looks like spam but I'd better check." Thus I would guess that the marginal cost of spam is higher. Given then though that the total cost of spam processing over a year is probably low, (I probably spend more time having spam driven conversations like this than dealing with actual spam) I would wager that people are reacting negatively to the idea of paying for email in any fashion as given the market power your existing email provider will have over your established email address, the rates charged could easily surpass the total cost of "spam processing." A $.10 reimbursement for reading this message is available upon request. (Requester pays S&H) -- John Morrow At 11:22 AM 3/10/2004 -0500, you wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[no subject]
To the extent that prescription drugs can be illegally obtained and to the degree that illegal (non-prescription) drugs are substitutes for legal drugs that have associated stigmatization (e.g. recreational drugs used to self-medicate instead of facing psychiatric treatment) you could certainly list organized crime as a beneficiary of keeping several drugs as prescription only. John Morrow At 02:22 PM 3/7/2004 -0800, you wrote: I'm trying to come up with a comprehensive list of all the parties interested in keeping most drugs with a prescription-only status. Obviously doctors because it increases demand for their services, the government to support its drug prohibition, and to an extent the public due to decreased efficacy coming from antibiotic overuse (but overall the public loses from this practice). Any others? How about pharmacists or drug companies? Do they gain, lose, don't care, don't know? What about manufacturers of herbal and dietary supplements? trent __ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Search - Find what you're looking for faster http://search.yahoo.com
Re: Women Don't Ask
Following the analogy of price control, any evidence that the group advocating aggressive relationship bargining are the same ones who would generally benefit by such a policy? On a related note, do the strength of male/female bargining positions in a long term relationship change as male libido decreases over their 20's and 30's and female libido peaks around 35-38? (Think "Battle of the Sexes" over several periods...) Wild conjectures welcomed. -- John Morrow Quoting Bryan Caplan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > I just read the well-reviewed *Women Don't Ask* by Babcock and > Laschever. Main thesis: Women should bargain harder. > > It is frankly kind of silly. The whole book makes it sound like > aggressive bargaining is a strictly dominant strategy, so women will > definitely be better off if they do more of it. It never considers the > obvious possibility that women will price themselves out of a job. Nor > does it explore the interesting possibility that one reason female > employees are doing so well in spite of obvious child-related drawbacks > is precisely that employers know that they are less likely to demand > more money. > > The book also tries to get women to bargain more aggressively in > relationships. I think this is another case where feminist norms are > likely to function as a price control - some women will get a better > deal, but a lot of others will be unable to get married because their > standards are too high. > -- > Prof. Bryan Caplan > Department of Economics George Mason University > http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > "I hope this has taught you kids a lesson: kids never learn." > > --Chief Wiggum, *The Simpsons* >
V!agra
I don't know if this is true, but I have been told the #1 shoplifted item is Preparation H and like ointments -- this seems to fit in well with the theory that people want to remain anonymous in purchasing V!agra...
Many choices
Although I would gamble Schwartz has more ideological than empirical reasons for his conclusions, is there trend data available over multiple years? I don't think a point estimate is any way to gauge something like "happiness with respect to time." As for surveys, from what I know of the experimental literature, economists seem to put very little credence in surveys aside from gathering rather concrete data (e.g. demographics, independently verifiable data). My impression is that survey research is generally looked down upon -- if for no other reason than similar research in other fields is often highly contestable and unsophisticated (in both senses). Surveys also beg the question of the incentive and ability of respondents to answer in an externally valid way. Monetary incentives used to help ensure externally valid behavior seem to be a publishing requirement of modern experiments -- incentives completely lacking by nature in a survey. However, this may be completely different in particular subfields. -- John Morrow
Re: Why is a dollar today worth more than a dollar tomorrow?
I recall a Japanese econ grad student telling me that in fact real interest rates were negative for some span and people were STILL saving in the late nineties in Japan. He also blamed several bubbles at the time (notably, real estate in Japan) on this. Interesting if true... (Anyone know the details and can they justify the connection without resorting to framing biases of investors?) Following: Fred, I think you answered your own question -- even if many people would save some of their money even if the risk-free interest rate were zero, the quantity of funds demanded by borrowers at this rate would exceed the amount saved. So, a positive interest rate induces some people to defer consumption (save) and others to borrow less, until the market clears. And this would be the case even if there were no risk of nonpayment, and no inflation/deflation. By the way, there have been times and places where the measured real interest rate was essentially zero; I think this happened in Japan in the 1990s. --Robert
Re: why aren't we smarter?
