On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
Trei, Peter wrote:
Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
unneccesary complication.
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification (to prove your vote was counted) clashes
rather directly
Brian McGroarty wrote:
On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification (to prove your vote was counted) clashes
rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
from coercion (I can't prove I voted in a
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62983,00.html
Wired News
See-Through Voting Software
By Kim Zetter
02:00 AM Apr. 08, 2004 PT
VoteHere, an electronic voting systems company, released its source code
this week in a bid to let others examine how the machines work and help
people gain
a counterpoint...
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
I'm a believer in the KISS principle.
:-) that's one S too many. For true believers, KIS is enough.
A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by
machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you
verify it
At 8:24 AM -0400 4/8/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that
the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens
the way for serial voting fraud.
The receipt should be exposed to the voter
Having a paper ballot printed by machine (and checked by the votor) before
being dropped in a box may permit some additional cross-checks:
* Put serial numbers or something like them, on each ballot, so that
missing or added ballots can be detected.
* Put check digits on each ballot, so that
At 11:16 PM 4/8/04 +0200, privacy.at Anonymous Remailer wrote:
In the second place, it fails for elections with more than two parties
running. The casual reference above to representatives on each
side betrays this error. Poorly funded third parties cannot provide
representatives as easily as
http://www.ecompute.org/ecc2/
There has been a PROBABLE solution generated as of 1425 hrs GMT, April
8, 2004.
Until Certicom has confirmed this, it will be treated as a PROBABLE
solution and the DP collection will continue.
The two people who have submitted the DP values have been emailed.
privacy wrote:
[good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptographic
I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure
voting security miss the point entirely.
They start with the assumption that something is broken about the
current voting system. I contend it is just fine.
For example, it takes a long time to count pieces of papers compared
On Fri, Apr 09, 2004 at 12:46:47PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure
voting security miss the point entirely.
[...]
I'm a technophile. I've loved technology all my life. I'm also a
security professional, and I love a good
| privacy wrote:
| [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
|
| It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
| and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
| error and incompetence is overwhelming.
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Complicated systems are the bane of security. Systems like this are
simple to understand, simple to audit, simple to guard.
I fully agree, but there is a wide variety of voting schemes out there,
of varying complexity. In a ballot with only very few options, your
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