Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-18 Thread Alypius Skinner


- Original Message -
From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 One factor that keeps large corporations honest is the threats of hostile
 takeovers and bankruptcy. Unfortunately neither of these seem likely to
 apply to a large nation-as-corporation. Imagine creditors trying to force
 everyone else to leave the U.S. after a bankruptcy because they now own
 all of the shares.


What if a foreign power began buying up large numbers of shares and
assigning them to its foreign agents? How many shares would Al Qua'ida buy?

Other questions/observations I have:  will shareholders receive dividends?
Would immigration's effect on dividend size affect shareholders' demand for
one immigration policy or another?

If the government refused to issue more shares, but simply bought one back
on the open market to issue to each new child and charge the parents's for
the cost, this would be an interesting way to stabilize population.

Would it make more sense to organize a nation like a not-for-profit
corporation?

Since the modern state is often regarded as already being organized like a
corporation, I assume this thread is about organizing the literal nation
itself as a corporation.  Does this not mean an internal labor market in
which the managers would be responsible for training, job assignments,  and
promotions (and wages and salaries), so that involuntary unemployment and
welfare schemes would be non-existent?

Would social security and medicare be run like a pension system? But what
would they be invested in? With the nation (not just the state) as
corporation, there presumably would not be any use for a stock market, so
pensions would have to be funded entirely out of corporate (national)
profits.  If the whole apparatus of state were so funded, there really would
be no need for taxes per se.  (Perhaps this thread should be nation as
conglomerate.)

Would corporate divisions or subsidiairies compete against each other or
receive protected territories?

Could the corporation hire employees who were not shareholders?

Could one become a shareholder without moving here?  What if most of our
shareholders eventually lived overseas, while our residents were mostly
employees?

If only shareholders may be employees, and foreigners may not own shares,
does that mean no overseas employees permitted unless they are shareholders
stationed abroad? The nation could not be a multinational corporation?

Would a social stigma  to selling one's share evolve? In one survey, 25% of
US respondents said they would change their religion for 2 million dollars,
but only 16% would give up their US citizenship for the same sum.  Go
figure.

How would we preserve an independent judiciary (essentially an arbitration
system)--although that is a challenge under any system?  The US judiciary
already seems to be increasingly politicized.

Would the only restraint on our CEO be contractual agreements and decisions
by the Board of Directors? If so, we would not need a legislature anymore.
New laws-regulations could be drafted by legal experts as the CEO directed.


John Hull wrote:
 1. The program will prevent poor from coming to the
 States.  I think that's wrong, but I respect your view
 if you feel otherwise.

So you think its wrong to demand that poor people respect private property
rights (since the corporate-nation would be the private property of the
shareholders).  But if you want to forcibly confiscate a share or two from
Berkshire-Hathaway and donate it to me (since I can't afford to buy them),
I won't complain very loudly :)

Seriously though, if no limitations are placed on immigration, the effects
would likely be unpleasant for many of the people who already live here and
do, in fact, think of themselves sort of as shareholders (citizens) of the
nation.  (In olden times, the kingdom was viewed as a sole proprietorship
owned by the king and national identity was weak or non-existent.  Soldiers
were mercenairies beholden only to their employer, not to the people.
Multicultural states were much more stable under sole
proprietorship-monarchies than under conditions of republican nationalism.)
Do you mean that you want to benefit a select few of the foreign poor at the
cost of depressing wages and opportuny for the native poor of your own
country and raising the net cost of public services (according to labor
economists), or do you mean that you want mutually open borders as a matter
of principle?  In either case, what effect will this have on the native
lower classes' sense of belongingness, national loyalty, willingness to make
sacrifices and avoid free-riding, etc.? Does the logic here not ultimately
lead to an every-man-for-himself mentality that ultimately shifts loyalty
from the nation-state to the family with whatever repercussions that may
have for political stability?  Now, I will readily agree that the concept of
transferable national shares may well have the effect of eroding social
capital, but so does your view that foreign 

Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-18 Thread john hull

--- Alypius Skinner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
'John Hull wrote:
1. The program will prevent poor from coming to the
States.  I think that's wrong'
So you think its wrong to demand that poor people
respect private property rights

That's a bit of a non sequitur. :)
Nope.  All I was saying is that poor shouldn't be
prevented from immigrating simply for being poor (and
that the proposed citizenship structure would do that,
a view that has been well challenged).  Furthermore,
that people should be allowed to move from country to
country fairly unhindered--taking the fleas with the
dog.  No insightful economic arguments here, it's just
a value that I have (and interjected).

