Yes, the current price ratio indicates there is no need for a new
difficulty algorithm. I do not desire to fork before a disaster, or to
otherwise employ a new difficulty before a fork is otherwise needed.
A 2-week delay in difficulty response is a 2 week error in
measurement. Slow response genera
Good morning,
>ZmnSCPxj wrote:
>> Thus even if the unwanted chain provides 2 tokens as fee per block,
>> whereas the wanted chain provides 1 token as fee per block, if the
>> unwanted chain tokens are valued at 1/4 the wanted chain tokens, miners
>> will still prefer the wanted chain regardless.
>
ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> Thus even if the unwanted chain provides 2 tokens as fee per block,
> whereas the wanted chain provides 1 token as fee per block, if the
> unwanted chain tokens are valued at 1/4 the wanted chain tokens, miners
> will still prefer the wanted chain regardless.
This is a good point
> On Oct 12, 2017, at 3:40 AM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
>
> As most Core developers hodl vast amounts, it is far more likely that any
> hardfork that goes against what Core wishes will collapse, simply by Core
> developers acting in their capacity as hodlers of Bitcoin, without need
Good morning,
>ZmnSCPxj wrote:
>> Hodlers have much greater power in hardfork situations than miners
>
>Not when hodlers are more evenly split between coins. Miners will prefer
>the coin with higher transaction fees which will erode hodler confidence
>via longer delays. This means transaction fees
(This is new thread because I'm having trouble getting yahoo mail
to use "reply-to", copy-pasting the subject did not work, and the
list has not approved my gmail)
A hard fork in the near term is feasible only post-disaster (in my mind,
that means Core failing from long transaction delays that
