Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote
> I just wish that half as much energy had gone into discussing > whether we want a 100% supermajority or a 99% supermajority or an > 80% supermajority, as has gone into discussing whether we want 1MB > blocks or 8MB blocks or 20MB blocks. And I understand that Gavin is now proposing that a 75% supermajority should be enough. This constantly reducing threshold worries me greatly. There is a risk that we get a situation where a stable amount of hashing power somewhat over 75% (say 80%) accepts the fork - and therefore triggers it - but both a significant minority (say 20%) of hashrate rejects it *and* the economic majority rejects it. I'm not saying this is a likely outcome - indeed I hope it's not - but it is a _possible_ outcome. Ok, the chain that the economic marjority is using will have a bit of a temporary crisis due to 50 minute block times, but it will recover in a few weeks as difficulty adjusts. And, in the worst case, you end up with two competing semi-stable ecosystems both claiming to be 'the real Bitcoin'. My fear is that in that situation it could take an extended period - perhaps many months - for one fork to clearly win and the other fork to lose support (or at least lose sufficient support to be relegated to altcoin status). I think such an extended period of uncertainty would be the ultimate worst case scenario for Bitcoin. It _probably_ wouldn't be fatal to Bitcoin, but it would certainly be far worse for Bitcoin than getting the blocksize wrong even by an order of magnitude (in either direction). Therefore if we can design the hardfork mechanism to make such an outcome impossible, I believe we really need to. roy -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote
As I've observed before, Gavin originally advocated either a 99% or 100% buy in by miners for a hard fork to trigger. https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/2355445 I don't understand why people (Gavin included) now seem to favour a much more modest supermajority except perhaps that they believe that that level of consensus is unachievable. FWIW I'm in favour of a block size increase. I just wish that half as much energy had gone into discussing whether we want a 100% supermajority or a 99% supermajority or an 80% supermajority, as has gone into discussing whether we want 1MB blocks or 8MB blocks or 20MB blocks. (So thank you, Pieter, for raising this.) roy On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 07:13:06PM +0200, Pieter Wuille wrote: > Hello all, > > I've seen ideas around hard fork proposals that involve a block version > vote (a la BIP34, BIP66, or my more recent versionbits BIP draft). I > believe this is a bad idea, independent of what the hard fork itself is. > > Ultimately, the purpose of a hard fork is asking the whole community to > change their full nodes to new code. The purpose of the trigger mechanism > is to establish when that has happened. > > Using a 95% threshold, implies the fork can happen when at least 5% of > miners have not upgraded, which implies some full nodes have not (as miners > are nodes), and in addition, means the old chain can keep growing too, > confusing old non-miner nodes as well. > > Ideally, the fork should be scheduled when one is certain nodes will have > upgraded, and the risk for a fork will be gone. If everyone has upgraded, > no vote is necessary, and if nodes have not, it remains risky to fork them > off. > > I understand that, in order to keep humans in the loop, you want an > observable trigger mechanism, and a hashrate vote is an easy way to do > this. But at least, use a minimum timestamp you believe to be reasonable > for upgrade, and a 100% threshold afterwards. Anything else guarantees that > your forking change happens *knowingly* before the risk is gone. > > You may argue that miners would be asked to - and have it in their best > interest - to not actually make blocks that violate the changed rule before > they are reasonably sure that everyone has upgraded. That is possible, but > it does not gain you anything over just using a 100% threshold, as how > would they be reasonably sure everyone has upgraded, while blocks creater > by non-upgraded miners are still being created? > > TL;DR: use a timestamp switchover for a hard fork, or add a block voting > threshold as a means to keep humans in the loop, but if you do, use 100% as > threshold. > > -- > Pieter > -- > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote
On Saturday, 20 June 2015, at 8:11 pm, Pieter Wuille wrote: > you want full nodes that have not noticed the fork to fail rather than see a > slow but otherwise functional chain. Isn't that what the Alert mechanism is for? If these nodes continue running despite an alert telling them they're outdated, then it must be intentional. -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote
On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 7:26 PM, David Vorick wrote: > I see it as unreasonable to expect all nodes to upgrade during a hardfork. > If you are intentionally waiting for that to happen, it's possible for an > extreme minority of nodes to hold the rest of the network hostage by simply > refusing to upgrade. However you want nodes to be able to protest until it > is clear that they have lost the battle without being at risk of getting > hardforked out of the network unexpectedly. > You can't observe the majority of nodes, only miners, and weighed by hashrate. If you need a mechanism for protest, that should happen before the hard fork change code is rolled out. I am assuming a completely uncontroversial change, in order to not confuse this discussion with the debate about what hard forks should be done. So I am not talking about protest, just about deploying a change. And yes, it is unreasonable to expect that every single node will upgrade. But there is a difference between ignoring old unmaintained nodes that do not influence anyone's behaviour, and ignoring the nodes that power miners producing actual blocks. In addition, having no blocks on the old chain is safer than producing a small number, as you want full nodes that have not noticed the fork to fail rather than see a slow but otherwise functional chain. -- Pieter -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote
I agree giving notice that the change is going to happen is critical for a hard fork. If miners vote in favor, they need to give people time to upgrade (or to decide to reject the fork). The BIP 100 proposal is that no change will happen until a timestamp is reached. It isn't clear exactly how it would work. Testnet: Sep 1st 2015 Mainnet: Jan 11th 2016 It suggests 90% of 12000 blocks (~83 days). This means that if 10800 of the last 12000 blocks are the updated version, then the change is considered locked in. I think having an earlier "fail" threshold would be a good idea too. This guarantees notice. Assuming 3 is and 4 is If the median of 11 timestamp is after 1st Sep 2015 and less than 10800 of the last 12000 blocks are version 4+, then reject version 4 blocks If the median of 11 timestamp is after 1st Nov 2015 and at least 10800 of the last 12000 blocks are version 4+, then reject version 3 blocks (lock-in) If the median of 11 timestamp is after 1st Jan 2016 and at least 10800 of the last 12000 blocks are version 4+, the allow This means that if the 90% threshold is lost at any time between 1st Sep and 1st Nov, then the fork is rejected. Otherwise, after the 1st Nov, it is locked in, but the new rules don't activate until 1st Jan. For block size, miners could still soft fork back to 1MB after 1st Nov, it there is a user/merchant revolt (maybe that would be version 5 blocks). On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > Hello all, > > I've seen ideas around hard fork proposals that involve a block version > vote (a la BIP34, BIP66, or my more recent versionbits BIP draft). I > believe this is a bad idea, independent of what the hard fork itself is. > > Ultimately, the purpose of a hard fork is asking the whole community to > change their full nodes to new code. The purpose of the trigger mechanism > is to establish when that has happened. > > Using a 95% threshold, implies the fork can happen when at least 5% of > miners have not upgraded, which implies some full nodes have not (as miners > are nodes), and in addition, means the old chain can keep growing too, > confusing old non-miner nodes as well. > > Ideally, the fork should be scheduled when one is certain nodes will have > upgraded, and the risk for a fork will be gone. If everyone has upgraded, > no vote is necessary, and if nodes have not, it remains risky to fork them > off. > > I understand that, in order to keep humans in the loop, you want an > observable trigger mechanism, and a hashrate vote is an easy way to do > this. But at least, use a minimum timestamp you believe to be reasonable > for upgrade, and a 100% threshold afterwards. Anything else guarantees that > your forking change happens *knowingly* before the risk is gone. > > You may argue that miners would be asked to - and have it in their best > interest - to not actually make blocks that violate the changed rule before > they are reasonably sure that everyone has upgraded. That is possible, but > it does not gain you anything over just using a 100% threshold, as how > would they be reasonably sure everyone has upgraded, while blocks creater > by non-upgraded miners are still being created? > > TL;DR: use a timestamp switchover for a hard fork, or add a block voting > threshold as a means to keep humans in the loop, but if you do, use 100% as > threshold. > > -- > Pieter > > > -- > > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote
I see it as unreasonable to expect all nodes to upgrade during a hardfork. If you are intentionally waiting for that to happen, it's possible for an extreme minority of nodes to hold the rest of the network hostage by simply refusing to upgrade. However you want nodes to be able to protest until it is clear that they have lost the battle without being at risk of getting hardforked out of the network unexpectedly. I think it makes sense to add a second fuse. After the 95% barrier has been crossed, a 6 week timer starts that gives the remaining 5% time to upgrade. If they still don't upgrade, they have intentionally forked themselves from the network and it is not something that the remaining 95% need to be concerned with. On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 1:13 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > Hello all, > > I've seen ideas around hard fork proposals that involve a block version > vote (a la BIP34, BIP66, or my more recent versionbits BIP draft). I > believe this is a bad idea, independent of what the hard fork itself is. > > Ultimately, the purpose of a hard fork is asking the whole community to > change their full nodes to new code. The purpose of the trigger mechanism > is to establish when that has happened. > > Using a 95% threshold, implies the fork can happen when at least 5% of > miners have not upgraded, which implies some full nodes have not (as miners > are nodes), and in addition, means the old chain can keep growing too, > confusing old non-miner nodes as well. > > Ideally, the fork should be scheduled when one is certain nodes will have > upgraded, and the risk for a fork will be gone. If everyone has upgraded, > no vote is necessary, and if nodes have not, it remains risky to fork them > off. > > I understand that, in order to keep humans in the loop, you want an > observable trigger mechanism, and a hashrate vote is an easy way to do > this. But at least, use a minimum timestamp you believe to be reasonable > for upgrade, and a 100% threshold afterwards. Anything else guarantees that > your forking change happens *knowingly* before the risk is gone. > > You may argue that miners would be asked to - and have it in their best > interest - to not actually make blocks that violate the changed rule before > they are reasonably sure that everyone has upgraded. That is possible, but > it does not gain you anything over just using a 100% threshold, as how > would they be reasonably sure everyone has upgraded, while blocks creater > by non-upgraded miners are still being created? > > TL;DR: use a timestamp switchover for a hard fork, or add a block voting > threshold as a means to keep humans in the loop, but if you do, use 100% as > threshold. > > -- > Pieter > > > -- > > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
