Re: [bitcoin-dev] Create a BIP to implement Confidential Transactions in Bitcoin Core

2018-12-31 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
I understand, thank you! :) From: SomberNight Sent: Friday, December 28, 2018 22:41 To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org; tens...@hotmail.com Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Create a BIP to implement Confidential Transactions in Bitcoin Core Hi Kenshiro, That is not how the BIP process works.

[bitcoin-dev] Create a BIP to implement Confidential Transactions in Bitcoin Core

2018-12-27 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi, I think Confidential Transactions (CT) are a great idea to provide enough privacy for normal users (hidden amounts) and fungibility. I would like to request the creation of a BIP to implement CT in Bitcoin Core. I read that CT are already implemented in Grin and Monero so it looks that CT

[bitcoin-dev] Payjoin privacy with the receiver of the transaction

2019-03-18 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi, I think Payjoin can be a very good privacy solution for Bitcoin, but I have a question about it: - If a user has 1 BTC in a single address and make a payjoin payment to other person of 0.1 BTC using that address as input, the other person can see in a blockchain explorer the change

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Payjoin privacy with the receiver of the transaction

2019-03-22 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
l Message ‐‐‐ On Monday, March 18, 2019 3:55 AM, Kenshiro \[\] via bitcoin-dev wrote: Hi, I think Payjoin can be a very good privacy solution for Bitcoin, but I have a question about it: - If a user has 1 BTC in a single address and make a payjoin payment to other person of

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Payjoin privacy with the receiver of the transaction

2019-03-22 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
l be wildly different depending on how you use your wallet. -Ryan ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ On Monday, March 18, 2019 3:55 AM, Kenshiro \[\] via bitcoin-dev wrote: Hi, I think Payjoin can be a very good privacy solution for Bitcoin, but I have a question about it: - If a user has 1

[bitcoin-dev] Implementing Confidential Transactions in extension blocks

2019-02-08 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Greetings, What do you think about implementing Confidential Transactions in extension blocks? CT transactions go from extension block to extension block passing through normal blocks. It looks the perfect solution: - Soft fork: old nodes see CT transactions as "sendtoany" transactions - Safe:

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Implementing Confidential Transactions in extension blocks

2019-02-12 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Good morning ZmnSCPxj, Thank you for your answer. There is a position that fullnodes must be able to get a view of the UTXO set, and extension blocks (which are invisible to pre-extension-block fullnodes) means that fullnodes no longer have an accurate view of the UTXO set. I think old nodes

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Implementing Confidential Transactions in extension blocks

2019-02-14 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Greetings, I think extension blocks could be optional, and it could be many different extension blocks with different functionalities like Confidential Transactions or smart contracts. Only the interested nodes would enable this extension blocks, the rest would see only the classic blockchain

[bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-16 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi, After studying several Proof of Stake implementations I think it's not only an eco-friendly (and more ethical) alternative to Proof of Work, but correctly implemented could be 100% secure against all 51% history rewrite attacks. Over a "standard" PoS protocol like PoS v3.0, only 2 extra

[bitcoin-dev] Add a moving checkpoint to the Bitcoin protocol

2019-07-31 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi all, I would like to propose that a "moving checkpoint" is added to the Bitcoin protocol. It's a very simple rule already implemented in NXT coin: - A node will ignore any new block under nodeBlockHeight - N, so the blockchain becomes truly immutable after N blocks, even during a 51% attack

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Add a moving checkpoint to the Bitcoin protocol

2019-08-02 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
f-Work. On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 2:37 PM Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote: P.S.: To be clearer, in this example I set an N value of 144 blocks, which is approximately 24 hours. From: Kenshiro [] mailto:tens...

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Add a moving checkpoint to the Bitcoin protocol

2019-08-03 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
JAMES HRMH <https://earn.com/willtech> From: bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org on behalf of Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev Sent: Friday, 2 August 2019 11:08 PM To: Ethan Heilman ; Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Add a moving chec

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Add a moving checkpoint to the Bitcoin protocol

2019-07-31 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Kenshiro [] ; Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Add a moving checkpoint to the Bitcoin protocol On Wednesday 31 Jul 2019 12:28:58 Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I would like to propose that a "moving checkpoint" is added to the Bitcoin > protocol. It's a

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Add a moving checkpoint to the Bitcoin protocol

2019-07-31 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
019 15:59 To: Kenshiro [] ; Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Add a moving checkpoint to the Bitcoin protocol On Wednesday 31 Jul 2019 12:28:58 Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I would like to propose that a "moving checkpoint" is added to the Bitcoin > pro

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Add a moving checkpoint to the Bitcoin protocol

2019-08-01 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
mm you are right, then the "moving checkpoint" rule needs to have some limits to allow the network self-heal instead of requiring humans detecting the splits or stopping nodes. Let's suppose than a 51% attack can be detected and the developers can release a new version of the software with a

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-20 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi all, >>> Miners cannot feasibly take over 50% of energy sources in the world. As I said in other e-mail, you don't need 50% of energy sources of the world, you only need to hack the biggest mining pools to execute a 51% attack. >>> Thus it is immaterial that each tiny stake of the evil

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-20 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi all, >>> For example, if you are capable of disrupting a coin such that its value is >>> very likely to drop, you can buy short options as leverage. Suppose you hold a large stake of coins and know you control a significant fraction, enough that a censorship attack by you will be so

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-18 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi all, >>>1. A network split (maybe better term is "network partition"?) wherein some >>>number of nodes are temporarily unable to contact the rest of the network. This has the degenerate but very common case where a single node is temporarily unable to communicate with the rest of the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-19 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi all, >>> A 51% attack under proof-of-work is only possible, in general, if some >>> singular entity were able to have physical control of almost 50%, or some >>> such close number, of the globe, simply due to the fact that energy >>> availability is somewhat distributed over the globe.

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-19 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi all, >>>Pools only have short-term power in that they can only temporarily attack >>>the coin until miners notice and then voluntarily leave. I agree >>>GPUs still require electricity to run, and are far easier to source. Hash change simply means that those with control of energy sources

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-19 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi all, >>> I already told you that it is always possible to get around this: leverage >>> by use of short options. Short the coin to attack, then perform your attack by censorship. Coin value will drop due to reduced utility of the coin, then you reap the rewards of the short option you

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-24 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi ZmnSCPxj, Thank you for your apologies. >>> Just to be clear, I do not think your additions to the base proof-of-stake >>> can fix the issues introduced by proof-of-stake. No problem. After thinking about my experimental idea to use a formula to give more weight to coins together in a

[bitcoin-dev] Eco-friendly mining algorithms

2019-07-24 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Hi all, Here are some links to the best eco-friendly mining algorithms I have found: - Proof of Stake v3.0: http://earlz.net/view/2017/07/27/1904/the-missing-explanation-of-proof-of-stake-version Used in several PoS coins like Bitcoin Confidential: https://bitcoinconfidential.cc/ -

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-17 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
tried similar checkpointing schemes that have resulted in hard forks or overall weakened consensus. I haven't dug too deeply, but I'm not aware of any cases where these schemes accomplish anything useful to improve the bitcoin network. Best, On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 5:33 AM Kenshiro [] via bitco

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin

2019-07-17 Thread Kenshiro [] via bitcoin-dev
Secure Email. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ On Tuesday, July 16, 2019 8:33 PM, Kenshiro \[\] via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Hi, > > After studying several Proof of Stake implementations I think it's not only > an eco-friendly (and more ethical) alternative to Proof of Work, but