So far I've only liked the original name Stealth address and the
suggestion routing address.
Should we put this up for some kind of informal vote with comments allowed?
Like a Google docs form?
- Sent from my phone
Den 17 jan 2014 10:18 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
I must say, this shed
Because it's trivial to create collisions! You can choose exactly what
output you want. That's why XOR is a very bad digest scheme.
- Sent from my phone
Den 4 feb 2014 14:20 skrev Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org:
On Tue, Feb 04, 2014 at 02:13:12PM +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:
Hah, good point. If
Regarding chains of transactions intended to be published at once together,
wouldn't it be easier to add a only-mine-with-child flag?
That way the parent transactions aren't actually valid unless spent
together with the transaction that depends on it, and only the original
will have a child
in that area.
This might be helpful enough to help a lot of use cases, but shouldn't be
final.
-Allen
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 6:22 PM, Natanael natanae...@gmail.com wrote:
Regarding chains of transactions intended to be published at once
together, wouldn't it be easier to add a only-mine
You've heard of TRESOR?
No, not Trezor.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRESOR
Signing on the CPU, without touching RAM.
- Sent from my phone
Den 6 mar 2014 09:41 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
I'm wondering about whether (don't laugh) moving signing into the kernel
and then using the
Regarding (ISO standards) currency symbols, XBT is already used as
equivalent to 1 Bitcoin in numerous places, and XBC is taken and BT*
belongs to Bhutan (and X** is already the default for non-national currency
common items of trade), so IMHO we should define something like XUB as
microbitcoins
Den 29 mar 2014 19:15 skrev Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name:
On Saturday, 29 March 2014, at 2:08 pm, Alan Reiner wrote:
Regardless of how does it, I believe that obfuscating that
information is bad news from a usability perspective. Undoubtedly,
users will make lots of backups
Does't BIP70 cover this already via Certificate Authorities?
On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 12:21 PM, vv01f vv...@riseup.net wrote:
Some users on bitcointalk[0] would like to have their vanity addresses
available for others easily to find and verify the ownership over a kind
of WoT. Right now they
This sounds like Namecoin. You can already register profiles with it,
including keypairs. onename.io is a web-based client you can use to
register on the Namecoin blockchain.
On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Chris D'Costa chris.dco...@meek.io wrote:
Security of transmission of person-to-person
I am in favor of xbit, my only concern is if average Joes will consider
that name stupid (like various attempts at cool branding with unusual
letters like Q, X, Z, etc). We should see if we can get support for it in
the community and if there would be any notable opposition against it or
not. If
Now you are talking about Trusted Platform Modules. Like smartcards,
actually. Devices that won't leak their keys but let the holder spend the
coins. It could even have it's own simple SPV wallet client to make it
easier to handle. And they'd use the attestation features provided by the
TPM to
of technical security in here, and this is
the problem I'm seeking solutions for.
Best regards,
Alex Kotenko
2014-05-18 14:50 GMT+01:00 Natanael natanae...@gmail.com:
Now you are talking about Trusted Platform Modules. Like smartcards,
actually. Devices that won't leak their keys but let
Den 17 jun 2014 17:59 skrev Isidor Zeuner cryptocurrenc...@quidecco.de:
quote:
Mike Hearn, why don't we just have all nodes report attempted double
spends
through the node network. No need to involve the miners at all really,
or
do your suggestion but also report the double spend attempt.
Probably because the network isn't designed for interactive proofs. Most
interactive algoritms AFAICT requires that some machine holds a secret
state (or at least continuous and untampered state, but you still need to
verify you're falling to the right machine), otherwise the machine can be
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 8:52 PM, Justus Ranvier
justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 02/12/2015 07:47 PM, Allen Piscitello wrote:
Nothing will stop that. Bitcoin needs to deal with those issues,
not stick our heads in the sand and pretend they
Den 31 jan 2015 23:17 skrev Brian Erdelyi brian.erde...@gmail.com:
Hello all,
The number of incidents involving malware targeting bitcoin users
continues to rise. One category of virus I find particularly nasty is when
the bitcoin address you are trying to send money to is modified before the
Den 1 feb 2015 00:05 skrev Brian Erdelyi brian.erde...@gmail.com:
See vanitygen. Yes, 8 characters can be brute forced.
Thank you for this reference. Interesting to see that there is a tool to
generate a vanity bitcoin address.
I am still researching viruses that are designed to manipulate
Den 1 feb 2015 00:37 skrev Natanael natanae...@gmail.com:
To bruteforce 8 decimals, on average you need (10^8)/2 = 50 000 000
tries. log(50M)/log(2) = 25.6 bits of entropy.
Oops. Used the wrong number in the entropy calculation. Add one bit, the
division by 2 wasn't supposed to be used
BIP70 is a protocol for getting a user's wallet client communicate with a
merchant's server in order to agree on details like where to send the
payment, how much to send, what the shipping address is, sending a receipt
back, and much more using various extensions that adds more functionality.
