On Fri, 4 Jan 2008, Alex Alten wrote: > I think that we will have to move toward encrypting more data at > rest in some manner that is that is easy for the user to use (like > ATM cash cards) yet difficult for a malicious piece of software on > the user's machine to circumvent. This will require that all PC's > ship with a trusted hardware/firmware chip AKA a reference monitor > on the motherboard that can safely handle any red keys. This also > means the PC needs a trusted path to the user like the pin pad in > ATM machines. Many laptops now ship with fingerprint scanners, so > maybe these things are not such an onerous requirement on PC > manufacturers anymore. Also the reference monitor could be used to > prevent viruses being able to completely taking over the user's > machine (maybe at least to maintain some sort of host IDS > capability).
It sounds like: we cannot make secure OS because it is too large -- let us don't bother to make a smaller secure OS, just add some more software and hardware to an existent system and then it will be secure. Sounds like a fairytale :-) Data at rest encryption is good since it protects data on lost laptops, but it does not work against malware (if power is off, malware does not run as well), especially if the data is used in decrypted form on the running system. Probably with data at rest encryption you can protect rarely used sensitive data, but not the data you use regularly (by the way, how you are going to make sure that you remove all malware when you work with that sensitive data?). Now consider trusted paths: adding an additional `secure' button is easy (MS was able to add more keys to our keyboards), but how you make sure that (1) there is a trusted path from computer to user and (2) users understand how to use and actually use it? There are many ideas how to achieve the former, but apparently the latter always fails. Fingerprint readers are added not because this adds much security (it is reported to be easy to fool them once an attacker has a sample of the fingerprint, and you are very unlikely to keep your computer free from your fingerprints), but because USERS LIKE THEM: finger scanning is faster than entering the password and seems to be more secure. I suspect that if you use some data at rest protection and lose your laptop while it is not completely off, the fingerprint reader is counterproductive. Using embedded hardware to scan for viruses seems not very realistic: you probably can use it to check parts of RAM that are not supposed to be changed, but a lot of malware live outside of those areas. > We need really good IDS tools that track down the control lines of > the botnets, etc., back to their actual handlers. This may mean > that each carrier must archive large amounts of either netflow data > or even raw packets (say for non-TCP traffic) so that detailed L7 > analysis can take place to track botnet control lines back to their > handlers in after-the-fact investigations. Malware already evolved to P2P communication and thus it is almost impossible to find the real master by tracing local connections between hosts. > Also, I hate to say this, we may need to also require that all > encrypted traffic allow inspection of their contents under proper > authority (CALEA essentially). If we can do this then we can put > real policing pressure on these virus writers, essentially removing > them from being able to attack us over the Internet. That is you propose to create a law that all malware must have some key escrow mechanism? Or you mean that police should be able to force every user to decrypt data sent to/from their computer? Both are hilarious, but the sad thing is that in some countries each of them can become a real law. -- Regards, ASK --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]