If anything, I think you could argue that the Holocaust contributed to a higher than average Jewish IQ rather than the other way around. I'm sure Jews able to avoid fatal persecution in WWII and in the USSR have several qualities highly correlated with intelligence. An environment which values education and teaches what is being tested helps explain lots of the results of the cited paper (chess in particular is very much a learned game, not one of raw general intelligence) as well as the tendency for small groups in a population to engage in all types of preferential and assistive behavior towards members of the same group (in particular, academia as in the cited paper). Where am I going with this? Perhaps several of the social psychological cognitive biases (in group/out group bias, attribution theory, etc.) are good examples of advantageous "evolutionary stupidity" as biases add no or even detract from relevant information yet help guarantee irrational or even rational outcomes (even if for uncalculated reasons) that may benefit the group and individual. As for the original post -- I would imagine the selection going on outside of the game would help guarantee that the situation described does not usually occur. But finding examples of say, the "dumb" players all together having chased the "smart" players out due to coalition or other behavior would be interesting. Ideas? (Maybe penny stock traders?) At 08:01 PM 11/26/2003 -0500, you wrote: On Wed, Nov 26, 2003 at 04:47:17PM -0500, Robin Hanson wrote: > There certainly do seem to be some situations in which it can pay not be > seen as "too clever by half". But of course there are many other situations > in which being clever pays well. So unless the first set of situations are > more important than the second, it seems unlikely that evolution makes us > dumb in general on purpose. Perhaps the first set of situations is more important than you think. For example, could the Holocaust (and anti-semitism in general) fall into that category, given that Jews have a higher average IQ than gentiles? (116 vs 100, according to http://www.lagriffedulion.f2s.com/ashkenaz.htm.) > The question instead is whether evolution > was able to identify the particular topic areas where we were better off > being dumber, so as to tailor our minds to be dumber mainly in those areas. I'd argue no, at least beyond a certain degree, because if you have sufficient general intelligence, you can apply it to any area but still fake being dumb in particular areas. The only way to convince others of actually being dumb in those areas is to be dumb in general. > Yet most educated people actually seem > to understand physics better than economics. Do you have any evidence for this? At least personally I find economics easier to understand than, say, string theory, or even electromagnetism.
Fwd: Tax Loans
A Tax Loan is given by the gov't to a specific person, and is repaid by that person's taxes. 1) Tax Loans can replace gov't grants with loans. 2) Taxes repay the loan. 3) A small loan repayment surcharge (loan tax) also repays the loan. 4) In a Tax Loan program an explicit, honest social contract replaces the current imprecise and uncertain tax-benefit mixed "contract". (Legal persons, like corporations, could be eligible for such loans as well.) I think first you would have to clarify why this method is superior to private funding institutions -- e.g. insuffient student loans are a good example of market failure due to a variety of factors -- creating a government body to record information that would help private firms make sound investments would seem to help efficiency and avoid a lot of other problems with putting bureaucrats in charge of our private investment structure -- also, there are some reasons to think that private markets do not provide such loans for a reason aside from information costs -- e.g. a high drop-out rate among state university students who cannot then repay loans out of future earns, which paired with administrative costs of enforcement, etc probably would push the effective rate of interest on successful graduates past usury standards. Reasons Most voters want benefits, from the gov't, using Other People's Money. This desire is part of the social contract espoused by Rousseau, the vagueness of which makes it both unenforceable and essentially dishonest. If this entitlement benefit was instead a gov't Tax Loan, and repaid by the recipient, it would be using the taxpayer's own money, and be an honest, explicit social contract. A large portion of the immorality of taxes and entitlements is the fact that you are forced to pay taxes to benefit others. If your taxes go