> Unsure how this solves or relates to the smoothing of block rewards. Let me
> know if I misunderstood.
This example shows clearly that even if tail supply supporters will win, then
no matter how they will introduce new coins to the system, we can still resist
that attack by burning those
> There is a smarter way. Just send 0.01 BTC per block to the timelocked
outputs. Now, we have 6.25 BTC, so it means less than 0.2%. But that
percentage will grow over time, as basic block reward will shrink, and we
will have mandatory 0.01 BTC endlessly moved, until it will wrap. And guess
what:
it's in line with the values of
- immutable supply
- enforced by the game theory of hard money
and no, it's not only "rich holders"... i mine, and lots of people i know do
it's certainly more decentralized than the alternatives
On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 7:43 AM Gino Pinuto wrote:
> This
This is not an argument in line with bitcoin values, on that scenario only
rich people will be able to mine and participate to the consensus process.
Like George Soros today, he use its financial reserves to monopolize ONG in
order to manipulate nation states. I would not define this a "tax",
Fees and miner rewards are not needed at all for security at all since long
term holders can simply invest in mining to secure the value of their stake.
Isn't it enough that the protocol has a mechanism to secure value?
Sure fees *might* be enough.
But in the event that they are not, large
> This specific approach would obviously not work as most of those outputs
> would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd amount of block
> space just to grab them, but maybe there's a smarter way to do it.
There is a smarter way. Just send 0.01 BTC per block to the timelocked
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 08:21:40PM -0400, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> Oops, you are right. We need the bribe to be the output of the coinbase,
> but due to the maturity rule, it isn't really a bribe.
> Too bad coinbases cannot take other coinbase outputs as inputs to bypass
> the
> What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth out
while keeping the ~21M coins limit ?
This would be a hard fork afaict as it would go against the rules of the
coinbase transaction following the usual halving schedule.
However, if instead we added a rule that fees have
Bitcoin doesn't rely on fees. It relys on users protecting the network out
of self interest
- running nodes now
- mining later
It has always been incentivised by holders acting out of self interest
If large holders allocating a small percentage to mining to protect their
interest, that's all
What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth out
while keeping the ~21M coins limit ?
Benefits :
- Miners would still be incentivized to collect higher fees transaction
with the indirect perspective to generate more reward in future.
- Revenues are equally distributed over
> There's only one coin whose expected (soft) emission time is larger
> than bitcoin's, and it's about an order of magnitude larger, at 50
> years.
Make that two coins. For DOGE it is 33 years.
___
bitcoin-dev mailing list
> The emission curve lasts over 100 years because Bitcoin success state
> requires it to be entrenched globally.
It effectively doesn't. The last 100 years from 2040-2140 only emits a
pittance of about 0.4 of all bitcoin.
What matters for proper distribution is the shape of the emission
curve.
On 7/11/22 15:26, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
Anyway, designing protocols for "price go up forever" hopium is a bad idea.
Yet that is the design, and it's a good one. It is equivalent to
relying on bitcoin to steadily grow in utility vs. fiat currencies.
If it fails to do that,
BIP119, OP_CTV, allows value to be assigned in a predetermined tree
of payments that confirms with a single output.
This allows batched transactions in the predetermined tree (e.g.
withdrawals from a centralized exchange) to be anchored in a way that
disallows double-spending of the inputs, yet
>Probably the only thing Bitcoiners should do is to advertise this rather than
>to make it some sort of secret
Satoshi made this clear in the beginning that mining will trend to where energy
is free.
During this stage of bootstrapping we need a security budget to prevent nation
state attacks.
>
> we can expect mining to transition to a public service from the current
> for-profit business model
>
I get it now
Game theory would predict all of the major players mining in the future
will be large holders
If you're holding a hundred Bitcoin you should take one, sell it for mining
The Bitcoin emission curve requires a 2x value increase per 210,000 blocks to
maintain the existing security level.
Transactions are practically irreversible when the value the miners expend (not
receive) is greater than said transaction value.
If you send 1000 gold grams of value in a
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 2:53 PM Peter Todd wrote:
>
> The only type of fee-smoothing scheme that is feasible is to smooth an
> entirely
> separate category of fees that are made mandatory. For example, you could
> achieve the economic impact of inflation by having a fixed value*time
> based fee
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 08:21:40PM -0400, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> Oops, you are right. We need the bribe to be the output of the coinbase,
> but due to the maturity rule, it isn't really a bribe.
