Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Binyamin Dissen
On Mon, 16 Nov 2020 18:35:29 -0700 Paul Gilmartin <0014e0e4a59b-dmarc-requ...@listserv.uga.edu> wrote: :>On 2020-11-16, at 17:47:10, Dan Greiner wrote: :>> ... :>> So, the facility only applies to virtual addresses on newer models. As I recall, the development of this facility was

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Jim Mulder
I am not dismayed. REFRPROT works exactly the way I intended it to work. Jim Mulder z/OS Diagnosis, Design, Development, Test IBM Corp. Poughkeepsie NY "IBM Mainframe Assembler List" wrote on 11/16/2020 08:35:29 PM: > From: "Paul Gilmartin"

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Jim Mulder
That is correct, a subpool has 2 SPQEs - one for EXECUTABLE=YES, and one for EXECUTEABLE=NO. In z/OS 2.3 and 2.4, we search only the SPQE for the EXECUTABLE attribute that you specify when releasing storage, In future release which follows z/OS 2.4, release processing has been enhanced to

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Ze'ev Atlas
That make sense, as I am competing with the Linux develipers.  I consider implementing a simple model, befiting native z/OS, with option to implement the security model when it becomes ubiquitous.  I really thank you for the information, as it gives me the basic answer to my question and

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On 2020-11-16, at 17:47:10, Dan Greiner wrote: > ... > So, the facility only applies to virtual addresses on newer models. As I > recall, the development of this facility was requested by z/Linux in order to > help avoid classic stack-overflow exposures; but, it obviously has >

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Dan Greiner
The ability to prevent instruction execution was introduced by the instruction-execution-protection (IEP) facility on the z14 (September 2017). Per the facility blurb in Chapter 1 of the PoO: "The instruction-execution-protection facility may be available on a model implementing

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Ze'ev Atlas
Ok, this is a piece of information in line of what i was looking for.  Could you please refer me to documentation about storage obtain and storage releaseThank youZA Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 5:29 PM, Ngan, Robert wrote: I found out the hard way that, if

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Ngan, Robert
I found out the hard way that, if you code EXECUTABLE=YES of the STORAGE OBTAIN, you must also code it on the associated STORAGE RELEASE. Evidently, it's implemented as a subpool under the covers, so like subpool getmains, you must have matching values on OBTAIN and RELEASE. Robert Ngan HCL

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Charles Mills
All programs except the IPL text, the nucleus and a few things like that are of course loaded into "GETMAIN" storage. An across the board restriction on executing in GETMAIN storage would not just break things, it would break every thing. It would totally brick the box. Charles -Original

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Charles Mills
> If a program has a bug such that it treats part of its input data as a branch > offset without validating it, > then it is useful to have the normal kind of storage not allow execution. Yes, and to help prevent a bad guy from sending a z/OS program some sort of "message" -- perhaps a URL or

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Binyamin Dissen
Why would anything break? How would that be any different from the same code being in your module? On Mon, 16 Nov 2020 20:32:24 + Ze'ev Atlas <01774d97d104-dmarc-requ...@listserv.uga.edu> wrote: :>I am pretty certain that something would break.  My question was to guide me to where the

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Farley, Peter x23353
It is not necessary to getmain storage in which to run a dynamically created program. I wrote a simple subroutine to retrieve the LE CAA address from R12 that can be stored in a COBOL WORKING-STORAGE area and executed very easily. Sample code below. You could copy this simple subroutine into

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Tony Harminc
On Mon, 16 Nov 2020 at 12:24, Ze'ev Atlas <01774d97d104-dmarc-requ...@listserv.uga.edu> wrote: > > Hi allIn the 1970's I probably could have done some getmain, write some code > into that obtained memory and jump to that code. I assume that nowadays, this > would be impossible and there is

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Ze'ev Atlas
I am pretty certain that something would break.  My question was to guide me to where the security model is discussed, so I could code a valid and safe application that actually does what I've described in a safe and compliant way. ZA Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Seymour J Metz
An across the board restriction would brek, e.g., LOADER. -- Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3 From: IBM Mainframe Assembler List on behalf of Ze'ev Atlas <01774d97d104-dmarc-requ...@listserv.uga.edu> Sent: Monday, November 16,

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Tom Harper
And curiously the facility is present for STORAGE OBTAIN and ISRV64 but not for IARCP64. Sent from my iPhone > On Nov 16, 2020, at 12:39 PM, Steve Smith wrote: > > There is a new operand on STORAGE, EXECUTABLE=YES|NO. The default is YES, > and for earlier releases there was no

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Steve Smith
There is a new operand on STORAGE, EXECUTABLE=YES|NO. The default is YES, and for earlier releases there was no execute-prevention capability afaik. I don't know what to tell you about the "security model". It's a big subject. sas On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 12:24 PM Ze'ev Atlas <

Re: security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Tom Harper
That is not impossible and used in many products for performance reasons, such as sorting. Sent from my iPhone > On Nov 16, 2020, at 12:24 PM, Ze'ev Atlas > <01774d97d104-dmarc-requ...@listserv.uga.edu> wrote: > > Hi allIn the 1970's I probably could have done some getmain, write some

security with storage allocation under z.OS

2020-11-16 Thread Ze'ev Atlas
Hi allIn the 1970's I probably could have done some getmain, write some code into that obtained memory and jump to that code.  I assume that nowadays, this would be impossible and there is some security model to prevent such a security breach.Do you know where can I find information on the