Hi,
i am having cisco 6509 switch with MFSC card.
When i am manually restarting the switch, the boot variable and boot loader
of the MSFC card entries are missing and it is going to
ROMMON mode. We have to give BOOT command everytime.
I have configured the boot variable and bood loader entries in
On Fri, 2011-08-05 at 14:43 +0530, Ambedkar Podeti wrote:
When i am manually restarting the switch, the boot variable and boot loader
of the MSFC card entries are missing and it is going to
ROMMON mode. We have to give BOOT command everytime.
...
RSM_6509_1#sh boot
BOOT variable =
Hi,
On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 02:53:21AM +0300, Martin T wrote:
why would one like to limit(maximum-prefix) ingress prefixes from IPX?
Because you really don't want to receive leaked full-tables from your
peers. Mistakes happen, and your customers will not like it if you
route all of the
Hi,
We're implementing two pairs of N5Ks (and downstream N2k FEXes) to act
as separate iSCSI SAN fabrics, with SAN heads attached directly to
N5Ks and host ports (and downstream integrated blade switches)
connecting to the FEXes. Does anyone have any real-world experience of
using N5Ks for a
Ambedkar Podeti wrote:
i am having cisco 6509 switch with MFSC card. When i am manually
restarting the switch, the boot variable and boot loader of the MSFC
card entries are missing and it is going to ROMMON mode. We have to
give BOOT command everytime.
RSM_6509_1#sh boot
BOOT variable =
Hi peter,
The command remote command switch show boot is not working on this
platform.
Thanks,
Ambi
On Fri, Aug 5, 2011 at 2:43 PM, Ambedkar Podeti p.ambed...@gmail.comwrote:
Hi,
i am having cisco 6509 switch with MFSC card.
When i am manually restarting the switch, the boot variable and
Ambedkar Podeti wrote:
RSM_6509_1#sh boot
BOOT variable = bootflash:c6msfc2-jsv-mz.121-19.E1.bin,12
CONFIG_FILE variable does not exist
BOOTLDR variable = bootflash:c6msfc2-jsv-mz.121-19.E1.bin
Configuration register is 0x2102
It appears you're running your sup2/msfc2 on hybrid mode.
Matthew,
When you say a large deployment, can you describe the number of FEXes
and hosts?
Which model of FEX?
What speed are your heads, how many connections?
What speed are your hosts, how many connections?
Mostly reading, writing, random?
You can increase the buffer size available per port
Note that the FEX will disable any port that receives a BPDU, by design in
hardware. You will need to disable STP on the blade-switch-to-FEX links for
this to work. If it's Cisco blade switches you can use Flex Links.
Cheers,
Brad
http://bradhedlund.com
Sent from my iPad
(please excuse
Thanks for that - that's another issue we've encountered. I am hoping
we can implement bpdufilter on the FEX ports (as well as disabling STP
on downstream switches).
On 5 August 2011 14:12, Brad Hedlund (brhedlun) brhed...@cisco.com wrote:
Note that the FEX will disable any port that receives a
It would be filter toward the FEX ports on your blade switches, but not
on the FEX ports themselves. Whether you turn STP off or not on the
blades, the FEX doesn't know. Just remembering if you create a loop, you
no longer have the protection of STP; you are intentionally tricking the
FEX into
Can P prevent a FEX port being disabled by implementing bpdufilter, or
do we need to ensure that BPDUs aren't receiving on FEX ports?
We were hoping to use LACP between the downstream switch and the FEXes
as a poor-man's loop prevention mechanism.
Cheers,
Matt
On 5 August 2011 15:17, John Gill
Around 8 heads, each with 4x10G connections, and then 10G connections
to downstream integrated blade centre switches where the hosts reside.
A handful of hosts will have 1G connections (landing on the FEXes)
The heads will be distributed across four 5548P, and the hosts/blade
centres and
anybody actually know what is this presentation about ?? or is it the same
well known attack ?
http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-us-11/bh-us-11-briefings.html#Nakibly
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/080411-blackhat-ospf-vulnerability.html
thanks,
Gobinath.
No. The FEX has BPDU Guard logic running in hardware. The moment a BPDU is
received on the port it will be disabled.
On the blade switches you can implement:
1) Flex Links (safe)
2) Egress BPDU filter (risky)
3) Disable STP (dangerous)
For #2 and #3, a misconfigured or missing LACP config can
this is may be their research summary assumption.
Our only assumption is that we have* full control over a single OSPF router
*. From there, we have to cause maximum damage to the AS.
Therefore, overcoming OSPF Authentication Protection is trivial, since* the
authentication key is known* to us.
As far as I can gather, it boils down to if you have the authentication
phrase, you can do really bad things. Truly eye-opening.
- Mikkel
On Fri, 05 Aug 2011 12:30:23 -0400, arulgobinath emmanuel
arulg...@gmail.com wrote:
anybody actually know what is this presentation about ?? or is
On Friday, August 05, 2011 01:47:24 AM Jay Ford wrote:
Note that metrics can be ( perhaps must be) configured
distinctly for IPv4 IPv6.
Yes, they have to be in IOS (and Junos too, including
other vendors I'm sure).
Mark.
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On Friday, August 05, 2011 03:11:15 AM Ross Halliday wrote:
Does this all sound right to you folks? Am I completely
insane? Should I even bother hiding the private AS
number? I think this will accomplish my goal but I'd
like to hear what other people are doing. Most of this
stuff I've
Hi.
I have two 2911 routers running 15.0(1)M4 in a redundant topology
connected to an ASA 5520 firewall running 8.4 version. All gears are
running EIGRP.
In order to distribute the incoming traffic between the two 2911
routers, I am using 'offset-list out' on them, but in the ASA's routing
table
Sorry to post if this is the wrong place, but I figured it would give me the
best shot to reach the intended audience.
I am hoping to find some small ISP's who are partnered with Covad providing DSL
service (both via ATM DS3/OC3 the new gigabit vlan handoff setup) that would
have some time to
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