Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Drak
Sorry this is possibly OT, but someone posted this thread to r/bitcoin and it's gone straight to position 1. People are really enthusiastic about this feature. Drak -- CenturyLink Cloud: The Leader in Enterprise Cloud Serv

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Roy Badami
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 04:58:01PM +0100, Mike Hearn wrote: > > Signing a payment request for an individual is easy, anyway, depending on > the kind of ID you want. If you want to sign with an email address, just go > here with a browser like Chrome/Safari/IE that uses the system keystore: > >

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Jeremy Spilman
On Tue, 14 Jan 2014 13:51:06 -0800, Adam Back wrote: > I saw in the math version you had said Q'=Q+H(S) and I presumed it was a > typo, but your code says the same thing. I presume you meant Q'=Q+H(S)*G > and therefore that Util.SingleSHA256() multiplies by G internally? > > Adam > Thanks for re

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Adam Back
I saw in the math version you had said Q'=Q+H(S) and I presumed it was a typo, but your code says the same thing. I presume you meant Q'=Q+H(S)*G and therefore that Util.SingleSHA256() multiplies by G internally? Adam -

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Peter Todd
On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 11:12:40AM -0800, Jeremy Spilman wrote: > Maybe you are saying: > > byte[] S = EC.DH(e, Q2); > byte[] q1New = EC.PointAdd(Q1, Util.SingleSHA256(S)); > byte[] q2New = EC.PointAdd(Q2, Util.SingleSHA256(S)); > > But the payment would have (q2New - q1New) == (Q2 - Q1), s

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Jeremy Spilman
On Tue, 14 Jan 2014 06:19:08 -0800, Peter Todd wrote: > On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 02:02:00PM -0800, Jeremy Spilman wrote: >> I decided to put both pubKeys in a 2-of-2 multisig, instead of keeping >> one of the pubKeys in the OP-RETURN, to prevent a malicious sender from >> triggering false posi

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Odinn Cyberguerrilla
Hello Peter et. al. As I read more into this stealth discussion I am curious to know what you think of the background microdonation concept I posted recently. It is shown in full here http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=31837430 Given the lengthy nature of the concept as presen

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 02:02:00PM -0800, Jeremy Spilman wrote: > > > Uh while I'm responding again, what I'd discussed with Peter Todd in > > IRC used two EC points in the stealth address. One for the payment and > > one for the ECDH. The reason to use two is that it makes delegating > > detecti

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 01:13:08AM -0800, Jeremy Spilman wrote: > It's a given this will be implemented for Payment Protocol. The question > is whether it's also usable outside of PP. I think what stealth addresses is showing is that the concept of an address being "instructions on how to genera

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol and reliable Payment messages

2014-01-14 Thread Adam Back
Maybe even pay to (address derived from) contract hash has a hole: it assumes the merchant cashes the funds (or cashes then reimburses via the refund address). There is another rational (though abusive) move for the merchant: let the buyers funds sit in limbo. Then the buyer has the onus to go in

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Stealth Addresses

2014-01-14 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 03:20:15PM -0800, Jeremy Spilman wrote: > On Mon, 13 Jan 2014 13:27:52 -0800, Peter Todd wrote: > > >There is a catch however: if you need the prefix to be against > >H(scriptPubKey) rather than scriptPubKey directly the sender needs to > >grind the OP_RETURN output at 2^l

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol and reliable Payment messages

2014-01-14 Thread Adam Back
He's probably thinking of fair advertising rules. There are regulations motivated by consumer protection/advertising standards (prevents merchant listing attractive prices in media, and then when consumer goes to pay the merchant says "oh actually that doesnt include X and Y, and the minimum price

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol and reliable Payment messages

2014-01-14 Thread Andreas Schildbach
On 01/14/2014 11:45 AM, Mike Hearn wrote: > Imagine you get a good offer (payment request) from a merchant. You > would like to accept that offer, however the merchant has changed his > mind. > > > Usually if the merchant has not delivered, then at that point it's not a > problem and

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol and reliable Payment messages

2014-01-14 Thread Mike Hearn
> > Imagine you get a good offer (payment request) from a merchant. You > would like to accept that offer, however the merchant has changed his > mind. Usually if the merchant has not delivered, then at that point it's not a problem and he is allowed to change his mind. It's only if they change t

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol and reliable Payment messages

2014-01-14 Thread Andreas Schildbach
On 01/13/2014 06:56 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > I want to avoid the case where a transaction confirms, but the > associated payment is not delivered. If there is a reasonable chance > that this case occurs in normal operation, it means the payment > transmission cannot be relied upon. I was thinki