On Sat, 25 Oct 2008, John Denker wrote:
On 10/25/2008 04:40 AM, IanG gave us some additional information.
Even so, it appears there is still some uncertainty as to
interpretation, i.e. some uncertainty as to the requirements
and objectives.
I hereby propose a new scenario. It is detailed enou
John Denker wrote:
> On 09/29/2008 05:13 AM, IanG wrote:
>> My assumptions are:
>>
>> * I trust no single source of Random Numbers.
>> * I trust at least one source of all the sources.
>> * no particular difficulty with lossy combination.
>
>
>> If I have N pools of entropy (all same size X) a
Forwarded with permission.
---
From: "Sieg, Kent G" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Symposium Call for Papers
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2008 10:23:50 -0400
Just sending notice of our upcoming Symposium, especially if you can
present or know of a colleague who would like to do so. Dr. Kent Sieg
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-10069776-46.html?tag=mncol
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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Peter Gutmann wrote:
> In fact none of the people/organisations I queried about this fitted into any
> of the proposed categories, it was all embedded devices, typically SCADA
> systems, home automation, consumer electronics, that sort of thing, so it was
> really a single category which was "Em
Suppose one has a system that automatically signs you on to anything if
your cell phone is within bluetooth range of your computer, and
automatically signs you off out of everything, and puts up a screen
saver that will not go away, when your cell phone is out of range of
your computer.
What
"Usability research" about how to track web users? How Google-like.
Can't you just dump a 25-year cookie on them from twelve different
directions, and be done with it?
> Federated Login has been a "holy grail" in the identity community
> for a long time. We have known how to do the technical pa
John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> To say the same thing in more detail: Suppose we start
> with N generators, each of which puts out a 160 bit word
> containing 80 bits of _trusted_ entropy. That's a 50%
> entropy density.
So you need a 2:1 or heavier compression that won't lose
entropy.
Alas on 10/25/2008 01:40 PM, I wrote:
> To summarize: In the special sub-case where M=1, XOR
> is as good as it gets. In all other cases I can think
> of, the hash approach is much better.
I should have said that in the special sub-case where
the member word has entropy density XX=100% _or_ i
On 10/25/2008 04:40 AM, IanG gave us some additional information.
Even so, it appears there is still some uncertainty as to
interpretation, i.e. some uncertainty as to the requirements
and objectives.
I hereby propose a new scenario. It is detailed enough to
be amenable to formal analysis. The
On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 12:40 PM, IanG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Jonathan Katz wrote:
>> I think it depends on what you mean by "N pools of entropy".
>
>
> I can see that my description was a bit weak, yes. Here's a better
> view, incorporating the feedback:
>
> If I have N people, each with
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