mostly to benefit yourself, the immorality goes down. Also, naturally, the desire for a new gov't entitlement will also be reduced. An explicit purpose of a tax loan program is to reduce the desire for entitlements, especially from the rich and middle classes. Including a repayment surcharge enhances this effect. A Tax Loan program can, in principle, answer the anti-freedom question: What about the poor? The answer becomes, offer the poor a tax loan. With explicit conditions, and a real tracking of individual agreements; and certainly increasing the known facts about each poor person who is unable, or more likely unwilling, to pay back the tax loan. (Unwilling in the sense that they are unwilling to adjust their lifestyles to be able to become productive.) All kinds of efficiency and political problems come up if a significant portion do not repay their loans -- some of the reasons that these people cannot get loans from the private sector may be good reasons -- in other words, the policy may create a large amount of inefficiency. Further restraints (job training, case workers, etc.) might be put into the plan, but that makes the plan increasingly parental. The interest rate on the loan (if any), and the level of taxes which go towards repayment will be good gov't discussion issues, as will be the levels and forms of the repayment surtax. This is important because democratic governments must be actively "doing something" to be reelected. Similarly, once enacted for people, such tax loans can also be used to reduce corporate welfare for big, questionably run corporations looking for, and now receiving, gov't handouts. Not charging any interest creates a horde of moral hazard and efficiency problems. Here also, I suspect the tendency would be to charge repayments rates which will never be paid off, a la social security. Also, how do we restrict old people from these loans -- it is hard for seniors to get loans (that they can't back) from the private sector for a reason. An obvious starting program would be a large Tax Loan for education (eg in California): Example program: an automatic $20 000/ year education Tax Loan. After 4 years, the graduate borrowing the maximum would owe $80 000. Half of his income tax (50%) goes to reduce this, yearly, and the Tax Loan balance is recorded just like a real loan. PLUS, if he makes more than the average ($30 k?), he pays some surtax, say 10%, on that amount, which also goes to reduce the tax loan. Is this any different from a two-tier "progressive" tax for loans? Such a Tax Loan program would operate in some specific economic environment, for example: The income tax rate is a flat 20% (for illustrative purposes; a little wishful thinking). Average income is $30 k/ year, which continues (instead of realistically increasing). A surtax of 10% on the amount over average is also levied. While the surtax would prolly be pre-tax, for the following examples this is ignored; similarly while there would be some interest rate (eg the avg. prior year's Fed rate), the examples ignore this. Individual Example (med success): one graduates and makes $40 k/ which in
Re: Socialist health and starvation
I believe that even quite recently (in the last year or two) China was found to be inflating its growth estimates significantly, and I have some economically minded Indian friends who claim Indian estimates are also intentionally inflated. I believe at the collapse of the Soviet Union it was found that may growth estimates were also inflated back into the Seventies at least, so I would look towards number tampering in general as being a contributing cause. Quoting fabio guillermo rojas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > In preparing a lecture about socialist economies, I have come across the > claim that socialist nations had decent life expectancies. How can that > be? We know that: > > (a) there have been episodes of mass starvation in the largest > socialist nations (USSR, China) > > (b) socialist nations have often engaged in destructive wars > against other nations (USSR) and against their own populations > (Cambodia) > > (c) chronic shortages of consumer goods, and in some cases, > shortage of basic food stuffs (think of wheat imports to Russia > and North Korea) > > (d) Socialist nations tend to be stressful places with mass arrests > and > the like > > I could think of a few mechanisms: socialist nations tend to invest in the > kind of infra-structurers that extend life (Education, sanitation, etc.), > a vibrant black market, or most likely - vital statistics from these > nations are hugely misleading. > > Any comments? > > Fabio >
Re: What's Wrong With Blood Feuds?