>
> Too bad coinbases cannot take other coinbase outputs as inputs to bypass
>
On Tue, Jul 12, 2022 at 02:01:09AM +0200, James MacWhyte wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 12, 2022 at 12:26 AM Peter Todd wrote:
>
> > Anyway, designing protocols for "price go up forever" hopium is a bad idea.
> >
>
> I'm quite disappointed that this is what you've reduced my argument to. The
> price
Oops, you are right. We need the bribe to be the output of the coinbase,
but due to the maturity rule, it isn't really a bribe.
Too bad coinbases cannot take other coinbase outputs as inputs to bypass
the maturity rule.
I guess that means the bribe has to be by leaving transactions in the
On Tue, Jul 12, 2022 at 12:26 AM Peter Todd wrote:
> Anyway, designing protocols for "price go up forever" hopium is a bad idea.
>
I'm quite disappointed that this is what you've reduced my argument to. The
price doesn't need hopium; if it stays between where it is now and the all
time high,
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 11:12:52AM -0700, Bram Cohen via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> If transaction fees came in at an even rate over time all at the exact same
> level then they work fine for security, acting similarly to fixed block
> rewards. Unfortunately that isn't how it works in the real world.
On 11 Jul 2022, at 19:12, Bram Cohen via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> There's a very well established day/night cycle with fees going to zero
> overnight and even longer gaps on weekends and holidays. If in the future
> Bitcoin is entirely dependent on fees for security (scheduled very strongly)
>
The expectation is that in a few years a space in the block will be very
competitive / expensive and be used only as a bridge for second layers or
big transactions. Who would have thought in 2017 that one day we would be
worried about cheap rates!
Anyway, it seems like a good point and I suggest
>
> Miners will learn to create anyone-can-spend outputs to bribe other miners
> to build on their block rather than reorg it. (Due to the coinbase
> maturity, this will require some amount of floating capital.)
>
(reward + avg fee) * 144 * 365 (one year) == approximate investment needed
to
This problem can be solved by mining decentralization.
> What's likely to happen is that at first there will simply be no or very few
> blocks mined overnight.
Why? When it comes to energy usage, there are also cycles, because energy usage
during the day is definitely higher than at night. You
> If in the future Bitcoin is entirely dependent on fees for security
(scheduled very strongly) and this pattern keeps up (overwhelmingly likely)
then this is going to become a serious problem.
We should carefully define "when" this becomes an issue.
Suppose the reward is 1.5625 BTC. That's
On Tue, Jul 12, 2022 at 12:19:06AM +0200, James MacWhyte via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I think many of these discussions about the loss of the mining reward are
> fatally shortsighted.
>
> It's always daytime somewhere--when you talk about volume dropping at
> night, that simply means there is not
I think many of these discussions about the loss of the mining reward are
fatally shortsighted.
It's always daytime somewhere--when you talk about volume dropping at
night, that simply means there is not enough activity outside the US. If
Bitcoin continues its rise in price, mining rewards will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 05:36:52PM -0400, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 04:35:02PM -0400, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > > What happens after that I'm not sure.
> > >
> >
> > Miners will learn to create anyone-can-spend outputs to bribe other miners
>
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 11:12:52AM -0700, Bram Cohen via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> If transaction fees came in at an even rate over time all at the exact same
> level then they work fine for security, acting similarly to fixed block
> rewards. Unfortunately that isn't how it works in the real world.
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 04:35:02PM -0400, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> > What happens after that I'm not sure.
> >
>
> Miners will learn to create anyone-can-spend outputs to bribe other miners
> to build on their block rather than reorg it. (Due to the coinbase
> maturity, this
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 2:19 PM Bram Cohen via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> If transaction fees came in at an even rate over time all at the exact
> same level then they work fine for security, acting similarly to fixed
> block rewards. Unfortunately that isn't
If transaction fees came in at an even rate over time all at the exact same
level then they work fine for security, acting similarly to fixed block
rewards. Unfortunately that isn't how it works in the real world. There's a
very well established day/night cycle with fees going to zero overnight
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