Re: DRM for batteries

2008-01-06 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
On Sat, 5 Jan 2008 15:28:50 -0800 Stephan Somogyi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > At 16:38 +1300 04.01.2008, Peter Gutmann wrote: > > >At $1.40 each (at least in sub-1K quantities) you wonder whether > >it's costing them more to add the DRM (spread over all battery > >sales) than any marginal gain i

Fw: SHA-3 API

2008-01-06 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
Forwarded with permission. This is part of a discussion of the proposed SHA-3 API for the NIST competition. Those interested in discussing it should subscribe to the list; see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/email_list.html for instructions. Begin forwarded message: Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2008 10

Re: Question on export issues

2008-01-06 Thread Ivan Krstić
On Jan 3, 2008, at 10:47 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: That's because there's nothing much to publish: In the US, notify the BIS via email. Our outside counsel -- specializing in this area -- thought this was insufficient. That said, thanks for all the feedback in the thread -- I'll pass the inf

Re: DRM for batteries

2008-01-06 Thread Stephan Somogyi
At 16:38 +1300 04.01.2008, Peter Gutmann wrote: At $1.40 each (at least in sub-1K quantities) you wonder whether it's costing them more to add the DRM (spread over all battery sales) than any marginal gain in preventing use of third-party batteries by a small subset of users. I don't think I a

Re: DRM for batteries

2008-01-06 Thread Izaac
On Fri, Jan 04, 2008 at 04:38:07PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: >At $1.40 each (at least in sub-1K quantities) you wonder whether it's costing >them more to add the DRM (spread over all battery sales) than any marginal >gain in preventing use of third-party batteries by a small subset of users. The

Re: DRM for batteries

2008-01-06 Thread Florian Weimer
* Marcos el Ruptor: >> http://www.intersil.com/cda/deviceinfo/0,1477,ISL6296,0.html > > > "A 32-Bit CRC-based hash engine (FlexiHashTM) > calculates the authentication result immediately after > receiving a 32-Bit random challenge code." > > huh? > heh! If the law is on your side, you don't need

Re: Death of antivirus software imminent

2008-01-06 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Fri, 4 Jan 2008, Alex Alten wrote: > I think that we will have to move toward encrypting more data at > rest in some manner that is that is easy for the user to use (like > ATM cash cards) yet difficult for a malicious piece of software on > the user's machine to circumvent. This will require t

Re: DRM for batteries

2008-01-06 Thread Jon Callas
On Jan 3, 2008, at 7:38 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: http://www.intersil.com/cda/deviceinfo/0,1477,ISL6296,0.html At $1.40 each (at least in sub-1K quantities) you wonder whether it's costing them more to add the DRM (spread over all battery sales) than any marginal gain in preventing use of t

Re: Death of antivirus software imminent

2008-01-06 Thread Leichter, Jerry
| > | ...Also, I hate to say this, we may need to also require that all | > | encrypted traffic allow inspection of their contents under proper | > | authority (CALEA essentially) | > Why not just require that the senders of malign packets set the Evil Bit | > in their IP headers? | > | > How

Re: Death of antivirus software imminent

2008-01-06 Thread Alex Alten
At 05:47 PM 1/4/2008 -0500, Leichter, Jerry wrote: | ...Also, I hate to say this, we may need to also require that all | encrypted traffic allow inspection of their contents under proper | authority (CALEA essentially) Why not just require that the senders of malign packets set the Evil Bit i

Re: DRM for batteries

2008-01-06 Thread Jason
On Fri, 4 Jan 2008, Leichter, Jerry wrote: Over all, I find it hard to see how such a product can really make sense, however. If there's enough money to make it worth trying to keep the clone makers out, there's enough money in it for the clone makers to be willing to invest in determining the

Re: Death of antivirus software imminent

2008-01-06 Thread Leichter, Jerry
| ...Also, I hate to say this, we may need to also require that all | encrypted traffic allow inspection of their contents under proper | authority (CALEA essentially) Why not just require that the senders of malign packets set the Evil Bit in their IP headers? How can you possibly require tha