* James A. Donald:
Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so
that the signature proves that at least m possessors of
secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n
a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m,
or which ones signed?
What about this?
James A. Donald writes:
-+---
| Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so
| that the signature proves that at least m possessors of
| secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n
| a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m,
| or which
On Mon, Aug 18, 2008 at 10:16:02AM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote:
[...]
Essentially no one would argue that is is quite expensive. I
suspect that nearly everyone in the country would be happy to pay an
additional $1/election for more reliable results.
Without seeing all of the expense (and
On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 11:57 AM, John Ioannidis [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This just about sums it up: http://xkcd.com/463/
Only slightly better then suggested by the comic. McAfee anti-virus
software was on the servers, not the DRE voting machines themselves.
From
At 9:24 AM -0700 8/18/08, Eric Rescorla wrote:
(and because of the complexity of US elections,
hand counting is quite expensive)
This is quite disputable. Further, hand vs. machine counting is core
to the way we think about the security of the voting system.
On a complex ballot, there are
Paul Hoffman writes:
-+--
| At 9:24 AM -0700 8/18/08, Eric Rescorla wrote:
| (and because of the complexity of US elections,
| hand counting is quite expensive)
|
| This is quite disputable. Further, hand vs. machine counting is core
| to the way we think about the
On Apr 15, 2004, at 8:58 PM, Ed Gerck wrote:
Currently, voter privacy is absolute in the US and does not depend
even on the will of the courts. For example, there is no way for a
judge to assure that a voter under oath is telling the truth about how
they voted, or not.
For many years in the 90's
David Jablon wrote:
I think Ed's criticism is off-target. Where is the privacy problem with
Chaum receipts when Ed and others still have the freedom to refuse
theirs or throw them away?
The privacy, coercion, intimidation, vote selling and election integrity
problems begin with giving
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
David Jablon wrote:
The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only
vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends.
What I see in serious
voting system research efforts are attempts to build systems that
Yeoh Yiu wrote:
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only
vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends.
You get totals per nation, per state, per county, per riding,
per precinct, per polling stion
One area we are not addressing in voting security is absentee ballots. The
use of absentee ballots is rising in US elections, and is even being
advocated as a way for individuals to get a printed ballot in jurisdictions
which use electronic-only voting machines. Political parties are
encouraging
Ed Gerck[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
John Kelsey wrote:
At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to
'verify'
that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for
voter
coercion.
I think
At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
...
1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify'
that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter
coercion.
I think the VoteHere scheme and David Chaum's scheme both claim to solve
this
a counterpoint...
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
I'm a believer in the KISS principle.
:-) that's one S too many. For true believers, KIS is enough.
A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by
machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you
verify it
At 8:24 AM -0400 4/8/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that
the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens
the way for serial voting fraud.
The receipt should be exposed to the voter
Having a paper ballot printed by machine (and checked by the votor) before
being dropped in a box may permit some additional cross-checks:
* Put serial numbers or something like them, on each ballot, so that
missing or added ballots can be detected.
* Put check digits on each ballot, so that
At 11:16 PM 4/8/04 +0200, privacy.at Anonymous Remailer wrote:
In the second place, it fails for elections with more than two parties
running. The casual reference above to representatives on each
side betrays this error. Poorly funded third parties cannot provide
representatives as easily as
privacy wrote:
[good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptographic
On Fri, Apr 09, 2004 at 12:46:47PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure
voting security miss the point entirely.
[...]
I'm a technophile. I've loved technology all my life. I'm also a
security professional, and I love a good
| privacy wrote:
| [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
|
| It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
| and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
| error and incompetence is overwhelming.
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Complicated systems are the bane of security. Systems like this are
simple to understand, simple to audit, simple to guard.
I fully agree, but there is a wide variety of voting schemes out there,
of varying complexity. In a ballot with only very few options, your
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