I would think that the general lack of information about the probability and severity (including duration) of enforcement would impair the ability of people to choose an efficient level of lawbreaking, to put it in that light. Also, more information about who to harm when committing a crime is necessary as the punishment costs, as it were, may vary greatly from bloodline to bloodline of the victim. At 10:11 AM 9/25/2003 -0400, you wrote: A standard story is that formal law is a great improvement over the informal institution of blood feuds, because such feuds tend to go on too long and get too disconnected from whatever harms were originally done. Is there any theoretical treatment of this, explaining or refuting such an argument? Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Intellectual property
Not meaning to reopen the can of worms, but seems this response was lost I'm sorry, I couldn't find any particular articles about the negative effects of the DMCA on the first link (I'm sure there are some -- please post a link.) The second link is not content based -- I would like to see some precise highlighted examples of DMCA infringing on economic freedom. E.g. say pre-DMCA I buy a CD or DVD which forms an implicit contract with the provider, the DMCA is passed and suddenly my contract has been changed -- if nothing else, this is clearly an efficiency issue -- if behavior like this is common, the cost of forming and maintaining contracts along with information costs will skyrocket, not the mention the effect on incentives. For instance, off the first link a page indicates that one may not "patch" software one purchases, which it would seem reasonable to assume I could do so for my own personal use, for convenience, functionality, compatibility, whatever -- it may make a significant difference in the value of the software to me. Likely in this case the law only will apply to people distributing particular code which facilitates illegal duplication, which increases efficiency, and is valuable to the individual insofar as they want to see the optimal (i.e. market clearing) level of reinvestment in producing new software/media. At 01:48 PM 9/8/2003 +0200, you wrote: For further information about the negative impact of the DMCA on our freedom see: http://www.chillingeffects.org/ And here for the logical conclusion of enforcing laws like the DMCA: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.html
Re: immigration's effect on per capita GDP
I fail to see how the delineation and protection of property rights in the DMCA is in any way "anti-Libertarian" -- most laws seem to be a mixed bag, DMCA included, but the DMCA seemed to me to be a general move in the right direction -- could you (or someone) explain why the DMCA does more harm than good? At 03:46 PM 9/5/2003 +0200, you wrote: Given the anti-libertarian legislation passed by the American Government in recent times (e.g. DMCA, Patriot Act) and how happily the populace has gone along with this legislation I think an influx of immigrants from almost any country would help advance the libertarian cause. Hamish > -Original Message- > From: alypius skinner [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Thursday, 4 September 2003 21:02 > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: immigration's effect on per capita GDP > > > libertarians (although not von Mises or the "objectivist" Ayn > Rand) are > >the > > > >strongest supporters of open borders, even though most of > the people who > > > >would enter under such an arrangement would be hostile to libertarian > > > >political thought. > >> > > >American libertarians putting the principle of liberty for > all ahead of > personal gain?! Whodda thunk it?! > > > > I thought the implication here was so obvious it did not need > to be spelled > out, but I guess I was mistaken (jab, jab). Importing new > voters from very > unlibertarian political cultures will further diminish, if > not eventually > kill off altogether, struggling libertarianism's already > modest influence. > Open borders libertarians have in effect become enemies of > liberty when they > pursue a strategy that is likely to diminish freedom in what may be > (depending on the measures used) the free-est country in the > world. It is > politically self-defeating, not just for libertarians, but > for us all. If > immigrants arrived in numbers that made assimilation more > practical, and if > assimilation to either libertarian or classical liberal > political ideas were > a high (although admittedly very statist) priority, then the > threat posed > to liberty might be modest, but that is not the case. But while > libertarians may be fools to import large numbers of people > who will vote > against both their own and America's core political values, > socialistic > politicians, such as those who control the Democratic Party, > are wise: they > are importing future socialist voters, as they are well aware. > > On crime rates: > > > >Perhaps labor economists are at heart radical subjectivists > who know better > than to rely on misleading aggregate statistics. > > > > When trying to determine effects on the mean crime level, > only aggregate > stats matter. That is, focusing on a tiny, elite segment of > immigrants, > such as those from India, tells us nothing about the effects > of immigrants > as a whole on the overall crime rate, and the cost of > increased mean levels > of criminality on victims and taxpayers. > > >For example, without even > looking it up, I would be willing to bet you $200 that the > crime rate among > Indian immigrants in Baltimore City or Washington, D.C. is > lower than the > crime rate among native-born citizens in those cities. > > > > No doubt, given immigrants from India are reported to have a > mean IQ of 118 > (versus only 81 for India as a whole), but since the average