At 9:35 AM -0800 2/5/01, Jurgen Botz wrote:
Slashdot this morning reported on a ZD-Net article at:
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2681947,00.html?chkpt=zdhpnews0
1
which states that there are major holes in IEEE 802.11 "WEP" encryption.
Does anyone have any more details on
"R. A. Hettinga" writes:
At 9:35 AM -0800 2/5/01, Jurgen Botz wrote:
Slashdot this morning reported on a ZD-Net article at:
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2681947,00.html?chkpt=zdhpnews0
1
which states that there are major holes in IEEE 802.11 "WEP" encryption.
Does anyone
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 22:00:35 -0500
To: buncha people, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Somebody
Subject: WEP Wipes Out
http://interactive.wsj.com/
February 5, 2001
Yeah, for example I have always wondered why Sun, in JCE 1.2.1, has gone
through the trouble of introducing the signed CSP mechanism at the same time
when their domestic-strength provider (which in theory should be good enough
even for Saddam) was made freely exportable. By the way, has anybody
I couldn't find the document, but Ulf was kind enough to
forward me the PDF file, which I've placed online:
http://www.politechbot.com/docs/echelon-nl.0101.pdf
-Declan
On Wed, Jan 31, 2001 at 02:46:53AM +0100, Ulf Mller wrote:
[I haven't seen the original documents, so consider this only a
To pick nits, this is not completely accurate. What is at odds with
non-coercibility is the ability to demonstrate to a third party how
one voted. But there are techniques that allow a voter to verify that
his/her vote was counted correctly without being able to prove this to
others. (Not that
Unfortunately these are not new attacks. Some IETFers were talking
about these as long as 1.5 years ago. This new paper is just a
formalization of the (previously known, or at least guessed) attacks.
About a year ago we theorized that we could guess a key by passive
eavesdropping. However
At 8:58 AM -0500 2/5/2001, Steve Bellovin wrote:
Every now and then, something pops up that reinforces the point that
crypto can't solve all of our security and privacy problems. Today's
installment can be found at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/advisories/advemailwiretap.html
For almost all
The notion that e-mail should be permitted to contain arbitrary
programs that are executed automatically by default on being opened
is so over the top from a security stand point that it is hard to
find language strong enough to condemn it. It goes far beyond the
ordinary risks
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2001 12:59:46 -0500 (EST)
From: Christof Paar [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: WPI Crypto Seminar: ;
Subject: WPI Cryptoseminar, Wednesday, Feb 7
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Christof Paar [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Here we go again, the WPI Cryptoseminar starts
Well, there's quite a distance between executing something that
is signed by a public entity during a transaction that I initiate,
and having code silently execute because something was pushed
to me unsolicited.
btw, the suggested workaround in the privacy advisory does not
appear to work - at
This would seem relevant ...
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010206/ts/voting_systems_dc_1.html
Tuesday February 6 12:23 PM ET Study: Old Voting Systems May Work Best
By Deborah Zabarenko
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Looking back at Florida's election mess,
scientists say the old ways of casting
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