Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin Core 0.9.4 not on bitcoin.org?

2015-02-01 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 8:08 PM, xor wrote: > Why is that? Because Binaries on Bitcoin.org have always been unaffected by the issue 0.9.4 was released to address. > Also, is it correct that there wasn't a release candidate before the release? > Sounds dangerous to me. The changes were tried firs

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin Core 0.9.4 not on bitcoin.org?

2015-02-01 Thread Wladimir
On Sun, 1 Feb 2015, xor wrote: > Why is that? v0.9.4 is not really a release, just a tag in git. It contains merely a workaround for a change in OpenSSL which caused problems - see Gregory Maxwell's post. As the releases are statically built against OpenSSL, it is not necessary to upgrade if y

[Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin Core 0.9.4 not on bitcoin.org?

2015-02-01 Thread xor
Why is that? Also, is it correct that there wasn't a release candidate before the release? Sounds dangerous to me. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part. -- Dive into the World of Parallel Pr

Re: [Bitcoin-development] var_int ambiguous serialization consequences

2015-02-01 Thread Pieter Wuille
Hashes are always computed by reserializing data structures, never by hashing wire data directly. This has been the case in every version of the reference client's code that I know of. This even meant that for example a block of 99 bytes with non-shortest length for the transaction count could

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware

2015-02-01 Thread m...@bitwatch.co
> This video demonstrates how HSBC uses a security token to verify transactions online. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sh2Iha88agE. Since it's not very widely used outside of Austria and Germany, this may be interesting for some: there is a second factor scheme called "cardTAN" or "chipTAN" wher

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New BIP: protocol for multisignature payments

2015-02-01 Thread Martin Habovštiak
Both wallet and server side implementations will be based on existing code in me-friendly language (C++>Python>anything else). I don't have a time for it right now but Crypto hackathon in Parallel Polis (http://cryptohack.org/) seems like good opportunity for it. I will let you know then. 2015-02-

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware

2015-02-01 Thread Brian Erdelyi
> BIP70 is quite safe agains MitB. If user copies URL belonging to other > merchant, he would see the fact after entering it into his wallet > application. The only problem is, attacker can buy from the same > merchant with user's money. (sending him different URL) This can be > mitigated by merch

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware

2015-02-01 Thread Mike Hearn
> > I see how BIP 70 verifies the payment request, however, is there any way > to verify that the transaction signed by the wallet matches the request > before it is sent to the blockchain (and how can this support out of band > verification)? > No. It cannot be done in the Bitcoin context. Your w

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware

2015-02-01 Thread Mike Hearn
TREZOR does not support BIP70. I think they planned to work on it after multi-sig support, which is now done, so I'm hoping that it's next on their roadmap. The signing features of BIP70 have (fortunately!) been implemented by payment processors quite early, before we really have the client side f

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New BIP: protocol for multisignature payments

2015-02-01 Thread Mike Hearn
If you decide to implement this in an existing or new bitcoinj based wallet, then I'm happy to give you pointers on how to do it. Making one-off, cross platform app specific wallets is pretty easy these days. For 2-of-3 dispute mediation transactions they'd start out being kind of specialist so ask

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware

2015-02-01 Thread Martin Habovštiak
BIP70 is quite safe agains MitB. If user copies URL belonging to other merchant, he would see the fact after entering it into his wallet application. The only problem is, attacker can buy from the same merchant with user's money. (sending him different URL) This can be mitigated by merchant setting

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware

2015-02-01 Thread Brian Erdelyi
In online banking, the banks generate account numbers. An attacker cannot generate their own account number and the likelihood of an attacker having the same account number that I am trying to transfer funds to is low and this is why OCRA is effective with online banking. With Bitcoin, the Bi

Re: [Bitcoin-development] var_int ambiguous serialization consequences

2015-02-01 Thread Tamas Blummer
Thanks for the clarification. Yes, I referred to CompactSize using the lingo of https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Protocol_documentation I am not sure if it is current concern. Apparently an exception is thrown if non-canonical CompactSize in a transaction s parsed. Is it ensured that transactions are

Re: [Bitcoin-development] var_int ambiguous serialization consequences

2015-02-01 Thread Wladimir
On Sun, 1 Feb 2015, Tamas Blummer wrote: > I wonder of consequences if var_int is used in its longer than necessary > forms (e.g encoding 1 as 0xfd0100 instead of 0x01) In serialize.h lingo you are talking about CompactSize, not VarInt. CompactSizes indeed have redundancy in their representati

[Bitcoin-development] var_int ambiguous serialization consequences

2015-02-01 Thread Tamas Blummer
I wonder of consequences if var_int is used in its longer than necessary forms (e.g encoding 1 as 0xfd0100 instead of 0x01) This is already of interest if applying size limit to a block, since transaction count is var_int but is not part of the hashed header or the merkle tree. It could also b