Alypius Skinner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ken Lay, Bill Clinton (Hillary in 2008), what's the
difference? Lay might even be an improvement.

Hillary in 2008?  Ooof.  Humor aside, I'm not sure I
agree that Lay-esque leadership would be an
improvement.  You remark how stupid and apathetic
voters are, it seems to me that in that environment
someone more clever than I could come up with a scheme
to build stock prices in the short-run, get paid, and
bail out of office.  The world has certainly seen its
share of bad leaders, but that doesn't mean that they
couldn't be worse.  I think that the proposed scheme
would shorten political time horizons by linking
reward to a very short-term phenomenon, and thereby
produce even greater incentives for bone-head moves. 
I feel that if leaders' primary compensation comes in
the form of going down in the history books in a good
light, then they'll be more inclined to think in the
longer term.  

Obviously, I don't have a general argument to back
this up.  It is also obvious that one could easily
pick out plenty of counter examples, which I could not
counter with counter examples because we're dealing
with a hypothetical.  I would like to hear an argument
as to why linking reward to an extremely short-term
phenomenon would produce better leaders on average. 
I'm not throwing down the gauntlet...it's just
something I'd like to hear.

--- Alypius Skinner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But all the incentives for that scenario (embracing
mercantile excesses) already exist.

That must be true to some degree since people keep
putting Pat Buchanan on TV.  But I submit that those
incentives arise from your aforementioned voter
ignorance  stupidity: some people support schemes
that are ultimately harmful for the nation  the world
and will vote for the slobs who enact such policies. 
The proposed scheme, IMO, creates an *institutional*
incentive for such mercantilist policies because they
can, at least in the short-run, hurt the rest of the
world alot more than they will hurt us.

Thanks for reading my stuff,
jsh

=
...for no one admits that he incurs an obligation to another merely because that 
other has done him no wrong.
-Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Discourse 16.

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Re: Nations as Corporations--how to price?

2002-08-16 Thread john hull

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that you wish to
speculate in U.S. Citizenship Stocks, UCS for
short--pronounced yuks.  By low  sell high, and all
that sort of thing.

Assume that:
1. An individual is free to own many UCS
2. Non-human legal entities may own UCS
3. There is no legally recognized disenfranchised
class, in line w/ Mr. Hanson's affirmation that one
may be stopped and asked for proof of citizenship. 
Anyone without at least one UCS who cannot be deported
is shot on sight.  Fatally.

As a speculator in UCS, how would you go about
estimating a fair price?  Do you think taking the
break-up value of the States gives the fair price?

Recall that one must be able to go somewhere after
selling; no foreign visa, no sale.

Terminally curious,
jsh


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Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-16 Thread rhanson

Hi.  I'm on vacation, and can't respond to this thread much now, but 
will when I get back in a week and a half.  But for now let me confirm 
that we can think of this discussion in two steps.   One, assuming that 
a CEO maximized share value of a nation, what would they do wrong or 
right.  And two, what institutions could get them to maximize share 
value.  The first question is interesting even if we don't know the 
answer to the second question. 

Robin D. Hanson, Asst Prof Economics, hanson.gmu.edu  
MSN 1D3, George Mason Univ., Fairfax, VA 22030
 
 --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 I feel fairly confident in believing, however, that
 he did not mean that the financial incentives would
 produce CEOs with a militaristic or glory-seeking
 bent.
 
 So do i.




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-15 Thread AdmrlLocke


In a message dated 8/14/02 8:21:54 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 However, the two statements are compatible.
In society there are minorities with little power and other minorities with
much power.  For example, a country could have a ruling elite with much
wealth and power, and also despised minorities with little power.

Fred Foldvary 

Well minorities can't generally be both overpowered and overly-powerful as 
you first claimed in self-contradiction.   Either they as a general rule run 
things or as a general rule get overrun (or neither), but not both.  To say 
that currently some small groups get a good deal of what they want and that 
other small groups don't probably describes the current situation, and 
probably predicts the outcome of Professor Hanson's set-up, but not in a way 
that clarifies anything about either.

