On Oct 1, 2009, at 16:46, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
It is also completely impossible to prove you've deleted a
record. Someone who can read the record can always make a copy of
it. Cryptography can't fix the DRM problem.
Sorry, I should have clarified that. We don't want to verify that Bob
It is also completely impossible to prove you've deleted a
record. Someone who can read the record can always make a copy
of it. Cryptography can't fix the DRM problem.
If, and only if, the document lives solely within an
airtight surveillance system, then it is possible to
prove
Stephan Neuhaus neuh...@st.cs.uni-sb.de writes:
On Oct 1, 2009, at 16:46, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
It is also completely impossible to prove you've deleted a
record. Someone who can read the record can always make a copy of
it. Cryptography can't fix the DRM problem.
Sorry, I should have
On Sep 30, 2009, at 06:25, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Stephan Neuhaus neuh...@st.cs.uni-sb.de writes:
Is there something that could be done that would *not* require a
TTA? (I have
almost given up on this, but it doesn't hurt to ask.)
I think you've abstracted away too much information to
Stephan Neuhaus neuh...@st.cs.uni-sb.de writes:
I think you've abstracted away too much information to provide a
definite answer, but if all you want is a proof of something being
done at time X that'll stand up in court then what's wrong with going
to a notary? This has worked just fine
On Sep 29, 2009, at 10:31 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Stephan Neuhaus neuh...@st.cs.uni-sb.de writes:
For business reasons,
Alice can't force Bob to use a particular TTA, and it's also
impossible to stipulate a particular TTA as part of the job
description (the reason is that Alice and the
The Haber Stornetta scheme provides a timestamping
service that doesn't require terribly much trust,
since hard to forge widely witnessed events delimit
particular sets of timestamps. The only issue is
getting sufficient granularity.
I don't know if their scheme was patented in Germany.
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes:
The Haber Stornetta scheme provides a timestamping
service that doesn't require terribly much trust,
since hard to forge widely witnessed events delimit
particular sets of timestamps. The only issue is
getting sufficient granularity.
I don't know
On Sep 26, 2009, at 18:31, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
SP 800-102 is intended to address the timeliness of the digital
signatures generated using the techniques specified in Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-3. [...] SP 800-102
provides
methods of obtaining assurance of the
Stephan Neuhaus neuh...@st.cs.uni-sb.de writes:
For business reasons,
Alice can't force Bob to use a particular TTA, and it's also
impossible to stipulate a particular TTA as part of the job
description (the reason is that Alice and the Bobsgreat band name
BTW---won't agree to trust any
Forwarded:
From: Barker, Elaine B. elaine.bar...@nist.gov
To: Barker, Elaine B. elaine.bar...@nist.gov
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2009 15:54:18 -0400
Subject: NIST Publication Announcements
NIST announces the completion of two NIST Special Publications (SPs): SP
800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
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