Re: Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans

2010-09-29 Thread Ken Buchanan
On Tue, Sep 28, 2010 at 1:47 AM, Florian Weimer wrote: > Isn't this just a clarification of existing CALEA practice? > > In most jurisdictions, if a communications services provider is served > an order to make available communications, it is required by law to > provide it in the clear.  Anything

Re: road toll transponder hacked

2008-08-26 Thread Ken Buchanan
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 11:56 AM, Dustin D. Trammell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > This is the same for the state-wide Texas tag, TxTag[1]. If your tag > doesn't register, or you disable or remove it, the toll system can still > accurately bill you based on your license plate and vehicle > registra

Re: road toll transponder hacked

2008-08-26 Thread Ken Buchanan
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:24 AM, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Despite previous reassurances about the security of the system, > Nate Lawson of Root Labs claims that the unique identity numbers > used to identify the FasTrak wireless transponders carried in cars > can be cop

Re: wrt Cold Boot Attacks on Disk Encryption

2008-03-15 Thread Ken Buchanan
A lot of people seem to agree with what Declan McCullagh writes here: > It's going to make us rethink how we handle laptops in sleep mode and servers > that use > encrypted filesystems (a mail server, for instance). What I'd like to know is why people weren't already rethinking this when people

Re: How the Greek cellphone network was tapped.

2007-07-16 Thread Ken Buchanan
On 7/9/07, alan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Makes me wonder how this will effect the OpenMoko phone if someone builds an encryption layer for it. (OpenMoko is a totally open sourced phone.) Leigh Honeywell and Paul Wouters presented a 'crypto-phone' effort they have been working on at CCC in Ge

RE: encrypted tapes (was Re: Papers about "Algorithm hiding" ?)

2005-06-08 Thread Ken Buchanan
Steven M. Bellovin wrote: > The bigger issue, though, is more subtle: keeping track of the keys > is non-trivial. These need to be backed up, too, and kept separate > from (but synchronized with) the tapes. Worse yet, they need to be > kept secure. That may mean storing the keys with a different