David Levenstam




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-15 Thread Eric Crampton

On Thu, 15 Aug 2002, Misha Gambarian wrote:

 On the other side, if we allow people to buy more than one share (as it
 happens in real corporations) - then I think we can expect that rich
 people will buy many shares (as they do in existing real corporations)
 to get political influence more directly than now
 and USA will become oligopoly with poor people having less power than
 they have now.

Ok.  Assume 280 million shares (approx. current population).  Current GDP
is approx. 10 trillion.  I have no idea what the current valuation of the
stock of wealth in the US is, so let's just assume a lower bound share
price as being 1/n of the PDV of income flows (GDP).  The present value of
an infinite income flow of 10 trillion dollars at 5% interest is about 200
trillion dollars.  Dividing that by the number of shares, we get about
$700,000 share value.  The share price can't go much lower than that
because, in the limit, somebody could buy all the shares, enslave
everyone, and get output that would be some fraction of current output
(lower since it would be expensive to keep everyone as slaves).  But, to
get the majority necessary to do that would require an investment of at
least half the market valuation -- $100 trillion.  While I think capital
markets are fairly efficient, I find it quite implausible that anyone
could raise that kind of money to run a hostile takeover.  And, absent
that, just buying another $700K share to get one more vote would be
ridiculous.  Even if all the rich folks in the country liquidated all of
their resources to buy shares, they still wouldn't have any significant
increase in their control rights.  Bill Gates has what, about $62
billion?  If he sold everything, he could buy about 89,000 shares.  Out of
280 million.  That's still less than a tenth of a percent of the
shares.  Fears (or hopes!) of oligopoly are greatly overstated.






Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-15 Thread Misha Gambarian





Eric Crampton wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">
  On Thu, 15 Aug 2002, Misha Gambarian wrote:
  
On the other side, if we allow people to buy more than one share (as ithappens in real corporations) - then I think we can expect that richpeople will buy many shares (as they do in existing real corporations)to get political influence more directly than nowand USA will become oligopoly with poor people having less power thanthey have now.

Ok.  Assume 280 million shares (approx. current population).  Current GDPis approx. 10 trillion.  I have no idea what the current valuation of thestock of wealth in the US is, so let's just assume a lower bound shareprice as being 1/n of the PDV of income flows (GDP).  

Here you assume that all GDP income is distributed as dividents - doesn't
look probable. If people assume that their normal income is dividents this
still doesn't work, because of income inequality.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">
  The present value ofan infinite income flow of 10 trillion dollars at 5% interest is about 200trillion dollars.  Dividing that by the number of shares, we get about$700,000 share value.  
  
If we assume 5% interest on deposits, then $700,000 represents income of
$35,000/year - pretty good for not very rich USA citizen. I think with this
share price we will have huge emigration from USA to, for example, Bahamas.
I think share price will absolutely never be so high - I think we can speak
about 50-100,000 as top estimation. If price is 5, then .
Of course, You have a point - if USA 'Costs' 10 trillion, then 1/280million
part of USA should cost $700,000. But I doubt that it will work this way.
We probably have no dividents, market isn't very liquid and so on.
For example, in Russian Voucher program it was expected that Voucher (for
which was sold very substantial part of Russian industrial property would
cost about $10,000 - but actually they cost about $10.
  
There is two more questions. 
First, what happens with people who sell their shares. 
a) They can be effectively expelled from USA. It will probbaly lead to USA
without underclass, with much less crime and slightly higher cost of living.
Doesn't look very probable, through. (INS and border quard look uncapable
to achieve this).
b) They will be expelled, but unefficiently (more or less like mexican illegal
immigrants now). It will lead to larger underclass than now without rights,
probably more crime.
c) They can just lose their voting rights, but still have right to work and
live in USA. In this case I expect price of share to be very small, probably
less than $10,000 - and in this case Gates can buy 6,000,000 votes and more
or less make USA presidents (No president will be able to ignore him). I
this case we will come to oligarchy pretty quickly.
  
Second question, what will happen if somebody sells his share and then dies?
Or just dies ? does his share dissapear? It doesn't look just if somebody
bought share, come to live in USA, and then was suddenly expelled when previous
owner died. On the other side, if shares stay, there becomes constant supply
of shares from old persons, and we cannot expect shares price to be high.
(people will spend retirement in Mexico instead of Florida, in cheaper coutry
and having substantially more money.) 
  