Den 10 feb 2015 11:34 skrev MⒶrtin HⒶboⓋštiak martin.habovst...@gmail.com
:
Why would anyone want to do anything about payment before choosing
what he wants to buy and for what price? I've never used Amazon but
isn't filling a form with shipping information enough?
That's not what this is
Den 10 feb 2015 11:48 skrev MⒶrtin HⒶboⓋštiak martin.habovst...@gmail.com
:
I still don't understand. The website can have this information
available. This is exactly what e-bay does - it displays shipping
information to my country before I do anything. What's the problem?
Also with other
Den 11 feb 2015 09:55 skrev Hector Chu hector...@gmail.com:
A proposal for stemming the tide of mining centralisation -- Requiring a
miner's signature in the block header (the whole of which is hashed), and
paying out coinbase to the miner's public key.
Please comment on whether this idea is
Den 12 feb 2015 14:44 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
You can prove a doublespend instantly by showing two conflicting
transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be distributed as a
proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging mechanism.
There have been lots of e-cash
Den 12 feb 2015 13:49 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
Are you not counting collateralized multisignature notaries? Its an
extended version of the Greenaddress.it model.
It makes unconfirmed transactions useless in the classical Bitcoin model.
Obviously if you introduce a trusted third party
Den 12 feb 2015 12:58 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
[...]
Your scorched earth plan is aptly named, as it's guaranteed to make
unconfirmed payments useless.
Are you not counting collateralized multisignature notaries? Its an
extended version of the Greenaddress.it model.
NoRiskWallet:
Den 12 feb 2015 15:53 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner, without
spelling out exactly why.
I'm afraid I still don't understand why you think notaries would build
long term businesses but miners wouldn't, in this model.
I think you
Den 12 feb 2015 16:15 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
The first is that this setup means miners can steal arbitrary payments if
they work together with the sender of the money. The model assumes this
collaboration won't happen, but it will. Because no existing wallet has a
double spend this
Den 12 feb 2015 16:42 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
Remember that you aren't paying the bad pool, the bad pool is paying you.
Whichever pool benefits from the scorched earth protocol can simply pick an
address out of the transaction it perceived as starting the protocol, and
pay that.
My
Den 18 mar 2015 23:38 skrev Dennis Sullivan dennis.jm.sulli...@gmail.com
:
Hello. This is my first time posting to this list. I wanted to ask your
opinions on something relating to confirmation times.
I recently read about a transaction locking proposal which claims to
make it possible to
Den 8 mar 2015 02:36 skrev Pavol Rusnak st...@gk2.sk:
On 07/03/15 16:53, Mem Wallet wrote:
[...]
I am currently in process of implementing a SignIdentity message for
TREZOR, which will be used for HTTPS/SSH/etc. logins.
See PoC here:
Den 13 mar 2015 20:57 skrev Kalle Rosenbaum ka...@rosenbaum.se:
Hi all,
I've been thinking about how a person can prove that she has made a
payment. I came up with an idea I call Proof of Payment (PoP) and I would
highly appreciate your comments. Has something like this been discussed
Den 12 mar 2015 19:52 skrev Andreas Schildbach andr...@schildbach.de:
I'm afraid this will never fly. Wallets are just too different and
that's a good thing! For example, by design choice Bitcoin Wallet and
bitcoinj doesn't support multiple accounts. How would it ever import
wallets from
Den 12 mar 2015 17:48 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
b) Creation date is just a short-term hack.
I agree, but we need things to be easy in the short term as well as the
long term :)
The long term solution is clearly to have the 12 word seed be an
encryption key for a wallet backup with
Den 22 feb 2015 13:36 skrev Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org:
Implementing it as a general purpose scripting language improvement has
a lot of advantages, not least of which is that you no longer need to
rely entirely on inherently unreliable P2P networking: Promise to never
create two signatures
Den 22 feb 2015 14:29 skrev Natanael natanae...@gmail.com:
Den 22 feb 2015 13:36 skrev Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org:
Implementing it as a general purpose scripting language improvement has
a lot of advantages, not least of which is that you no longer need to
rely entirely on inherently
Den 22 feb 2015 17:00 skrev Justus Ranvier justusranv...@riseup.net:
On 02/22/2015 07:50 AM, Matt Whitlock wrote:
This happened to one of the merchants at the Bitcoin 2013
conference in San Jose. They sold some T-shirts and accepted
zero-confirmation transactions. The transactions depended
- Sent from my tablet
Den 22 feb 2015 17:25 skrev Justus Ranvier justusranv...@riseup.net:
You just disproved your own argument.
It is possible to predict risk, and therefore to price the risk.
Your fault is that you assume the predictions can be reliable and
trustable.
They can not be.
The
Den 23 feb 2015 08:38 skrev Andy Schroder i...@andyschroder.com:
I agree that NFC is the best we have as far as a trust anchor that you
are paying the right person. The thing I am worried about is the privacy
loss that could happen if there is someone passively monitoring the
connection. So, in
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