Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-06 Thread Bill Stewart
>At 01:50 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: >>What we need is a minimum of ONE decent quality additional >>entropy source, one that works for diskless IPSEC boxes. That's unfortunately outside the scope of IPSec :-) If you don't have random number hardware, you can't get hardware random number

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-04 Thread John Denker
At 11:42 AM 8/4/99 -0400, D. Hugh Redelmeier wrote: > >Pluto is a "bad guy" in that it is using up the entropy-estimate. Your modesty is charming. But I wouldn't say that pluto is the bad guy. There "ought" to be a system service (call it /dev/vrandom or whatever) that provides the sort of bit

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-04 Thread Bill Frantz
At 12:35 PM -0700 8/2/99, John Denker wrote: >2) Network timing may be subject to observation and possibly manipulation >by the attacker. My real-time clocks are pretty coarse (10ms resolution). >This subthread started with a discussion of software to estimate the >entropy of a bitstream, and I s

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-04 Thread John Denker
At 10:08 AM 8/4/99 -0400, D. Hugh Redelmeier wrote: > >I think that this description reflects an inappropriate understanding >of entropy. Entropy is in some sense spread throughout the whole >output of /dev/urandom. You don't use entropy up, you spread it over >more and more bytes of output. Th

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread Anonymous
John> The point is that there are a lot of customers out there who John> aren't ready to run out and acquire the well-designed hardware John> TRNG that you alluded to. So we need to think carefully about John> the gray area between the strong-but-really-expensive solution John> and the cheap

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread Paul Koning
> "John" == John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: John> At 01:50 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: >> I only remember a few proposals (2 or 3?) and they didn't seem to >> be [unduly weak]. Or do you feel that what I've proposed is this >> weak? If so, why? I've seen comments that

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread John Denker
At 01:50 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: > >I only remember a few proposals (2 or 3?) and they didn't seem to be >[unduly weak]. Or do you feel that what I've proposed is this >weak? If so, why? I've seen comments that say "be careful" but I >don't remember any comments suggesting that what

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread Paul Koning
> "John" == John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> Sure, you can do cat /dev/zero | md5sum > /dev/random, but I don't >> believe anyone is proposing that as a way of feeding entropy into >> it. John> That's where we might slightly disagree :-) ... I've seen some John> pretty questio

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread John Denker
At 01:27 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: > >we weren't talking about "in principle" or "in general". >Sure, given an unspecified process of unknown (to me) properties I >cannot make sensible statements about its entropy. That is true but >it isn't relevant to the discussion. > >Instead, we're

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread John Denker
At 10:09 AM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: > >1. Estimating entropy. Yes, that's the hard one. It's orthogonal >from everything else. /dev/random has a fairly simple approach; >Yarrow is more complex. > >It's not clear which is better. If there's reason to worry about the >one in /dev/random

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread Paul Koning
> "John" == John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: John> At 10:09 AM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: >> 1. Estimating entropy. Yes, that's the hard one. It's >> orthogonal from everything else. /dev/random has a fairly simple >> approach; Yarrow is more complex. >> >> It's not cl