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]">
The share price can't go much lower than thatbecause, in the limit, somebody could buy all the shares, enslaveeveryone, and get output that would be some fraction of current output(lower since it would be expensive to keep everyone as slaves).  But, toget the majority necessary to do that would require an investment of atleast half the market valuation -- $100 trillion.  While I think capitalmarkets are fairly efficient, I find it quite implausible that anyonecould raise that kind of money to run a hostile takeover.  And, absentthat, just buying another $700K share to get one more vote would beridiculous.  Even if all the rich folks in the country liquidated all oftheir resources to buy shares, they still wouldn't have any significantincrease in their control rights.  Bill Gates has what, about $62billion?  If he sold everything, he could buy about 89,000 shares.  Out of280 million.  That's still less t
han a tenth of a percent of theshares.  Fears (or hopes!) of oligopoly are greatly overstated.

As I tried to argue above, we can expect share price to be much lower than
$700,000 (at the least at the start), and possibility of oligopoly can be
much higher that you think.

Mikhail Gambarian
Major of Economics, Erasmus University




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-15 Thread Eric Crampton

On Thu, 15 Aug 2002, Misha Gambarian wrote:

 Here you assume that all GDP income is distributed as dividents - 
 doesn't look probable. If people assume that their normal income is 
 dividents this still doesn't work, because of income inequality.

Not assuming that at all.  Just trying to get a handle on the break-up
value of the country for purposes of assigning some minimum
valuation.  The break-up value shouldn't be less than the value of the
assets in the country, and the value of the assets in the country should
be reflected in the current earnings stream (GDP) generated thereby.

 Bahamas. I think share price will absolutely never be so high - I think 
 we can speak about 50-100,000 as top estimation. If price is 5, then .

The valuation I used assumed that any single owner could appropriate the
entire earnings flow of the country.  If the corporate charter of the
United States prevents the enslaving of people in the country who aren't
shareholders, then my numbers would be a rather high upper-bound and the
actual price would be lower.  How restrictive do we expect the corporate
charter to be?  And who will enforce it?  The Constitution was supposed to
have been some kind of binding document, but the Constitution now seems to
just increase the costs for government to engage in certain types of
activities rather than preventing them altogether.  H.

 For example, in Russian Voucher program it was expected that Voucher 
 (for which was sold very substantial part of Russian industrial property 
 would cost about $10,000 - but actually they cost about $10.

Well, the official estimates of the value of industrial property was
rather too high in that case, no?

 First, what happens with people who sell their shares.
 a) They can be effectively expelled from USA. It will probbaly lead to 
 USA without underclass, with much less crime and slightly higher cost of 
 living. Doesn't look very probable, through. (INS and border quard look 
 uncapable to achieve this).
 b) They will be expelled, but unefficiently (more or less like mexican 
 illegal immigrants now). It will lead to larger underclass than now 
 without rights, probably more crime.
 c) They can just lose their voting rights, but still have right to work 
 and live in USA. In this case I expect price of share to be very small, 
 probably less than $10,000 - and in this case Gates can buy 6,000,000 
 votes and more or less make USA presidents (No president will be able to 
 ignore him). I this case we will come to oligarchy pretty quickly.

If there are 240 million shares, Gates would need an order of magnitude
higher number of shares to be able to get a controlling interest.  Six
million out of 240 million is still pretty small potatoes.

 Second question, what will happen if somebody sells his share and then 
 dies? Or just dies ? does his share dissapear? It doesn't look just if 
 somebody bought share, come to live in USA, and then was suddenly 
 expelled when previous owner died. On the other side, if shares stay, 
 there becomes constant supply of shares from old persons, and we cannot 
 expect shares price to be high. (people will spend retirement in Mexico 
 instead of Florida, in cheaper coutry and having substantially more money.)

Presumably the estate would hold the share, and then sell it to the
highest bidder.  If the only source of new shares is from the sale of
current shares (either through emigration or death), the price of shares
would be quite high.  The sum of people wanting to move to the United
States plus people being born in the United States is much higher than the
current mortality numbers.

