There is no need, as you can look at the number of xpubs and use that as n.
Your wallet will not allow {m=2}{xpub1}{xpub2} signed message to vouch for
2 of 4 because you signed 2 of 2 where the n is shown by the number of
xpubs signed.
There is no need to add the extra byte, except maybe to help people who are
implementing a wallet checking some features to remember to check for the
number of total keys.
----
The expire / revoke problem is a larger problem than this feature can
handle.
In general, if one of the cold keys is stolen, there is rarely a situation
where you are completely sure the other cold keys haven't been
compromised... so the best practice would be all signers generate new keys
and all funds are moved to a completely new multisig wallet (no common
xpubs).
- Jonathan
2019年6月27日(木) 18:20 Dmitry Petukhov <d...@simplexum.com>:
> You're right re order of the keys, I forgot that redeem/witness
> scripts are included in outputs.
>
> But regarding the number of the keys, you need to always include all of
> xpubs, because otherwise, if you only put `m` in PSBT, and you use
> 2of3, for example, attacker may put 2 as `m`, two of your xpubs, but
> then use redeem/witness scripts for 2of4, where two other keys are
> under attacker's control.
>
> If you only encode `n`, and allow any 'm of n' scheme, then in 2of3
> case, if the attackers have control of only one of the keys, they can
> use redeem/witness scripts for 1of3, where two other keys are under
> their control.
>
> It seems to me that you need to sign the whole configuration:
> `n`, `m`, and the xpubs.
>
> And then there's a question of how to conveniently `expire` the keys
> that were compromized. If the attackers have a signature of
> `n+n+xpubs` package for some configuration that include the keys that
> was compromized, they can use that old signed package to fool the
> signer.
>
> Signer would need to somehow distinguish between old and new
> configurations, or you would need to change the keys in all the signers
> even if one is compromized, so the already-signed packages would become
> invalid.
>
> You could do without changing all the keys when only one is compromized
> by including a serial number in the xpub package (but that means signer
> will need to have a state where it would store the latest serial
> number), or you need some message to be included in the package that a
> human can check when manually signing, to ensure that 'obsolete' xpub
> package was not used.
>
> В Thu, 27 Jun 2019 17:56:06 +0900
> Jonathan Underwood <junderw...@bitcoinbank.co.jp> wrote:
>
> > The output will have redeemscript and witnessscript so order is not
> > necessary. I can just look at the multisig script and find the pubkey
> > inside it.
> >
> > -Jonathan
> >
> > 2019年6月27日(木) 17:45 Dmitry Petukhov <d...@simplexum.com>:
> >
> > > > m value for a multisig (set 0 for non-multisig), followed by 1 or
> > > > more 78 byte serialized extended public keys sorted in canonical
> > > > order
> > >
> > > Sorting xpubs would work if the addresses also sort their pubkeys
> > > (like in BIP67)
> > >
> > > But if the pubkey order in address creation is fixed, you better
> > > have the fixed order for xpubs, otherwise you would need to try all
> > > combinations of derived pubkeys when checking if the addresss match
> > > the presented xpubs. That would be factorial of the number of keys,
> > > not feasible beyond very small number of keys.
> > >
> > > Bitcoin Core, for example, currently does not support BIP67 and
> > > supports only fixed pubkey positions in their script descriptors
> > > specification.
> > >
> > > You also need to include all xpubs to match the address, for m of n
> > > standard multisig, you need to include n and check that number of
> > > keys is exactly n.
> > >
> > > Otherwise your would not be able to construct the address to
> > > compare to the destination address that you need to check, as you
> > > need all pubkesy to construct P2SH or P2WSH address.
> > >
> > > With Shnorr-musig, you probably can interpolate the combined pubkey
> > > out of m paticpant pubkeys (but don't cite me on this, I might be
> > > wrong)
> > >
> > > В Thu, 27 Jun 2019 17:16:14 +0900
> > > Jonathan Underwood <junderw...@bitcoinbank.co.jp> wrote:
> > >
> > > > I see what you mean.
> > > >
> > > > What about this?
