Adi Shamir and Nicko Van Someren, Playing Hide and Seek with Stored Keys:
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/vansomeren98playing.html
Shamir, not Rivest. Easy mistake...
William
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Douglas
F. Calvert
Sent:
The conventional wisdom is that the successful US cryptanalytic efforts
against Japanese naval codes was a closely-held secret. I've just
stumbled on a source that disputes that. In The Unknown Battle of
Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons (Alvin Kernan,
Yale University
* Douglas F. Calvert:
I remember seeing a paper about identifying private keys in RAM. I
thought it was by Rivest but I can not locate it for the life of me.
Does anyone remember reading something like this? The basic operation
was to identify areas in RAM that had certain characteristics
At 11:40 AM +0200 9/5/06, Massimiliano Pala wrote:
Jon Callas wrote:
On 4 Sep 2006, at 4:13 AM, Travis H. wrote:
Has anyone created hooks in MTAs so that they automagically
[...]
Go look at http://www.dkim.org/ for many more details.
This approach is MTA-to-MTA...
No, it's not. The
On 5 Sep 2006, at 2:40 AM, Massimiliano Pala wrote:
This approach is MTA-to-MTA... if you want something more MTA-to-
MUA
Not precisely. It is *primarily* MTA-to-MTA, for a number of very
good reasons, like privacy. However, a number of people will be
implementing DKIM verification in
Douglas,Many applications using RSA make use of a private key
in its ASN.1 BER form. In this format, the surrounding encoding of a
private key becomes very easily recognizable. The follow is an excerpt from RFC3447 (PKCS#1)
-- Representation of RSA private key with information for the CRT
--
Did you mean this article by Gutmann?
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/breakms.txt
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Douglas F. Calvert
Sent: Mon 9/4/2006 6:14 PM
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: Locating private keys in RAM?
Hello,
I
Hi.
If an attacker is given access to a raw RSA decryption oracle (the
oracle calculates c^d mod n for any c) is it possible to extract the
key (d)?
It is known, that given such an oracle, the attacker can ask for
decryption of all primes less than B, and then he will be able to
sign PKCS-1