 As I tried to  argue above, we can expect share price to be much lower 
 than $700,000 (at the least at the start), and possibility of oligopoly 
 can be much higher that you think.

Valuation will depend on the nature of the corporate charter and,
critically, on whether that charter can be made self-enforcing.  If a
majority shareholder is not bound by the corporate charter, then we can
quickly become his slaves and he can appropriate all revenue, unless the
total amount of extraction from a slave state is lower than the maximal
taxation from a free state.  In either case, the total valuation has to
reflect the PDV of the maximum amount that can be appropriated by a single
majority owner.

 
 Mikhail Gambarian
 Major of Economics, Erasmus University
 





Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-15 Thread Eric Crampton

On Thu, 15 Aug 2002, john hull wrote:

 to pay.  Do you think a firm would take the risk of
 plunking down that kind of money for a
 multi-generation debt?

It would likely depend a lot on how property rights over shares work out
and how liens on shares would be treated.  If the market price did settle
around $700K, then it would be unlikely that an indentured servant would
pay off his share in his lifetime.  However, he could pay off some
fraction of his share and his estate would inheret a fractional share.  So
long as the company bringing in the indentured servant could maintain its
property right over the part of it that isn't paid off, the system should
work.

 I am curious why you used GDP as the basis for share
 calcualtion.  I'm not attacking it, I just don't it's
 appropriate.

Seemed like a decent starting point for getting a total market valuation.  
I'd more than welcome alternatives.  In the limit, the market valuation of
the country is the market price of the assets in the country (the break-up
value).  I have no way of guessing at the valuation of the current stock
of wealth in the country, but the stock of wealth should be reflected in
the current price of outputs.  The stock of capital should be equal in
valuation to the present discounted value of the stream of revenues
flowing therefrom.  Of course, I'm also treating the population as part of
the capital stock in doing this.

Eric


 Best wishes,
 -jsh
 
 
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Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread fabio guillermo rojas

 Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation.  To live 

How would you enforce shareholder rights and monitor managers? For
corporations inside nations, one could appeal to the state for law
enforcement or start a lawsuit. What recourse do shareholders have in
such a worlds? Fabio 





Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread John A. Viator

These are very interesting questions!  This would clearly affect the 
decision to have children in one of two ways (that I can think of):
1.  Couples would have fewer children if they had to purchase a share 
for each child they had.
2.  Couples would have more children if they were granted a share for 
each child they had.

I'm sure there are many more consequences, though.

Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation.  To 
live (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share.  You could sell 
your share and leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a 
share.  The corporate management would be given financial incentives 
to maximize the market value of these shares.  They could issue more 
shares if these new shares were handed out to previous share holders 
in proportion to the shares they currently hold.

What would go wrong or right with running the US this way?  Would 
management focus too much on making immigrants happy, versus people 
already here who are reluctant to leave?  Would there be too many or 
two few people here?  Would government spending increase or 
decrease?  Would we get less desirable immigrants, relative to 
picking and choosing among applicants?  Would the homeless prefer to 
cash out and leave, rather than stay and beg here?  Would people 
tend to leave when they retire?



Robin Hanson  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323


-- 
John A. Viator, Ph.D.
Beckman Laser Institute
1002 Health Sciences Road East
University of California
Irvine, CA  92612
(949)824-3754
(949)824-6969 fax
[EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread CyrilMorong

How would we know what price to charge for a share? 
Would the U.S. have a monopoly?  
Or would it compete with other nations?  
What would we do about people who try to sneak in without buying a share?  
Will people be required to proove at any time they own a share or be deported (or 
worse)?
Would it be one share, one vote in an election for management?
Could a person end up with more than one share, buying from people who leave?

Cyril Morong




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread Fred Foldvary

--- Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation.  To live 
 (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share.  You could sell your share and 
 leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share.  The corporate 
 management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value

If you own a share, that implies that this is a cooperative, where each
person owns one share and has one vote.

 What would go wrong or right with running the US this way?  

The problem is central planning.  The US corporation would be a giant
enterprise subject to the inefficiencies of any large organization.
Also, minority interests would be overpowered as they are now.

 Would government spending increase or decrease? 

If the members vote as citizens do now, it seems to me that the government
would be under similar special-interest influence, and there would be little
change in government spending.

Fred Foldvary

=
[EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread Robin Hanson

Cyril Morong wrote:
How would we know what price to charge for a share?