> > > >
> > >
> https://github.com/junderw/bips/commit/57a57b4fae1ae14b77a2eebd99cd719148e3027e?short_path=82656c8#diff-82656c833e31e6751a412ce5e5c70920
>
> > > >
> > > > Plus side: for single sig case, the key only increases by one byte
> > > > (0x00 for the {m} value)
> > > >
> > > > This way if it was 2 of 3 like before, you sign the whole
> > > > "packet" so each key only signs the packet once. Way better than
> > > > n!
> > > >
> > > > Anywho. Please send your feedback. Thanks.
> > > > Jonathan
> > > >
> > > > 2019年6月27日(木) 16:27 Dmitry Petukhov <d...@simplexum.com>:
> > > >
> > > > > How would signer know that there _should_ be at least 3
> > > > > signatures signed by the key owned by this signer ?
> > > > >
> > > > > If it does not know that it should enforce 2of3 multisig, for
> > > > > example, the attacker that control only one key A can fool
> > > > > signer B by sending to 1of1 single-sig that is derived from A's
> > > > > xpub, and providing only sBxA in PSBT.
> > > > >
> > > > > If the signer does not have a hardcoded configuration that
> > > > > will mandate a particular multisig scheme, it will allow
> > > > > sending to any scheme.
> > > > >
> > > > > If the signer has a rich enough state to store updatable
> > > > > configuration, it can just store the trusted xpubs directly.
> > > > >
> > > > > Alternatively, signer can sign not individual xpubs, but whole
> > > > > xpub packages that correspond to particular multisig
> > > > > configuration, and enforce that destination addresses
> > > > > correspond to this configuration.
> > > > >
> > > > > But this would not be possible with your PSBT scheme that uses
> > > > > individual key-xpub pairs.
> > > > >
> > > > > В Thu, 27 Jun 2019 14:07:47 +0900
> > > > > Jonathan Underwood <junderw...@bitcoinbank.co.jp> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Thanks for the reply.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The way we would do it is:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Let's say we have 3 cold keys for multisig: A B and C
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Whose xpubs are: xA xB and xC
> > > > > >
> > > > > > We all sign each other's xpubs, whose signatures are:
> > > > > > sAxB
> > > > > > sAxC
> > > > > > sBxA
> > > > > > sBxC
> > > > > > sCxA
> > > > > > sCxB
> > > > > >
> > > > > > We can then create a wallet that says "when verifying change
> > > > > > with 0x01 global type proposed by Andrew Chow, if the change
> > > > > > is multisig, we MUST require the other pubkeys to have
> > > > > > signatures via my 0x02 proposal"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This way, all my PSBTs for my cold will have:
> > > > > > 1. an 0x01 entry to tell me how to get my change.
> > > > > > 2. All 6 of the signatures above.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > And the signer will then look at the change, check my pubkey
> > > > > > by deriving the xpub and checking equality to the
> > > > > > BIP_DERIVATION of the output... it will then check the OTHER
> > > > > > pubkeys via BIP32_DERIVATION to master fingerprint, then link
> > > > > > that fingerprint to a 0x02 sig from MY key, verifying all
> > > > > > pubkeys.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So this proposal of mine would not only fix the "send to
> > > > > > address verification" problem for HD, but also the multisig
> > > > > > change problem with 0x01.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Cool.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Only thing that is kind of sad is having to include n! (of
> > > > > > m-of-n) signatures in every PSBT... but tbh, the PSBT size is
> > > > > > not of much concern.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Thanks for the reply.
> > > > > > - Jonathan
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > 2019年6月27日(木) 13:49 Dmitry Petukhov <d...@simplexum.com>:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Hi!
