A couple of people wrote in to say that my remarks
about defending against traffic analysis are "not
true".
As 'proof' they cite
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/pubs/traffic.pdf
which proves nothing of the sort.
The conclusion of that paper correctly summarizes
the body of the paper; it says th
I agree with anonymous summary of the state of the art wrt
cryptographic anonymity of interactive communications.
Ulf Moeller, Anton Stiglic, and I give some more details on the
attacks anonymous describes in this IH 2001 [1] paper:
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/pubs/traffic.pdf
which explores
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
It will often be possible to also trace the communication channel back
through the crowd, by inserting delays onto chosen links and observing
which ones correlate with delays in the data observed at the endpoint.
This way it is not necessary to monitor
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
> Then the opponent can put unlimited effort into
> traffic analysis but won't get anything in return,
> beyond the _a priori_ obvious fact that some pair
> of subscribers *may* have communicated.
This is not true, and in fact this result is one of the
John S. Denker writes:
> A scenario of relevance to the present discussion
> goes like this:
> -- There exists a data haven. (Reiter and Rubin
> called this a "crowd".)
> -- Many subscribers have connections to the haven.
> -- Each subscriber maintains a strictly scheduled
> flow
bear wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Aug 2003, Ed Gerck wrote:
>
> >OTOH, it is possible that the dutch man was traced not by a one
> >time download of the image but by many attempts to find it,
> >since the upload time of the image to the site was not exactly
> >known to him and time was of essence. In thi