There's be an open market which would set prices.

Would the U.S. have a monopoly?

A monopoly on rights to live in the US, but other places are substitutes.

What would we do about people who try to sneak in without buying a share?

Same as you'd treat people who stole stock.

Will people be required to proove at any time they own a share or be 
deported (or worse)?

Yup.

Would it be one share, one vote in an election for management?

Yup.

Could a person end up with more than one share, buying from people who leave?

Yes, but it seems unlikely many would do so.






Robin Hanson  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread Robin Hanson

Fred Foldvary wrote:
  Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation.  To live
  (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share.  You could sell your share and
  leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share.  The corporate
  management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value

If you own a share, that implies that this is a cooperative, where each
person owns one share and has one vote.

OK.

  What would go wrong or right with running the US this way?

The problem is central planning.  The US corporation would be a giant
enterprise subject to the inefficiencies of any large organization.

But as with any corporation, the leaders could use decentralized planning,
or break the corporation into pieces, if they thought that would maximize
stock value.  They could dismantle most regulation, if they thought that
would help.

Also, minority interests would be overpowered as they are now.

And as they are in any corporation.

Robin Hanson  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread Robin Hanson

Fabio wrote:
  Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation.  To live

How would you enforce shareholder rights and monitor managers? For
corporations inside nations, one could appeal to the state for law
enforcement or start a lawsuit. What recourse do shareholders have in
such a worlds?

Are state-enforced lawsuits really what keeps large multinational
corporations honest now?  If not, then the concept here is to use
mechanisms similar to whatever large corporations now use.

Robin Hanson  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread AdmrlLocke


In a message dated 8/14/02 3:37:34 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 The problem is central planning.  The US corporation would be a giant
enterprise subject to the inefficiencies of any large organization.
Also, minority interests would be overpowered as they are now.

 Would government spending increase or decrease? 

If the members vote as citizens do now, it seems to me that the government
would be under similar special-interest influence, and there would be little
change in government spending. 

Rereading the two passages, I wonder if there isn't a contraction.  In the 
first passage we have minority interests overpowered, but in seeming 
contraction we have in the second passage special interests with influence.  
How other is a minority interest different from a special interest?   Or are 
we talking about corporations in the first rather than the voters in the 
second.  In the case of corporations, a minority holder ofte can, and does 
exert considerable interest, especially over a publicly-held corporation.  
Ross Perot gained some of his millions by using his minority stake in GM to 
harass the GM board of directors until they paid him off.

Unrelated to the question of minority interests, could Americans participate 
in any other organizations?  Or would everything be controlled by the 
corporation?  Could Americans start other corporations, partnerships, sole 
proprietorships?  Seperate churches and recreational or philanthropic 
organizations?  Or would everything have to be done under the auspcies of the 
corporations?

David




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread John A. Viator

It's not clear (to me, anyway.)  If new people were extremely 
productive, it seems that managers may want to encourage that type of 
person to be born, so they may give parents free shares for the 
child.  If new people aren't very productive, then giving away shares 
for free doesn't make much sense.


John A. Viator wrote:
This would clearly affect the decision to have children in one of 
two ways (that I can think of):
1.  Couples would have fewer children if they had to purchase a 
share for each child they had.
2.  Couples would have more children if they were granted a share 
for each child they had.

Yup.  And which policy would profit maximizing managers choose?

Robin Hanson  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323


-- 
John A. Viator, Ph.D.
Beckman Laser Institute
1002 Health Sciences Road East
University of California
Irvine, CA  92612
(949)824-3754
(949)824-6969 fax
[EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread fabio guillermo rojas


 Are state-enforced lawsuits really what keeps large multinational
 corporations honest now?  If not, then the concept here is to use
 mechanisms similar to whatever large corporations now use.
 Robin Hanson  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://hanson.gmu.edu

Multinationals come in different flavors. Those based in Western
nations and that have assets that can be seized after litigation
are probably kept in line by fear of lawsuits and jail terms.

I have no idea how share holders keep faith in firms based in dodgy
Third World nations. Probably some kind of trust, where paying out
dividends and respecting voting rights signals that future investors
will be treated well. But how often does this occur? Are these
multinationals not based in 3rd world not trying to avoid shareholder
rights? 

