It is very common to set aside one or more "version slots" for proprietary
usage so that people adding their own features don't use version 7 only to
have the official BIP add a REAL version 7 a couple months later.
It makes perfect sense to just say "anyone adding their own stuff, format
your
I would also like to agree that Signet should be a BIP.
Problem: Testnet is unreliable. *Testnet is used often for development of
Bitcoin*.
Proposal: To improve the dev environment for Bitcoin, let's create a new
kind of testnet that is more reliable.
I would also like to hear the logic behind
Hello All,
I have made a pull request based on the discussion currently. Please move
discussion there.
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/801
Thanks,
Jonathan
2019年6月29日(土) 17:11 Jonathan Underwood :
> Even if the difference is apparent outside the signed data (in the
> output). Signing the
t; On 7/9/19 11:58 AM, Jonathan Underwood via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> Just to be brief, I'll kick off with an attack scenario.
>
> 1. I am a signer, I get a PSBT that is ready to sign. I parse. I sign
> according to the PSBT as-is.
> 2. I notice my UTXO was stolen b
Hi all,
Just to be brief, I'll kick off with an attack scenario.
1. I am a signer, I get a PSBT that is ready to sign. I parse. I sign
according to the PSBT as-is.
2. I notice my UTXO was stolen by a hacker because they changed my PSBT
input's sighashtype to SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY | SIGHASH_NONE
Even if the difference is apparent outside the signed data (in the output).
Signing the data explicitly is more secure.
ie. if some sort of vulnerability / way to break this system for 1-of-1
multisig is found, someone who signed a single sig xpub whitelist will not
be exposed.
2019年6月29日(土)
ndividual xpubs of a
> > > > > > > multisig warm wallet, and one key from that multisig is
> > > > > > > compromized, attackers can then create a single-sig
> > > > > > > destination address that they control, and move the coins
> > > > > > > in a chain
Thanks for the reply Peter. Comments inline:
2019年6月28日(金) 23:37 Peter D. Gray :
> Thanks I get the idea better now: You want the PSBT creator to be
> able to indicate to the signers that it (the PSBT creator) controls
> specific outputs that don't otherwise look like change.
>
> Some problems:
Hi Peter,
tl;dr The problem this solves is "How can a signer verify an address with
HD changing the address every time?"
As an aside: (This is sort of explaining the current PR for the 0x01 global
field (separate from mine))
The problem is more easily understood with change addresses: If someone
t; > > > > > destination address that they control, and move the coins
> > > > > > > in a chain of two transactions, first to this single-sig
> > > > > > > address, and then to an address that they independently
> > > > &
' as trusted. My idea was [2] to use an auxiliary message
> > > > > that would be signed along with the 'xpub package', and that
> > > > > message can include specific 'epoch' word that hardware wallet
> > > > > can show prominently before signing, or have
n the whole 'xpub package'
>> > > > > of the multisig wallet, but there is also an issue of 'partial
>> > > > > compromize', where some of the keys in a multisig warm wallet is
>> > > > > compromized, and you do not want to regard a particular 'xpub
>> >
> > using some form of 'vendor-specific', or 'metainformation-specific'
> > > PSBT field. This way each usecase can be independently described in
> > > its own documentation, that would include the particulars of the
> > > format for the metainformation. This wou
the
> metainformation. This would also make it easier to implement PSBT for
> simple cases, because the 'core specification' would not grow that big.
>
> [1]
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-May/016917.html
>
> [2]
>
> https://lists.linuxf
Hello all,
Just wanted to pick your brains about an idea for PSBT extension.
One problem we try to solve with cold -> warm and warm -> hot sends for our
exchange wallet is "How do I know that the address I am sending to is not a
hacker's address that was swapped in between unsigned tx creation
Nope.
This is how Electrum treats BIP39 restoring as well, try it out.
-Jon
2018年11月16日(金) 23:04、Neill Miller さん（nei...@thecodefactory.org）のメッセージ:
> On Fri, Nov 09, 2018 at 02:17:30PM +0900, Jonathan Underwood via
> bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > If more apps would implement to the word
> as it seems bad design to have to fix and maintain a wordlist for every
language as the checksum depends on it.
>From BIP39:
> The conversion of the mnemonic sentence to a binary seed is completely
independent from generating the sentence. This results in rather simple
code; there are no
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