I am killing the Strong ES model vs Weak ES model thread unless someone
was something substantial to add. It is obvious both models have value
and that people disagree on their relative merit. Obviously this is the
reason they were both described in the RFC and neither recommended over the
other.
At 08:18 PM 06-03-2001 -, David Litchfield wrote:
This affects Windows NT as well. I spoke of the exact same problem back in
the December of 1998 (http://www.securityfocus.com/vdb/bottom.html?vid=1692
for the BID and http://oliver.efri.hr/~crv/security/bugs/NT/msproxy3.html
for the details)
In light of the current discussion about the "Loopback and multi-homed
routing flaw in TCP/IP stack." it's worth mentioning another "condition"
that exists in some TCP/IP stacks.
Some stacks will allow TCP connection to be established to the broadcast
address configured on any given interface.
Hello Martin,
Wednesday, March 07, 2001, 1:05:17 AM, you wrote:
MM there is no argument for making 'Weak ES Model' default. Including
Catch one: changing security model will give additional undesired work
for administrators. Situation where multihomed host has services
binded to all
On Wednesday, 2001-03-07 at 00:45:22 +, Woody wrote:
A machine which has routing turned off, is not _expected_ to route, so
it
is not tested for.
This is the point of this advisory, which is commonly
missed.
You mean forwarding, not routing, I suppose?
Forwarding means that a router
==
Defcom Labs Advisory def-2001-02
IBM HTTP Server Kernel Leak DoS
Author: Peter Grndl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Release Date: 2001-01-08
Re-release Date: 2001-03-07
In some mail from Ben Laurie, sie said:
Aleph1 wrote:
A flaw in the standard not on the stack. RFC 1122 "Requirements for
Internet
Hosts -- Communication Layers" covers this issue although without
pointing
out its security consequences.
In the case that a host is not routing, it is
hi,
this is an exploit for wu-ftpd 2.6.1(1) on linux
propz to segv for giving this to me
bringin' you the 0day from the hackweiser crew, australian
+chapter
cya,
Till
/*
* Linux wu-ftpd - 2.6.1(1)
*
* DiGiT
*/
#include sys/socket.h
#include sys/types.h
#include stdio.h
#include
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Cisco Security Advisory: Access to the Cisco Aironet 340 Series Wireless Bridge
via Web Interface
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2001 March 07 08:00 (GMT -0800)
Nomen Nescio wrote:
hi,
this is an exploit for wu-ftpd 2.6.1(1) on linux
propz to segv for giving this to me
bringin' you the 0day from the hackweiser crew, australian
+chapter
cya,
Till
/*
* Linux wu-ftpd - 2.6.1(1)
*
* DiGiT
*/
Correct me if I'm wrong,but this is
On Wed, Mar 07, 2001 at 04:40:05AM +0100, Nomen Nescio wrote:
this is an exploit for wu-ftpd 2.6.1(1) on linux
propz to segv for giving this to me
This is an old wuftpd 2.6.0 SITE EXEC exploit. 2.6.1 is not vulnerable
to this attack.
strcpy (cmdbuf, "SITE EXEC ");
for (ret = 0; ret =
UNDERSEC SECURITY ADVISORY 4th March 20001
===
PROGRAM: INDEXU
VERSIONS: All versions prior to 2.0Beta (2.0Beta included)
OS:All
REMOTE:YES
LOCAL: YES
CLASS: Authentication
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
-
Debian Security Advisory DSA-034-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
March 7, 2001
-
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
-
Debian Security Advisory DSA-033-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
March 7, 2001
-
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
-
Debian Security Advisory DSA-038-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
March 8, 2001
-
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
-
Debian Security Advisory DSA-036-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
March 7, 2001
-
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
-
Debian Security Advisory DSA-037-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
March 7, 2001
-
On Wed, Mar 07, 2001 at 04:26:41PM +0100, Kenny Jansson wrote:
Some stacks will allow TCP connection to be established to the broadcast
address configured on any given interface.
FreeBSD has had this behaviour for some time 4.x
up until 2001/03/03 17:39:20 PST when a fix was comitted to
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Linux-Mandrake Security Update Advisory
Package name: eperl
Date:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
UNSAFE TEMPORARY FILE HANDLING IN KRB4
2001-03-07
SUMMARY:
A /tmp race condition exists in MIT-derived implementations of
Kerberos 4.
IMPACT:
On a system running login daemons with Kerberos 4 support, a local
user may be able to overwrite
jogchem@kryptology:~$ diff wu2.6.1.c wu-lnx.c
jogchem@kryptology:~$
Exactly the same as the previously release wu-lnx.c exploit.
http://packetstorm.securify.com/0009-exploits/wu-lnx.c
kinda a hoax?? :)
On Wednesday 07 March 2001 04:40, you wrote:
hi,
this is an exploit for wu-ftpd 2.6.1(1)
In some mail from Woody, sie said:
Subject: Loopback and multi-homed routing flaw in TCP/IP stack.
Author: Woody [EMAIL PROTECTED]
We believe there to be a serious security flaw in the TCP/IP stack of
several Unix-like operating systems. Whilst being "known" behavior on
technical
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
-
Debian Security Advisory DSA-035-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
March 7, 2001
-
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