coreutils-8.23 x64
manpage says:
If FILE is not specified, use /var/run/utmp. /var/log/wtmp as
FILE is
common. If ARG1 ARG2 given, -m presumed: 'am i' or 'mom
likes' are
usual.
Behavior says:
access("/var/run/utmpx", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
"I don't think we need to fix this for runcon, as it isn't as
sandboxing tool like sandbox, and the loss of job control would likely
be much more noticeable for runcon."
Thanks, closing the debbugs bug report.
Quoting "Paul Eggert" :
Hello,
I set the bug report here before I got a response from Paul Moore
https://marc.info/?l=selinux=147481004710264=2
"I don't think we need to fix this for runcon, as it isn't as
sandboxing tool like sandbox, and the loss of job control would
On 25/09/16 12:39, up201407...@alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt wrote:
> When executing a program via the runcon utility, the nonpriv session
> can escape to the parent session by using the TIOCSTI ioctl to push
> characters into the terminal's input buffer, allowing an attacker to
> execute arbitrary commands
On 25/09/16 12:39, up201407...@alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt wrote:
> When executing a program via the runcon utility, the nonpriv session
> can escape to the parent session by using the TIOCSTI ioctl to push
> characters into the terminal's input buffer, allowing an attacker to
> execute arbitrary commands