h...@finney.org ("Hal Finney") writes:
> Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> Getting a straight answer on whether or not the recent preimage work
>> is actually related to the earlier collision work would be useful.
[...]
> There was an amusing demo at the rump session though of a different
> kind of preimage
Paul Hoffman wrote:
> Getting a straight answer on whether or not the recent preimage work
> is actually related to the earlier collision work would be useful.
I am not clueful enough about this work to give an authoritative answer.
My impression is that they use some of the same general technique
At 7:10 PM -0700 8/19/09, james hughes wrote:
>On Aug 19, 2009, at 3:28 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>>I understand that "creaking" is not a technical cryptography term, but
>>"certainly" is. When do we become "certain" that devastating attacks on one
>>feature of hash functions (collision resistance)
> Getting back towards topic, the hash function employed by Git is showing
> signs of bitrot, which, given people's desire to introduce malware
> backdoors and legal backdoors into Linux, could well become a problem in
> the very near future.
>
> "James A. Donald"
> I believe attacks on Git's
On 2009 Aug 19, at 3:28 , Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 5:28 PM -0400 8/19/09, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
I believe attacks on Git's use of SHA-1 would require second pre-
image
attacks, and I don't think anyone has demonstrated such a thing for
SHA-1 at this point. None the less, I agree that it would
ob Go To
Washington: A Cryptographic Theory of Politics and Policy". This was
interesting in that it explained that facts are not what politicians
want
http://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2009/acceptedpapers.html#crypto06
and that politicians form blocks to create shared power
Paul Hoffman writes:
> The longer that MD5 goes without any hint of preimage attacks, the
> less "certain" I am that collision attacks are even related to
> preimage attacks.
I believe that yesterday, at the rump session at Crypto, restricted
preimage attacks were described. Not quite what you w
At 5:28 PM -0400 8/19/09, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>I believe attacks on Git's use of SHA-1 would require second pre-image
>attacks, and I don't think anyone has demonstrated such a thing for
>SHA-1 at this point. None the less, I agree that it would be better if
>Git eventually used better hash fun