Fabio 





Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread Fred Foldvary

--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  minority interests would be overpowered as they are now.

 would be under similar special-interest influence

 Rereading the two passages, I wonder if there isn't a contraction. 

There is no contraction, but one could read into it a contradiction.

However, the two statements are compatible.
In society there are minorities with little power and other minorities with
much power.  For example, a country could have a ruling elite with much
wealth and power, and also despised minorities with little power.

Fred Foldvary

=
[EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread Wei Dai

On Wed, Aug 14, 2002 at 01:24:12PM -0400, Robin Hanson wrote:
 Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation.  To live 
 (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share.  You could sell your share and 
 leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share.  The corporate 
 management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value 
 of these shares.  They could issue more shares if these new shares were 
 handed out to previous share holders in proportion to the shares they 
 currently hold.

This seems very similar to having a poll tax, with the following twists:

1. You can voluntarily pay a higher tax and get proportionally more 
votes.
2. Management is given incentives to maximize revenue from poll taxes. 
(Other forms of taxes can be collected but management does not have direct 
incentives based on their revenues.)

They're similar in the sense that they look the same to people who have
access to perfect capital markets. I'm not sure how much this helps in
analyzing Robin's proposal, but at least it gives a different approach to
thinking about the problem. My variant may be an improvement since
it allows people who would benefit most by living in the U.S. to enter
even if they do not have access to credit.

One effect that becomes apparent in my variant is that management would
want to make income taxes more progressive and use the revenue to
subsidize the poor so that they can afford to pay a higher poll tax. I
think the effect carries over to Robin's system - subsidizing the poor at
the expense of the rich increases the total market value of the shares.  
More generally, management would want to subsidize the
marginal shareholder-residents at the expense of the non-marginal
shareholder-residents. This amounts to de facto price discrimination even 
though all shares supposedly have the same price on the open market.

On Wed, Aug 14, 2002 at 04:50:19PM -0400, Robin Hanson wrote:
 Are state-enforced lawsuits really what keeps large multinational
 corporations honest now?  If not, then the concept here is to use
 mechanisms similar to whatever large corporations now use.

One factor that keeps large corporations honest is the threats of hostile
takeovers and bankruptcy. Unfortunately neither of these seem likely to
apply to a large nation-as-corporation. Imagine creditors trying to force
everyone else to leave the U.S. after a bankruptcy because they now own
all of the shares.




Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-14 Thread Misha Gambarian

If we assume that most people of USA have exactly one share, then
changes from current system are mostly in immigration law - citizenship
is for sale, and people are rewarded if they leave country and drop
citizenship. We can expect much more rich immigrants and huge increase
in government (INS) policy toward them - government will begin to
actively attract wealthy immigrants. On the other side, poor americans
will emigrate to probably cheap countries and live there on the money
that they will receive for their share. (Or they will sell share and
live as underclass without voting rights (and may be right to work and
so on)) Both changes look attractive for me. I think we cannot expect
big changes in voters behavior - so may be elected officials will be
more or less the same (but with different motives, if they are rewarded
for share price). We can expect, that generally market for shares would
be small (not very liquid), so effect of wealthy people wanting to be
USA citizens can be very strong (so, for example, their expected
interest in low taxes can make taxes smaller, than now).

On the other side, if we allow people to buy more than one share (as it
happens in real corporations) - then I think we can expect that rich
people will buy many shares (as they do in existing real corporations)
to get political influence more directly than now
and USA will become oligopoly with poor people having less power than
they have now.

Mikhail Gambarian

Robin Hanson wrote:

   Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation.  To
   live (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share.  You could sell your
   share and leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share.
   The corporate management would be given financial incentives to
   maximize the market value of these shares.  They could issue more
   shares if these new shares were handed out to previous share holders
   in proportion to the shares they currently hold.
  
   What would go wrong or right with running the US this way?  Would
   management focus too much on making immigrants happy, versus people
   already here who are reluctant to leave?  Would there be too many or
   two few people here?  Would government spending increase or decrease?
   Would we get less desirable immigrants, relative to picking and
   choosing among applicants?  Would the homeless prefer to cash out and
   leave, rather than stay and beg here?  Would people tend to leave when
   they retire?
  
  
  
   Robin Hanson  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://hanson.gmu.edu
   Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
   MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-
   703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323