Indian > immigrant is not typical of the average immigrant, and, in > fact, represents > only a sliver of our total annual immigration, this argument against > aggregation amounts to a mere diversionary tactic. > > >A tangentially related question: does a proliferation of > laws that people > generally don't obey cause people to generally break other > laws more easily? > > > > From my observation of people (such as my priest!) who > routinely and often > egregiously ignore speeding laws, I would have to say: no. I > think people > distinguish between law and morality. I don't fault any of > the people who > sneak into the US illegally, but those who break the law > should still be > punished as a hopeful deterrent (perhaps by flogging before > deportation) if > unlimited immigration is not in our national--yes, our > collective--interest. > I think obedience to laws founded on intrinsic morality, such as those > forbidding theft and violence, things that are inherently > immoral because > they are obvious forms of free-riding, fall into a different > category of > misconduct in most people's minds. Obedience to morality-based laws > probably has much more to do with culture and childhood > socialization rather > than "respect for the law." > > >Instead of > examining the incentives that immigrants and native > populations face, many > invoke the different culture, beliefs, and values of > immigrants as the core > problem. > > > > And for good reason. Culture, beliefs, and values influence > behavior in > important ways. This is true even when incentives are the > same. Other > things bein
Re: The economics of heating (AND cooling)
I recall some companies working on consumer devices to automatically buy electricity based on price information sent to the device, namely for use in California -- they were expecting to implement some a couple of years ago, so you might be able to find price data from the devices on that -- sorry to be so vague, but maybe that will give you enough of a lead... Quoting "Robert A. Book" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Steffen Hentrich: > > >In germany we have a regulation for heating costs in tenements, so there > > >is no freedom of contract. For commercial buildings I have no evidence. > > Sampo Syreeni: > > I know even less about what is going on here in Finland. I suspect we do > > not have explicit rules on how much heating (or water, or electricity; > > they all tend to be priced flat in housing blocks) is supposed to cost. > > The same goes for the commercial zone, so I don't think there's a huge > > difference there, either. > > > For what it's worth, in the US this sort of thing is left to local > governments. For example, in Chicago there is a minimum temperature > to which the thermostat must be set (if the landlord controls the > thermostat, which is not always the case). > > Typically -- although not universally -- whoever sets the thermostat > pays the bill. However, in Houston it is common for the resident to > control the air conditioning even when the landlord pays the electric > bill -- that is, monthly rent is fixed, and it includes as much > electricity as you can use. Landlords advertise this arrangement with > the phrase "All bills paid!" I lived in an apartment like that > arrangement once; the only explanation I can think of is that there is > that electric meters are costly and the cost exceeds the reduction in > usage. > > Does anyone out there know of data on usage patterns, conditioned on > whether the resident or the landlord pays the bill? This might be > useful for some people I know working on energy use in Navy housing. > > > --Robert >
Re: Economics and E.T.s
Selection comes to mind. On uninhabited planets, sentient beings don't ponder this question. Quoting "Robert A. Book" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > On Thu, 21 Aug 2003, Bryan Caplan wrote: > > > > > That seems to water down the Principle to complete irrelevance, doesn't > > > it? > > > > Well, the notion that life is very unlikely, but happened on earth > > through sheer chance, does not require that earth is "special" in > > any fundamental physical sense. > > > What's the basis for the principle in the first place? > > > --Robert Book >
Re: Economics and E.T.s
I believe the #1 usage of content based bandwidth online is religious material, followed by ironically titled "adult" material (or at least was not too long ago), so perhaps the Thought Writer is already in existence, translating the amount of thinking time spent by human subjects day to day into a corresponding volume of web material. At 12:02 AM 8/19/2003 +0200, you wrote: Thanks for a fine list Bryan! Here's a cool idea I haven't heard anybody else articulate: computer assisted telepathy. I expect it in my lifetime. Instead of voice recognition "voice writer", imagine a brainwave sensitive headset (or imbedded sensors?) which allow, with individual man-machine training, "thought writer". Text to synthetic voice already exists. Is it not possible to hook an audio amplifier directly into the audio nerves of a deaf person in such a way that they can "hear" something? In the future, "thought speakers" will be likely -- so your Google news feed bypasses airwaves and goes from your computer, wirelessly, to your ear amp and into your head. And then the simultaneous Thought Writer -- Thought Speaker will be trivial. Voila. Comp assist. telepathy. ... and the need to broadcast comm to cosmos will rapidly diminish, as writers can try to speak directly into the thoughts of their listeners. Maybe our evolution towards this is why the cosmos is so "quiet". And I don't believe in faster than light travel. Sigh. On the other hand, nanotech (influenced) recycling robots are also likely before 2020. Cheers to all. Tom Grey (I think I'm becoming a Libertarian Paternalist)