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I wonder how your scheme handles multisig ?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > As I understand, you sign individual xpubs with cold keys,
> > > > > > > so that cold keys can check destination addresses are
> > > > > > > trusted.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I seems to me that if you sign individual xpubs of a
> > > > > > > multisig warm wallet, and one key from that multisig is
> > > > > > > compromized, attackers can then create a single-sig
> > > > > > > destination address that they control, and move the coins
> > > > > > > in a chain of two transactions, first to this single-sig
> > > > > > > address, and then to an address that they independently
> > > > > > > control.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > My idea to prevent this [1] is to sign the whole 'xpub
> > > > > > > package' of the multisig wallet, but there is also an issue
> > > > > > > of 'partial compromize', where some of the keys in a
> > > > > > > multisig warm wallet is compromized, and you do not want to
> > > > > > > regard a particular 'xpub package' as trusted. My idea was
> > > > > > > [2] to use an auxiliary message that would be signed along
> > > > > > > with the 'xpub package', and that message can include
> > > > > > > specific 'epoch' word that hardware wallet can show
> > > > > > > prominently before signing, or have 'serial number' for
> > > > > > > xpub packages (but that will require to store last known
> > > > > > > serial inside hw wallet, making it stateful).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I like the idea to extend PSBT to accomodate these schemes,
> > > > > > > but given that the huge number of possible schemes that
> > > > > > > each may probably require its own PSBT field type, I think
> > > > > > > that this is better dealt with outside of PSBT, as 'PSBT
> > > > > > > metainformation', or using some form of 'vendor-specific',
> > > > > > > or 'metainformation-specific' PSBT field. This way each
> > > > > > > usecase can be independently described in its own
> > > > > > > documentation, that would include the particulars of the
> > > > > > > format for the metainformation. This would also make it
> > > > > > > easier to implement PSBT for simple cases, because the
> > > > > > > 'core specification' would not grow that big.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > [1]
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-May/016917.html
> > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > [2]
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-May/016926.html
> > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > В Thu, 27 Jun 2019 11:11:23 +0900 Jonathan Underwood via
> > > > > > > bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Hello all,
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Just wanted to pick your brains about an idea for PSBT
> > > > > > > > extension.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > One problem we try to solve with cold -> warm and warm ->
> > > > > > > > hot sends for our exchange wallet is "How do I know that
> > > > > > > > the address I am sending to is not a hacker's address
> > > > > > > > that was swapped in between unsigned tx creation and
> > > > > > > > first signature?"
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > We have a proprietary JSON based encoding system which we
> > > > > > > > are looking to move towards PSBT, but PSBT is missing
> > > > > > > > this key functionality.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > BIP32_DERIVATION does allow us to verify the address is
> > > > > > > > from a certain XPUB, but, for example, it can not allow
> > > > > > > > us to verify a signature of that xpub.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I have made a rough draft of the proposed key value
> > > > > > > > specification.
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> https://github.com/junderw/bips/blob/addXpubSig/bip-0174.mediawiki#specification
>
> > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > The signing key path used in the spec is just randomly
> > > > > > > > chosen 31 x 4 bits shown as numbers with hardened paths.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Since this issue seems similar to the change address
> > > > > > > > issue, I started from that as a base. With the HW wallet
> > > > > > > > case, I can verify the xpub by just deriving it locally
> > > > > > > > and comparing equality, however, in our case, we need to
> > > > > > > > verify an xpub that we do not have access to via
> > > > > > > > derivation from our cold key(s) (since we don't want to
> > > > > > > > import our warm private key into our cold signer)
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > So the flow would be:
> > > > > > > > 1. Securely verify the xpub of the warm / hot wallet.
> > > > > > > > 2. Using the airgap signing tool, sign the xpub with all
> > > > > > > > cold keys. 3. Upload the signature/xpub pairs to the
> > > > > > > > online unsigned transaction generator.
> > > > > > > > 4. Include one keyval pair per coldkey/xpub pairing.
> > > > > > > > 5. When offline signing, if the wallet detects there is a
> > > > > > > > global keyval XPUB_SIGNATURE with its pubkey in the key,
> > > > > > > > it must verify that all outputs have BIP32_DERIVATION and
> > > > > > > > that it can verify the outputs through the derivation, to
> > > > > > > > the xpub, and to the signature.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > In my attempt to fitting this into PSBT, I am slightly
> > > > > > > > altering our current system, so don't take this as an
> > > > > > > > indication 100% of how we work in the backend.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > However, I would like to hear any feedback on this
> > > > > > > > proposal.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > > > > Jonathan
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> >
>
>
--
-----------------
Jonathan Underwood
ビットバンク社 チーフビットコインオフィサー
-----------------
暗号化したメッセージをお送りの方は下記の公開鍵をご利用下さい。
指紋: 0xCE5EA9476DE7D3E45EBC3FDAD998682F3590FEA3
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
