On 2013-09-17 Max Kington mking...@webhanger.com wrote:
[snip]
Hence, store in the clear, keep safe at rest using today's archival mechanism
and when that starts to get dated move onto the next one en-masse, for all
your media not just emails.
[snip]
I would tend to agree for environments
On 18 Sep 2013 07:44, Christoph Gruber gr...@guru.at wrote:
On 2013-09-17 Max Kington mking...@webhanger.com wrote:
[snip]
Hence, store in the clear, keep safe at rest using today's archival
mechanism and when that starts to get dated move onto the next one
en-masse, for all your media not
On 2013-09-16 Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote:
[snip]
If people are sending email through the corporate email system then in many
cases the corporation has a need/right to see what they are sending/receiving.
[snip]
Even if an organisation has a need/right to look into people's
On 17 Sep 2013 15:47, Christoph Gruber gr...@guru.at wrote:
On 2013-09-16 Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote:
[snip]
If people are sending email through the corporate email system then in
many cases the corporation has a need/right to see what they are
sending/receiving.
[snip]
Just writing document two in the PRISM-Proof series. I probably have to
change the name before November. Thinking about 'Privacy Protected' which
has the same initials.
People talk about end-to-end without talking about what they are. In most
cases at least one end is a person or an
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
On 16 September 2013 18:49, Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote:
To me the important thing about transparency is that it is possible for
anyone to audit the key signing process from publicly available
information.
On 16 September 2013 18:49, Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote:
To me the important thing about transparency is that it is possible for
anyone to audit the key signing process from publicly available
information. Doing the audit at the relying party end prior to every
reliance seems
